Land tenure

Abstract: Acknowledges that the reasons why land management can fail are extremely varied, and must include a thorough understanding of the changing natural resource base itself, the human response to this, and broader changes in society, of which land managers are a part. Four chapters provide a method of analyzing the problems of management and degradation. They focus particularly on the decision making environment of the land users and managers themselves, its great variety through space and time, and on the inability of single theories to provide satisfactory explanations. Case studies cover Nepal, North America, Indonesia, the Pacific, China, India and historical erosion in Europe, and in modern capitalist, socialist, and developing countries.

Abstract: ASSUME that a supplier owns the total stock of a completely durable good. At what price will he sell it? To take a concrete example, assume that one person owns all the land in the United States and, to simplify the analysis, that all land is of uniform quality. Assume also that the landowner is not able to work the land himself, that ownership of land yields no utility and that there are no costs involved in disposing of the land. If there were a large number of landowners and the price were competitively determined, the price would be that at which the amount demanded was equal to the amount of land in the United States. If we imagine this fixed supply of land to be various amounts either greater or smaller, and then discover what the competitively determined price would be, we can trace out the demand schedule for American land. Assume that this demand schedule is DD and that from this a marginal revenue schedule, MR, has been derived. Both schedules are shown in Figure I. Let the total amount of land in existence be OQ. Then, if the price were competitively determined, the price would be OB (see Figure I). We now have to determine the price which the monopolistic landowner would charge for a unit of land in the assumed conditions. The diagram would seem to suggest (and has, I believe, suggested to some) that such a monopolistic landowner would charge the price OA, would sell the quantity of land OM, thus maximising his receipts, and would hold off the market the quantity of land, MQ. But suppose that he did this. MQ land and money equal to OA X OM would be in the possession of the original landowner while OM land would be owned by others. In these circumstances, why should the original landowner continue to hold MQ off the market? The original landowner could obviously improve his position by selling more land since he could by this means acquire more money. It is true that this would reduce the value of the land OM owned by those who had previously bought land from him-but the loss would fall on them, not on him. If the same assumption about his behaviour was made as before, he would then sell part of MQ. But this is not the end of the story, since some of MQ would still remain unsold. The process would continue as long as the original landowner retained any land, that is, until OQ had been sold. And if there were no costs of disposing of the land, the whole process would take place in the twinkling of an eye.

Abstract: Land policies are of fundamental importance to sustainable growth, good governance, and the well-being of, and the economic opportunities open to, both rural and urban dwellers - particularly the poor. To this end, research on land policy, and analysis of interventions related to the subject, have long been of interest to the Bank's Research Department, and other academic, and civil society institutions. The report aims to strengthen the effectiveness of land policy in support of development, and poverty reduction, by setting out the results of recent research in a way that is accessible to a wide audience of policymakers, nongovernmental organizations, academics in the Bank's client countries, donor agency officials, and the broader development community. Its main message rests on three principles: 1) provision of secure tenure to land improves the welfare of the poor, particularly by enhancing the asset base of those whose land rights are often neglected, and, creates incentives needed for investment, paramount to sustainable economic growth; 2) facilitation of land exchange, and distribution, whether as an asset or for current services, at low cost, through markets, and non-market channels, will expedite land access by productive, but land-poor producers, so that once economic growth improves, financial markets would rely on the use of land as collateral; and, 3) governments' contribution to the promotion of socially desirable land allocation, and utilization. The report discusses mechanisms to promote tenure security, demonstrates the importance of rental market transactions, arguing the removal of impediments to these can generate equity advantages, and positive investments. It also illustrates mechanisms, ranging from taxation, to regulation and land use planning to address these issues.

Abstract: This is the first major study of gender and property in South Asia. In a pioneering and comprehensive analysis Bina Agarwal argues that the single most important economic factor affecting women's situation is the gender gap in command over property. In rural South Asia, the most significant form of property is arable land, a critical determinant of economic well-being, social status, and empowerment. But few women own land; fewer control it. Drawing on a vast range of interdisciplinary sources and her own field research, and tracing regional variations across five countries, the author investigates the complex barriers to women's land ownership and control, and how they might be overcome. The book makes significant and original contributions to theory and policy concerning land reforms, 'bargaining' and gender relations, women's status, and the nature of resistance.

Abstract: Argues for combining the study of physical and social processes to study the political economy of soil erosion; the study must include a 'place-based' analysis of soil erosion, where it actually occurs, where flooding and siltation caused by soil erosion in one place affects another, and where land users have been spatially displaced to and from areas. It must also include 'non-place- based' analysis of the relations of production under which land is used including land tenure, rents, prices of agricultural inputs and outputs. Bringing these two analyses together, a 'bottom-up' approach is outlined in which the focus is first directed to the smallest unit of decision making in the use of land, the family and the household, up to the government and administration. At the latter level, it looks at where power lies and how it is used.