Topic
Judicial opinion
About: Judicial opinion is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 5300 publications have been published within this topic receiving 64803 citations.
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the deference doctrine developed by courts in the United States, Canada, Britain, Australia and South Africa, and determine how well the leading theories of judicial decision making explain the variety of judicial responses to the common problem of deference to agency interpretation of statues.
Abstract: Examined in this article are the deference doctrines developed by courts in the United States, Canada, Britain, Australia and South Africa. Deference doctrines determine when and if courts are to defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous terms of the statute that the agency administers. The study of deference doctrines in comparative perspective reveals much about the need for agency autonomy in the modern administrative state and the capacity of courts to maintain the delicate balance and remedy abuses of discretion. It also provides an opportunity to determine how well the leading theories of judicial decision making explain the variety of judicial responses to the common problem of deference to agency interpretation of statues.
17 citations
TL;DR: The authors interview senior judges about courts and judicial decision-making, but few political scientists conduct interviews with senior judges to understand their decision making process, and they find that "misconceptions abound about the feasibility and feasibility and p...
Abstract: Interview research is ubiquitous in social science, but few political scientists interview senior judges about courts and judicial decision making. Misconceptions abound about the feasibility and p...
17 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that American and Scandinavian Realism have almost nothing in common, and that the Scandinavians are closer to Hart and even Kelsen than they are to the Americans; all Realists share skepticism about the causal efficacy of legal doctrine in explaining judicial decisions.
Abstract: “Legal Realism” now has sufficient cache that scholars from many different fields and countries compete to claim the mantle of the "Realist program": from political scientists who study judicial behavior, to the "law and society" scholars associated with the Wisconsin New Legal Realism project, to philosophers interested in a naturalized jurisprudence. But what does it mean to be a “legal realist”? What unites the two most famous “old” Legal Realisms — the American and the Scandinavian — with the “new legal realism” invoked, variously, by sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists, among others? There are, of course, other “legal realisms,” old and new, from the “free law” movement in Germany more than a century ago, to the Italian realism of the Genoa School today. My focus, however, shall be on the old and new Realisms that are probably most familiar. Is there anything they all share? I argue that (1) American and Scandinavian Realism have almost nothing in common — indeed, that H.L.A. Hart misunderstood the latter as he did the former, and that the Scandinavians are closer to Hart and even Kelsen than they are to the Americans; (2) all Realists share skepticism about the causal efficacy of legal doctrine in explaining judicial decisions ("the Skeptical Doctrine") (though the Scandinavian skepticism on this score is not at all specific to the legal domain, encompassing all explanation in terms of norms); (3) American Realism almost entirely eschewed social-scientific methods in its defense of the Skeptical Doctrine, contrary to the impression given by much recent work by "new" legal realists; (4) the myth that the American Realists were seriously interested in social science derives mainly from two unrepresentative examples, Underhill Moore's behaviorism and Llewellyn's work with the Cheyenne Indians. Moore's case is a cautionary note in taking au courant social science too seriously; and Llewellyn's work was necessitated by the fact that the "primitive" peoples he wanted to study did not write their judicial opinions down. For any modern legal culture, such "field work" would be unnecessary on Llewellyn's view.
17 citations
TL;DR: The authors used automated text analysis on a sample of state supreme court opinions from all fifty states, finding that variation in judicial retention systems is not associated with substantively meaningful differences in opinion clarity.
Abstract: We contribute to the literature on judicial independence and performance in the states by analyzing opinion clarity. Written opinions are the primary means of communication for state supreme court justices, and clarity is a core component of judicial performance. Using automated text analysis on a sample of state supreme court opinions from all fifty states, we find that variation in judicial retention systems is not associated with substantively meaningful differences in opinion clarity. Furthermore, elected judges do not seem to produce clearer opinions in salient cases notwithstanding the increased public visibility of those decisions. These results suggest that judges tend to conform to prevailing professional norms despite differing institutional constraints.
17 citations