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Legislature

About: Legislature is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 16557 publications have been published within this topic receiving 290672 citations. The topic is also known as: organs of power.


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TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and contract theory of contractual institutions, and explain why, given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures, specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange.
Abstract: This paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions. Like market institutions, legislative institutions reflect two key components: the goals or preferences of individuals (here, representatives seeking reelection) and the relevant transactions costs. We present three conclusions. First, we show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators. Second, we explain why, given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures, specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange. Third, our approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue.

1,316 citations

Book
01 Jan 1990
TL;DR: Arnab et al. as mentioned in this paper examined the influence of citizens' potential preferences, and argued that legislators also respond to these preferences in order to avoid future electoral problems, and showed how legislators estimate the political consequences of their voting decisions, taking into account both the existing preferences of attentive citizens and the potential preferences of inattentive citizens.
Abstract: Congress regularly enacts laws that benefit particular groups or localities while imposing costs on everyone else. Sometimes, however, Congress breaks free of such parochial concerns and enacts bills that serve the general public, not just special interest groups. In this important and original book, R. Douglas Arnold offers a theory that explains not only why special interests frequently triumph but also why the general public sometimes wins. By showing how legislative leaders build coalitions for both types of programs, he illuminates recent legislative decisions in such areas as economic, tax, and energy policy. Arnold's theory of policy making rests on a reinterpretation of the relationship between legislators' actions and their constituents' policy preferences. Most scholars explore the impact that citizens' existing policy preferences have on legislators' decisions. They ignore citizens who have no opinions because they assume that uninformed citizens cannot possibly affect legislators' choices. Arnold examines the influence of citizens' potential preferences, however, and argues that legislators also respond to these preferences in order to avoid future electoral problems. He shows how legislators estimate the political consequences of their voting decisions, taking into account both the existing preferences of attentive citizens and the potential preferences of inattentive citizens. He then analyzes how coalition leaders manipulate the legislative situation in order to make it attractive for legislators to support a general interest bill.

1,308 citations

Book
01 Jan 2005
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explained the EU political system and the decision-making procedures of the European Union, focusing on the role of the Single Market and the single market's role in the political system.
Abstract: Introduction: Explaining the EU Political System PART I: GOVERNMENT Executive Politics Legislative Politics Judicial Politics PART II: POLITICS Public Opinion Democracy, Parties and Elections Interest Representation PART III: POLICY-MAKING Regulation of the Single Market Expenditure Policies Economic and Monetary Union Citizen Freedom and Security Policies Foreign Policies Conclusions: Rethinking the European Union Appendix: Decision-making Procedures of the European Union Bibliography

1,282 citations

Book
01 Jan 1991
TL;DR: Rohde as mentioned in this paper argues that a realignment of electoral forces led to a reduction of sectional divisions within the parties, particularly between the northern and southern Democrats, and to increased divergence between the parties on many important issues.
Abstract: Since the Second World War, congressional parties have been characterized as declining in strength and influence. Research has generally attributed this decline to policy conflicts within parties, to growing electoral independence of members, and to the impact of the congressional reforms of the 1970s. Yet the 1980s witnessed a strong resurgence of parties and party leadership-especially in the House of Representatives. Offering a concise and compelling explanation of the causes of this resurgence, David W. Rohde argues that a realignment of electoral forces led to a reduction of sectional divisions within the parties-particularly between the northern and southern Democrats-and to increased divergence between the parties on many important issues. He challenges previous findings by asserting that congressional reform "contributed" to, rather than restrained, the increase of partisanship. Among the Democrats, reforms siphoned power away from conservative and autocratic committee chairs and put control of those committees in the hands of Democratic committee caucuses, strengthening party leaders and making both party and committee leaders responsible to rank-and-file Democrats. Electoral changes increased the homogeneity of House Democrats while institutional reforms reduced the influence of dissident members on a consensus in the majority party. Rohde's accessible analysis provides a detailed discussion of the goals of the congressional reformers, the increased consensus among Democrats and its reinforcement by their caucus, the Democratic leadership's use of expanded powers to shape the legislative agenda, and the responses of House Republicans. He also addresses the changes in the relationship between the House majority and the president during the Carter and Reagan administrations and analyzes the legislative consequences of the partisan resurgence. A readable, systematic synthesis of the many complex factors that fueled the recent resurgence of partisanship, "Parties and Leaders" in the Postreform House is ideal for course use.

1,185 citations

Book
01 Jan 1986
TL;DR: Riker as discussed by the authors discusses the feature of politics that all of the manipulators exploited and sketches out the new political theory that explains why manipulation works the way it does, which is a useful and entertaining informal essay on political tactics that will have direct utility in the classroom.
Abstract: In twelve entertaining stories from history and current events, a noted political scientist and game theorist shows us how some of our heroes we as well as ordinary folk have manipulated their opponents in order to win political advantage. The stories come from many times and places, because manipulation of people by other people is universal: from the Roman Senate through the Constitutional Convention of 1787, to the Congress, state legislatures, and city councils of twentieth-century America. The results of manipulation are not trivial, as we see, for example, in Riker's account of Lincoln's outmaneuvering of Douglas in their debates and in his description of the parliamentary trick that defeated the Equal Rights Amendment only six years ago in the Virginia Senate. The tales can be enjoyed by anyone. For the scholar, they are held together by a concluding chapter in which Riker discusses the feature of politics that all of the manipulators exploited and sketches out the new political theory that explains why manipulation works the way it does. Preface Lincoln at Freeport Chauncey DePew and the Seventeenth Amendment The Flying Club Gouverneur Morris in the Philadelphia Convention Heresthetic in Fiction Camouflaging the Gerrymander Pliny the Younger on Parliamentary Law Trading Votes at the Constitutional Convention How to Win on a Roll Call by Not Voting Warren Magnuson and Nerve Gas Exploiting the Powell Amendment Reed and Cannon Conclusion "A useful and entertaining informal essay on political tactics that will have direct utility in the classroom."-Douglas W. Rae, Yale University William H. Riker is Wilson Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester and a former president of the American Political Science Association. He is the author of numerous books, including Theory of Political Coalitions, a classic in the field.

1,145 citations


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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
20241
20232,787
20226,259
2021417
2020484
2019532