Showing papers on "Loss aversion published in 2004"

A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences

Abstract: We develop a model that fleshes out, extends, and modifies existing models of reference dependent preferences and loss aversion while accomodating most of the evidence motivating these models. Our approach makes reference-dependent theory more broadly applicable by avoiding some of the ways that prevailing models—if applied literally and without ancillary assumptions—make variously weak and incorrect predictions. Our model combines the reference-dependent gain-loss utility with standard economic “consumption utility†and clarifies the relationship between the two. Most importantly, we posit that a person’s reference point is her recent expectations about outcomes (rather than the status quo), and assume that behavior accords to a personal equilibrium: The person maximizes utility given her rational expectations about outcomes, where these expectations depend on her own anticipated behavior. We apply our theory to consumer behavior, and emphasize that a consumer’s willingness to pay for a good is endogenously determined by the market distribution of prices and how she expects to respond to these prices. Because a buyer’s willingness to buy depends on whether she anticipates buying the good, for a range of market prices there are multiple personal equilibria. This multiplicity disappears when the consumer is sufficiently uncertain about the price she will face. Because paying more than she anticipated induces a sense of loss in the buyer, the lower the prices at which she expects to buy the lower will be her willingness to pay. In some situations, a known stochastic decrease in prices can even lower the quantity demanded.

The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis

Abstract: One of the most influential ideas in the past 30 years is the efficient markets hypothesis, the idea that market prices incorporate all information rationally and instantaneously. The emerging discipline of behavioral economics and finance has challenged the EMH, arguing that markets are not rational, but rather driven by fear and greed. Research in the cognitive neurosciences suggests these two perspectives are opposite sides of the same coin. An adaptive markets hypothesis that reconciles market efficiency with behavioral alternatives applies the principles of evolution?competition, adaptation, and natural selection?to financial interactions. Extending Simon9s notion of ?satisficing? with evolutionary dynamics, the author argues that much of what behaviorists cite as counter-examples to economic rationality?loss aversion, overconfidence, overreaction, mental accounting, and other behavioral biases?is in fact consistent with an evolutionary model of individual adaptation to a changing environment via simple heuristics. The adaptive markets hypothesis offers a number of surprisingly concrete implications for portfolio management.

Loss aversion and inhibition in dynamical models of multialternative choice.

Abstract: The roles of loss aversion and inhibition among alternatives are examined in models of the similarity, compromise, and attraction effects that arise in choices among 3 alternatives differing on 2 attributes. R. M. Roe, J. R. Busemeyer, and J. T. Townsend (2001) have proposed a linear model in which effects previously attributed to loss aversion (A. Tversky & D. Kahneman, 1991) arise from attention switching between attributes and similarity-dependent inhibitory interactions among alternatives. However, there are several reasons to maintain loss aversion in a theory of choice. In view of this, an alternative theory is proposed, integrating loss aversion and attention switching into a nonlinear model (M. Usher & J. L. McClelland, 2001) that relies on inhibition independent of similarity among alternatives. The model accounts for the 3 effects and makes testable predictions contrasting with those of the Roe et al. (2001) model.

Optimal portfolio choice under loss aversion

Abstract: This paper analyzes the optimal investment strategy for loss averse investors, assuming a complete market and general Ito processes for the asset prices. The loss-averse investor follows a partial portfolio insurance strategy. When the investor's planning horizon is short (less than 5 years), he or she considerably reduces the initial portfolio weight of stocks compared to an investor with smooth power utility. The empirical section of the paper estimates the level of loss aversion implied by historical U.S. stock market data, using a representative agent model. We find that loss aversion and risk aversion cannot be disentangled empirically.

Alternative Models for Capturing the Compromise Effect

Abstract: The compromise effect denotes the finding that brands gain share when they become the intermediate rather than extreme option in a choice set. Despite the robustness and importance of this phenomenon, choice modelers have neglected to incorporate the compromise effect in formal choice models and to test whether such models outperform the standard value maximization model. In this article, the authors suggest four context-dependent choice models that can conceptually capture the compromise effect. Although the models are motivated by theory from economics and behavioral decision research, they differ with respect to the particular mechanism that underlies the compromise effect (e.g., contextual concavity versus loss aversion). Using two empirical applications, the authors (1) contrast the alternative models and show that incorporating the compromise effect by modeling the local choice context leads to superior predictions and fit compared with the traditional value maximization model and a stronge...

Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial

Abstract: Plea-bargaining literature predicts that parties strike plea bargains in the shadows of expected trial outcomes. In other words, parties forecast the expected sentence after trial, discount it by the probability of acquittal, and offer some proportional discount. This oversimplified model ignores how structural distortions skew bargaining outcomes, causing them to diverge from trial outcomes. Part I of this Article explores the various structural forces that warp plea bargains. Agency costs, attorney compensation and workloads, resources, sentencing and bail rules, and information deficits all skew bargaining. In addition, psychological biases and heuristics warp judgments. Part II applies recent research from behavioral law and economics and cognitive psychology to critique plea bargaining. Overconfidence, denial, discounting, risk preferences, loss aversion, framing, and anchoring all affect bargaining decisions. Skilled lawyers can partly counteract some of these problems, but they can also overcompensate. The oversimplified shadow-of-trial model of plea bargaining needs to be supplemented by a structural-psychological perspective. On this perspective, uncertainty, money, self-interest, and demographic variation greatly influence plea bargains. Part III explores how to respond to the various structural and psychological influences that warp plea bargains. Reforming systems of defense counsel, bail rules, and the structure of sentencing rules, and increasing use of mediators and judges in bargaining could ameliorate some of these influences. Other problems, such as demographic variations in psychology, are very difficult to correct. These influences cast light on how civil and criminal bargaining differ in important respects.

