Judicial opinion

About: Judicial opinion is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 5300 publications have been published within this topic receiving 64803 citations.

Sentencing Guidelines and Judicial Discretion: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Human Calculation Errors: Sentencing Guidelines and Judicial Discretion

Abstract: The extent to which rules set by the legislature bind or influence decisions regarding sentence length is central to institutional design and to determining the practical impact of any proposed reform regarding criminal punishment. However, it is generally difficult to identify empirically the impact of sentencing recommendations because court actors may have preferences that are correlated with those outlined in the guidelines. In this article, we take advantage of a new source of identification to study how government actors interact and make decisions in the criminal sentencing process. We identify instances in the Maryland circuit court in which the case facts are not consistent with the final sentence recommendation - inconsistencies that appear to be the result of human error and exogenous to the preferences of downstream actors. We find that even an advisory guidelines system like the one in Maryland has a direct impact on judicial decision making in cases involving drugs and violent crimes. Judges appear eager to go along with an erroneous lesser sentence for violent offenses. In contrast, judges appear to discount mistakes that are too high. This asymmetry does not occur for property and drug offenses that are simpler and more frequently encountered. More generally, experience matters. Error rates are lower for more frequently occurring offense types and lower for those court professionals who complete more of the sentencing worksheets. The net effect of sentencing guidelines on time served appears to be small because parole boards counteract the remaining influence of the guidelines.

SMEs in the Philippine Manufacturing Industry and Globalization: Meeting the Development Challenges

Abstract: The performance of the judicial system has been thrown into the limelight as business surveys point to its performance as one of the main obstacles and disincentives to doing business in the Philippines. The channels through which judicial decisions may affect business behavior are straightforward: increased uncertainty and high costs. To quantify the perceived effects, a survey of 320 of the top 7000 corporations in the Philippines was conducted in 2001. Our findings show that governance problems are at least as important as economic or financial problems in doing business. Of more direct relevance to the judiciary, difficulties in settling legal conflicts were among the most frequently cited factor affecting business. Further, the current level of functioning of the legal system has an economic impact equivalent to foregoing at least 6-11 percent of total investment in the economy and foregoing at least one-fourth to one-half of a percentage point (0.25-0.46) of GDP growth annually, or an annual loss amounting to between Php7 billion and Php13 billion in 1999 alone. These are significant and recurring economic losses attributable to the nature and functioning of institutions and form a strong case for judicial reform. JEL classification: K41, L14, D23

The Politics of Judicial Elections: The Influence of Campaign Contributions on the Voting Patterns of Texas Supreme Court Justices, 1994–1997

Abstract: As preparations for the 2004 elections begin, many candidates for judicial positions will start the process of advertising their candidacy, raising money and in general, running a political campaign to obtain a legal position. Legal scholars question whether or not campaign contributions corrupt the judicial process by forcing justices to consider the preferences of campaign contributors during the decision-making process. It is an important question, and as such I examine the influence of campaign contributions on judicial decisions. Specifically, I examine decisions made by the Texas Civil Supreme Court between January 1994 and June 1997 in cases dealing with two business litigants and determine if there is a systematic relationship between those decisions and the interests of campaign contributors, controlling for factors such as judicial ideology, type of case, and decision timing. Using logit regression, I find empirical evidence suggesting that the justices are influenced by the preferences of campaign contributors. Moreover, I am able to establish a loose causal link between contributions and decisions that indicates that decisions follow dollars.

