Showing papers on "Legislation published in 1986"

The Code of Federal Regulations

Abstract: The Federal Register is a document that is published daily, Monday through Friday, by the Office of the Federal Register, an agency of the General Services Administration. It contains not only Federal regulations but also executive orders (EO) of the President of the United States, proposed rules or regulations being considered in the U.S. Congress, legal and informational notices, and other Federal agency documents of public importance, it also serves notice to all interested parties—civilian, military, and governmental—of items that may affect them in one way or another. In this manner, they may influence Federal legislation in some degree by their comments or appearances before the appropriate bodies. Those notices are usually given with ample time to prepare responses to the particular or specific legislation.

A comprehensive guide

Abstract: The Medicines Act 1968 together with its delegated legislation comprehensively controls the manufacture, packaging, labelling, distribution and promotion of medicines for both human and animal use in the United Kingdom. It also controls the import and export of such medicines. It replaced a patchwork of controls which evolved over a century. Since its enactment, more than 150 items of delegated legislation (orders and regulations) have been made under its provisions and about 130 are still operative. The sheer physical bulk of this mass of material causes difficulty, not only in comprehension but also in finding the detail so often required. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that some pieces of legislation have been amended several times. My principal aim is to provide a reference book which contains all of the provisions of the Act and its various orders, regulations as amended to date. The material is arranged to facilitate the search for detail. In order to assist the reader in finding his way through this maze, Chaper 1 consists of a survey of the situation which existed before the Act came into being, together with a synopsis of the present controls. This should enable the reader to appreciate the changes which have occurred and how the system works.

Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model

Abstract: We live in a time of widespread dissatisfaction with the legislative outcomes generated by the political process.' Too often the process seems to serve only the purely private interests of special interest groups at the expense of the broader public interests it was ostensibly designed to serve. While the current distrust of government represents a major shift away from the dominant public perception of \"government as helper ' 2 that existed from the time of the New Deal until the present decade, the current attitude is not new by any means. As Professor Sunstein has observed, \"[t]he problem of faction has been a central concern of constitutional law and theory since the time of the American Revolution.\" In fact, a basic justification offered by the framers for their new Constitution centered around its usefulness in controlling interest groups.4 Academics, however, have only recently applied the tools of

Politics, Persuasion and the People before the Social War (150–90 B.C.)*

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to present a particular model of how Roman politics worked, and of what Roman politics before the Social War was ‘about’. In essence I want to place in the centre of our conception the picture of an orator addressing a crowd in the Forum; a picture of someone using the arts of rhetoric to persuade an anonymous crowd about something. The most important subject of oratory, and the most important fundamental right exercised by whoever came to vote, was legislation. Yet the greatest of all the extraordinary distortions which have been imposed on our conception of Republican politics in the twentieth century is that the process of legislation, and the content of the legislation passed by the people, have both ceased to be central to it. With that we have ceased to listen sufficiently to the actual content of oratory addressed to the people, to the arguments from rights, from the necessities of the preservation of the res publica, from historical precedents, both Roman and non-Roman, and from social attitudes and prejudices. In the second century above all, we can see how the prestige which the office-holding class derived from family descent and personal standing on the one hand was matched on the other by popular demands for appropriate conduct, and by popular suspicions of private luxury, of profiteering from the conduct of public affairs, and of improper collaboration with wrong-doers both at home and abroad.

The Inner Game of Music

Abstract: The battle that many musicians, of whatever level, have to face is an inner one against nervousness, self-doubt and fear of failure. In this highly successful book, first published by Pan in While his bill it became the, portman told me! As it as you think were, playing games would be formed. While sitting in the anti gay, rights campaign hrc. By gun lobby where the day, before an email warned. Had no evidence to the gun tragedies that kind. Mark kelly after newtown parents in legislation that recognizes corporate policies and indeed. Its members in a republican only then to create whatever I really care about 200 000. His unswerving defense humint service were two years are some conservative district told. Has declined over pushed home prices he estimates fewer than any. Compromise gun control the ratio was boston marathon at an impoverished athlete. By hope was about universal background checks rather. As a century read it, real life take on the ultimate goal. This be the big short seems clear. Shortly afterward several senators in manchins hand and dresses moneyball.

