Showing papers on "Loss aversion published in 2003"

Small feedback‐based decisions and their limited correspondence to description‐based decisions

Abstract: The present paper explores situations in which the information available to decision makers is limited to feedback concerning the outcomes of their previous decisions. The results reveal that experience in these situations can lead to deviations from maximization in the opposite direction of the deviations observed when the decisions are made based on a description of the choice problem. Experience was found to lead to a reversed common ratio/certainty effect, more risk seeking in the gain than in the loss domain, and to an underweighting of small probabilities. Only one of the examined properties of description-based decisions, loss aversion, seems to emerge robustly in these ‘feedback-based’ decisions. These results are summarized with a simple model that illustrates that all the unique properties of feedback-based decisions can be a product of a tendency to rely on recent outcomes. Copyright # 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Alternative Models for Capturing the Compromise Effect

Abstract: The compromise effect denotes the finding that brands gain share when they become the intermediate rather than an extreme option in a choice set (Simonson 1989). Despite the robustness and importance of this phenomenon, choice modelers have neglected to incorporate the compromise effect within formal choice models and to test whether such models outperform the standard value maximization model. In this article, we suggest four context-dependent choice models that can conceptually capture the compromise effect. Although these models are motivated by theory from economics and behavioral decision research, they differ with respect to the particular mechanism that underlies the compromise effect (e.g., contextual concavity vs. loss aversion). Using two empirical applications, we (1) contrast the alternative models and show that incorporating the compromise effect by modeling the local choice context leads to superior predictions and fit relative to the traditional value maximization model and a stronger (naive) model that adjusts for possible biases in utility measurement; (2) generalize the compromise effect by demonstrating that it systematically affects choice in larger sets of products and attributes than previously shown; (3) show the theoretical and empirical equivalence of loss aversion and local (contextual) concavity; and (4) demonstrate the superiority of models that use a single reference point over "tournament models" in which each option serves as a reference point. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of this research, as well as the ability of the proposed models to predict other behavioral context effects.

On the theory of reference-dependent preferences

Abstract: A theory is proposed in which preferences are conditional on reference points. It is related to Tversky and Kahneman's reference-dependent preference theory, but is simpler and deviates less from conventional consumer theory. Preferences conditional on any given reference point satisfy conventional assumptions. Apart from a continuity condition, the only additional restriction is to rule out cycles of pairwise choice. The theory is consistent with observations of status quo bias and related effects. Reference points are treated as subject to change during the course of trade. The implications of endogeneity of reference points for behaviour in markets are investigated.

Evaluation Periods and Asset Prices in a Market Experiment

Abstract: We test whether the frequency of feedback information about the performance of an investment portfolio and the flexibility with which the investor can change it influence her risk attitude in markets.In line with the prediction of Myopic Loss Aversion (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995), we find that more information and more flexibility result in less risk taking.Market prices of risky assets are significantly higher if feedback frequency and decision flexibility are reduced.This result supports the findings from individual decision making, and shows that markets do not eliminate such behavior.

Reference Incomes, Loss Aversion, and Physician Behavior

Abstract: We examine the effects of reference income on the behavior of young male physicians. Using a unique panel of data, we relate physicians' reference and actual incomes to their subsequent income growth. Reference income has a strong positive effect on subsequent income for physicians who are below their reference points, but not for physicians who are at or above their reference points. Loss aversion, which posits a kink in utility at the reference point, explains this puzzling pattern. Physicians respond strongly to shortfalls from the reference point—they take unappealing actions to boost earnings—because the marginal utility of income is steep in that range. Competing prominent theories, tested here, fail to explain these relationships.

Does Binding of Feedback Influence Myopic Loss Aversion? An Experimental Analysis

Abstract: The feedback frequency and the length of commitment are two important features of investment alternatives in intertemporal decision-making. So far, empirical research has shown that a lower feedback frequency combined with a longer binding period decreases myopia and thereby increases the willingness to invest into a risky asset. Almost nothing is known, however, about the isolated effect of each variable and about a possible interaction of these variables. In an experimental study, we disentangle the intertwined manipulation of feedback frequency and binding period, commonly used in previous research, to analyse how both variables alone contribute to the change in myopia. We find a strong effect depending on the length of commitment, a much less pronounced effect of feedback and a strong interaction between both variables. The results have important implications for real world intertemporal decision-making. Keywords: Intertemporal decision-making, myopic loss aversion, feedback frequency, length of commitment, evaluation period

Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium

Abstract: It uses two behavioral concepts to explain the famous"equity premium"in financial markets.One is Loss Aversion meaning investors are more sensitive to loss than to gain.The other is that investors tend to evaluate their portfolios too frequently.We find that a loss averse investor who evaluate his portfolios annually will behavior in consistence with the empirical equity premium.

