Judicial opinion

About: Judicial opinion is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 5300 publications have been published within this topic receiving 64803 citations.

Self-Determination and National Minorities

Abstract: 1.: The Origins of National Consciousness. 2.: Self-Determination and the First World War. 3.: The Inter-War Years: The Minorities Treaties Regime. 4.: Self-Determination in Modern International Law: International Instruments and Judicial Decisions. 5.: Self-Determination in Modern International Law: The Practice of States. 6.: The Protection of Minorities. 7.: Definitions of the Term "People". 8.: Secession. 9.: Irredentism. 10.: Historical Title. Epilogue. Bibliography. Index

Comparing Attitudinal and Strategic Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals

Abstract: Students of judicial behavior have increasingly turned to strategic accounts to understand judicial decision making. Scholarship on the Supreme Court and state high courts suggests that the decision to dissent is better understood in light of strategic considerations rather than simply reflecting ideological disagreement. We investigate whether these findings comport with behavior by judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. We develop a spatial model of the decision to dissent that incorporates both attitudinal and strategic elements and subject this model to empirical analysis. We find that ideological disagreement between a judge and the majority opinion writer is a more persuasive explanation of the decision to dissent than a strategic account in which a judge conditions a dissent on whether circuit intervention would obtain the judge's preferred outcome. Though we do not discount the existence of other types of strategic behavior on the Courts of Appeals, our research suggests that strategic accounts of dissenting behavior are not generalizable to all courts.

What's Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the "Legal Model" of Judicial Decision Making

Abstract: [Behavioral research has] the potential to engender serious confusion over judicial decision making. Even worse, [it] may mislead the unsuspecting … into thinking that judges are lawless in their decision making, influenced more by personal ideology than legal principles…. I have no doubt that careful statistical analysis, cautiously interpreted, may conceivably shed some light on judicial decision making. But serious scholars seeking to analyze the work of the courts cannot simply ignore the internal experiences of judges as irrelevant or disingenuously expressed. (Edwards 1998, 1337-38) [E]ven if Chief Judge Edwards is accurately reporting his perceptions, one must worry about whether those perceptions are in fact an accurate portrayal of the work of his court…. [W]hen leaders tell the public that their institutions function well and that the views of potential critics should be disregarded, skepticism and empirical testing are appropriate. (Revesz 1999, 845)

Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning

Abstract: In 1988, hundreds of federal district judges were suddenly confronted with the need to render a decision on the constitutionality of the Sentencing Reform Act and the newly promulgated criminal Sentencing Guidelines. Never before has a question of such importance and involving such significant issues of constitutional law mandated the immediate and simultaneous attention of such a large segment of the federal trial bench. Accordingly, this event provides an archetypal model for exploring the influence of social background, ideology, judicial role and institution, and other factors on judicial decisionmaking. Based upon a unique set of written decisions involving an identical legal problem, the authors have produced an unprecedented empirical study of judicial reasoning in action. By exploiting this treasure trove of data, the authors have looked deeper into the judicial mind and observed the emergence of influences upon the manner in which a judge examined the constitutional issues, adopted a constitutional theory, and engaged in legal reasoning.

Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary

Abstract: Conventional wisdom holds that appointed judges are superior to elected judges because appointed judges are less vulnerable to political pressure. However, there is little empirical evidence for this view. Using a data set of state high court opinions, we construct measures for three aspects of judicial performance: effort, skill, and independence. The measures permit a test of the relationship between performance and the four primary methods of state high court judge selection: partisan election, non-partisan election, merit plan, and appointment. Appointed judges write higher quality opinions than elected judges do, but elected judges write more opinions, and the evidence suggests that the large quantity difference makes up for the small quality difference. In addition, elected judges are not less independent than appointed judges. The results suggest that elected judges focus on providing service to the voters, whereas appointed judges care more about their long-term legacy as creators of precedent. If the state has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the state brought upon itself by continuing the practice of popularly electing judges. Justice O’Connor, concurring in Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 792 (2002).