Showing papers on "Loss aversion published in 1997"

An Experiment on Risk Taking and Evaluation Periods

Abstract: Does the period over which individuals evaluate outcomes influence their investment in risky assets? Results from this study show that the more frequently returns are evaluated, the more risk averse investors will be. The results are in line with the behavioral hypothesis of "myopic loss aversion," which assumes that people are myopic in evaluating outcomes over time, and are more sensitive to losses than to gains. The results have relevance for the equity premium puzzle, and also for the marketing strategies of fund managers.

The Effect of Myopia and Loss Aversion on Risk Taking: An Experimental Test

Abstract: Myopic loss aversion is the combination of a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains and a tendency to evaluate outcomes frequently. Two implications of myopic loss aversion are tested experimentally. 1. Investors who display myopic loss aversion will be more willing to accept risks if they evaluate their investments less often. 2. If all payoffs are increased enough to eliminate losses, investors will accept more risk. In a task in which investors learn from experience, both predictions are supported. The investors who got the most frequent feedback (and thus the most information) took the least risk and earned the least money. Language: en

Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations

Abstract: A half-decade after the first systematic applications of prospect theory to international relations, scholars continue to debate its potential utility as a theoretical framework. Key questions include the validity of the experimental findings themselves, their relevance for real-world international behavior that involves high-stakes decisions by collective actors in interactive settings, and the conceptual status of prospect theory with respect to rational choice. In this essay I assess theoretical and methodological debates over these issues. I review work in social psychology and experimental economics and conclude that challenges to the external validity of prospect theory-based hypotheses for international behavior are much more serious than challenges to their internal validity. I emphasize the similarities between prospect theory and expected-utility theory, argue that hypotheses regarding loss aversion and the reflection effect are easily subsumed within the latter, and that evidence of framing effects and nonlinear responses to probabilities are more problematic for the theory. I conclude that priorities for future research include the construction of hypotheses on the framing of foreign policy decisions and research designs for testing them; the incorporation of framing, loss aversion, and the reflection effect into theories of collective and interactive decision making; and experimental research that is sensitive to the political and strategic context of foreign policy decision making.

A Test of the Theory of Reference-Dependent Preferences

Abstract: Eight alternative methods of eliciting preferences between money and a consumption good are identified: two of these are standard willingness-to-accept and willingness-to-pay measures. These methods differ with respect to the reference point used and the dimension in which responses are expressed. The loss aversion hypothesis of Tversky and Kahneman's theory of reference-dependent preferences predicts systematic differences between the preferences elicited by these methods. These predictions are tested by eliciting individuals' preferences for two private consumption goods; the experimental design is incentive-compatible and controls for income and substitution effects. The theory's predictions are broadly confirmed.

Loss Aversion and Bargaining

Abstract: We consider bargaining situations where two players evaluate outcomes with reference-dependent utility functions, analyzing the effect of differing levels of loss aversion on bargaining outcomes. We find that as with risk aversion, increasing loss aversion for a player leads to worse outcomes for that player in bargaining situations. An extension of Nash’s axioms is used to define a solution for bargaining problems with exogenous reference points. Using this solution concept we endogenize the reference points into the model and find a unique solution giving reference points and outcomes that satisfy two reasonable properties, which we predict would be observed in a steady state. The resulting solution also emerges in two other approaches, a strategic (non-cooperative) approach using Rubinstein’s alternating offers model and a dynamic approach in which we find that even under weak assumptions, outcomes and reference points converge to the steady state solution from any non-equilibrium state.

Explaining Returns with Loss Aversion

Abstract: I develop and test an equilibrium asset pricing model based on loss averse investors. The model specifies a pricing kernel that is a nonmonotonic function of the market return. It also implies that investors demand a higher risk premium for risk associated with negative market returns than for positive market returns. The model assumes rational expectations and is consistent with no-arbitrage pricing. Estimates of the model's parameters are similar to values reported elsewhere. As the loss aversion literature predicts, the accuracy of the model depends on the frequency with which data is observed. Consistent with Benartzi and Thaler (1995), the model explains annual returns better than competing models, but it does not explain monthly, quarterly, or half-year returns. The model fits both returns that reflect the equity premium and stock returns alone.