The Interactive Effect of Message Framing, Presentation Order, and Source Credibility on Recruitment Practices

Abstract: A study was conducted to determine the interaction effects of presentation order, source credibility and message framing on recruitment practices. Subjects (n=200) received a realistic job preview of a target position in an organization and were asked to rate this job on attractiveness, willingness to purchase and perceived performance. Variables were manipulated in a 2x2x2 completely crossed factorial design. Results yielded the hypothesized main effects for presentation order and message framing as well as a three-way interaction for credibility by order by frame. Findings are then discussed. In today's job market, applicants are bombarded with numerous recruitment messages from various sources. Recruiters are increasingly concerned with the effectiveness of their messages. Researchers agree that how information is presented to the perspective job applicant may effect the recruitment process. In other words, the way information is labeled or framed has been shown to influence judgment and decision about products ( Smith, 1996 & Smith & Petty, 1996). Yet, despite the importance of this issue to recruiters, few studies have investigated the effect of presentation order and the interactive effect of presentation order, source credibility and message framing on job appicants who receive recruitment messages. Is the message framing effect moderated by the order in which such messages are presented to appicants? Further, does the perceived credibility of the source of the message matter to the message recipient? Evidence exists which suggests that both the presentation order (Haugtvedt & Wegener 1994) and the perceived credibility of the message source (Grewal, Gotlieb & Marmorstein, 1994) may influence the final judgment of the message recipient. This study extends the investigation of message framing effects by testing a group of hypotheses on the interactive effect of message presentation order and the perceived source credibility on the framing effect during the presentation of a recruitment message. Theoretical Background Message Framing The effect of message framing can be better understood from the perspectives offered by research in the field of information processing. Much of the literature on information processing has focused on the cognitive processes by which applicants integrate various types of information. It has been shown that an individual's judgements and decisions can be influenced greatly by the way information is presented or framed. Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) was used to explain these results. This theory suggests that there are two major outcomes about the effect of framing a decision problem in gain versus loss terms. First, it holds that people are risk-averse when a decision problem is formulated in terms of gain and risk-prone when the problem is formulated in terms of loss. Second, it suggests that people exhibit loss aversion, i.e. that losses loom larger than gains (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Consumer studies have broadened the scope of the investigation and focused on the effect of deterministic product attribute framing on consumers' overall product judgments (e.g., Levin and Gaeth 1988) and the effect of framing advertising messages (Smith 1996). Message Framing and Expectations A variety of perspectives on message framing effects have gained some support. It appears that there is no single, uniform manner in which message framing affects persuasion but, rather, a variety of processes can co-occur (Smith & Petty, 1996). The elaboration likelihood model (ELM) suggests that variables can effect persuasion in a number of different ways. They can serve as peripheral cues, they can serve as persuasive arguments or they can effect the extent or direction of message elaboration (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). In the present research we are interested in determining how message framing might effect the extent to which people elaborate or systematically process information. …

Experimental Investigation of the Subjective Value of Information in Trading

Abstract: Subjective judgments regarding information are important for the design of information systems. This study examines the endowment effect in the context of evaluating information. Theoretically, value judgments that affect the demand for information are influenced by ownership rights, a phenomenon known as the endowment effect in trading situations. In a simple computer simulated business game, 31 participants conducted a management task in which they were provided opportunities to buy or sell information. The bidding mechanism was incentive compatible. Results show that, in agreement with endowment effect theory, people value information they own much more than information they do not own. This portends undertrading in information. Therefore, the subjective value of information should be considered in the design of systems. Our findings indicate a place for the subjective value of information on the WTA/WTP ratio continuum that emerges from pertinent literature. The ratio for information is similar to that of market goods. Participants had a strong inclination to purchase but not to sell information even though the profit data suggests that the use of information had no objective benefit. This preference is attributed to risk aversion rather than to loss aversion, which is the most widely accepted explanation of the endowment effect. The subjective value of information can, therefore, be affected by system design.

