Showing papers on "Legitimacy published in 1978"

The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis*

Abstract: In spite of the traditional legitimacy accorded the market mechanism of the private sector in advanced capitalist nations, governments in those nations have become more influential as providers of social services and income supplements, producers of goods, managers of the economy, and investors of capital. And in order to finance these various activities the revenues of public authorities have increased dramatically–to a point where they are now equivalent to one-third to one-half of a nation's economic product.This growth in governmental activity in advanced capitalist society is examined by considering the causes, and some of the consequences, of the expansion of the public economy–defined, following Schumpeter's discussion of the “tax state,” in terms of the extractive role of government. The primary concern of this article is to discover why some nations have experienced a far greater rate of increase in recent years and, as a result, have a much larger public economy than other nations. Five types of explanation are elaborated to account for the growth of the scope of governmental activity: (1) the level and rate of growth in the economic product; (2) the degree to which the fiscal structure of a nation relies on indirect, or “invisible,” taxes; (3) politics–in particular the partisan composition of government and the frequency of electoral competition; (4) the institutional structure of government; and (5) the degree of exposure of the economy to the international marketplace. The article evaluates the five explanations with data for 18 nations, and concludes by discussing some implications of the analysis.

Infrastructures, Societies, and History'

Abstract: THis ARTICLE is a translation of my response to a request from the review Dialectiques for my opinion on two points fundamental to the social sciences, namely, ideology and class. For want of space, I shall merely outline some provisional conclusions that I have reached as briefly and as clearly as possible. I shall be dealing with four topics in turn: (1) the distinction between infrastructure and superstructure; (2) the relationship between the determinant role of the economy in the last analysis and the dominant role of any given superstructure; (3) the ideel2 aspect of social reality and the distinction between ideological and nonideological when dealing with ideel realities; (4) the role of violence and consent in the workings of the power of domination of an order or a class, etc. (can we speak of a paradox of "legitimacy" regarding the emergence of classes and the state?). Before going any farther, I should like to emphasize my debt to the ever-growing-and already immense-body of fresh material being thrown up by anthropological and historical research. As far as history is concerned, I am a mere amateur. My reading has centered mainly on problems of state formation and the transformation of class relations. I am afraid I shall probably disappoint those of my readers who would have liked me to spell out more precisely the connections between my general, abstract positions and this wealth of anthropological material

Crisis and Legitimacy: The Administrative Process and American Government

Abstract: Preface Introduction 1. Crisis and legitimacy in the administrative process Part I. Sources of crisis in the administrative process: 2. Separation of powers and the American imagination 3. The departure from judicial norms 4. Public perceptions and administrative performance 5. Agency independence and political accountability 6. Delegation of power and institutional competence 7. Explaining differences in agency performance 8. The significance of public attitudes toward agency goals 9. The significance of institutional capacities and limitations Part II. The relevance of administrative procedure 10. Administrative procedure and the nature of legitimacy Part III. The nature of the formal administrative process 11. Defining the idea of 'agency' 12. The Administrative Procedure Act and enforcement proceedings 13. The significance of an impartial hearing officer 14. Separation of functions and the Constitution 15. Disqualification for bias Part IV. The nature of the informal administrative process: 16. The meaning of summary action 17. Summary action and the Constitution 18. Summary action as an administrative process 19. Structuring the use of summary action Conclusion: 20. The challenge of administrative legitimacy Notes Bibliography Index.

Corporate Liberalism in the American Business Community, 1920–1940

Abstract: (i.e., big business leaders who believed that intelligent collaboration between business, government, and organized labor was an attainable goal) from World War I through the prosperous 1920s, the despondent 1930s, and the busy and prosperous years of World War II. He concludes that corporate liberal opinion grew more influential in both corporate and governmental circles during and after the period. Throughout the twentieth century, relations between large corporations and the state have provided vast fields for academic conjecture. The national government grounds its legitimacy in doctrines of citizen sovereignty, natural rights of the individual, mass suffrage, majority rule, and the public accountability of elected officials. But big business, as a system of power, rests upon very different bases. Ascending hierarchies of technological expertise, financial and managerial skill, profitability, and power replace the relatively egalitarian assumptions of a republican political system. Direct mass participation in managerial decision-making is largely non-existent, the various paeans to "stockholder democracy" and "pension fund socialism" notwithstanding. Virtual representation of interests enables corporate leaders to make decisions for their respective clienteles and, presumably, in their best interests. Corporate social responsibility, when and where recognized, has generally assumed that simple profit maximization legitimizes industrial operations.'

