Leasehold estate

About: Leasehold estate is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1589 publications have been published within this topic receiving 21480 citations. The topic is also known as: leasehold & tenancy.

Social exclusion and land administration in Orissa, India

Abstract: The authors report on the first empirical study of its kind to examine - from the perspective of transaction costs - factors that constrain access to land for the rural poor and other socially excluded groups in India. They find that: a) Land reform has reduced large landholdings since the 1950s. Medium size farms have gained most. Formidable obstacles still prevent the poor from gaining access to land. b) The complexity of land revenue administration in Orissa is partly the legacy of distinctly different systems, which produced more or less complete and accurate land records. These not-so-distant historical records can be important in resolving contemporary land disputes. c) Orissa tried legally to abolish land-leasing. Concealed tenancy persisted, with tenants having little protection under the law. d) Women's access to and control over land, and their bargaining power with their husbands about land, may be enhanced through joint land titling, a principle yet to be realized in Orissa. e) Land administration is viewed as a burden on the state rather than a service, and land records and registration systems are not coordinated. Doing so will improve rights for the poor and reduce transaction costs - but only if the system is transparent and the powerful do not retain the leverage over settlement officers that has allowed land grabs. Land in Orissa may be purchased, inherited, rented (leased), or - in the case of public land and the commons - encroached upon. Each type of transaction - and the State's response, through land law and administration - has implications for poor people's access to land. The authors find that: 1) Land markets are thin and transaction costs are high, limiting the amount of agricultural land that changes hands. 2) The fragmentation of landholdings into tiny, scattered plots is a brake on agricultural productivity, but efforts to consolidate land may discriminate against the rural poor. Reducing transaction costs in land markets will help. 3) Protecting the rural poor's rights of access to common land requires raising public awareness and access to information. 4) Liberalizing land-lease markets for the rural poor will help, but only if the poor are ensured access to institutional credit.

Urban Housing Estates in the Eighteenth Century

Abstract: This paper examines the supply of building land by estate owners in the eighteenth century, based particularly on estate records and other contemporary sources for about fifteen British towns. While the rise in the value of land on its conversion from agricultural use into building sites was an obvious incentive to estate owners, it was offset in part by the high initial cost of providing the basic amenities, and the frequent delay in obtaining a substantial return on this outlay. In England and Wales land was either sold, or conveyed on building lease, the latter being preferred by the large private owners and corporations, and by 1800 ninety-nine years was becoming an increasingly common term. In the case of leasehold developments landlords preferred that builders should erect better-class rather than artisan dwellings, although the demand for the former was limited apart from London, Edinburgh and Bath. Their main means of controlling development lay in the covenants inserted in the leases, which varie...

Agrarian Reform in the Republic of Vietnam

Abstract: style "land reform" in the North, this law (Ordinance No. 57) was in fact proclaimed at a time when large landowners seemed to be regaining influence in places of political power and was in many respects an inadequate compromise measure. Emboldened by the crushing of Communist organizations in Southern Vietnam's countryside and reestablishment of their control over their estates, large landed proprietors succeeded in preventing President Diem's government from undertaking as drastic a program as had first been envisaged. In fact, it is conceivable that no land transfer program would have been possible if the political elite of Diem's regime had been drawn entirely from Cochinchina.2 Vietnam has long been faced with a tenancy problem as acute as any in Southeast Asia. Unfortunately the most reliable data are even less up-to-date than elsewhere in the area. Nor does the invaluable study by Yves Henry in 19313 clearly state the number of tenants or the amount of land they cultivated. One can only estimate the figures indirectly. In Annam, out f a total population of 4.9 million, there were 658,000 landowners; less than one in every eight persons owned land. If the average family is taken to be five persons, it may be estimated that more than 35 per cent of family heads were landless. What proportion of these had non-agricultural occupations is not known, but it was certainly small. Of the total number of landowners, 93.9 per cent, or 614,000, owned less than 2.5 hectares. But many of these, even, must have rented out their land, since only 590,000 owners cultivated their own land.4

Land Rental Market Activity in Agrarian Reform Areas: Evidence from the Philippines

Abstract: Using data from 3,120 farm household surveyed in 2000 and 2006 the paper tests for factors that affect the degree and extent of households participation in the rural land rental market. The survey period coincided with the full implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) which imposes restriction on the conveyance and transfer (including rental) of all lands awarded under the program. Econometric results show that the rural land rental market is not functioning efficiently. Transaction costs in land leasing are significant resulting in high proportion of non-participants and incomplete adjustment towards desired cultivated area for households that participate in the market. Moreover, the poor and landless have limited access to the land rental market since participation in the market is not determined by agricultural ability but is strongly influenced by endowment of land and access to formal credit. While households with less land tend to rent-in more land, the demand for land increases for household owning land more than 5 hectares. On the other hand, the wealth bias of rural credit market is creating more barriers for the poor to access land. The poor has been able to participate in the rental market through share tenancy arrangements but dependence on informal credit markets constrains them to operate desired cultivated area. The twin effects of inefficient land rental market and credit market imperfections can offset labor advantages of family farms and cause farms to operate below optimal level. The need to achieve an efficient farm size is critical for rural development and should be viewed separately from land ownership. In particular, the land rental market plays a critical role in access to land by the poor and in households adjustment to an optimal farm size. It would thus be desirable for the government to improve the regulatory framework for the land rental market to operate efficiently.

The valuation of short leasehold investments

Abstract: The valuation of short leasehold investments has become a subject of debate over the past few years. Concern has been centred upon the suitability of conventional valuation techniques, the unique nature of the short leasehold investment and its affinity with gilts rather than the mainstream property market. This paper is the result of a seminar at ISVA headquarters in late 1985 to which Butler and Baum contributed, and examines the nature of short leaseholds as investments, the market for short leaseholds, characteristics affecting values and both principles and practice of short leasehold investment valuations. Three case studies are presented in illustration.