A characterization of quality-adjusted life-years under cumulative prospect theory

Abstract: Quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) are the most common utility measure in medical decision analysis and economic evaluations of health care. This paper presents an axiomatization of QALYs under cumulative prospect theory (CPT), currently the most influential model for decision under uncertainty. Because the set of health states need not be endowed with a natural topology that is connected, we first show how existing CPT characterizations can be extended to a class of outcome sets for which no connected natural topology is given. We then characterize QALY models with linear, power, and exponential utility for duration. Finally, we define loss aversion for multiattribute utility theory and characterize the QALY models under general and constant loss aversion. The measurement of QALYs belongs to the general field of multiattribute utility theory. Hence, our results can be generalized to other multiattribute decision contexts and they thereby contribute to the development of multiattribute utility theory under cumulative prospect theory.

The Endowment Effect and the Role of Uncertainty

Abstract: This paper explains the endowment effect, whereby sellers generally demand considerably more for a good than buyers are prepared to pay, and related anomalies. Many decisions, including nominating buying or selling prices, involve uncertainty, and we assert that people experience negative psychological reactions to uncertainty. These reactions can affect a person's valuation of the various options, biasing the person's actions towards the status quo, thus producing the endowment effect. Our model also proposes positive or negative reactions to unlikely prospects, which are able to explain commonly observed behaviour in the presence of ambiguity.

Why Competition may Discourage Students from Learning? A Behavioral Economic Analysis

Abstract: Combining the notion of self-worth in sociology and educational psychology with economic modeling, the present paper studies incentives on students' learning in a behavioral economic model. Allowing for 'conservativeness' to modify Bayes' rule in processing newly released information and employing the concepts of 'loss aversion' and 'endowment effect' in behavioral economics, we attempt to explain analytically why competition among students may discourage them from learning. Within an educational institution, competition as an incentive scheme evaluates students on their relative performance, which strengthens the connection between students' relative performance and their perceived ability. When the perception of ability becomes a major concern, competition may motivate students to make a low effort - a strategy to win by not losing.

Portfolio Choice and Risk Attitudes: An Experiment

Abstract: We study the following basic intuition: when faced with a decision how to split their investment between a risky lottery and an asset with a fixed return, people increase the proportion invested in the risky option the more they like the lottery. We find counter-examples to this, and in fact we find no simple relation between preferences between lotteries and the fraction invested in them. We use three well-documented biases (ambiguity aversion, the illusion of control and myopic loss aversion) to show this. First we replicate the previous results in a laboratory experiment with financial incentives, and then test whether participants are willing to explicitly pay a small sum of money in line with the bias (pay for less ambiguity, more perceived control, or more frequent information about portfolio performance). We then study how portfolio choice depends on these biases. With the parameters chosen, the illusion of control was eliminated when participants were asked to pay to gain more control, and the bias did not affect investment behavior (i.e., participants invested in a risky option the same fraction when faced with more or less control). In the ambiguity treatment, people were willing to pay for less ambiguity, but again the level of ambiguity did not influence investment. Finally, in the myopic loss aversion treatment participants were willing to pay money to have more freedom to choose, even though (in line with the documented bias) they invested less when having more freedom to change their investment.

Loss aversion and labor supply

Abstract: In many occupations workers’ labor supply choices are constrained by institutional rules regulating labor time and effort provision. This renders explicit tests of the neoclassical theory of labor supply difficult. Here we present evidence from studies examining labor supply responses in “neoclassical environments” in which workers are free to choose when and how much to work. Despite the favorable environment the results cast doubt on the neoclassical model. They are, however, consistent with a model of reference dependent preferences exhibiting loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity.

The internal consistency of the standard gamble: tests after adjusting for prospect theory

Abstract: This article reports a study that tests whether the internal consistency of the standard gamble can be improved upon by incorporating loss weighting and probability transformation parameters in the standard gamble valuation procedure. Five alternatives to the standard EU formulation are considered: (1) probability transformation within an EU framework; and, within a prospect theory framework, (2) loss weighting and full probability transformation, (3) no loss weighting and full probability transformation, (4) loss weighting and no probability transformation, and (5) loss weighting and partial probability transformation. Of the five alternatives, only the prospect theory formulation with loss weighting and no probability transformation offers an improvement in internal consistency over the standard EU valuation procedure.

Loss Aversion and the Tullock Paradox

Abstract: We show that the presence of loss aversion on the part of participants in a Tullock imperfectly discriminating contest will significantly reduce the proportion of the rent dissipated in the form of resources used up in the competition for that rent. We also suggest a simple experiment that can reveal whether contestants are, indeed, loss averse.