Legitimacy: Can We Retrieve It?

Abstract: of political units, regimes, or.institutions.I Not getting a clear answer to this question, we may begin, Stein-fashion, with asking what the question implies. Why are so many students of national, comparative, and international politics concerned about legitimacy? When a term whose use goes back far into history becomes questionable, there must be something in the underlying situation that accounts for it. We hear about the "crisis" of systems, the "decline" or even "loss" of their legitimacy. The question seems to be urgent. Before dealing with this question, I shall briefly state the main theses of this article (leaving definitions of terms to subsequent clarification): (a) The external legitimacy of the territorial state is declining, in part, because of its frequent failure to fulfill its traditional function of providing feelings of group identity; (b) Domestic legitimacy is endangered because of the state's increasing difficulty in fulfilling its function of protection as well as that of insurin2 a minimum of welfare to its people; (c) Much of (b) is due to failure to cooe effectively with global issues raised by population increase combined with the limits economic growth encounters in regard to resources, environment, etc. People everywhere lose trust in rulers' ability to solve these novel but basic problems; (d) Global problems can only be solved by transforming the relationships between the territorial state and international organization; such a transformation may restore legitimacy to the state and convey increased legitimacy to the international agencies concerned.

The new Dutch and German drug laws: social and political conditions for criminalization and decriminalization.

Abstract: The "drug wave" of the late 1960s was widely perceived as a threat to the legitimacy of normative expectations in Dutch and German society. Although the overwhelming reaction of public opinion to drug users in both countries was hostile and punitive, the German legislature passed even more repressive laws whereas the Dutch legislature adapted the normative system to the use of both "soft" and "hard" drugs. Although in each instance the initiative for legal change came from the political and moral "progressives," the conservative "moral center" retained a veto power. Why it used this veto power in Germany but actively supported the reform bill in Holland is explained in terms of the macrostructure of each society.

The Nature of Communications Practice in a Dependent Society

Abstract: In a capitalist society every activity and every product participate in the world and logic of commodities. The very language which allows the sense of this activity and of this product - whatever they may be - to be transmitted to the public is the language of the merchant; this mercantile language is transformed into the lord and master of all languages. The mercantile form is the general form of exchange. The activity and product of communication do not escape dominant social relationships. In order to establish the mercantile form of communications, to make of it a "natural" activity - an activity which is achieved without those who are dominated (i.e., the receivers) suspecting its identity as an instrument of domination controlled by a particular class - the means of communication undergo a process of fetishization, like that to which all activities and products are subjected. Under the influence of fetishism, living beings are transformed into things (factors of production) and things begin to live. Thus, money "works," capital "produces." In the same way, the media "act." To guarantee its legitimacy, the capitalist mode of production needs a collection of fetishes which fortify its rationale of social domination. The appearance of these fetishes is intimately connected to the development of the productive forces. Marx spoke of the fetishism of commodities and money and described it as inherent to the capitalist mode of production. To make a fetish

Bangladesh in 1977: Dilemmas of the Military Rulers

Abstract: THE OUTSTANDING EVENTS in 1977 reveal two leading patterns in Bangladesh. On the one hand, the first half of the year was characterized by the government's pragmatist policy, its stability and confidence. During this period the military regime sought legitimacy through a referendum, a nationwide election was held for the local councils, and the government launched a wide range of socioeconomic policies. During the second half of the year, on the other hand, divergent political forces generated tension and an abortive coup shook the military establishment and introduced elements of disquiet and instability. The purpose of this paper is to outline the changing events in 1977, the dilemmas of the military government, and the management of the internal economy and international relations.

Economic Structure and National Goals—The Jewish National Home in Interwar Palestine

Abstract: The formation of the Jewish national home in Palestine provides an opportunity to examine the economics of an unusual “nation building”: the planning and making of a national existence without a state The revival of Jewish nationality in Palestine started in the late nineteenth century with the first immigration motivated by national ideology ( Alia Rishona ) and with, the establishment of the World Zionist Organization (1897), whose goal was to create a Jewish political entity and ultimately a state It was not, however, until the end of World War I that the revival achieved momentum The Balfour Declaration (November 1917) proclaiming Britain's intention to promote the formation of a Jewish national home in Palestine and the establishment of the British mandate in Palestine after the war provided the supportive political environment for the renewal of Jewish nation building Moreover, both the League of Nations (which officially granted Britain the mandate) and the British government recognized the Zionist Organization as the legitimate representative of world Jewry and as the leading body of the emerging Jewish community in Palestine for matters concerning the national home This gave the Zionist Organization an international legitimacy to add to its legitimacy among Jews as a quasi-governmental institution for the purpose of re-establishing their national existence

