Showing papers on "Ideal type published in 1984"

Toward an action philosophy for managers based on Arendt and Tillich

Abstract: On the basis of the Weber, Jaspers, and Arendt style ‘ideal types’ of the manager as Eichmann, Richard III, and Faust it is explained how under strong organizational pressures to obey orders and further organizational ends, different types of managers cooperate with organization behavior that harms people. On the basis of Arendt's and Tillich's action philosophies, the manager as Institution Citizen with the courage to be both as oneself and as a part is presented as alternative, contrast, and resistance model to the other ‘ideal types’, particularly to the Eichmann ‘ideal type’.

Public Universities and Societal Development – Application of the Ideal Type Methodology in the Case Studies of Addis Ababa University and Michigan State University

Abstract: ion from the concreteness of reality is determined (Weber, 1904-5, 1917/1949). In his second assumption Weber turned to the question of the process by which both the natural and the social sciences form their construct or synthetic concepts. It is clear to Weber right from the beginning that both natural and social scientists alike utilize concepts which are syntheses of aspects of the category of facts th at comprise the subject m atter of that respective branch of science. In the first stage, he concentrated on subject m atter. How, he asked, does each kind of science define the "basic facts" it studies? In the second stage of the examination, he turned to method, exploring the principles that guide construction of the synthetic concepts in the natural and social sciences. The conclusions that arose from this two-stage investigation-that is, his conclusions regarding the logic of concept formation in the two branches of science-constitute the basis for his theory of ideal type. (Hekman, 1983, p. 23) Giddens pointed out "in setting for the formal characteristics of ideal Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. type concepts, Weber does not consider th a t he is establishing a new sort of conceptual method, but th a t he is making explicit what is already done in practice" (Giddens, 1971, p. 141). Furthermore, Weber did not consider methodological work as the necessary firs t step for a fru itfu l research , but rather claimed th a t methodological work arises from the context of the substantive problems under consideration (Weber, 1904-5, 1917/1949, p . 115). Weber s ta ted that both natural and social sciences have available categories of facts from which the investigators of the respective fields make their initial selections according to their in te rest. A fter this first initial step, each science's course of constructing a synthetic concept takes a d ifferent path from the o ther. While the natural scientist is interested in common tra its of the facts or average aspects of the fac t, the social sc ien tist, on die other hand, looks for their characteristic tra its , their cultural significance and their meaningful interrelationships as defined by the problem a t hand (Weber, 1904-5, 1917/1949). The selection of aspects of these concepts, therefore , "is based not on commonality but on the interrelationship of the meaningful aspects of the facts th a t can be utilized to answer the question under investigation. The result is not an average but a 'one-sided' accentuation" of aspects of those concepts related to each other on the basis of the "logic" inherent in the meaning of the concepts (Hekman, 1983, p . 25). Such aspects which are synthesized into a concept serve as the ideal type which Weber considered as the necessary tool of social scientific analysis (Weber, 1904-5, 1917/1949). In his analysis Weber attem pted to show that the facts of social sciences a re not presuppositionless. In fac t, he claimed th at without presuppositions no reality can be apprehended. It is reality of immediate Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. concrete situations "which serves as the subject m atter of Social Science" (1904-3, 1917/1949, p. 72) and this reality can be defined by its relationship to other cultural values by which it is understood. Thus he sta ted "Order is brought ». only on the condition th a t in every case only a part of concrete reality is interesting and significant to us, because only it is related to the cultural values with which we approach reality” (1904-5, 1917/1949, p. 78). In other words, Weber argued that part of the existing, concrete reality becomes an object of social scientific investigation only insofar as it is related to value concepts of the given culture. In his discussion of Meyer, Weber (1904-5, 1917/1949) considers the natural sciences as primarily concerned with establishing of universal laws while the social sciences are concerned with elucidating the meaning of the concrete reality of the current situation. For Weber, the purposes of the concrete reality sciences are to explain the concrete occurrences in the world. This concrete reality refers to concrete human events which elucidate the cultural significance. He argues th a t social sciences cannot formulate universal laws because concrete events cannot be "deduced" from Jaws. Furthermore, Weber claimed that to the goals of sociocultural sciences formulation of universal law is irrelevant (1904-5, 1917/1949, p. 135), because the knowledge attained by the social sciences is rooted in particular value-orientations and represents merely a fragmented segment of the larger experience, "an exhaustive causal investigation of any concrete phenomena m its full reality is not only practically impossible—it is simply nonsense;" hence, "the question of causality is not a question of laws but of concrete causal relationships—" This does not imply th at the demonstration of functional relationships and uniform regularities and, in tu rn , the formulation of laws should be avoided in the social sciences. What Weber's statem ent does imply is that causal adequacy must be made adequate on the level of meaning. (Hearn, 1975, p. 535) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The Category of Pragmatic Knowledge in Sociological Analysis

Abstract: There have been a number of new developments in the methodology of social science. One of them is the emergence of a new field, vaguely called ‘sociological analysis’. The aim of this chapter is to contribute towards a sharper delineation of this field. The present usage of the term is still very uncertain and therefore difficult to summarise. One could say, however, in general that all discussions of this kind are in one way or another striving towards a closer integration of theory and research. Many attempts have been made to find out how general theory could be made more realistic. The words ‘realistic’, ‘social reality’, ‘real structure’, ‘real type’ are used in such discussions with increasing frequency and also with a sense of urgency. But the boxes thus labelled are as yet rather empty. For example the concept of real-type analysis is used to suggest some sort of contrast to the method of theory building by means of ideal-type constructs. Although there has been much controversy about ideal-type theory2 the one thing that is unquestionable about Weber’s intentions is that an ideal type is not a statistical mode representing a cluster of observable real entities in a given frequency distribution.3 One accepts therefore that real types will turn out to be something in the nature of clustered entities that are observable (statistically or otherwise).

Weber's Ideal Type of Bureaucracy:

Abstract: M AX WEBER'S 'ideal type' construct of bureaucracy, depicting structure of bureaucratic system of administration, has been the single most important conceptual framework in the study of administration. This ideal type of bureaucracy was formulated in the context of Weber's discussion of the bases oflegitimate authority. Before delving into the bases of authority, it is necessary to point out how Weber distinguished power from authority. Weber defined power as \"the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance\"1. Authority, on the other hand, is \"the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons\". 2 Thus, power is a situation where an individual can compel another person to do certain things against his will. Authority is a situation where a person willingly complies with legitimate commands or orders because he considers that a person occupying a superior position has a right to direct him. Weber classified authority on the basis of its claim to legitimacy. His three pure types of authority are based respectively on three bases of legitimacy. They are= traditional authority, charismatic authority, and legalrational authority. Traditional authority rests on \"an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them\".3 The legitimacy of the ruler's authority rests in traditional norms. In the pure type of traditional authority, the following features of a bureaucratic administrative staff are absent= (a) clearly defined sphere of competence, subject to impersonal rules; (b) a rational ordering of relations of superiority and inferiority; (c) a regular system of appointment and promotion on the basis of free contract; (d) technical training as a regular requirement, and (e) fixed salaries paid in money.4 Charismatic authority rests on the devotion of the followers to the leader, devotion given because of the leader's 'gift of grace'. No specific proce-