Showing papers on "Inflation published in 2006"

Not All Oil Price Shocks are Alike: Disentangling Demand and Supply Shocks in the Crude Oil Market

Abstract: Using a newly developed measure of global real economic activity, a structural decomposition of the real price of crude oil in four components is proposed: oil supply shocks driven by political events in OPEC countries; other oil supply shocks; aggregate shocks to the demand for industrial commodities; and demand shocks that are specific to the crude oil market. The latter shock is designed to capture shifts in the price of oil driven by higher precautionary demand associated with concerns about the availability of future oil supplies. The paper quantifies the magnitude and timing of these shocks, their dynamic effects on the real price of oil and their relative importance in determining the real price of oil during 1975-2005. The analysis also sheds light on the origins of the major oil price shocks since 1979. Distinguishing between the sources of higher oil prices is shown to be crucial for assessing the effect of higher oil prices on U.S. real GDP and CPI inflation. It is shown that policies aimed at dealing with higher oil prices must take careful account of the origins of higher oil prices. The paper also quantifies the extent to which the macroeconomic performance of the U.S. since the mid-1970s has been determined by the external economic shocks driving the real price of oil as opposed to domestic economic factors and policies.

Facts and Fantasies about Commodity Futures

Abstract: For this study of the simple properties of commodity futures as an asset class, an equally weighted index of monthly returns of commodity futures was constructed for the July 1959 through December 2004 period. Fully collateralized commodity futures historically have offered the same return and Sharpe ratio as U.S. equities. Although the risk premium on commodity futures is essentially the same as that on equities for the study period, commodity futures returns are negatively correlated with equity returns and bond returns. The negative correlation is the result, primarily, of commodity futures' different behavior over a business cycle. Commodity futures are positively correlated with inflation, unexpected inflation, and changes in expected inflation.

Were there regime switches in U.S. monetary policy

Abstract: Working Paper 2004-14 June 2004 Abstract: A multivariate model, identifying monetary policy and allowing for simultaneity and regime switching in coefficients and variances, is confronted with U.S. data since 1959. The best fit is with a model that allows time variation in structural disturbance variances only. Among models that also allow for changes in equation coefficients, the best fit is for a model that allows coefficients to change only in the monetary policy rule. That model allows switching among three main regimes and one rarely and briefly occurring regime. The three main regimes correspond roughly to periods when most observers believe that monetary policy actually differed, and the differences in policy behavior are substantively interesting, though statistically ill determined. The estimates imply monetary targeting was central in the early '80s but was also important sporadically in the '70s. The changes in regime were essential neither to the rise in inflation in the '70s nor to its decline in the '80s. JEL classification: E52, E47, C53 Key words: counterfactuals, Lucas critique, policy rule, monetary targeting, simultaneity, volatility, model comparison I. THE DEBATE OVER MONETARY POLICY CHANGE In an influential paper, Clarida, Gali and Gertler 2000 (CGG) presented evidence that US monetary policy changed between the 1970's and the 1980's, indeed that in the 70's it was drastically worse. They found that the policy rule apparently followed in the 70's was one that, when embedded in most stochastic general equilibrium models, would imply non-uniqueness of the equilibrium and hence vulnerability of the economy to "sunspot" fluctuations of arbitrarily large size. Their estimated policy rule for the later period, on the other hand, eliminated this indeterminacy. These results are a possible explanation of the volatile and rising inflation of the 70's and of its subsequent decline. The CGG analysis has two important weaknesses. One is that it fails to account for stochastic volatility. US macroeconomic variables, and particularly the federal funds rate, have gone through periods of tranquility and of agitation, with forecast error variances varying greatly from period to period. Ignoring such variation does not lead to inconsistent estimates of model parameters when the forecasting equations themselves are constant, but it strongly biases--toward a finding of changed parameters--tests of the stability of the forecasting equations. The other weakness is that the CGG analysis rests on powerful and implausible identifying assumptions. They require that we accept that the response of the monetary authority to expected future inflation and output does not depend on the recent history of inflation, money growth, or output. It is hard to understand why this should be so, especially in the 70's, when monetarism was a prominent theme in policy debates, Congress was requiring reports from the Fed of projected time paths of monetary aggregates, and financial markets were reacting sensitively to weekly money supply numbers. The requirement for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in dynamic models is that the monetary policy rule show a more than unit response of interest rates to the sum of the logs of all nominal variables that appear on the right-hand side of the reaction function. If we force a particular measure of expected future inflation to proxy for all the nominal variables that actually appear independently in the reaction function, we are bound to get distorted conclusions. On the one hand, because expected future inflation will be a "noisy" measure of the full set of nominal influences on policy, we might get downward bias in our estimates from the usual errorsin-variables effect. On the other hand, to the extent that expected future inflation (like most expected future values) shows less variation than current nominal variables, we could find a mistaken scaling up of coefficients. …

