Showing papers on "Leasehold estate published in 1985"
TL;DR: Cheung as discussed by the authors argued that share contracts have the advantage that they allow the risk to be shared between the landlord and tenant whereas with fixed rent contracts the tenant bears all the risk and with wage contracts the landlord does.
Abstract: Newbery and Stiglitz (I979) suggest four stylised facts of sharecropping which theories should attempt to explain. The first is the persistence of sharecropping and its coexistence with fixed rental and wage markets under a variety of conditions over centuries of time. The second is that in modern developed economies there appears to be a decline in share tenancy. Thirdly share tenancy is often but not alwavs associated with lower productivity than fixed rental land. Finally, in many economies contracts involve shares of around one half for landlord and tenant. This does not vary from contract to contract and does not seem to be the object of negotiation. Smith (I776) and many subsequent authors have likened sharecropping to a tax. They argue that under this type of contract tenants choose their labour supply to equate their marginal disutility of labour with their proportionate share of the marginal product instead of the full marginal product. They therefore regard sharecropping as an inefficient form of land tenure. However, this view is difficult to reconcile with the first observation: given the coexistence of fixed rent and share contracts, it is reasonable to expect that if share contracts were relatively inefficient they would quickly die out. This does not appear to have happened. More recently it has been argued, most notably by Cheung (I969), that if there is certainty and transactions costs are the same for all contracts, then provided a share contract specifies the labour supply of the tenant it leads to the same efficient allocation of resources as a fixed rent or wage contract. Cheung has used this result as the basis of an explanation for coexistence. He suggests that the transaction costs for share contracts are higher than for wage and fixed rent contracts. However, share contracts have the advantage that they allow the risk to be shared between the landlord and tenant whereas with fixed rent contracts the tenant bears all the risk and with wage contracts the landlord does. Given varying degrees of risk aversion among landlords and tenants it is possible that for some parties the risk-sharing advantages outweigh the transaction cost disadvantages so that they will prefer share contracts whereas with others the reverse is true. One problem with this argument raised by Stiglitz (I974) and Newbery (I977) is that given constant returns to scale the risk-sharing properties of share contracts can be attained with mixtures of fixed rent and wage contracts. If these do indeed have lower transaction costs, share contracts would not then be observed.
87 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show how recent developments in the economics of information can provide insights into economic relations in less developed countries, and how they can provide explanations for institutions which, in neoclassical theory, appear anomalous and/or inefficient.
Abstract: This paper shows how recent developments in the Economics of Information can provide insights into economic relations in less developed countries, and how they can provide explanations for institutions which, in neoclassical theory, appear anomalous and/or inefficient. Sharecropping and other tenancy relationships in the rural sector and wage determination and urban unemployment are both investigated within this perspective.
40 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show how recent developments in the economics of information can provide insights into economic relations in less developed countries, and how they can provide explanations for institutions which, in neoclassical theory, appear anomalous and/or inefficient.
Abstract: This paper shows how recent developments in the economics of information can provide insights into economic relations in less developed countries, and how they can provide explanations for institutions which, in neoclassical theory, appear anomalous and/or inefficient. Sharecropping and other tenancy relationships in the rural sector and wage determination and urban unemployment are both investigated within this perspective.
33 citations
TL;DR: For peasants who have been collectivized for nearly three decades, the national campaign initiated by the Party Central Committee's Document No. 1, 1984 to promote the reparcellization of collective farmland, by extending the peasants' leasehold right to over 15 years (para. 3-1), is certainly not less spectacular than the land reform of 1949-52, when land was confiscated from the rich for redistribution among poor peasant families as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: For peasants who have been collectivized for nearly three decades, the national campaign initiated by the Party Central Committee's Document No. 1, 1984 to promote the reparcellization of collective farmland, by extending the peasants' leasehold right to over 15 years (para. 3–1), is certainly not less spectacular than the land reform of 1949–52, when land was confiscated from the rich for redistribution among poor peasant families. This “second land reform” has now firmly consolidated the long-fought policy of Deng Xiaoping for a decentralized approach towards rural management. All the cats – “black or white” – seem to have now been totally unleashed to run after their best catch. This stands in sharp contrast to the uneasy equilibrium of the “two-line struggle,” which existed throughout the entire 20-year period following the abortive communization drive of 1958/1959. Nevertheless, while probably no Chinese leader today can afford to play the role of Mao's Liu cum Deng, one wonders whether, for economic reasons, the present rural institutional solution as envisaged in Document No. 1 will mark the end of the perennial Chinese search for an “optimum” level of decentralization. In a way, the agricultural reform of recent years has begun with the drastic increases, decreed in 1979, in state farm procurement prices, averaging 25 per cent. For a regime very much obsessed with the value imperative of modernization, the farm price increases should clearly be construed as income incentives for promoting agricultural production to ease the economic constraints on industrialization. This is nothing new but is exactly the policy developed by the prominent Chinese economist, Ma Yinchu, some 25 years ago in his then much condemned “balanced growth model” for China. Thus the strategy fits in well with a western analytical model formulated by Chiang and Fei in 1966, for a “maximum-speed development through austerity.” The model postulates that under socialism, a consumption policy which imposes an “optimum” rather than maximum degree of austerity, may induce greater labour effort and thus an output growth more than proportionate to the required marginal consumption expenditure. It follows that not only will the rate of capital accumulation not be depressed by increased consumption, but it may even accelerate and thus help to sustain a higher overall income growth rate.
