Topic
Leasehold estate
About: Leasehold estate is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1589 publications have been published within this topic receiving 21480 citations. The topic is also known as: leasehold & tenancy.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the problem of simultaneous trading in the land lease and credit markets, where a tenant lacking suitable collateral may find in his landlord the only source of credit while the landlord may be willing to provide credit to his tenant because he is better informed about his tenant's loan repayment capacity and also because he can accept collaterals which are not acceptable to other sources of credit, for example the standing crops on leased-in land or the tenant's labour, etc.
Abstract: It is by now generally admitted that rural markets are often imperfect and moveover, transactions in two or more markets are interlinked. Interlocking of markets is supposed to take place when there is a simultaneous trade in more than one commodity or service between the same pair of individuals and this linking of trade in different commodities or services is found to be essential because delinking is either not feasible or too costly.1 Thus, for example, delinking may be impossible if the market for some commodity or service exists only in conjunction with other markets, or if one of the parties has sufficient market power to insist on linking.2 One of the most reported forms of interlinking is the simultaneous trading in the land lease and credit markets. The ^landowner is observed to provide consumption and/or production loans to his tenant. It the context of imperfect capital markets this may be because a tenant lacking suitable collateral may find in his landlord the only source of credit while the landlord may be willing to provide credit to his tenant because he is better informed about his tenant's loan repayment capacity and also because he can accept collaterals which are not acceptable to other sources of credit, for example the standing crops on leased-in land or the tenant's labour, etc. Share-cropping is another instance of interlinking. In such a tenancy contract land is supplied by the landlord while the tenant supplies the labour. A possible rationale for this arrangement could be that by renting out land the landlord is essentially buying the labour of the entire family of the tenant including that of the women and children of the
7 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the value for research and policy development of rental tenancy data collected by the South Australian Rental Tenancy Tribunal (RTT) and found that the lessons learned from South Australia could serve as a pilot for the development of a new (semi-) national framework for monitoring the private rental market.
Abstract: This paper examines the value for research and policy development of rental tenancy data collected by the South Australian Rental Tenancy Tribunal (RTT). The data held by the RTT are for South Australia only, but comparable organisations exist in a number of other states, such as New South Wales and Victoria. Lessons learned from South Australia could serve as a pilot for the development of a new (semi‐) national framework for monitoring the private rental market.
7 citations
01 Apr 1984
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined natural resource management in relation to fuelwood production and agroforestry using a systems approach and focusing on the social context, using a social context.
Abstract: Using a systems approach and focusing on the social context, the study examines natural resource management in relation to fuelwood production and agroforestry. An initial section describing the use and interlinkage of the concepts of ecozone and ecosystem is followed by a discussion of problem ecozones, human use of ecozones, agricultural ecosystems, resource competition, uses of trees and forest products, and tree planting. Rural resource management strategies at the household, community, local, and state levels are discussed in the context of political economy, land tenure and rights, tenancy and sharecropping, group or public landholding, and acquisition and transfer of land.
7 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a two-season production process interlinking land and credit markets and landlord monopoly power was introduced, not to avoid-as Datta and Nugent seem to imply-the problem of corner solutions, but only to introduce a dosage of realism in the model.
Abstract: It is by now well known, particularly due to Bell and Braverman, that a model with constant returns to scale, sharecropping, and the wage-contract choice leads to a tendency for corner solution. In Bardhan (1979) I introduced a two-season production process interlinking land and credit markets and landlord monopoly power, not to avoid-as Datta and Nugent seem to imply-the problem of corner solutions, but only to introduce a dosage of realism in the model. The main problem for interior solutions in the context of the model was caused by the special assumption of constant returns to scale, which I used here, unlike in Bardhan and Srinivasan and Bardhan (1977), primarily to avoid cluttering up the equations. In any case, in peasant agricultural production functions with only land and labor as arguments and other factors suppressed (particularly managerial and animal labor input), the assumption of constant returns to scale is not very realistic. If my 1979 model is taken with diminishing returns to scale, the interior solution and most of the comparative-static results are more robust. It is not inconsistent for the landlord to be a monopolist in the land-lease market and at the same time be a competitive buyer in the labor market. In fact, I think this may be the more realistic case. As indicated in footnote 3 of Bardhan (1979), the demand for labor by others has been suppressed for convenience in equation (9); but, if one likes, one may introduce on the left-hand side of that equation a term D(W2) to represent the net demand for labor by others (say, by pure owner-cultivators) with usual properties of demand functions. None of the subsequent results in Bardhan (1979) changes. As far as I can see the empirical result reported in table 1 by Datta and Nugent on the basis of a "normalized" dependent variable is illegitimate. They combine the proportion of cultivated area under total tenancy given in Bardhan (1979) and the area under sharecropping as percentage of area under sharecropping and fixed-rental tenancy in Bardhan (1977) to get their "normalized" dependent variable, which is the percentage of land under share and "wage" contracts only. This they cannot do unless they use independent information on land under leasing arrangements other than share and fixed-rental tenancy, which in some states are significant.
7 citations
TL;DR: The residential private rented sector (PRS) has the potential to make a significant contribution to the housing needs of the future as discussed by the authors, and the overall effect of these measures is beginning to make the PRS a reinvigorated investment opportunity with long-term potential.
Abstract: The residential private rented sector (PRS) has the potential to make a significant contribution to the housing needs of the future. The PRS benefited from regulatory changes in the late 1980s that removed fetters to rent levels and tenancy length. The historic under‐investment is being re‐evaluated and the PRS is beginning to emerge as a viable corporate and institutional investment vehicle. The strategic assembly of portfolios, which may be highly specialised or more general, can be identified from published demographic forecasts. Finance for new‐build, refurbishment and bulk acquisition can be sourced from specialist residential investment funds. The overall effect of these measures is beginning to make the PRS a reinvigorated investment opportunity with long‐term potential.
7 citations