Parties and politics in modern Germany

Abstract: Introduction An International And National Overview Political Parties: A Comparative Perspective German Parties: A Historical Perspective West German Parties Since World War Ii The Party State: Political Legitimacy The Christian Democrats: Right of Center The Social Democrats: Left of Center The Free Democrats: Keeping the Balance The Greens: Challenging the Establishment Left and Right Radical Parties: Protesting the System East German Parties Since World War Ii The Socialist Unity Party and the Bloc Parties The Turbulent Transition, 19891990 Parties In The Unified Germany The First Three Years Super Election Year 1994 Conclusion.

The 1977 indonesian election and new order legitimacy

Abstract: the cause of this tension was the difference between what the government said and what it did, between the stated commitment to build Panca Sila Democracy and the general perception of few-holds-barred manipulations designed to ensure government victory and opposition defeat. The effect was that, despite a 62% popular majority, the government's goal of maintaining its right to rule through electoral processes was not achieved. Ongoing conflicts over leadership, policies, and constitutional issues have thus not been resolved and indeed have been only marginally influenced (probably to the disadvantage of the present government) by the campaign and its outcome. Establishing Legitimate Government in Indonesia In liberal democratic theory, elections are'the link between the principle of popular sovereignty and the practice of government by a small number of officials. Citizens choose their leaders and, through those choices, decide on the substantive issues of the day. Assurance that election results reflect the people's will is provided by a set of guarantees ? usually contained in a constitution or other basic law ?concerning freedoms of speech, press and assembly, election procedures, an independent judiciary, and so on. These rules are accepted by politicians as a given of the system in which they operate and constitute an essential constraint on their behaviour. From the early days of Indonesian nationalism, popular sovereignty has been the generally accepted legitimating principle of government. The 1950 Constitution, on which the first posttransfer of sovereignty governments was based, expressed this principle in liberal democratic terms. An elected Parliament and a cabinet chosen by majority rule were the central institutions of government. In the first general election in 1955, a large number of parties competed for 257 seats in Parliament. Four were successful: the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), with 22.3% of the votes and 57 seats; the Masyumi, a modernist Muslim party, with 20.9% of the vote and 57 seats; the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), a more conservative Islamic party, with 18.4% and 45 seats; the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) with 16.4% and 39 seats. No other party won more than 8 seats (Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955, Ithaca,

Decolonisation and International Status: The Experience of Brunei

Abstract: T N the final quarter of the twentieth century, the residual practice of decolonisation has been influenced by standards sanctioned by its previous beneficiaries who dominate the General Assembly of the United Nations. Governments which claim legitimacy on the basis of a popular will, expressed-if at all-more often than not in managed elections and referenda, have affirmed conventions about the bases of post-colonial state succession, especially the inalienable right of self-determination. Internal consistency has not always been the strongest quality of such affirmation. For example, constitutional association with a traditional colonial power is likely to be challenged even in the face of the verifiable wishes of the inhabitants of any imperial residuum. Thus, the people of the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar have been encouraged to contemplate life under Argentine and Spanish rule. In these cases, physical distance from the metropolitan power and close contiguity to claimant states have bulked large, whereas the principle of self-determination has been conveniently overlooked. Such inconsistency of standards in the urging of decolonisation does not appear to be the case for the Sultanate of Brunei, a mere vestige of a Malay-Moslem suzerainty which once extended over the entire area of Northem Borneo. Brunei offends against all the canons of new statehood. This is not because of its minuscule size which might seem to validate charges of non-viability. Such charges are hardly permitted in an age which has seen numerous micro-states accepted as legitimate members of the international community. The fact that one of the oil majors exercises an overwhelming role in its economy also does not place Brunei in either a unique or a pariah position. Brunei has been condemned as an objectionable political anachronism because of its exclusive association with the United Kingdom and because as a direct consequence of that association it is governed openly on a monarchical basis without deference to the orthodoxies of popular participation. As a result, i,ts international status is questionable in the opinion of a vast majority of the members of the UN General Assembly. A relevant factor in successive attempts to make the Sultanate conform to the standards espoused by this majority has been