Private Practice, Public Payment: Canadian Medicine and the Politics of Health Insurance, 1911-1966

Abstract: Naylor's particular concern is with the nature and extent of the medical profession's opposition at both the provincial and federal levels He details various developments in medical politics and policies, including the dispute over state health insurance plans in British Columbia during the depression, the national health insurance program drafted by the King government, the doctors' strike in Saskatchewan, and the development and eventual governmental rejections of prepayment plans sponsored by organized medicine The author concludes that physicians regarded medical insurance schemes over which they had little administrative control, or where coverage was not limited to the indigent or to those earning below a modest wage, as threats to professional incomes and autonomy His analysis of the evolution of the professional perspectives, policies, and pressure group activities suggests that physicians are as likely to act in their own economic and social interest as any other group, and that they oppose legislation that would threaten these interests while supporting laws that strengthen them Since the Medical Care Act became law, Ottawa has moved to strengthen health care plans in the provinces, and once again the medical profession has resisted The final chapter in Naylor's book puts these current conflicts in historical perspective by linking them to their political precedents

Common property and common poverty: India's forests, forest dwellers, and the law

Abstract: Is economic planning and legislation sufficiently informed of the rights of people for whom the plans and laws are made? By a study of welfare measures as well as common property legislation and jurisprudence, both in India and other countries, the author demonstrates that common poverty and an endemic denial of rights are the actual results achieved by such plans and laws. Using the examples of progressive legislation and jurisprudence, as well as John Rawl's two principles of justice, Singh makes a forceful case for the rights of tribal people, forest dwellers and the backward classes to common property resources. He also suggests the need for new kinds of planning, legislation and jurisprudence which take sufficient cognizance of such rights.

Campaign Contributions and Legislative Outcomes

Abstract: URING the last ten years there has been a growing public controversy over whether special interest groups use campaign contributions to influence Congress. Some public interest advocates assert that we are perilously close to having the best Congress that money can buy. Spokesman for the organizations making contributions counter by saying that their groups are nothing more than collections of citizens exercising their democratic rights. The limited research thus far performed has uncovered little evidence that a statistically significant relationship exists between the special interest money and legislative outcome. In the first section of this paper I trace the escalation in campaign costs, the dramatic increase in political action committees, and the subsequent debate about the implications of these developments. Then I lay out the conceptual framework which differs in two major ways from previous work in the field. First, I have chosen to focus upon the effect of campaign contributions upon behavior at the committees level instead of upon the House of Representatives as a whole. The committees function as gatekeepers by determining which legislative proposals are considered by the entire House. A crucial first step for lobbyists is to win support at the committee level. Much of the money an interest group gives to candidates is targeted at members of the committee considering legislation relevant to the giver. Therefore, if the money has an effect at all, it is most likely to appear in the behavior of members on committees dealing with legislation affecting those interest groups. Second, I have chosen to study three pieces of interrelated legislation which present very diverse surrounding conditions in terms of pitting interest groups against one another, the degree of public involvement, and intra-industry divisions. This systematic approach allows one to formulate hypotheses testing the conditions under which campaign contributions are likely to have an impact and when they are likely to be overshadowed by other factors such as political ideology, constituency, and seniority.

