Topic

# Inflation

About: Inflation is a(n) research topic. Over the lifetime, 43124 publication(s) have been published within this topic receiving 916968 citation(s).

##### Papers published on a yearly basis

##### Papers

More filters

••

Abstract: This paper reviews the recent literature on monetary policy rules. To organize the discussion, we exposit the monetary policy design problem within a simple baseline theoretical framework. We then consider the implications of adding various real word complications. We concentrate on developing results that are robust across a reasonable variety of competing macroeconomic frameworks. Among other things, we show that the optimal policy implicitly incorporates inflation targeting. We also characterize the gains from making credible commitments to fight inflation and consider the implications of frictions such as imperfect information and model uncertainty. Finally, we assess how proposed simple rules, such as the Taylor rule, square with the principles for optimal policy that we describe. We use this same metric to evaluate the recent course of U.S. monetary policy.

4,540 citations

••

Abstract: The paper reviews the recent literature on monetary policy rules. We exposit the monetary policy design problem within a simple baseline theoretical framework. We then consider the implications of adding various real world complications. Among other things, we show that the optimal policy implicitly incorporates inflation targeting. We also characterize the gains from making a credible commitment to fight inflation. In contrast to conventional wisdom, we show that gains from commitment may emerge even if the central bank is not trying to inadvisedly push output above its natural level. We also consider the implications of frictions such as imperfect information.

3,912 citations

••

Abstract: We present a model embodying moderate amounts of nominal rigidities that accounts for the observed inertia in inflation and persistence in output. The key features of our model are those that prevent a sharp rise in marginal costs after an expansionary shock to monetary policy. Of these features, the most important are staggered wage contracts that have an average duration of three quarters and variable capital utilization.

3,869 citations

••

Abstract: Society can sometimes make itself better off by appointing a central banker who does not share the social objective function, but instead places "too large" a weight on inflation-rate stabilization relative to employment stabilization. Although having such an agent head the central bank reduces the time-consistent rate of inflation, it suboptimally raises the variance of employment when supply shocks are large. Using an envelope theorem, we show that the ideal agent places a large, but finite, weight on inflation. The analysis also provides a new framework for choosing among alternative intermediate monetary targets. I. INTRODUCTION It is now widely recognized that even if a country has a perfectly benevolent central bank (one that attempts to maximize the social welfare function), it may suffer from having an inflation rate which is systematically too high.' Suppose, for example, that a distortion (such as income taxation) causes the market rate of employment to be suboptimal. Then inflation can arise because wage setters rationally fear that the central bank will try to take advantage of short-term nominal rigidities to raise employment systematically. Only by setting high rates of wage inflation can wage setters discourage the central bank from trying to reduce the real wage below their target level. This paper considers some institutional responses to the timeconsistency problem described above. In particular, we examine the practice of appointing "conservatives" to head the central bank, or of giving the central bank concrete incentives to achieve an intermediate monetary target. Our analysis of intermediate monetary targeting is quite different from conventional analyses in which the central bank is rigidly constrained to follow a particular feedback rule. Indeed, an important conclusion is that it is not generally optimal to legally constrain the central bank to hit its intermediate target (or follow its rule) exactly, or to choose

3,325 citations

•

Abstract: In a discretionary regime the monetary authority can print more money and create more inflation than people expect. But, although these inflation surprises can have some benefits, they cannot arise systematically in equilibrium when people understand the policymaker's incentives and form their expectations accordingly. Because the policymaker has the power to create inflation shocks ex post, the equilibrium growth rates of money and prices turn out to be higher than otherwise. Therefore, enforced commitments (rules) for monetary behavior can improve matters. Given the repeated interaction between the policymaker and the private agents, it is possible that reputational forces can substitute for formal rules.Here, we develop an example of a reputational equilibrium where the out-comes turn out to be weighted averages of those from discretion and those from the ideal rule. In particular, the rates of inflation and monetary growth look more like those under discretion when the discount rate is high.

3,265 citations