Showing papers on "Leasehold estate published in 1976"

Radical Protest and Social Structure: The Southern Farmers' Alliance and Cotton Tenancy, 1880-1890

Abstract: "Michael Schwartz's book is really three books in one an analysis of the structural changes that produced one of the most oppressive social systems the world has known (the one-crop cotton tenancy economy and the system of institutionalized racism and authoritarian one-party politics that was required to preserve the fragile economic arrangement); a theoretical analysis of the origins, mobilization, and outcome of insurgent challenges; and a meticulous application of that theory to the rise and collapse of the Populist movement." Craig Jenkins, "Theory and Society" "

Land Tax and Social Change in Sichuan, 1925-1935

Abstract: During the second, third, and fourth decades of this century, Sichuan (Szechwan) province underwent a process of sweeping social change. A new class of landlords controlling large estates arose-a class made up of warlords in intimate association with ostensibly civilian bureaucrats, the two forming an elite which virtually monopolized political power and governmental authority. Under their rule, traditional rural society was deeply altered. The old landlord elite was destroyed, the numbers of small, free-holding peasants were steeply reduced, and tenancy increased in proportion. In this process of change, the warlord administration of the land tax played a crucial role. This paper examines the nature and impact of the land tax. The significance of the tax during the years 1925-1935 was twofold (1) levies became confiscatory, and (2) the burden of payments fell on all old classes, although not equally, while the new warlord and bureaucrat landlords escaped taxation After 1925 land-tax exactions grew by leaps and bounds as the Sichuan warlords demanded ever more funds to finance their expanding armies and to pay for armed conflicts of increasing frequency and intensity. In 1916 the regular armies in Sichuan totaled between five and eight divisions, and those

Uncertainty and the Choice of Tenure Arrangements: Some Hypotheses

Abstract: Recently, in this Journal, Adams and Rask and Boxley discussed the problem of tenure arrangement, in particular the apparent misallocation of resources under share tenancy. Their analyses operate within a framework of certainty and do not explicitly consider many of the conditions of the lease contract that are subject to negotiation. However, to gain a more complete understanding of why differing tenure arrangements exist and the conditions under which parties to the lease prefer one arrangement over the others, a more realistic framework is required. This paper attempts to move in this direction by relaxing the assumption of certainty. As a first step, we investigate how differing tenure systems alter the risk to landowners and tenants. We then identify and investigate a few of the factors affecting the choice of tenure arrangement when uncertainty is an inherent factor. Given certainty, landowners and tenants are presumably concerned solely with their income. But when uncertainty is introduced, both the level of income and its variability need to be considered. Uncertainties in farming are caused largely by the uncertainties of nature, changing technology and market conditions, factors that are beyond the control of, and often also the insurability by, individual farmers. In other words, a farm produces not a known income but a probability distribution of income. Given a probability distribution of income that can be produced from a piece of land, the probability distribution of the landowner's income and that of the tenant-peasant differ significantly when the land is operated under different tenure arrangements. Assume that the net income from farming one unit of land, x, is a random variable with a distribution, f(x).' Further assume that f(x) can be fully described by its mean (Ix) and variance (trx2). Given f(x), table I summarizes the means and variances of the landlord's income and those of the tenant when the land is operated under several common tenure arrangements. Most of the results are familiar, so it is only necessary to briefly review them. Under the owner-operator system, the owner bears the risk of income variations.2 Under the fixed rent arrangement, the landowner is assured of a fixed nominal income and the tenant bears all the risk.3 Under the crop-share arrangement, the landlord and the tenant split the risk of income variations in proportion to their respective shares of income.4 The fixed rent contract with escape clause is perhaps less familiar than the other arrangements. The purpose of the escape clause is to permit the