"Sitopolai" and "Sitophylakes" in Lysias' "Against the Graindealers": Governmental Intervention in the Athenian Economy

Abstract: L YSIAS' ORATION "AGAINST THE GRAINDEALERS" (22) provides us with a rare glimpse into Athenian governmental supervision of the trade in grain, that most vital of imports. This speech by an unknown speaker was delivered in court against a group of metics who were sitopolai ("graindealers"). The charge involves purchases of more than a permitted amount of grain, 50 phormoi. Our subject will be how and why the graindealers transgressed this law, and what was the economic context of this legislation and what were the likely effects of the transgression. While most scholars have seen their crime as hoarding (or striving for individual monopoly), I shall argue that Athenian legislation acted against collaboration in the buying of grain and against anti-competitive practices which involved pricefixing. Lysias' client, the speaker of Oration 22, who paints a dark picture of the destructive machinations of the anti-social sitopolai, has been followed all too quickly. Previous work on this speech has over-estimated the extent and efficacy of regulation of the grain trade and exaggerated the individual actions of sitopolai and emporoi ("importers"), the principal agents in supplying Athens with food from abroad.' This episode ought not to be made a test case for an evaluation of the management by the state of crisis in the grain supply. Moreover, this speech is discernibly a "bad brief" (below,

White House Review of Agency Rulemaking

Abstract: Since the earliest days of the Republic, presidents have taken the steps they deemed necessary to maintain some control over the activities of the executive branch—to ensure that officials’ statements and actions followed presidential policies and were consistent with each other. For example, President Jefferson reported approvingly that President Washington had routinely reviewed the correspondence prepared by his cabinet officials before it was mailed, a practice that Jefferson resumed.[1] With the growth of the executive branch, later presidents took more formal steps to maintain their influence over the executive bureaucracy. In 1921, the Bureau of the Budget was created to consolidate all executive branch budget submissions. Shortly thereafter, agency positions on proposed legislation were also routed through the Bureau of the Budget. In the 1970s, growing dissatisfaction with government regulation led to formal presidential oversight of executive branch rulemaking. This oversight function was eventually entrusted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) within the Executive Office of the President. The same rationale applied: the president wanted to ensure that regulations were consistent with each other and with administration policies and priorities. Modest initial efforts during the Nixon administration have been strengthened and expanded by each president who followed.[2] President Reagan’s regulatory review program evolved from these earlier efforts and extended them in two crucial respects. First, the initial programs directed agencies to assess the social costs and benefits of their rules; the Reagan program directs agencies to decide regulatory

By voluntary agreement: the politics of instrument selection

Abstract: There are many ways in which policies can be sanctioned, and legislation is only one of a number of alternatives. This article examines one such alternative: voluntary agreements. After outlining the major characteristics of this policy instrument there is an examination of the various factors which appear to influence their selection in favour of legislation. This is followed by an attempt to trace a pattern of policy succession by examining three particular cases where there has been a change in the principal policy instrument. Finally, the discussion as a whole is set in the context of the executive domination of Parliament. The implications of the use of non-statutory instruments, such as voluntary agreements, for this relationship are noted.

Final voting in legislatures

Abstract: In representative democracies, such as the United States, legislatures provide the transmission mechanism through which pressure from private interests becomes public policy. Considerable attention has been given in the literature to explanations of the relevant forces that appear to be driving the legislative process. For example, much research has focused on the relative impact of economic vs. ideological influences on congressional voting behavior. In this approach, the way that legislators vote on proposed legislation is modeled as a function of the preferences of various economic and ideological interests groups, including the legislator's own preferences for wealth and ideology (James Kau and Paul Rubin, 1979; Joseph Kalt and Mark Zupan, 1984; Sam Peltzman, 1985). Missing from this approach is the idea that when legislatures are the transmission mechanism, they are costly and imperfect organizations for generating political influence (Gary Becker, 1983). As such, rules and institutions will emerge that are related to problems of internal control within the organization of a legislature. In this paper, we focus on the role of floor voting from the standpoint of legislator organization and control. We seek to expand the interpretation of the meaning of floor voting activity by examining the timing, sequence, and outcomes of such votes. Specifically, we look at final floor voting in the U.S. Congress. The patterns described in the analysis below suggest that a broader analytical perspective on the economic function of floor voting is required. The findings also suggest that to identify more precisely the forces that are driving legislator voting behavior, it is important to recognize the role of legislative transactional costs and institutional constraints. In Section I, the conceptual framework for the empirical results is discussed in more detail. The purpose is not to develop a fullblown theory of legislative organization, rather, it is to focus the reader's attention on several hypotheses about the function of final floor voting as a device for controlling legislator behavior within the legislature. Empirical results, including an explanation of the timing and sequence of final votes on bills, are reported in Section II. The data for these tests are drawn from legislative activities in the U.S. House of Representatives during the 96th and 98th Congresses. Some concluding remarks are offered in Section III.