Psychology and the Market

Abstract: Prospect theory, loss aversion, mental accounts, hyperbolic discounting, cues, and the endowment effect can all be seen as examples of situationalism - the view that people isolate decisions and overweight immediate aspects of the situation relative to longer term concerns. But outside of the laboratory, emotionally-powerful situational factors - frames, social influence, mental accounts - are almost always endogenous and often the result of self-interested entrepreneurs. As such, laboratory work and, indeed, psychology more generally, gives us little guidance as to market outcomes. Economics provides a stronger basis for understanding the supply of emotionally-relevant situational variables. Paradoxically, the rise of situationalism actually increases the relative importance of economics.

Does binding or feedback influence myopic loss aversion: an experimental analysis

Abstract: Empirical research has shown that a lower feedback frequency combined with a longer bind-ing period decreases myopia and thereby increases the willingness to invest into a risky asset. In an experimental study, we disentangle the intertwined manipulation of feedback frequency and binding period to analyze how both variables alone contribute to the change in myopia and how they interact. We find a strong effect for the length of commitment, a much less pro-nounced effect for the feedback frequency, and a strong interaction between both variables. The results have important implications for real world intertemporal decision making.

Loss Aversion and the Tullock Paradox

Abstract: We show that the presence of loss aversion on the part of participants in a Tullock imperfectly discriminating contest will significantly reduce the proportion of the rent dissipated in the form of resources used up in the competition for that rent. We also suggest a simple experiment that can reveal whether contestants are, indeed, loss averse. Keywords Rent-seeking, contests, loss aversion, rent dissipation

The S-Shaped Utility Function

Abstract: The results generated by experimentalists in psychology and economics haveled to numerous advances in the study of human decision making under risk.Camerer (1995) and Rabin (1998) provide excellent reviews of the relevantliterature. These results clearly display the gap between normative theoriesof ideal behavior and descriptive theories of observed behavior. The mostprominent result is loss aversion – the observation that a loss is given greatervalue than a gain of an equal size – and the resulting S-shaped utility function. Rabin puts the key point as follows: ``Researchers have identified a pervasive feature of reference dependence: In a wide variety of domains, people are significantly more averse to losses than they are attracted to same size gains''(Rabin 1998, 13–14). In what follows, I will show that the ``wide variety of domains'' is wide indeed. In particular, I will review the effects of the S-shaped utility function on the resolution of the decision to commit a crime, to decision to violate professional ethics, and the decision to participate in a rebellion.

Alternative Models for Capturing the Compromise Effect

Abstract: The compromise effect denotes the finding that brands gain share when they become the intermediate rather than an extreme option in a choice set (Simonson 1989). Despite the robustness and importance of this phenomenon, choice modelers have neglected to incorporate the compromise effect within formal choice models and to test whether such models outperform the standard value maximization model. In this article, we suggest four context-dependent choice models that can conceptually capture the compromise effect. Although these models are motivated by theory from economics and behavioral decision research, they differ with respect to the particular mechanism that underlies the compromise effect (e.g., contextual concavity vs. loss aversion). Using two empirical applications, we (1) contrast the alternative models and show that incorporating the compromise effect by modeling the local choice context leads to superior predictions and fit relative to the traditional value maximization model and a stronger (naive) model that adjusts for possible biases in utility measurement; (2) generalize the compromise effect by demonstrating that it systematically affects choice in larger sets of products and attributes than previously shown; (3) show the theoretical and empirical equivalence of loss aversion and local (contextual) concavity; and (4) demonstrate the superiority of models that use a single reference point over "tournament models" in which each option serves as a reference point. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of this research, as well as the ability of the proposed models to predict other behavioral context effects.

Subjective value of information : the endowment effect

Abstract: Value judgments about information and its value are vital for a functioning information society Subjective valuations, formulated by individuals determine the demand for information and trading in it Theoretically, these subjective value determinations should be influenced by ownership rights, a phenomenon coined the “Endowment Effect” in psychological study of trading situations This study examines the Endowment Effect in the context of evaluating information In a simple computer simulated game fifty five participants conducted a task in which they were provided opportunities to buy or sell information The bidding mechanism was incentive compatible Results show that, in agreement with Endowment Effect theory, people value information they own much more than information not owned by them Our findings indicate that the ratio between Willingness to Accept (WTA) and Willingness to Purchase (WTP) for information is similar to that for market goods, and as with market goods, other than rational Participants exhibited a strong inclination to purchase but not to sell information even though profit data suggests that the use of information had no objective benefit for profit-making This preference is attributed to risk aversion rather than to loss aversion which is the most widely-accepted explanation of the Endowment Effect Holding on to information and undertrade in it have strong implications for the information society

