Topic
Handshake
About: Handshake is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1105 publications have been published within this topic receiving 15166 citations. The topic is also known as: 🤝.
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08 Dec 2009
TL;DR: In this paper, a trusted network connect handshake method based on tri-element peer authentication is provided, which comprises the following steps: an access controller (AC) sends message 1 for handshake activation to an Access Requestor (AR), the AR sends message 2 for access handshake request to the AC after receiving message 1.
Abstract: A trusted network connect handshake method based on tri-element peer authentication is provided, which comprises the following steps. An access controller (AC) sends message 1 for handshake activation to an Access Requestor (AR). The AR sends message 2 for access handshake request to the AC after receiving message 1. The AC sends message 3 for certificate authentication and integrity evaluation request to a Policy Manager (PM) after receiving message 2. The PM sends message 4 for certificate authentication and integrity evaluation response to the AC after receiving message 3. The AC sends message 5 for access handshake response to the AR after receiving message 4. The trusted network connect handshake is completed after the AR receives message 5.
6 citations
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16 Apr 1983
TL;DR: In this paper, a simple handshake circuit was added between a master processor and slave processors 13, 23-n3 to enable the processor to access RAMs 14, 24-n4 of the slaves.
Abstract: PURPOSE:To perform high-speed data transfer between a master processor and plural slave processors, by using a simple handshake circuit and attaining direct access from the master processor to the RAM of a slave processor. CONSTITUTION:Simple handshake circuits 16, 26-n6 are added between a master processor 01, and slave processors 13, 23-n3. Then, the processors 13, 23-n3 are held to allow the processor 01 to access RAMs 14, 24-n4 of the processors 13, 23-n3 directly. Thus, high-speed data transfer is carried out.
6 citations
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01 Dec 2012TL;DR: This paper evaluates the use of the Return-to-One 4-phase handshake protocol on Delay-Insensitive Minterm Synthesis (DIMS) logic blocks and results point that this protocol leads to significant reductions on power consumption when compared to classic Return- to-Zero protocols.
Abstract: Asynchronous design techniques are gaining attention in the scientific community for their ability to cope with current technologies' problems that the synchronous paradigm may fail to cope with In fact, fully synchronous SoCs may soon become unfeasible to build Among multiple asynchronous design styles, the quasi delay insensitive (QDI) stands out for its robustness to delay variations When coupled to DI codes like m-of-n and to four-phase handshake protocols, the QDI style produces the dominant asynchronous template currently in use This paper evaluates the use of the Return-to-One 4-phase handshake protocol on Delay-Insensitive Minterm Synthesis (DIMS) logic blocks Results point that this protocol leads to significant reductions on power consumption when compared to classic Return-to-Zero protocols No extra hardware is required by the evaluated protocol, as the only required modification is that OR gates are replaced by AND gates, adding no extra delay to the resulting circuit
6 citations
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20 Feb 2008
TL;DR: In this article, a gateway device receives a handshake message sent on a newly-initiated conversation by an identified illegal client terminal, and sends the handshake message to the server, which then performs the handshake process of the conversation with the illegal client terminals.
Abstract: The utility model discloses a method for performing the isolation prompt to the illegal client terminal, which comprises the following steps: a gateway device receives a handshake message sent on a newly-initiated conversation by an identified illegal client terminal, and sends the handshake message to the server, which then performs the handshake process of the conversation with the illegal client terminal; the gateway device records the conversation as an isolated conversation; after the handshake process, the gateway device snoops the message on the conversation, after monitoring successfully, the conversation is identified as an isolation conversation according to the records, then an isolation prompt will be sent to the illegal client terminal. The utility model also discloses a gateway device and a system for sending isolation prompts to illegal client terminals. The utility model reduces the difficulty in realizing the gateway device, which is favorable for the operation and implementation of business.
6 citations
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20 Apr 2020TL;DR: This work proposes to use an unconventional hardware security primitive named Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) to nullify the impact of KRACK attack by ensuring a mutual authentication before establishing the communication between the authenticators and the supplicants.
Abstract: A digital communication network is typically the backbone of world wide web and web based applications. Security protocols, specifically in wireless network has undergone several rounds of modifications and upgrades in order to prevent supplicants (or clients) or authenticators (or access points) from attackers either sitting physically around the wireless coverage area or being hooked up to a wired network connected to wireless clients. The latest security protocol in the series is WPA2 (Wi-Fi Protected Access II) which has been implemented in most of the Wi-Fi stations (clients or access points) that are being used in traditional wireless networking as well as recent IoT and CPS devices. Recently a severe replay attack named Key Reinstallation AttaCK (KRACK) has shown that the handshake in WPA2 protocol suite can be compromised and enforce the stations to reuse an old set of initialization vectors (IVs). In this work, we propose to use an unconventional hardware security primitive named Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) to nullify the impact of KRACK attack by ensuring a mutual authentication before establishing the communication between the authenticators and the supplicants. In this demo, we show i) how the hardware intrinsic properties of a device can be leveraged to embed a PUF instance in each device, ii) a working prototype of PUF based authentication protocol using Z-Turn board integrated with dual-core ARM Cortex-A9 processor and Artix-7 FPGA, iii) how this protocol can be integrated with existing handshake protocol in WiFi network to resist against KRACK attacks.
6 citations