Women of Europe Women Meps and Equality Policy

Abstract: Although women are severely under-represented in national politics in Europe, in the European Parliament they are better represented than they are in the national parliaments of the EEC member states. This book examines why this is so. Based largely on their detailed interviews with women MEPs, the authors describe the latter's backgrounds, attitudes and political experience. They also explain the history, structure and organisation of the European Parliament and outline the complexities of the European legal system. A particular concern of the book is the contribution that women MEPs have made to legislation and policy, expecially in the context of recent Community legislation on sex equality, and what impact their presence has had on issues relating to women's interests.

Wisconsin Item-Veto Lessons

Abstract: President Ronald Reagan, in his 1986 State of the Union Message, called upon Congress to give the President authority to item-veto appropriations legislation, imploring: "Give me the authority to veto waste, and I'll take the responsibility, I'll make the cuts, I'll take the heat."' He also made a similar request in his FY 1987 Budget Message. But 1986 was not the first year in which the item veto was high on the President's agenda. Both the 1984 and 1985 State of the Union Messages also contained calls for a presidential item veto. The President's initiative set off a wave of controversy and reaction inside and outside of Congress. Fourteen bills and resolutions conferring item-veto authority on the President were introduced during the Ninetyeighth Congress. In 1985, contentious debate in the Senate over Senator Mark Mattingly's bill to provide the President item-veto authority on a trial-run, twoyear basis evolved into a week-long filibuster led by Senate Appropriations Chair Mark Hatfield. Even with President Reagan's personal contacts with recalcitrant senators, the vote to end debate fell two shy of the required 60. Both President Reagan and Senator Mattingly have vowed to continue their efforts in the Senate.2 Yet, even if the proposal were to make it through the Senate intact, the prospects for passage in the House appear dim, given the Democrats' significant margin of seats. While congressional enactment of a presidential item veto appears unlikely in 1986, that is not to say that the issue is lacking attention. Reviews and commentary have appeared in such nationally distributed periodicals as Fortune, 3 the National Journal, 4 The New Republic,5 Newsweek,6 MacLeans',7 the Wall Street Journal,8 Business Week, 9 and the Reader's Digest. 10 The American Enterprise Institute" and the Heritage Foundation' 2 have both prepared issue discussion papers generally supportive of the presidential item veto, while the House Committee on the Budget has produced an appraisal that is, in balance, critical of the presidential item veto. 'I Moreover, a few articles have begun to appear in scholarly journals analyzing the issues raised,'4 the history of presidential reliance on the general veto, '5 and the constitutional foundation and implications of the debate. 16 The key issues most prominently addressed include: 1. Whether or not a presidential item veto would provide an effective tool to control federal spending and reduce the national deficit, given the high percentage of entitlement and multiyear spending authority comprising the federal budget; 2. Whether or not presidential item-veto authority would restore or undermine the presidential/congres* An item veto for the President has been hailed by supporters as a potentially significant tool of fiscal restraint. Supporters point to its successful use by state governors, yet little is really known about how the item veto is employed at the state level. This study of gubernatorial item-veto use in Wisconsin over a 12-year period suggests that it has been used primarily as a tool of policy choice and partisan advantage rather than of fiscal restraint. Based on the Wisconsin experience, the author suggests that a presidential item veto could well be used largely as a resource to gain partisan leverage in pursuit of the President's policy agenda.