24 citations
TL;DR: The agricultural ladder metaphor was popularized to depict the mobility "rungs" by which tenants could climb to full ownership as discussed by the authors, and it appears to have served ideologically to prepare the nation for part-owner-operatorship.
23 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors suggest that consumption credit may be a side payment designed to enable the landlord to absorb the tenant's risk due to weather uncertainty without weakening his incentive to work.
20 citations
01 Jun 1985
19 citations
TL;DR: In the United States, share leasing is the most important type of rental arrangement, accounting for more than 40% of the total value of farm real estate as mentioned in this paper. And share rents account, nationwide, for $2 out of every $3 rent paid to landlords.
8 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a two-season production process interlinking land and credit markets and landlord monopoly power was introduced, not to avoid-as Datta and Nugent seem to imply-the problem of corner solutions, but only to introduce a dosage of realism in the model.
Abstract: It is by now well known, particularly due to Bell and Braverman, that a model with constant returns to scale, sharecropping, and the wage-contract choice leads to a tendency for corner solution. In Bardhan (1979) I introduced a two-season production process interlinking land and credit markets and landlord monopoly power, not to avoid-as Datta and Nugent seem to imply-the problem of corner solutions, but only to introduce a dosage of realism in the model. The main problem for interior solutions in the context of the model was caused by the special assumption of constant returns to scale, which I used here, unlike in Bardhan and Srinivasan and Bardhan (1977), primarily to avoid cluttering up the equations. In any case, in peasant agricultural production functions with only land and labor as arguments and other factors suppressed (particularly managerial and animal labor input), the assumption of constant returns to scale is not very realistic. If my 1979 model is taken with diminishing returns to scale, the interior solution and most of the comparative-static results are more robust. It is not inconsistent for the landlord to be a monopolist in the land-lease market and at the same time be a competitive buyer in the labor market. In fact, I think this may be the more realistic case. As indicated in footnote 3 of Bardhan (1979), the demand for labor by others has been suppressed for convenience in equation (9); but, if one likes, one may introduce on the left-hand side of that equation a term D(W2) to represent the net demand for labor by others (say, by pure owner-cultivators) with usual properties of demand functions. None of the subsequent results in Bardhan (1979) changes. As far as I can see the empirical result reported in table 1 by Datta and Nugent on the basis of a "normalized" dependent variable is illegitimate. They combine the proportion of cultivated area under total tenancy given in Bardhan (1979) and the area under sharecropping as percentage of area under sharecropping and fixed-rental tenancy in Bardhan (1977) to get their "normalized" dependent variable, which is the percentage of land under share and "wage" contracts only. This they cannot do unless they use independent information on land under leasing arrangements other than share and fixed-rental tenancy, which in some states are significant.
7 citations
Book•
01 Jun 1985TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the structure of the land tenure system in the Okun Area of Kwara State, Nigeria, and its influence on the farming system in that area.
01 Jun 1985
TL;DR: This article pointed out several shortcomings of both his theoretical and empirical analyses and hence to urge caution with respect to the validity of some of his conclusions, and pointed out the shortcomings of the analysis.