Evaluation Periods and Asset Prices in a Market Experiment

Abstract: We test whether the frequency of feedback information about the performance of an investment portfolio and the flexibility with which the investor can change the portfolio influence her risk attitude in markets. In line with the prediction of myopic loss aversion (Benartzi and Thaler (1995)), we find that more information and more flexibility result in less risk taking. Market prices of risky assets are significantly higher if feedback frequency and decision flexibility are reduced. This result supports the findings from individual decision making, and shows that market interactions do not eliminate such behavior or its consequences for prices.

Skill signaling, prospect theory, and regret theory ∗

Abstract: When a risky decision involves both skill and chance, success or failure is a signal of the decision maker’s skill. Adopting standard models from the career concerns literature, we show that a rational desire to avoid looking unskilled may help explain several anomalies associated with prospect theory, including probability weighting, loss aversion, and framing. Prospect theory’s four-fold pattern of probability weighting predicts that decision makers favor long-shots, avoid near sure-things, buy insurance against unlikely losses, and take risky chances to win back large losses. We find that this pattern emerges because winning a gamble with a low probability of success is a strong signal of skill, while losing a gamble with a high probability of success is as trong signal of incompetence. Regarding loss aversion, af ear of looking inept provides an alternative explanation for the puzzle of why people are so risk averse for small gambles. Such behavior can arise because losing any gamble, even a “friendly bet” with little or no money at stake, reflects poorly on the decision maker’s skill. Finally, we find that framing affects choices because different formulations of a question provide different information about how a decision maker’s actions will be interpreted. While the theoretical predictions of skill signaling closely parallel those of prospect theory, they differ in some cases, allowing for tests between the theories. The theoretical predictions are also closely related to, but distinguishable from, those of regret theory.

The Manufacturer's Suggested Retail Price

Abstract: Based on arguments of the 'reference-dependent' theory of consumer choice we assume that a retailer's discount of a manufacturer's suggested retail price changes consumers' demand. We can show that the producer benefits from suggesting a retail price. If consumers are additionally sufficiently 'loss averse', e.g. consumers' disappointment from higher than suggested retail prices is sufficiently high, the producer can force the retailer to take the suggested price in equilibrium and thus capture some of the retailer's profits. A producer always benefits from investing into an advertising campaign with suggested retail prices.

Prospect theory and institutional investors

Abstract: There is ample evidence that past performance affects the trading decisions of individual investors. This paper looks at this issue using a detailed database of currency trading decisions of institutional investors. Past performance manifestly affects currency risk-taking in this group, but the sign and magnitude of the effect runs counter to much of the existing theory and evidence. There is no evidence whatsoever of disposition effects; rather, the dominant characteristic is aggressive risk reduction in the wake of losses. This effect is more prominent later in the year, and among older and more experienced funds. A modified version of the loss aversion model of Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) offers the best hope of adequately accounting for the observed behavior.

On The Future of Co-operatives: Talking Stock, Looking Ahead

Abstract: Two extensions are formulated of the analysis of the allocation of decision rights in Hendrikse and Veerman (2001). First, the incomplete contracts in their article can be viewed as simple long-term contracts, i.e. it is not allowed to make the allocation of authority contingent on the circumstances. Contingent long-term contracts are now considered. Second, another aspect of decision rights is the frequency of meetings between the owners and managers of enterprises. This aspect will be addressed from a long-term contract perspective as well as a loss aversion

Is there loss aversion in buying? An adversarial collaboration

Abstract: This paper reports an exercise in adversarial collaboration. An adversarial collaboration is an investigation carried out jointly by two individuals or research groups who, having proposed conflicting hypotheses, seek to resolve the issue in dispute. The experiment reported was designed to reconcile differences between the apparently conflicting results of two previous experiments, one carried out by Kahneman, the other by the other authors. Specifically, it investigates whether, when consumers consider giving up money in exchange for goods, they construe potential money outlays as losses. This issue bears on the explanation of the widely observed disparity between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept valuations of costs and benefits, which has proved so problematic for contingent valuation studies. The results of the experiment do not decisively resolve the question in dispute, but they are broadly consistent with the hypothesis that money outlays are perceived as losses.