The use of rhetorical sources by the U.S. supreme court

Abstract: This study considers whether U.S. Supreme Court justices use opinion content strategically, to enhance the legitimacy of case outcomes. This hypothesis is tested by examining the Court's use of rhetorical sources, which are references to esteemed figures and texts that corroborate the justices' views. The data are consistent with the position that justices use rhetorical sources strategically, citing them when the legitimacy of their actions is lowest, such as when they are overturning precedent, invalidating state or federal law, or issuing directives from a divided bench. The study also tests several other explanations for the use of these sources, such as legal considerations, the justices' ideologies, and efficiency concerns. Though sometimes overlooked, the language of court opinions can be as important as the disposition of cases, albeit for different reasons. The outcome of a case has the most direct impact on the parties and issues involved. It announces who wins and who loses, which laws and policies survive and which do not. But the language of opinions is often where the real work of courts is done. Judicial opinions can confine holdings to particular sets of claimants or announce more general principles. They can firmly endorse rules or they can equivocate, inviting relitigation. And opinions can persuade, building up coalitions of judges for majorities and earning the support of interpreting and implementing groups. This study investigates some of the language choices that U.S. Supreme Court justices make. Specifically, it focuses on what might be termed rhetorical sources: references to prominent authors and texts that are nonbinding on case outcomes. These sources include a wide range of materials, from interpretive authorities such as the Federalist Papers and Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England to the writings of esteemed figures such as Thomas Jefferson and John Locke. Because their inclusion is optional, rhetorical sources can serve as a gateway to understanding how Supreme Court justices assemble their opinions. Why does one justice cite the Federalist Papers when another does not? Is it simply a matter of personal preference, or do legal considerations also matter? Are justices motivated by efficiency concerns, or by more complex interests? One possibility is that justices use rhetorical sources strategically, employing them most frequently when the legitimacy of their holdings is in doubt, such as when they are overturning precedents or invalidating statutes. When deciding hard cases, justices must know that their opinions are likely to be scrutinized by individuals both on and off the bench. Even if such scrutiny does not affect the outcome a justice chooses (Segal & Spaeth 1993), it may still affect the language used to defend it. Making an opinion as persuasive as possible can serve any number of useful functions. It can hold together a majority coalition or encourage a wavering justice to sign on. It can facilitate compliance by winning over interpreting and implementing groups. Or it can enhance the reputation of an opinion and its author in the legal community. For example, when the Court in Furman v. Georgia (408 U.S. 238 [1972]) declared that states could not impose the death penalty because, as applied, it constituted "cruel and unusual punishment," the justices did not simply present their views as raw expressions of judicial will. The separate opinions justify their expressed policy preferences by invoking such materials as Blackstone's Commentaries, John Stuart Mill's "On Liberty," the Magna Carta, and the writings of Thomas Jefferson, Joseph Story, and Oliver Wendell Holmes, among other legal authorities. Buckley v. Valeo (424 U.S. 1 [1976]), concerning the constitutionality of campaign finance legislation, contains references to Charles de Montesquieu, while Justice John Paul Stevens's majority opinion in U.S. Term Limits v. Thornlon (514 U. …

The Transformation of the American Legal Profession

Abstract: Professions are historically specific institutions for organizing the production and distribution of services. American lawyers constructed the contemporary legal profession between the 1870s and the 1950s by forming local, state, and national bar associations through which they sought, with considerable success, to control the production of and by producers of legal services. In the last two decades, these structures of control have significantly eroded. Lawyers exerted no restraint over the threefold increase in law students since the early 1960s or the changes in the composition of that student body. Restrictive practices taken for granted for half a century have been summarily eliminated by judicial decisions and executive action. To the extent that lawyers have responded by seeking to create new demand, they run the risk of intensifying competition, becoming more dependent on the state, and organizing hitherto atomistic consumers into collectivities that can challenge professional dominance. The image of the profession as a homogeneous collection of independent practitioners is harder to maintain. The proportion of employees is growing, solo practitioners are declining in the face of a hostile economic environment, and units of production are growing in size and becoming more bureaucratic. Divisions of race, gender, age, and class, superimposed over the differentiation of lawyers among structures of practice and the stratification of private practice into two hemispheres, make professional unity increasingly problematic. For similar reasons, self-regulation is being undermined from within while it is challenged from without. These cumulative transformations demand that we reconsider whether it is useful to continue thinking of the practice of law as a profession.