Self-control and loss aversion in intertemporal choice

Abstract: The life-cycle theory of saving behavior (Modigliani, 1988) suggests that humans strive towards an equal intertemporal distribution of wealth. However, behavioral life-cycle theory (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988) proposes that people use self-control heuristics to postpone wealth until later in life. According to this theory, people use a system of cognitive budgeting known as mental accounting. In the present study it was found that mental accounts were used differently depending on if the income change was positive or negative. This was shown both in a representative nationwide sample of households and in a student sample. Respondents were more willing to cut down on their propensity to consume when faced with an income decrease than to raise it when the income increased. Furthermore, contrary to the predictions of behavioral life-cycle theory, it was found that the respondents adjusted their propensity to consume the most when the income increases or decreases took place immediately. Hence, it is suggested that theories of intertemporal choice (e.g., Loewenstein, 1988; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992) provide a better account of the data than does the behavioral lifecycle theory.

Despairing Over Disparities: Explaining the Difference Between Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept

Abstract: This paper examines the three major explanations for the disparity between WTP and WTA observed in contingent value surveys and laboratory experiments: a belief that the results must be biased in some fashion, Hanemann's (1991) substitutes hypothesis, and the loss aversion model proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1991). Starting from the assumption that individuals make utility maximizing choices, we develop structural equations that yield parametric tests of the hypotheses within a single, non-experimental framework. The approach is flexible enough to incorporate a variety of functional form and distributional assumptions and can be applied to either data from either open-ended bids or dichotomous choice questions.

Prospect Theory Goes to War: Loss-Aversion and the Duration of Military Combat

Abstract: This paper contributes to the empirical foundation of prospect theory in real-life international relations by testing two of its major implications in the field of military conflict. Using duration analysis for a data set of twentieth century battles, it is shown how the experience of losses contributes positively to the preparedness to continue fighting, up to a point where casualties clearly outweigh any direct utility drawn from ordinary expected-utility theory. Moreover, the empirical results also indicate that the relative position compared to the opponent's is clearly less important for the decision whether to stop a battle or not than the change of one's own position compared to the beginning of the fight.

Undercontribution bias in health care spending account decisions.

Abstract: Results from this work describe 239 responses to a mailed survey regarding employee benefits decisions at a large eastern university. The primary objective of this work is to test for an undercontribution bias in health care financing decisions. The results establish the existence of an undercontribution bias in both actual employee decisions and hypothetical flexible spending account contribution decisions. We describe this bias within the context of related biases including loss aversion, mental accounting, status quo and omission biases. Surprisingly, we find a significant order effect in this study and posit that preference construction in this context is an active, reference-dependent process. In addition, results from this work demonstrate the endogenous nature of health care flexible spending account expenditures. The results have important implications both for the descriptive framework of and the normative solution to the flexible spending account contribution decision.

Loss Aversion and the Non-Neutrality of Money

Abstract: We consider whether the introduction of the psychological concept of loss aversion into agents' preferences could generate a macroeconomic model in which changes in the money supply can have real, persistent effects. It is demonstrated that the macroeconomic implications of loss aversion depend on the specification of the reference wage. We consider two plausible specifications: one in which the reference wage is the average wage and the other in which a worker's reference wage is the wage she was paid in the previous period.

Self-Control and Loss Aversion in Intertemporal Choice

Abstract: The life-cycle theory of saving behavior (Modigliani, 1988) suggests that humans strive towards an equal intertemporal distribution of wealth. However, behavioral life-cycle theory (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988) proposes that people use self control heuristics to postpone wealth until later in life. According to this theory, people use a system of cognitive budgeting known as mental accounting. In the present study it was found that mental accounts were used differently depending on if the income change was positive or negative. This was shown both in a representative nationwide sample of households and in a student sample. Respondents were more willing to cut down on their propensity to consume when faced with an income decrease than to raise it when the income increased. Furthermore, contrary to the predictions of behavioral life-cycle theory, it was found that the respondents adjusted their propensity to consume the most when the income increases or decreases took place immediately. Hence, it is suggested that theories of intertemporal choice (e.g., Loewenstein, 1988; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992) provide a better account of the data than does the behavioral life-cycle theory.

Implementing behavioral concepts into banking theory : the impact of loss acersion on collateralization

Abstract: In standard bank theoretic models agents are assumed to be fully rational expected utility maximizers. This fact ignores the huge amount of evidence for anomalies in human behavior found by psychologists. In this paper we argue that the implementation of behavioral concepts into banking theory might increase the predictive power of the models. As an example we consider a loan market and discuss the impact of loss aversion on the degree of collateralization in equilibrium. The very well established concept loss aversion predicts entrepreneurs to pay much more attention to the potential loss of some of their initial wealth due to a collateralized loan than they would do as expected utility maximizers. This results in a higher effort choice which in turn increases the success probability of the loan financed project. Optimal levels of collateralization are derived for different degrees of loss aversion and the problem of private information about the degree of loss aversion is addressed. It is shown that in specific situations banks can offer self selecting pairs of contracts that costlessly eliminate the private information problem.