Why Has U.S. Inflation Become Harder to Forecast

Abstract: Forecasts of the rate of price inflation play a central role in the formulation of monetary policy, and forecasting inflation is a key job for economists at the Federal Reserve Board. This paper examines whether this job has become harder and, to the extent that it has, what changes in the inflation process have made it so. The main finding is that the univariate inflation process is well described by an unobserved component trend-cycle model with stochastic volatility or, equivalently, an integrated moving average process with time-varying parameters; this model explains a variety of recent univariate inflation forecasting puzzles. It appears currently to be difficult for multivariate forecasts to improve on forecasts made using this time-varying univariate model.

Does monetary policy generate recessions

Abstract: We consider two kinds of answers to the title question: Do random shifts in monetary policy account for historical recessions, and would changes in the systematic component of monetary policy have allowed reductions in inflation or output variance without substantial costs. The answer to both questions is no. We use weak identifying assumptions and include extensive discussion of these assumptions, including a completely specified dynamic stochastic equilibrium model in which our identifying assumptions can be shown to be approximately satisfied.

Inflation and the Redistribution of Nominal Wealth

Abstract: This study quantitatively assesses the effects of inflation through changes in the value of nominal assets. It documents nominal asset positions in the United States across sectors and groups of households and estimates the wealth redistribution caused by a moderate inflation episode. The main losers from inflation are rich, old households, the major bondholders in the economy. The main winners are young, middle‐class households with fixed‐rate mortgage debt. Besides transferring resources from the old to the young, inflation is a boon for the government and a tax on foreigners. Lately, the amount of U.S. nominal assets held by foreigners has grown dramatically, increasing the potential for a large inflation‐induced wealth transfer from foreigners to domestic households.

Monetary Economics: An Integrated Approach to Credit, Money, Income, Production and Wealth

Abstract: Introduction Balance Sheets, Transaction Matrices and The Monetary Circuit The Simplest Model with Government Money Government Money with Portfolio Choice Long-Term Bonds, Capital Gains and Liquidity Preference Introducing the Open Economy A Simple Model with Private Bank Money Time, Inventories, Profits and Pricing A Model with PrivateBank Money, Inventories and Inflation A Model with both Inside and Outside Money A Growth Model Prototype Open Economy with Flexible Prices and Exchange Rates General Conclusion

Price Changes in the Euro Area and the United States: Some Facts from Individual Consumer Price Data

Abstract: Prices of goods and services do not adjust immediately in response to changing demand and supply conditions. This paper characterizes the average frequency and size of price changes in the euro area and its member countries, investigates the determinants of the probability of price changes, and compares the evidence for the euro area with available U.S. results. The facts documented in this paper are based on evidence from individual price data recorded at the store level in all euro area countries except Ireland and Greece: that is in datasets covering Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain, which together account for around 97 percent of euro area GDP. The data used are the monthly price records underlying the computation of national Consumer Price Indices and Harmonized Consumer Price Indices. These data cover a large number of products selected on the basis of extensive Household Budget Surveys.