Democratic legitimacy and direct elections to the European parliament

Abstract: The theme of ‘democratic legitimacy’ and the way it affects the institutions and development of the European Community is a recurrent one both in the literature on Western European integration and especially in debates amongst European politicians and parliamentarians. This article examines the theme within the context of the direct elections to be held to the European Parliament in 1979. It is argued that the European Parliament has certain legitimacy problems which stem from the nature of its authority, intelligibility, visibility, and the way in which it acts as the European Community's ‘grand forum’. The holding of European elections will not in themselves overcome these problems, and a number of suggestions are offered as to how the European Parliament and the European Community can achieve democratic legitimacy.1

Political Strikes : Three Burning Questions

Abstract: The current state of the debate about political strikes in Australia is examined, looking particularly at three questions which merit urgent academic attention. In each instance it is suggested that the valid position may be some what different from that which many government and press spokesmen currently assume to be self-evident. It is also argued that the designation "political strike" is best reserved for reference to industrial action which has as its subject matter, an issue of broader significance than the narrow "traditional" sphere of trade union concerns (wages and working conditions). The phrase has frequently been used in the past in connection with the hidden political motives of the strikers. Secondly, it is advanced that the economic consequences of political strikes may be far less than is commonly supposed, though any conclusive data on this question is difficult to obtain. Finally, the question of the legitimacy of political industrial action in a liberal democracy is considered. Three a...

Compulsion and Social Change: Is Authoritarianism the Solution to India's Economic Development Problems?

Abstract: The view of critics like Myrdal that a solution to problems of mass poverty requires sweeping changes in established cultural attitudes and institutions which cannot be carried out through democratic methods remains influential in India among intellectuals and radical political parties. Yet, a frontal assault on the existing social order would delay or abort basic economic reforms by fragmenting large numbers of the poorer classes along more potent allegiances to religion, language, and caste. An alternative solution can be devised based on the distinction between direct and indirect obstacles to economic development which are part of the social setting. Direct constraints are found in patterns of land ownership and land tenure. By contrast, the cultural attitudes, caste structures, and power relations are indirect obstacles in the sense that they strengthen ideological and political patterns that stand in the way of agrarian reform. Under Indian conditions democratic rather than authoritarian institutions offer the best prospect over the long term for carrying out basic economic changes. They strengthen egalitarian values and provide an opportunity for direct organization of the more numerous lower castes to weaken both the legitimacy and power of the dominant landed castes—without risking the social disorder of a direct confrontation.

The Cult of Monarchy, Political Loyalty and the Workers' Movement in Imperial Germany

Abstract: Every political system depends for its stability on the society's acknowledgement of its authority. There must be a certain degree of identification between those who hold political power and those they rule. For this consensus to work there has to be not only a psychological disposition on the part of the majority to accept the 'rulers" legitimacy, but also shared values and agreed norms of behaviour which validate the authority of government. The political process insofar as it is not naked terror is never only a one way flow but an inter-action between rulers and ruled. That psychological disposition to accept authority is brought into being via the institutions of a given political system, through which its attitudes are transmitted. Generally this process is one of 'modellearning' within the framework of family, school, youth organizations, etc. which prepare the way for later, more specialized training in communication. One way in which this communication can be analysed is as a system of signs which, by simplifying reality, facilitate adjustment to the environment. 'Politics as ritual' crystallizes around concentrated symbols which, by presenting complex subject-matter simultaneously and in integral form makes it easy for the public to assimilate. The ritual thereby assists mental integration through conformity and in relieving anxieties via the security of group identity. This paper analyses the workings of 'politics as ritual', by examining a particular society as a representative example. Germany's system of government in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was constitutional monarchy. A compromise

Professor Renzo De Felice and the Fascist Phenomenon

Abstract: Renzo De Felice's most recent publications, Mussolini il duce and Fascism: An Informal Introduction to Its Theory and Practice, have caused considerable consternation among both the lay and academic public. De Felice has suggested that generic fascism, and particularly Italian Fascism, may have displayed some progressive and revolutionary features. He goes on to suggest that Italian Fascism shared some affinities with the traditional “left.” Most of these contentions are well supported in the specialized literature; while they may cause some political discomfort, they should generate little intellectual resistance. The discussion concerning sensitive political issues has caused scholars to neglect some important methodological theses which De Felice is prepared to defend. The most critical issue turns on the role and legitimacy of generalizing over an ill-defined generic fascism. De Felice has attempted to restrict the characterization “fascist” to one or two strictly European regimes. The article concludes that there are no methodological grounds for such a restriction.