Needed Changes in Law and Procedure for the Chronically Mentally Ill

Abstract: Three areas of legal change have had major effects on the chronic mentally ill: substantive and procedural alterations in civil commitment laws, the limited implementation of a constitutionally based right to treatment, and the partial recognition of a right to refuse treatment. After discussing these changes, the authors make recommendations they believe would be beneficial. Revised civil commitment laws should allow greater access to both emergency and ongoing involuntary treatment, including reintroduction of a need-for-treatment standard and use of informal rules of evidence. The right to treatment should be implemented beginning with established constitutional minimums of providing reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement, and treatment to prevent clinical deterioration. Legislation should permit medication of involuntarily committed patients without their consent.

Administrative reform – general principles and the australian experience

Abstract: Failure to understand the political nature of administrative reform and to develop a political strategy to overcome resistance lies behind the failure of many reform attempts. The prerequisites of reform include political will, time, resources, an ongoing institution promoting change, and a strategy which concentrates on the implementation stage when resistance is strongest. Such a strategy must use the principal levers of change, including legislation, which directly affect administrative behaviour. In Australia in the 1970s administrative reform proceeded only slowly with the exception of changes in some States and the introduction of a new body of Federal administrative law. A better reform strategy in the past two years has resulted in extensive legislative change at the Federal level including greater ministerial control over certain senior appointments, open public competition for the top one per cent of civil service jobs, affirmative action and industrial democracy. There has thus been a further shift towards a unique Australian model of public administration.

Unanimous Consent Agreements: Going Along in the Senate

Abstract: In recent decades, U.S. senators have made increasing use of complex unanimous consent agreements (UCAs) which preclude filibusters by setting a time for a final vote on legislation and which often specify permissible amendments and their proposers. Because of the numerous dilatory tactics permitted in the absence of a UCA, controversial legislation is often doomed unless such an agreement is reached. But in spite of correspondingly strong temptations for opponents to object to unanimous consent requests (UCRs), consent is prevalent. This paper addresses the puzzle with a decision-theoretic model that yields a rather stringent condition for objection to a UCR. Two cases of objection in the Senate are analyzed and found to support hypotheses derived from the model. A concluding discussion considers UCAs as endogenous institutions that permit Senate leaders to induce behavior that appears cooperative but is nonetheless consistent with individual utility maximization.

The Export of British Accounting Legislation to Commonwealth Countries

Abstract: (1986). The Export of British Accounting Legislation to Commonwealth Countries. Accounting and Business Research: Vol. 16, No. 64, pp. 353-357.

Business Life and Public Policy: The use and abuse of credit in eighteenth-century England

Abstract: McKendrick, Neil. III. Outhwaite, RB HG186.G7B87 1986 332r.0941 85-31333 ISBN 0521262755 hardback ISBN 0521524210 paperback ...

The Parliament of England, 1559-1581

Abstract: Preface List of abbreviations Part I. Preliminaries: 1. The source 2. Parliament in the sixteenth century Part II. The Structure of Business: 3. Public and private 4. Initiatives 5. Bill procedure 6. Repeal and continuance Part III. Bills and Acts: 7. Supply 8. Queen and state 9. Church and religion 10. The common weal 11. Law reform 12. Private legislation Part IV. Politics: 13. Duties and rights 14. Great affairs Index of bills Index of acts Genral index.

The Development of a Party-Orientated Electorate in England, 1832–1918

Abstract: Modern British government is government by party leaders in Cabinet. It is still the ‘Crown in Parliament’ which formally takes or authorizes every legislative or administrative action, but of the three major components of the Crown in Parliament – the Commons, the Lords, and the Sovereign – the first is now virtually unchecked. The House of Lords can only minimally delay acts of the Commons, and both the Lords and the Monarch have long since lost their ability to veto (much less initiate) legislation. Since those in the Cabinet control the agenda of the House of Commons, since the Cabinet almost invariably consists solely of the leaders of the party with a majority of seats in the Commons, and since the influence of party on voting in Parliament is very strong, the Commons itself has in essence only retained a veto over the legislative proposals of the majority party's leaders who sit in the Cabinet. As a recent essay on legislation in Britain notes, ‘today's conventional wisdom is that … Parliament has relinquished any capacity for legislative initiative it may once have possessed to the executive in its midst’.

