Topic
Judicial opinion
About: Judicial opinion is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 5300 publications have been published within this topic receiving 64803 citations.
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TL;DR: The authors introduce the American Legal Realism, a jurisprudential movement of lawyers, judges, and law professors that flourished in the early 20th century, and develop a perspective on judging that can usefully be understood as the modern manifestation of American legal realism.
Abstract: Economists have made great progress in understanding the incentives and behavior of actors who operate outside of traditional economic markets, including voters, legislators, and bureaucrats. The incentives and behavior of judges, however, remain largely opaque. Do judges act as neutral third-party enforcers of substantive decisions made by others? Are judges “ordinary” policymakers who advance whatever outcomes they favor without any special consideration for law as such? Emerging recent scholarship has started to explore more nuanced conceptions of how law, facts, and judicial preferences may interact to influence judicial decisions. This work develops a perspective on judging that can usefully be understood as the modern manifestation of American Legal Realism, a jurisprudential movement of lawyers, judges, and law professors that flourished in the early twentieth century. The purpose of this essay is to introduce, in simplified form, the Realist account of judicial decision making; to contras...
72 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the normative literature about judicial review will remain impoverished until it takes account of the positive literature regarding judicial behavior, and that normative scholars tend to the normative, studying how judges should behave, whereas political scientists and political economists ask positive questions: how do judges behave and why?
Abstract: This article marries the positive literature regarding judicial behavior to the normative literature regarding judicial review. Though scholars in the legal and political science academies both study judicial review, their approaches are dramatically different. Legal scholars tend to the normative, studying how judges should behave. Political scientists and political economists ask positive questions: how do judges behave, and why? The central thesis of the article is that normative literature about judicial review will remain impoverished until it takes account of the positive scholarship. Ought implies can; much of the positive literature suggests judges cannot or will not behave as normative scholars demand. The article proceeds in four parts. After an Introduction, there is a brief historical discussion to explain why normative and positive scholarship parted company in the early 1940s. The heart of the article follows. This part is a comprehensive examination of the political influences on the constitutional judges. Beginning with the politics of the judge herself, the article then moves out in concentric circles to examine (a) the politics of judging on a collegial court; (b) the difficulties the Supreme Court faces in managing a large judicial hierarchy; (c) the influences of the other branches on Supreme Court decisionmaking; and (d) the relationship between public opinion and judicial review. In each section the goal is to show how confronting normative aspiration with political reality refocuses the questions that ought to be asked about judicial review. A subsidiary goal is to introduce normative scholars who are unaware to the vast positive literature about judicial behavior. The final part examines how the political influences described here ought to bear upon normative scholarship on judicial review.
72 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors show how the rule-making opportunities in the litigation process affect the development of law and the judicial determination of statutory rights, and explain how early judicial opinions might influence later judicial interpretations of the law.
Abstract: This article expands upon the idea that repeat players influence the development of law by settling cases they are likely to lose and litigating cases they are likely to win. Through empirical analysis of judicial opinions interpreting the Family and Medical Leave Act, it shows how the rule-making opportunities in the litigation process affect the development of law and the judicial determination of statutory rights. In addition, the article explains how early judicial opinions might influence later judicial interpretations of the law. Although individuals may successfully mobilize the law to gain benefits in their disputes, that success often removes their experiences from the judicial determination of rights, limiting law's capacity to produce social change. This paradox of losing by winning separates the dispute resolution function of courts from their law-making function and raises questions about the legitimacy of law
71 citations
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01 Jul 1987
71 citations
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70 citations