A Note On Common Sense and Christian Eschatology

Abstract: According to Bernard Bailyn, Common Sense carried its case for independence "to the point where the whole received paradigm within which the Anglo-American controversy had until then preceded came into question". Thomas Paine's success with Common Sense is not easily accounted for. In trying, commentators have repeatedly been drawn to the pamphlet's lack of scholarly citations designed to impress the educated elite and its substitution of the everyday language of the common man for the Latin-studded prose typically employed by colonial pamphleteers. Dispassionate reason can unmask the historical monarch as a thief, thereby undermining his legitimacy, but unaided it provides no motive to revolution. Paine's prophetic voice emphasizes the providential discovery of America after the Reformation, "as if the Almighty graciously meant to open a sanctuary to the persecuted in future years, when home should afford neither the friendship nor safety".

Mormonism in America and Canada: accommodation to the nation-state*

Abstract: Though nineteenth century Mormonism confronted society as a rival political, economic, and social system, twentieth century Mormonism has acknowledged the legitimacy of the nation-state. Only by abandoning their "peculiar institutions" - theocracy, communitarian socialism, and polygamy - were Mormons allowed to establish permanent constituencies in America and Canada. This accommodation required reformulation of early Mormon theology and has resulted in remarkable conformity to national cultural values. The status of contemporary Mormonism in Canada and the United States is also discussed. Resume. Tandis que le mormonisme du dix-neuvieme siecle s'opposa a la societe, la voyant comme un rival politique, economique et social, le mormonisme du vingtieme siecle a reconnu la legitimit6 de l'etat national. Seulement a force d'abandonner leurs institutions singulieres - la th6ocratie, le socialisme communautaire et la polygamie - les mormons purent-ils 6tablir des colonies permanentes aux itats-Unis et au Canada. Cette readaption exigea la r6forme de la premiere th6ologie mormons et a abouti a la conformite remarquable aux valeurs nationales et culturelles. Dans l'essai actuel il s'agit en plus du mormonisme contemporain au Canada et aux ltats-Unis.