Optimal Simple and Implementable Monetary and Fiscal Rules: Expanded Version

Abstract: This paper computes welfare-maximizing monetary and fiscal policy rules in a real business cycle model augmented with sticky prices, a demand for money, taxation, and stochastic government consumption. We consider simple feedback rules whereby the nominal interest rate is set as a function of output and inflation, and taxes are set as a function of total government liabilities. We implement a second-order accurate solution to the model. Our main findings are: First, the size of the inflation coefficient in the interest-rate rule plays a minor role for welfare. It matters only insofar as it affects the determinacy of equilibrium. Second, optimal monetary policy features a muted response to output. More importantly, interest rate rules that feature a positive response to output can lead to significant welfare losses. Third, the welfare gains from interest-rate smoothing are negligible. Fourth, optimal fiscal policy is passive. Finally, the optimal monetary and fiscal rule combination attains virtually the same level of welfare as the Ramsey optimal policy.

Non-Gaussianities in two-field inflation

Abstract: We study the bispectrum of the curvature perturbation on uniform energy density hypersurfaces in models of inflation with two scalar fields evolving simultaneously. In the case of a separable potential, it is possible to compute the curvature perturbation up to second order in the perturbations, generated on large scales due to the presence of non-adiabatic perturbations, by employing the δN-formalism, in the slow-roll approximation. In this case, we provide an analytic formula for the nonlinear parameter fNL. We apply this formula to double inflation with two massive fields, showing that it does not generate significant non-Gaussianity; the nonlinear parameter at the end of inflation is slow-roll suppressed. Finally, we develop a numerical method for generic two-field models of inflation, which allows us to go beyond the slow-roll approximation and confirms our analytic results for double inflation.

Will the Euro Eventually Surpass the Dollar as Leading International Reserve Currency

Abstract: Might the dollar eventually follow the precedent of the pound and cede its status as leading international reserve currency? Unlike the last time this question was prominently discussed, ten years ago, there now exists a credible competitor: the euro. This paper econometrically estimates determinants of the shares of major currencies in the reserve holdings of the world’s central banks. Significant factors include: size of the home country, inflation rate (or lagged depreciation trend), exchange rate variability, and size of the relevant home financial center (as measured by the turnover in its foreign exchange market). We have not found that net international debt position is an important determinant. Network externality theories would predict a tipping phenomenon. Indeed we find that the relationship between currency shares and their determinants is nonlinear (which we try to capture with a logistic function, or else with a dummy “leader” variable for the largest country). But changes are felt only with a long lag (we estimate a weight on the preceding year’s currency share around 0.9). The advent of the euro interrupts the continuity of the historical data set. So we estimate parameters on pre-1999 data, and then use them to forecast the EMU era. The equation correctly predicts a (small) narrowing in the gap between the dollar and euro over the period 1999-2004. Whether the euro might in the future rival or surpass the dollar as the world’s leading international reserve currency appears to depend on two things: (1) do enough other EU members join euroland so that it becomes larger than the US economy, and (2) does US macroeconomic policy eventually undermine confidence in the value of the dollar, in the form of inflation and depreciation. What we learn about functional form and parameter values helps us forecast, contingent on these two developments, how quickly the euro might rise to challenge the dollar. Under two important scenarios – the remaining EU members, including the UK, join EMU by 2020 or else the recent depreciation trend of the dollar persists into the future – the euro may surpass the dollar as leading international reserve currency by 2022.

EMU and European Stock Market Integration

Abstract: The launch of the single currency in Europe in January 1999 was preceded by a period of regulatory harmonization, convergence in bond yields and inflation rates, and strict fiscal policy across the Eurozone countries. We examine whether the 1990s also were characterized by increased stock market integration. The results indicate that, as forward interest differentials benchmarked against Germany and inflation differentials benchmarked against the three best performing states shrank toward zero, stock markets converged toward full integration. The United Kingdom, a country that chose not to enter the Eurozone, shows no such increase in stock market integration.