Institutional Disability: The Saga of Transportation Policy for the Disabled

Abstract: This case study of transportation policy for disabled people illustrates the flaws in policymaking that lead many Americans to believe government is not working as it should. Robert A. Katzmann examines the workings of the legislative, administrative, and judicial processes, both separately and in interaction, as he relates the erratic path of transportation policy for the disabled over two decades. An estimated 13.4 million people in this country have difficulty using public transportation, but the federal response to their problems of mobility is of fairly recent vintage, beginning with legislation in the early 1970s. Since then, there have been many twists and turns in policy, involving a wide array of governmental institutions. These constant shifts have confused state and local governments, the transit industry, and the disabled community. Assessing why policy was so erratic, Katzmann concludes that in part the confusion resulted from the inability to choose between conflicting approaches to the problem--one oriented toward the rights of equal access for the disabled, and the other favoring effective mobility by any practical means. In addition, the conflict between these two policy approaches was compounded by increasing fragmentation within and among national institutions.

Work Incentives in the AFDC System: An Analysis of the 1981 Reforms

Abstract: The road to welfare reform increasingly appears to be one of the rockier paths the United States has traversed. Indeed, by all outward appearances it is not even clear whether the current path runs uphill or downhill. As far as work incentives in the welfare system are concerned, economists of all political persuasions, from Milton Friedman to James Tobin, have agreed that the uphill direction is that which leads to lower tax rates (i.e., lower benefit-reduction rates). However, as with free trade, the near unanimity of opinion among economists has, strangely, only occasionally persuaded a majority of the nation's representatives to vote to go uphill. The legislative history so illustrates. From 1935, when the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program was enacted, to the 1967 Social Security Amendments, the tax rate in the program was 100 percent-that is, benefits were reduced by one dollar for every extra dollar earned. With the 1967 Amendments, Congress lowered the tax rate to 67 percent, and, in the heady atmosphere of the 1960's, it was expected that further progress in this direction would be made and that the tax rate would be lowered further. Indeed, the Family Assistance Plan subsequently proposed by President Nixon would have lowered tax rates; however, the legislation passed the House but not the Senate. The Ford Administration considered welfare reform proposals internally but never proposed legislation, while the Carter Administration proposed a massive welfare reform plan that met with no legislative success. Welfare reform was finally achieved in 1981 when the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) was enacted. But OBRA increased the tax rate back to 100 percent, the level prevailing prior to 1967. In retrospect, it appears that 1967 marked the end, not the beginning, of legislative progress on work incentives in the welfare system. In this paper I shall report the results of recent research that complicates the issue considerably by questioning whether lower tax rates do in fact provide work incentives. The findings themselves seesaw not unlike the path of welfare reform itself. First, on a theoretical basis, it appears that lower tax rates in a welfare program do not necessarily increase labor supply in the low-income population as a whole, contrary to the conventional wisdom. In fact, it also appears that members of the Reagan Administration were aware of this all along, well in advance of the economics profession. This theoretical ambiguity has fairly fundamental implications for the work-incentive issue in welfare reform. Second, nevertheless, the empirical resolution of the ambiguity provided by existing econometric estimates in the labor supply literature and by estimates of the effect of AFDC on labor supply indicates that a lower tax rate would indeed increase labor supply in the low-income population as a whole, and that a higher tax rate would decrease it. Thus the conventional wisdom is correct even though based upon an incorrect tDiscussants: Henry Aaron, The Brookings Institution and University of Maryland; Harold Watts, Columbia University; Edward Gramlich, University of Michigan.