Three Forms of Political Ethics

Abstract: second-order" virtues (e.g., between being just and general conscientiousness), and sketched a "morality of traits" as his version of virtue ethics. Citing the Stephen maxim on being and doing, he concluded: I propose... that we regard the morality of principles and the morality of traits of character, of doing and being, not as rival kinds of morality between which we must choose, but as two complementary acts of the same morality. Then, for every principle there will be a morally good trait, often going by the same name, consisting of a disposition or tendency to act according to it; and for every morally good trait there will be a principle defining the kind of action in which it is to express itself. To parody a famous dictum of Kant's: principles without traits are impotent, traits without principles are blind.19 The principles and traits that Frankena finds most fundamental and irreduceable are benevolence and justice. 16 Leo Strauss, Liberalism: Ancient and Modern (New York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. 20-21. 7 Science of Ethics (1882), p. 148, quoted in John Laird, "Act Ethics and Agent Ethics," Mind 55 (1946): 113-32, at 116. 18 Nicolai Hartmann, Ethics, Stanton Coit, trans. 3 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1932), Vol. 2, pp. 226-27. 19 Ethics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 49, 53. This content downloaded from 207.46.13.111 on Sun, 22 May 2016 04:43:05 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Three Forms of Political Ethics 13 In 1970 an entire issue of The Monist was devoted to the concept of virtue. In that issue Frankena, and also Stanley B. Cunningham, harked back to H. A. Prichard's influential article, "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" (1912), and suggested that the eclipse of virtue as a concept in contemporary philosophy owed much to it. Prichard's article so sharply separated right actions from inner desires or a knowable good that he felt the right could never be derived from the good. "...we can only feel an obligation to act; we cannot feel an obligation to act from a certain desire."2° The attempt to derive the right from the good was, in Prichard's very influential view a "mistake." Good actions could not be derived from good motives alone and valid obligations could not, by the same token, be derived from anything as subjective and internal as virtue. The mistake was widely conceded, and deontologists began to look for more external bases of moral obligation. "... the demise of the notion of virtue was inevitable when it was cut off from direct participation in human actions and relegated exclusively to the private area of emotions and desires."21 (Oddly, although Prichard did not allow right to be derived from good, i.e., did not allow us to feel obligated to act from a specific desire, he did allow the reverse. He thought we could, for example, intuitively feel an obligation to become courageous, even if we were not permitted to feel validly obligated by the mere presence of courageous feelings.) Prichard dismissed the possibility of a different view of virtue in a footnote. This prompted Frankena in the 1970 article to say: ... moral philosophy must do more than hint at an ethics of virtue in a footnote or in an article or a chapter. It must fully explore the possibility of a satisfactory ethics of virtue as an alternative or supplement to one of obligation and moral goodness, not only to explain what the people we admire in biography and literature live by, but to see what there is in our "new morality" and how we ourselves should or at least may live.22 The "new morality" to which Frankena refers is presumably the new communitarianism or ambiguous rebellious individualism that grew up in the nineteen sixties. Students of politics may be allowed to wonder that his illustration of the usefulness of an ethics of virtue was not drawn from a slice of the real world but from people "in biography and literature." The sense that people in books are more real than the check-out clerk in the local supermarket may be a peculiar academic affectation. There is, however, a more serious point here. An ethics of virtue may always be somewhat academic because it rests on good motives, which are, we know, in real life always somewhat opaque. Acting on the assumed motives of others, however, may be a political necessity how else can bargaining, promising, contracting, threatening, cooperating go on? Students of politics may all be like Coddington's economists who need certain concepts mainly so they can beg the question of what people really want. Virtue may not be a very good analytical concept for political ethics because it points to an impenetrable inner self. Frankena may have been well advised to advocate an ethics of virtue to explain literary figures, for literary figures have exposed motivations as real people rarely do. E. F. Carritt, a rigorous writer on ethics, perhaps on these grounds believed that morality and virtue should be separated altogether. His position is that if I do an act I think right "for that reason simply" it is a moral act (Carritt can be classified as an act-deontologist and an intuitionist). If I do an act because I desire to do it, and the desire has usually led to right acts, it is a virtuous act. If the act 20 Prichard, "Does Moral Philosophy Rest Upon a Mistake?" Mind 21 (1912): 21-37 at 33. The essay is reprinted in H. A. Prichard. Moral Obligation (London: Oxford University Press, 1949). 21 Stanley B. Cunningham, "Does 'Does Moral Philosophy Rest Upon a Mistake?' Make an Even Greater Mistake?" The Alonist 54 (1970): 86-99 at 87. 22 Frankena, "Prichard and the Ethics of Virtue," The Monist 54 (1970): 1-17 at 17. This content downloaded from 207.46.13.111 on Sun, 22 May 2016 04:43:05 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 14 Western Political Quarterly is done because I desire to do, not just this particular act, but right acts as such, it is a saintly act. Finally, if the act is done with no desires at all, it is a holy act.23 With the arrival on the pages of the American Political Science Review of the articles by Salkever and Bank and McCarl, mentioned above, we may perhaps herald the return of virtue as a conceptual concern in politics. (Whether the postWatergate political campaigns of the late 1970s with their added ingredient of appeals to good moral character represent a parallel shift in popular consciousness remains to be seen.) Neither of these articles, valuable as they are, is directed at furthering a new virtue ethic as defined here. Salkever begins by noting how different are the two questions, "What am I obligated to do?" and "What is the virtuous thing to do?" He portrays the politics of obligation and the politics of virtue as "the two alternative political languages presented to us most clearly by the history of political thought." The forgotten political man, the lover of the city, is contrasted with the central figure of modern political life, economic man, the lover of self. It is the predominance of the latter which requires the theory and practice of obligation and legitimacy. (Philosophic man, the lover of truth, in both ancient and modern times occupies a rarified atmosphere outside either the political or the economic realm.) Salkever's complaint is that in modern thought, "the shift from the virtue paradigm to the legitimacy paradigm appears to have been accompanied by a severe narrowing of the range of questions which inform philosophic inquiry into the political things."24 The weakness of Salkever is that he draws a Straussian line between ancients and moderns in much too categorical a fashion and therefore exaggerates the unity of obligation theorists and others who might be called modern. Hannah Arendt, for example, despite her admiration for the Greek polis and her communitarianism, is put by Salkever in the unlikely company of modern liberals because she expounds a concept of freedom. Interest theory is treated as but an aspect of obligation theory. The deep gap that separates deontologists and utilitarians as well as the attempts through rule-utilitarianism to overcome the gap are overlooked by Salkever, presumably because neither are Aristotelian. Bank and McCarl, in reaction to Salkever's juxtaposition of the obligation paradigm over against the virtue paradigm (economic man over against political man), argue that these divisions are not historical watersheds but simply stages in a cognitive-developmental sequence that can be explained in terms of the personal growth of any individual. Following the theories of cognitive and moral development employed by John Dewey, Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, they argue against Salkever's fixed view of human nature: "Our position is also based on an understanding of human nature. We have argued that the nature of a thing is how it grows, that man grows (develops cognitively and morally) in the presence of justice, so human nature is to be understood in connection with justice."25 Virtue for Salkever is Greek arete, employed with Greek phronesis, judged by Greek sophia. Virtue for Bank and McCarl is Kohlberg's sixth stage of moral development. It is no disparagement of their positions to say that together their concerns are more meta-ethical, even epistemological, than ethical. Neither position is directly concerned to incorporate current ethical thinking into a virtue ethic that can be brought to bear on current policy decisions.