Recent House Price Developments: The Role of Fundamentals

Abstract: In the vast majority of OECD economies, house prices in real terms have been moving up strongly since the mid-1990s. Because of the important role housing wealth has been playing during the current upswing, this paper will look more closely at what is underlying these developments for 18 OECD countries over the period from 1970 to the present, with a view to shedding some light on whether or not prices are in line with fundamentals. The paper begins by putting the most recent housing price run-ups in the context of the experiences of the past 35 years. It then examines current valuations against a range of benchmarks. It concludes with a review of the links between a possible correction of housing prices and real activity. The main highlights from this analysis are as follows: 1) The size and duration of the current real house price increases; the degree to which they have tended to move together across countries; and the extent to which they have disconnected from the business cycle are unprecedented. 2) Overvaluation of real house prices may only apply to a relatively small number of countries. However, the extent to which these prices look to be fairly valued depends largely on longer-term interest rates remaining at or close to their current low levels. 3) If house prices were to adjust downward, the historical record suggests that the drops might be large and that the process could be protracted, given the observed stickiness of nominal house prices and the current low rates of inflation.

Heterogeneity in Price Stickiness and the Real Effects of Monetary Shocks

Abstract: There is ample evidence that the frequency of price adjustments differs substantially across sectors. This paper introduces sectoral heterogeneity in price stickiness into an otherwise standard sticky price model to study how it affects the dynamics of monetary economies. Qualitative and quantitative results from a realistic calibration for the U.S. economy show that monetary shocks tend to have larger and more persistent real effects in heterogeneous economies, when compared to identical-firms economies with similar degrees of nominal and real rigidity. In the presence of strategic complementarities in price setting, sectors with lower frequencies of price adjustment have a disproportionate effect on the aggregate price level. In order to better approximate the dynamics of the calibrated heterogeneous economy, an identical-firms model requires a frequency of price changes that is up to three times lower than the average of the heterogeneous economy.

The distribution of money and prices in search equilibrium

Abstract: This article considers a search-theoretic model of monetary exchange. Agents bargain over both the amount of money and the quantity of goods to be exchanged in bilateral meetings, determining endogenously the distributions of money and of prices. I show that money is neutral if changes in the money supply are accomplished via proportional transfers. However, within the class of lump-sum transfers, an increase of the rate of monetary expansion tends to decrease the dispersion of wealth and prices and to improve welfare when inflation is low; but when inflation is high enough, the opposite effects occur.

Recent House Price Developments

Abstract: In the vast majority of OECD economies, house prices in real terms have been moving up strongly since the mid-1990s. Because of the important role housing wealth has been playing during the current upswing, this paper will look more closely at what is underlying these developments for 18 OECD countries over the period from 1970 to the present, with a view to shedding some light on whether or not prices are in line with fundamentals. The paper begins by putting the most recent housing price run-ups in the context of the experiences of the past 35 years. It then examines current valuations against a range of benchmarks. It concludes with a review of the links between a possible correction of housing prices and real activity. The main highlights from this analysis are as follows: 1) The size and duration of the current real house price increases; the degree to which they have tended to move together across countries; and the extent to which they have disconnected from the business cycle are unprecedented. 2) Overvaluation of real house prices may only apply to a relatively small number of countries. However, the extent to which these prices look to be fairly valued depends largely on longer-term interest rates remaining at or close to their current low levels. 3) If house prices were to adjust downward, the historical record suggests that the drops might be large and that the process could be protracted, given the observed stickiness of nominal house prices and the current low rates of inflation.

Discretionary Monetary Policy and the Zero Lower Bound on Nominal Interest Rates

Abstract: Ignoring the existence of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates one considerably understates the value of monetary commitment in New Keynesian models. A stochastic forward-looking model with an occasionally binding lower bound, calibrated to the U.S. economy, suggests that low values for the natural rate of interest lead to sizeable output losses and deflation under discretionary monetary policy. The fall in output and deflation are much larger than in the case with policy commitment and do not show up at all if the model abstracts from the existence of the lower bound. The welfare losses of discretionary policy increase even further when inflation is partly determined by lagged inflation in the Phillips curve. These results emerge because private sector expectations and the discretionary policy response to these expectations reinforce each other and cause the lower bound to be reached much earlier than under commitment.

