Intermediation

About: Intermediation is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 3358 publications have been published within this topic receiving 84086 citations. The topic is also known as: financial brokerage & brokers.

Financial Intermediation and Endogenous Growth

Abstract: An endogenous growth model with multiple assets is developed. Agents who face random future liquidity needs accumulate capital and a liquid, but unproductive asset. The effects of introducing financial intermediation into this environment are considered. Conditions are provided under which the introduction of intermediaries shifts the composition of savings toward capital, causing intermediation to be growth promoting. In addition, intermediaries generally reduce socially unnecessary capital liquidation, again tending to promote growth.

Microeconomics of banking

Abstract: Over the last thirty years, a new paradigm in banking theory has overturned economists' traditional vision of the banking sector. The asymmetric information model, extremely powerful in many areas of economic theory, has proven useful in banking theory both for explaining the role of banks in the economy and for pointing out structural weaknesses in the banking sector that may justify government intervention. In the past, banking courses in most doctoral programs in economics, business, or finance focused either on management or monetary issues and their macroeconomic consequences; a microeconomic theory of banking did not exist because the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model of complete contingent markets (the standard reference at the time) was unable to explain the role of banks in the economy. This text provides students with a guide to the microeconomic theory of banking that has emerged since then, examining the main issues and offering the necessary tools for understanding how they have been modeled. This second edition covers the recent dramatic developments in academic research on the microeconomics of banking, with a focus on four important topics: the theory of two-sided markets and its implications for the payment card industry; "non-price competition" and its effect on the competition-stability tradeoff and the entry of new banks; the transmission of monetary policy and the effect on the functioning of the credit market of capital requirements for banks; and the theoretical foundations of banking regulation, which have been clarified, although recent developments in risk modeling have not yet led to a significant parallel development of economic modeling. Praise for the first edition:"The book is a major contribution to the literature on the theory of bankingand intermediation. It brings together and synthesizes a broad range ofmaterial in an accessible way. I recommend it to all serious scholars andstudents of the subject. The authors are to be congratulated on a superbachievement." -- Franklin Allen, Nippon Life Professor of Finance and Economics, WhartonSchool, University of Pennsylvania "This book provides the first comprehensive treatment of the microeconomicsof banking. It gives an impressive synthesis of an enormous body ofresearch developed over the last twenty years. It is clearly written and apleasure to read. What I found particularly useful is the great effort thatXavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet have taken to systematicallyintegrate the theory of financial intermediation into classicalmicroeconomics and finance theory. This book is likely to become essentialreading for all graduate students in economics, business, and finance." -- Patrick Bolton, Barbara and David Zalaznick Professor of Business, Columbia University Graduate School of Business "The authors have provided an extremely thorough and up-to-date survey ofmicroeconomic theories of financial intermediation. This work manages to beboth rigorous and pleasant to read. Such a book was long overdue and shouldbe required reading for anybody interested in the economics of banking andfinance." -- Mathias Dewatripont, Professor of Economics, ECARES, Universit

Chicken and egg: competition among intermediation service providers

Abstract: We analyze a model of imperfect price competition between intermediation service providers. We insist on features that are relevant for informational intermediation via the Internet: the presence of indirect network externalities, the possibility of using the nonexclusive services of several intermediaries, and the widespread practice of price discrimination based on users' identity and on usage. Efficient market structures emerge in equilibrium, as well as some specific form of inefficient structures. Intermediaries have incentives to propose non-exclusive services, as this moderates competition and allows them to exert market power. We analyze in detail the pricing and business strategies followed by intermediation services providers. Copyright 2003 by the RAND Corporation.