Machiavelli and Fanon: Ethics, Violence, and Action

Abstract: Niccolo Machiavelli and Frantz Fanon are in the tradition of political philosophy. Do they not address themselves to the notion of freedom, the concept of legitimacy, and the moral basis of political action? This article will further argue that there exists a notable correspondence of thought between them.The political thought of Machiavelli enjoys ubiquitous fame. Its pristine vigour is attested to by the fact that, through the past four and a half centuries, dictators and democrats have embraced its values.1 Yet there is no patent contradiction in this if one realises that Machiavelli deals compellingly with what is while not rejecting what ultimately ought to be; his prince is a sort of political Everyman concerned with realising the kingdom of earth.

Building on Cultural Strengths: A Route to Academic Achievement.

Abstract: The basic tradition in the education of mi nority children in this country has been grounded in the "compensatory" approach on the assump tion that black, latin, and other minority groups have special deficiencies that must be "made up" in the educational effort. The overwhelming opinion has been that blacks were educationally deficient and thus cul turally inferior. Even those who believed in racial equality denied the legitimacy of an African world culture. Moynihan and Glazer (1965), for example, said:

Attitudes towards Political Independence in Jamaica after Twelve Years of Nationhood

Abstract: In a follow-up study of 83 Jamaican leaders after twelve years of nationhood, we conclude that attitudes towards political independence have become considerably more favourable. The theory linking social structural inequalities and favourable judgements of equality as joint eauses of nationalist attitudes which had been formulated to account for the I962 pre-independence relationships fits the data in post-independence I974 too, but not as well as before the explained variance in attitude towards independence going from 57 to 25 per cent. Additionally, path models reflect some important changes in the structural and ideational sources of attitlldinal variation, espeeially the disproportionate increase in nationalist attitudes among economic dominants, the wealthiest leaders, and leaders with unfavourable attitudes towards equality. Another change was the new development of Restive Nationalists, elites who were more likely than other leaders to think that political independence had not gone far enough in producing structural change, that problems such as poverty and economic inequality had not been reduced adequately, that more radical changes were needed, and that such changes were not possible under a democratic political regime nor under an economy dependent on international capitalism. No period in history has seen the formation of so many new states as that since the Second World War. For 24 years, from I943 to I966, there was an average of about two and one-half new states created each year, more than one every five months for a total of 6I by I966.1 By I977 the total exceeded 80. The thunderous cries of 'Freedom' and 'Equality' and the jubilant celebrations held on tlle eve of imperialist departure and the raising of the new flag were testaments to the widespread belief among rnany of the new citizens that political independence would be beneficial for them. Prior to independence, the question of national sovereignty was a burning issue. However, mingled with the hopes of the nationalists and the favourable images of the future national society they created were This content downloaded from 207.46.13.158 on Wed, 16 Nov 2016 04:27:43 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Attitudes towards political inde7endence in jtamaica . . . fears expressed by other voices. Often, the well-to-do classes under 209 colonialism, the descendants of the European ruling classes, and differentiated tribal or racial minorities, among others, anticipated more ill-treatment from local nationalists than they had received from the European imperialists. Frequently, they opposed the transition from colony to independent state or tried to delay it as long as possible. In this paper we ask about the fate of such hopes and fears in one new state, Jamaica, after twelve years of nationhood. Specifically, (I) we report changes in elite attitudes towards political independence from just prior to independence to twelve years later. (2) We test for the post-independence period the 'egalitarian revolution' theory of nation formation constructed to explain pre-independence relationships; that is, we ask if the structural and ideational sources of support and opposition to political independence are the same as they were and, if not, how they have changed. And (3) we search for emergent developments in the nature of elite attitudes, new responses after twelve years of nationhood that did not exist before. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND A major conclusion of earlier work on the new states of the Caribbean is that political independence was primarily a means, an organizational tool, to achieve the end of a more egalitarian society.2 There are at least two senses in which this was so. The first was the desire to achieve the status of 'citizen' equal to that of the peoples of already existing independent states, and the second was the desire to achieve distributional reforms, social justice, and more equal rights for people within the new states as well. The nationalist revolution of our time is thus viewed as a manifestation of the demand for equality within an inegalitarian social structure, both nationalism and equality being traced by Bell and Moskos, using the works of other scholars,3 to the eighteenth-century foundations of modern nationalism and the Age of Enlightenment in Western Europe and its North American settlements. Whether or not the master underlying trend is more properly thought of as a 'democratic' or an 'egalitarian' revolution, of course, depends in part on the historical period one is considering. For the formation of the older states, political democracy was of more relevance than questions of economic and social equality. Most true nationalists during the American Revolution, for example, regarded themselves as republicans, advocating a system of government in which officials derived their authority from an electorate (of varying sizes) and assumed that the legitimacy of government rested on 'the people's will'. Even Sam Adams 'who was accused of preferring the company of ropewalkers to men of his own station' would not have understood the demand for economic and socia] equality that was often mixed with-and frequently