Optimal Monetary Policy under Commitment with a Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates

Abstract: We determine optimal monetary policy under commitment in a forwardlooking New Keynesian model when nominal interest rates are bounded below by zero. The lower bound represents an occasionally binding constraint that causes the model and optimal policy to be nonlinear. A calibration to the U.S. economy suggests that policy should reduce nominal interest rates more aggressively than suggested by a model without lower bound. Rational agents anticipate the possibility of reaching the lower bound in the future and this amplifies the effects of adverse shocks well before the bound is reached. While the empirical magnitude of U.S. mark-up shocks seems too small to entail zero nominal interest rates, shocks affecting the natural real interest rate plausibly lead to a binding lower bound. Under optimal policy, however, this occurs quite infrequently and does not imply positive average inflation rates in equilibrium. Interestingly, the presence of binding real rate shocks alters the policy response to (non-binding) markup shocks.

Macro Factors and the Term Structure of Interest Rates

Abstract: This paper presents an essentially affine model of the term structure of interest rates making use of macroeconomic factors and their long-run expectations. The model extends the approach pioneered by Kozicki and Tinsley (2001) by modeling consistently long-run inflation expectations simultaneously with the term structure. Application to the U.S. economy shows the importance of long-run inflation expectations in the modeling of long-term bond yields. The paper also provides a macroeconomic interpretation for the latent factors found in standard finance models of the yield curve: the level factor represents the long-run inflation expectation of agents; the slope factor captures business cycle conditions; and the curvature factor expresses a clear independent monetary policy factor.

Inflation persistence and price-setting behaviour in the euro area: a summary of the Inflation Persistence Network evidence

Abstract: This paper provides a summary of current knowledge on inflation persistence and price stickiness in the euro area, based on research findings that have been produced in the context of the Inflation Persistence Network. The main findings are: i) Under the current monetary policy regime, the estimated degree of inflation persistence in the euro area is moderate; ii) Retail prices in the euro area are more sticky than in the US; iii) There is significant sectoral heterogeneity in the degree of price stickiness; iv) Price decreases are not uncommon. The paper also investigates some of the policy implications of these findings.

Who Adjusts and When? The Political Economy of Reforms

Abstract: Why do countries delay stabilizations of large and increasing budget deficits and inflation? And what explains the timing of reforms? We use the war-of-attrition model to guide our empirical study on a vast sample of countries. We find that stabilizations are more likely to occur when times of crisis occur, when new governments take office, when governments are “strong” (that is, presidential systems and unified governments with a large majority of the party in office), and when the executive branch faces fewer constraints. The role of external inducements like IMF programs has at best a weak effect, but problems of reverse causality are possible. [JEL H11, H61, H62]

Is price stability enough

Abstract: No one in the industrial countries should now question the substantial economic benefits associated with reducing inflation from earlier, high levels. At the same time, history also teaches that the stability of consumer prices might not be sufficient to ensure macroeconomic stability. Past experience is replete with examples of major economic and financial crises that were not preceded by inflationary pressures. Conversely, history shows that many periods of deflation, based on rising productivity, were simultaneously characterised by rapid growth. Recent structural changes in the global economy imply that this history might have more contemporaneous relevance than is commonly thought. If so, the implication is that policies directed to the pursuit of price stability might have to be applied more flexibly and with a longer-run focus than has recently been the case.

Does Inflation Targeting Anchor Long-Run Inflation Expectations? Evidence from Long-Term Bond Yields in the U.S., U.K. And Sweden

Abstract: We investigate the extent to which inflation targeting helps anchor long-run inflation expectations by comparing the behaviour of daily bond yield data in the United Kingdom and Sweden - both inflation targeters - to that in the United States, a non-inflation-targeter. Using the difference between far-ahead forward rates on nominal and inflation-indexed bonds as a measure of compensation for expected inflation and inflation risk at long horizons, we examine how much, if at all, far-ahead forward inflation compensation moves in response to macroeconomic data releases and monetary policy announcements. In the U.S., we find that forward inflation compensation exhibits highly significant responses to economic news. In the U.K., we find a level of sensitivity similar to that in the U.S. prior to the Bank of England gaining independence in 1997, but a striking absence of such sensitivity since the central bank became independent. In Sweden, we find that inflation compensation has been insensitive to economic news over the whole period for which we have data. We show that these observations are also matched by the relative means and volatilities of the time series of far-ahead forward inflation compensation in these three countries. Our findings support the view that a well-known and credible inflation target helps anchor the private sector's views regarding the distribution of long-run inflation outcomes.