Abstract: In a recent contribution to this Journal, Bardhan (1979) has constructed an interesting two-season model of a peasant economy to study the determinants of land tenancy. He derived a number of hypotheses and provided supporting evidence from interstate cross-section data from India in the early 1950s. The results of Bardhan's theoretical and empirical analyses have already been cited by other scholars, e.g., Hayami and Kikuchi and Quibria and Taslim, as providing evidence for the relevant propositions. Given the dearth of theoretically derived and empirically supported propositions in this important area of applied economics, Bardhan's work is sure to gain increasing recognition over time and to stimulate further research. The purpose of this note is to assist future researchers by pointing out several shortcomings of both his theoretical and empirical analyses and hence to urge caution with respect to the validity of some of his conclusions.
Book•
01 Jan 1985
TL;DR: In this article, the authors define Hay Straw Silage Tower Silage Silage Harvested Roots GROWING CROPS TENANT'S PASTURES UNEXHAUSTED VALUE OF FEEDING STUFFS CONSUMED Unexhausted Value of Fertilisers Applied Farmyard Manure Unexhusted value of Lime Applied SOD FERTILITY CLAIMS TENant's IMPROVEMENTSTENANT's FIXTURES Offgoing Crops DILAPIDATONS PIPELINES, CAPITAL
Abstract: HISTORY DEFINITIONS PRODUCE Hay Straw Silage Tower Silage Harvested Roots GROWING CROPS TENANT'S PASTURES UNEXHAUSTED VALUE OF FEEDING STUFFS CONSUMED Unexhausted Value of Fertilisers Applied Farmyard Manure Unexhausted Value of Lime Applied SOD FERTILITY CLAIMS TENANT'S IMPROVEMENTS TENANT'S FIXTURES OFFGOING CROPS DILAPIDATONS PIPELINES, CAPITAL, EASEMENT PAYMENTS & CLAIMS ELECTRICITY LINE WAYLEAVES AND CLAIMS NOTICES TO REMEDY BREACHES OF TENANCY AGREEMENT PROBATE VALUATIONS STOCK TAKING OR INCOME TAX VALUATIONS FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN VALUATION OF FREEHOLD FARMS AND THEIR RENTAL VALUES INVENTORIES COMPUSARY PURCHASE CLAIMS FARM RENTALS VALUATION CLAUSES ON SALES OF FARMS RECORDS OF CONDITIONS LIVESTOCKS ARBITRATION MILK QUOTAS SOIL, CLIMATE AND PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS AGRICULTURAL TENANCIES ACT 1995 GLOSSARY OF GENERAL INFORMATION ADVICE TO YOUNG PRACTIONERS, VALUATION BOOKS INDEX
TL;DR: The reliability of tenure statistics is open to criticism since they do not adequately account for the complexities of tenancy arrangements, particularly of those between members of the same family as discussed by the authors, since the overwhelming majority of tenanted land is privately owned.
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show how recent developments in the economics of information can provide insights into economic relations in less developed countries, and how they can provide explanations for institutions which, in neoclassical theory, appear anomalous and/or inefficient.
Abstract: This paper shows how recent developments in the Economics of Information can provide insights into economic relations in less developed countries, and how they can provide explanations for institutions which, in neoclassical theory, appear anomalous and/or inefficient. Sharecropping and other tenancy relationships in the rural sector and wage determination and urban unemployment are both investigated within this perspective.
Dissertation•
01 Jan 1985
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a brief outline of the scope and the progression of the thesis of positive covenants in English land law and present a number of techniques and devices used by conveyancers in order to circumvent the principle.
Abstract: The purpose of this introduction is to provide a brief outline of the scope and the progression of the thesis.
Since the latter part of the nineteenth century, it has been a well-established principle of real property law in England and
Wales that the burden of a positive covenant cannot run directly with freehold land at law or in equity. The fact that a positive
covenant cannot run directly with freehold land has for many years been acknowledged to be a major defect of English land law.
In Chapter I, the rules which govern the enforceability of freehold covenants are examined. Further, the chapter identifies
why the Judges in the nineteenth century decided not to permit the burden of a positive covenant to run with freehold land.
Conveyancers use a number of techniques and devices in order to circumvent the aforementioned principle. However, none of them are foolproof. In Chapter II, a number of devices which are used by conveyancers in order to circumvent the aforementioned principle are examined and evaluated.
The difficulties which can arise from the present law's failure to provide a satisfactory means whereby positive
covenants may be made to run with freehold land are identified in Chapter III.