Preparing for unwanted events: Instances of international political terrorism∗

Abstract: The problems posed by international political terrorism, the likely performances of governments facing such challenges, and advisable preparatory coping strategies all benefit from systematic consideration of the experience, provided by practices and analyses of attempts to avoid and manage other forms of international crises. This paper pursues such a perspective to supplement more familiar approaches that use police and disaster amelioration points of departure. The broader experience of international crises makes it clear that the problems are less ones of incident management than of prolonged competition for an image of political legitimacy and efficacy. Accordingly, recommendation for analysis and planning are made with emphasis on inventory of existent management capacities and decision processes, clarification of alternative political consequences, nonintrusive technology fixes, bargaining and indemnification policy options; and diagnostic gaming.

Weimar Republic and Nazi Era in East German Perspective

Abstract: COMMUNIST countries are notably history-minded.1 Since they see mankind as advancing toward socialism and commu? nism as part ofa law-determined historical process, they base their legitimacy in large part on historical antecedents.2 East Germany, being faced with the opposing claims of West Germany, has been par? ticularly concerned with establishing its historical legitimacy. The Ger? man Democratic Republic (GDR) traces its roots back into a distant past, along a road on which medieval peasant risings, socioreligious upheavals, Reformation and Peasants' War, the War of Liberation against Napoleon I, and the revolutions of 1848 and 1918 stand as significant milestones. Perhaps no Communist leadership ever did its homework in history more thoroughly prior to its assumption of power than did the East German leaders. From the mid-i930s on, in their Moscow exile, they devoted considerable attention to the exploration of historical questions from the Marxist perspective; later, Marxist historians and Communist party officials began drawing up plans for historical study programs, textbooks, and monographs in preparation for the day when they would be able to take over power in Germany. They knew it would be important to prepare the way "historically," too, for the transformation of Germany from a capitalist into a socialist society.3

Interest-Group Liberalism and Juridical Democracy Two Theses in Search of Legitimacy

Abstract: Theodore Lowi's proposal for juridical democracy is inspired by a "crisis in authority" that has been generated under "interest-group liberalism," his designation for con temporary pluralist theory. Lowi suggests that the roots of the crisis lie in the pluralists' misreading of the Madisonian model. Juridical democracy is an alternative analytical and programmatic format which is designed to reintroduce the now lost benefits of the Madisonian model. Lowi's approach demonstrates, in contrast to interest-group liberal ism, that government coercion is essential and advantages some groups over others, and it provides a vehicle for testing whether consensus about public values exists. Both approaches accept "interests" as the basic unit of analysis, but neither affords criteria for assessing them. Interests make claims which are undemocratic, inegalitarian, and the like. Lacking evaluative criteria, both positions resort to social and institutional regularities and procedures as the essence of democracy.