Leasehold estate

About: Leasehold estate is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1589 publications have been published within this topic receiving 21480 citations. The topic is also known as: leasehold & tenancy.

Operation Barga, ‘Efficiency’ and (De)interlinkage in a Differentiated Structure of Tenancy in Rural West Bengal:

Abstract: Operation Barga in West Bengal caused a decline in the institution of tenancy over a period of two decades. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the field-level data shows that the tenant households are placed in a highly heterogeneous and differentiated manner in society, which is similar to that of the pattern of distribution of general (tenant plus non-tenant) households. We find that tenant households are less productive than the general category of households and, therefore, less efficient. The yield level of recorded tenant households is also distinctly higher than unrecorded tenant households. Recorded tenants are enjoying lower rental rate than unrecorded tenants. The possibility of interlinked transactions has been remote among tenant households.

Rural factor markets in Pakistan

Abstract: Four important and inter-related issues in the economics of agriculture in developing countries are production efficiency, tenancy, technological innovation and rural-urban migration. These issues are examined in this study by analysing the working of rural factor markets using empirical evidence on selected farmers in four villages and an important sub-division in Pakistans Punjab province. The pattern of land holding in Pakistan suggests that land is very unequally distributed. This observation is the basis for may proposals of land reform. It has been argued that inequality in land distribution is undesirable per se as well as because it leads to inefficiency in agricultural production. Empirical evidence from the villages suggests that an inverse relationship exists between farm size and productivity thus lending support to the second part of the argument. Explanations in terms of the working of rural land and labour markets are offered for the existence of the relationship. Tenancy is important in Pakistan. Its existence is explained in terms of adjustments in factor endowments by landowners and landless cultivators given that markets for labour and draught power operate imperfectly. Different tenurial contracts imply different sets of incentives that influence decisions regarding resource allocation on the farm. The empirical evidence suggests that adjustments are made - such as devising cost-sharing, input stipulation and supervision arrangements - to ensure that different tenurial contracts are equally efficient. It is argued that despite the apparent difficulties of access to 'green revolution' technology inputs due to imperfections in their distribution and scarcity of rural credit, small farms use inputs such as high yield variety seeds and chemical fertilizers no less intensively compared to the large farmers. The evidence suggests that new markets for factor services and intricate but more accessible networks of fertilizer and seed distribution may have developed to facilitate the use by small farmers. The relationship between migration and rural credit markets is examined. It is argued that migration may improve the credit ratings of households and thus may facilitate borrowing in the rural credit market. Detailed comments are also made on the role of other rural-end variables such as non-farm income, mechanization, output per capita, education and available land per capita in influencing the decision to migrate. The underlying theme of the study is the analysis of operations in rural factor markets. We analyse, carefully, interactions in these markets and then examine some important aspects of policies in the light of our analysis of the four issues.

Revenue Realization and Distribution in the Transfer of Rural Collective Construction Land Leasehold

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to study feasible ways to obtain the revenue of rural collective construction land during its transfers,and discuss some fundamental principles of its distribution,both of which can be the references for policy makers.Methods of documentation and case study were employed.The results indicate that the government's participation in the transfer of collective-owned construction land does harm to the building of a free land market,even worse,it can easily result in possible misplacement of governmental functions and even corruption.The conclusion drawn from the research is that the government's basic function is to establish and monitor the rules of market,while the realization and distribution of the revenue arising from the transfer of land use right should be done by the market.

Revisit the Coase Conjecture: Monopoly, Durability, and Bundling in Urban Land Use

Abstract: Although land and collective goods are bundled together, they could be provided separately. By studying intertemporal externality in land monopoly and analyzing the interaction between land market structure and the provision of local public goods, this paper conducts a comparative institutional study in the urban setting. I consider five institutional settings depending on whether land and collective good are provided in a bundle: private rental, public rental, private ownership, public ownership, and public ownership with restrictive zoning. The two-period model developed in this paper suggests that homeownership may result in more land development than leasehold. Numeric examples suggest (1) public ownership, i.e., the common form of government providing collective goods, may be efficient for more uniform distribution at large spatial scales; (2) rentals can be desirable for "poor" communities such as historic company towns; (3) private ownership, such as CID (Common Interest Development) and condominium, is more efficient for "rich" communities; (4) restrictive zoning reduces social surplus, and "rich" community may adopt more restrictive measures. These results may help explain why public institutions is the dominating feature of urban institutions and why most private communities are small-scale and located in the suburbs.