Limit price

About: Limit price is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 4865 publications have been published within this topic receiving 148546 citations.

Technical Note—Dynamic Pricing with Gain-Seeking Reference Price Effects

Abstract: We study a dynamic pricing problem of a firm facing reference price effects at an aggregate demand level, where demand is more sensitive to gains than losses. We find that even the myopic pricing strategy belongs to one type of discontinuous maps, which can exhibit complex dynamics over time. Our numerical examples show that, in general, the optimal pricing strategies may not admit any simple characterizations and the resulting reference price/price dynamics can be very complicated. We then show for a special case that a cyclic skimming pricing strategy is optimal, and we provide conditions to guarantee the optimality of high-low pricing strategies.

The Benefit of Uniform Price for Branded Variants

Abstract: The extensive adoption of uniform pricing for branded variants is a puzzling phenomenon, considering that firms may improve profitability through price discrimination. In the paper, we incorporate consumers' concerns of peer-induced price fairness into a model of price competition and show that uniform price for branded variants may emerge in equilibrium. Interestingly, we find that uniform pricing induced by consumers’ concerns of fairness can actually help mitigate price competition and hence increase firms’ profits if the demand of the product category is expandable. Furthermore, an individual firm may not have incentive to unilaterally mitigate consumers’ concerns of price fairness to its own branded variants, which suggests the long-run sustainability of the uniform pricing strategy. As a result, fairness concerns from consumers provide a natural mechanism for firms to commit to uniform pricing which enhances their profits.

Network auction system and method

Abstract: The present invention provides a computerized system and methods for conducting on-line auctions. One or more concurrent auctions for one or more lots of products or services may be conducted. A dynamic pricing mechanism allows bidders to view the price at which a lot is offered and to make a bid when the price is acceptable to the bidder. In some embodiments, the results of the auction of one lot affect the starting price, reserve price and other characteristics of auctions for subsequent lots. In some embodiments, the pricing of a lot may depend more generally on the demand for similar products. Mulitple stage auctions with declining price and rising price aspects are also provided.

Price floors and competition

Abstract: A potential source of instability of many economic models is that agents have little incentive to stick with the equilibrium. We show experimentally that this can matter with price competition. The control variable is a price floor, which increases the cost of deviating from equilibrium. According to traditional theory, a higher floor allows competitors to obtain higher profits. Behaviorally, the opposite result obtains with two (but not with four) competitors. An error model, which builds on Luce (Individual Choice Behavior, 1959), can adequately describe supra-Nash pricing with a low-floor, but then fails to capture the overall pro-competitive effect of a high-floor seen for duopolies.