Leasehold estate

About: Leasehold estate is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1589 publications have been published within this topic receiving 21480 citations. The topic is also known as: leasehold & tenancy.

Is leasehold forestry really a pro-poor innovation? Evidences from Kavre District, Nepal

Abstract: Community based natural resource management has gained increased concern in the recent years as a means to halting forest degradation and addressing poverty. In Nepal, one of the recent initiatives in this regard is Leasehold Forest Policy, which seeks to enhance the access of the poorer members of the communities to communal land and forest resources. This paper seeks to analyze the practical efficacy of this policy, taking case studies of a cluster of eight Leasehold Forest User Groups in the central hills of Nepal. Our analysis indicates that despite explicit policy emphasis on granting exclusive use rights to the targeted poorest households, there was limited success in the cases studied. We argue that the policy was based on the impractical assumption that “redistributive impact” can be achieved through centrally designed policy instruments and delivery of extension services by state development organizations without deliberative engagement of citizens at different levels.

A New Lease on Life: Landlords, Tenants, and Immigrants in Ireland and Canada

Abstract: In Part 1 Wilson reconstructs the family circumstances and estate management of two landlords, Stephen Moore, third earl of Mount Cashell, and Major Robert Perceval Maxwell. Each owned several estates in Ireland and the estate known as Amherst Island in Ontario. She examines how the management of these estates changed over time and highlights the differences between management in the north and south of Ireland, particularly in Counties Down, Antrim, and Cork. She looks at the form the landlord-tenant relationship took in the New World to determine whether tenancy arrangements in the New World offered landlords an opportunity to start afresh or, instead, were influenced by the traditions and financial circumstances of their Irish estates. The second part of the study follows more than one hundred tenant families who, between 1820 and 1860, migrated from the Ards Peninsula in County Down to Amherst Island, where they rented land from Mount Cashell and, later, from Maxwell. Wilson reveals what life was like in the United Parish of St Andrews, why families emigrated and rented on Amherst Island, and what it meant socially and economically to be a tenant in the New World, where most farmers were freeholders. Wilson sets her study firmly in the framework of British, Irish, and American writing on land tenure, and in this comparative context opens the discussion of tenancy among Canadians more widely than anyone has done heretofore. She concludes that both landlords and tenants were more successful in the New World. Wealth and land ownership might be slow in materializing, but the opportunity, the choices, and the attainment of security were all greater than they had been in Ireland.

Preparing homeless people for independent living and its influence on resettlement outcomes

Abstract: > Abstract_ This paper examines associations between the preparation for independent living that homeless people receive and the outcomes of their resettlement. It draws on evidence from FOR-HOME, a longitudinal study in London and three provincial English cities of resettlement outcomes over 18 months for 400 single homeless people. A high rate of tenancy sustainment was achieved: after 15/18 months, 78% were still in the original tenancy, 7% had moved to another tenancy, and 15% no longer had a tenancy. The use of temporary accommodation prior to being resettled and the duration of stay had a strong influence on tenancy sustainment. People who had been in hostels or temporary supported housing for more than 12 months immediately before being resettled, and those who had been in the last project more than six months, were more likely to have retained a tenancy than those who had had short stays and/or slept rough intermittently during the 12 months before resettlement. The findings are consistent with the proposition that the current policy priority in England for shorter stays in temporary accommodation will lead to poorer resettlement outcomes, more returns to homelessness, and a net increase in expenditure on homelessness services.

Interlinkage, Limited Liability, and Strategic Interaction

Abstract: When will a landlord prefer to supply both land and credit to a tenant rather than allow the lender to borrow from a separate moneylender? The paper shows that if tenancy contracts are obtained prior to contracting with the moneylender, and the tenant has limited liability, interlinked deals will predominate over the alternative situation where the landlord and the moneylender act as noncooperative principals. Basu, Bell, and Bose analyze the example of a landlord, a moneylender, and a tenant (the landlord having access to finance on the same terms as the moneylender). It is natural to assume that the landlord has first claim on the tenant's output (as a rule, if they live in the same village, he may have some say in when the crop is harvested). The moneylender is more of an outsider, not well placed to exercise such a claim. A landless, assetless tenant will typically not get a loan unless he has a tenancy. Without interlinkage, the landlord is likely to move first. In the noncooperative sequential game where the landlord is the first mover and also enjoys seniority of claims if the tenant defaults, interlinkage is superior, even if contracts are nonlinear - a result unchanged with the incorporation of moral hazard. The main result is that if a passive principal - one whose decisions are limited to exercising his property rights to determine his share of returns - is the first mover, allocative efficiency is impaired unless his equilibrium payoffs are uniform across states of nature. The limited liability of the tenant creates the strict superiority of interlinkage by making uniform rents nonoptimal when, with noncollusive principals, the landlord (the passive principal) is the first mover. A change in seniority of claims from the first to the second mover (the moneylender) further strengthens this result. But uniform payoffs for the first mover are not essential for allocative efficiency if he is the only principal with a continuously variable instrument of control. So, the main result is sensitive to changes in the order of play but not to changes in the priority of claims. This paper - a product of the Office of the Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, Development Economics - is part of a larger effort in the Bank to understand the institutional structure of rural markets and its welfare implications.