Local authorities possess a number of statutory powers to impose positive covenants on freehold land and to enforce them
against successive owners. In Chapter IV, consideration is afforded to some aspects of their powers in this regard.
The need to reform the present law has long been recognised. However, despite the fact that several Reports have been made and one draft Bill produced reform has still not been achieved. In Chapter V, the major proposals made for reform in the 1960's and 1970's are considered. Further, reasons are advanced to explain why reform of the law of positive covenants has proved to be so difficult to secure.
One of the main consequences of the present law is that the vast majority of flats in England and Wales are held on long
leases. The popular preference is for freehold not leasehold ownership. Several common law countries have comprehensive
"condominium" legislation making full provision for rights and obligations, etc., in regard to freehold flats. The relevant
legislation of New South Wales and Trinidad and Tobago is examined in Chapters VI and VII respectively. One objective of
these chapters is to demonstrate that there are viable alternatives to using leasehold schemes for blocks of flats.
In 1984, the Law Commission published their Report on Positive and Restrictive Covenants. Chapter VIII deals with this
Report and with a number of other relevant recent developments
Book•
01 Jan 1985
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the relationship between a landlord and a tenant, and the rights and obligations of the parties involved in the creation and termination of a tenant's tenancies.
Abstract: Part A - Creation of Tenancies Relationship of Landlord and tenant Leases and licences Creation of form and leases Part B - Rights and Obligations of the Parties Covenants generally Implied covenants Express covenants Rent and rent review Repairing obligations Rights and liabilities as between landlord or tenant and third parties Devolution of title Part C - Termination of Tenancies Modes of termination Landlord's rights on termination Tenant's rights to fixtures Part D - Residential Tenancies Rent Act protected and statutory tenancies Assured tenancies Special residential tenancies provisions Long residential tenancies Part E - Business Tenancies Application of Part II of the 1954 Act Restrictions on contracting out Continuation and termination of business tenancies Grounds of opposition Dismissal of tenant's application Court order of a new tenancy Compensation for improvements Part F - Agricultural Holdings Introduction and terms of the tenancy Variation of the terms of the tenancy Notice to quit and succession Rights on termination Tenant's rights to compensation Market gardens Arbitration Smallholdings and allotments Part G - Secure Tenancies Secure tenancies
TL;DR: The ownership of property is concerned with having control over a legal interest as discussed by the authors, and the owner of a freehold interest is inherently the absolute owner although technically a tenant of the Crown.
Abstract: The ownership of property is concerned with having control over a legal interest. In an historical context the Crown owns all land. However, the owner of a freehold interest is inherently the absolute owner although technically a tenant of the Crown. The Law of Property Act 1925 defines a freehold interest as the ‘Fee simple absolute in possession’. Thus a freeholder may have physical possession and/or be entitled to the receipts of all income from that land.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider some of the behavioural characteristics of the agricultural tenancy which contributed to its successful establishment yet which have failed to prevent its dominance from being eroded under the pressure of modern social and economic conditions.
Book Chapter•
01 Jan 1985
TL;DR: The Tenants' Rights, Etc. (Scotland) Act 1980 (in this article abbreviated to the Tenants Rights Act or the 1980 Act) was the creation of the public sector secure tenancy as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The biggest single change introduced by the Tenants' Rights, Etc. (Scotland) Act 1980 (in this article abbreviated to the Tenants' Rights Act or the 1980 Act) was the creation of the public sector secure tenancy. This was used to introduce that package of rights, known as the Tenants' Charter, including the right to a written lease, to sub-let or take in lodgers, to carry out repairs, alterations and improvements and, above all, the right to purchase from the landlord authority. These rights, which are similar to those granted to public sector tenants in England and Wales by the Housing Act 1980, apply to all secure tenancies. At their core is security of tenure itself, the grant to the public sector of rights parallel to those enjoyed for many years in the private sector under the Rent Acts. The essence if this
TL;DR: In the Federal Republic of Germany, farm tenancy arrangements are subject to very little interference from the authorities as mentioned in this paper, and legal regulations provide for free negotiation of rental contracts and favour long-term leases.
TL;DR: In spite of the remarkable long-term stability, at the national level, of the share of the land in France under owner-operation, at about one half of farmland, there have been regional changes, with tenancy increasing in mostly owner-occupied areas and owner-occupation in mostly rented areas as discussed by the authors.