The Prospects for Prospect Theory: An Empirical Evaluation of International Relations Applications of Framing and Loss Aversion

Abstract: International relations theorists have tried to adapt prospect theory to make it relevant to the study of real-world decision-making and testable beyond the constraints of the laboratory. Three experiments with undergraduate samples were conducted in an effort to clarify the advantages and limitations of prospect theory as adapted to explain political behavior The first experiment tested hypotheses regarding the impact of prospect framing on group polarization, but these were only weakly supported. The second and third experiments examined alternative adaptations of the concept offraming; the results suggest that the political science expansion of the concept of framing may, under certain conditions, produce clear and robust preference reversals. Why do weaker states challenge clearly more capable military powers? Why do leaders expand their war aims and "gamble for resurrection" when mired in losses on the battlefield? Why did Japan attack Pearl Harbor and Germany attack the Soviet Union? Why did Jimmy Carter try to rescue American hostages in Iran? In short, why do states, governments, and/or leaders take risks? In the past there were three traditional explanations for actor risk propensity-the rational choice assumption of general risk aversion, the inductive behavioral approach of predicting risk acceptance/aversion at time t based on risk acceptance/aversion at time t - 1, and the personality literature's search for the factors that produce "risk takers" and "wimps." The last decade has witnessed the development of a fourth explanation for risk propensity: prospect theory. Drawing on a now 25-year-old research program in behavioral decision theory, political

Loss aversion and labor supply

Abstract: In many occupations, workers' labor supply choices are constrained by institutional rules regulating labor time and effort provision. This renders explicit tests of the neoclassical theory of labor supply difficult. Here we present evidence from studies examining labor supply responses in “neoclassical environments” in which workers are free to choose when and how much to work. Despite the favorable environment, the results cast doubt on the neoclassical model. They are, however, consistent with a model of reference-dependent preferences exhibiting loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity. (JEL: J22, B49)

The impact of consumer loss aversion on pricing

Abstract: We develop a model in which a profit-maximizing monopolist with uncertain cost of production sells to loss-averse, yet rational, consumers. We first introduce (portable) techniques for analyzing the demand of such consumers, and then investigate the monopolist's pricing strategy. Compared to lower possible purchase prices, paying a higher price in the firm's pricing distribution is assessed by consumers as a loss, decreasing demand for the firm's product. We provide conditions under which a firm with continuously distributed marginal cost responds by (locally) eliminating this comparison effect and choosing a discrete price distribution; that is, prices are sticky. Price stickiness is more likely to obtain when the cost distribution has high density, the price responsiveness of demand is low, or consumers are likely to purchase. Whether or not prices are sticky, the monopolist wants to at least mitigate the comparison effect, leading to countercyclical markups. On the other hand, if consumers expect to buy the product, they experience a loss if they end up not consuming it, increasing their willingness to pay for it. Thus, despite the tendency toward price stability, there are also circumstances in which a firm with unchanging cost offers random sales to increase customers' expectation to consume, attracting more demand at higher prices.

Psychology and the Market

Abstract: Prospect theory, loss aversion, mental accounts, hyperbolic discounting, cues, and the endowment effect can all be seen as examples of situationalism -- the view that people isolate decisions and overweight immediate aspects of the situation relative to longer term concerns. But outside of the laboratory, emotionally-powerful situational factors -- frames, social influence, mental accounts -- are almost always endogenous and often the result of self-interested entrepreneurs. As such, laboratory work and, indeed, psychology more generally, gives us little guidance as to market outcomes. Economics provides a stronger basis for understanding the supply of emotionally-relevant situational variables. Paradoxically situationalism actually increases the relative importance of economics.

Whence GARCH? A Preference-Based Explanation for Conditional Volatility

Abstract: We develop a preference-based equilibrium asset pricing model that explains low-frequency conditional volatility. Similar to Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), agents in our model care about wealth changes, experience loss aversion, and keep a mental scorecard that affects their level of risk aversion. A new feature of our model is that when perturbed by unexpected returns, investors become temporarily more sensitive to news. Gradually investors become accustomed to the new level of wealth, restoring prior levels of risk aversion and news sensitivity. The state-dependent sensitivity to news creates the type of volatility clustering found in low-frequency stock returns. We find empirical support for our model's predictions that relate the scorecard to conditional volatility and skewness. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

Are Vote and Popularity Functions Economically Correct

Abstract: During the last 30 years about 300 papers on Vote and Popularity functions (defined in Table 1) have been written.1 Most of the research is empirical. The purpose of this article is to survey this literature and discuss how the empirical results fit into economic theory.

A Portfolio Perspective on Option Pricing Anomalies

Abstract: We empirically study the economic benefits of giving investors access to index options in the context of the standard asset allocation problem. We analyze both expected-utility and non-expected-utility investors in order to understand who optimally buys and sells in option markets. We solve the portfolio problem with a flexible empirical methodology that does not rely on specific assumptions about the process of the underlying equity index. Using data on S&P 500 index options (1987-2001) we consider returns on OTM put options and ATM straddles. CRRA investors find it always optimal to short put options and straddles, regardless of their risk aversion. The option positions are economically and statistically significant and robust to corrections for transaction costs, margin requirements, and Peso problems. Surprisingly, loss-averse and disappointment-averse investors also optimally hold short positions in puts and straddles. Because derivatives are in zero net supply, this suggests that generating empirically relevant option prices in an equilibrium model is a challenging task, even with investor heterogeneity and even with commonly-studied behavioral preferences. Only when loss aversion is combined with highly distorted probability assessments, can we obtain positive portfolio weights for puts and straddles.

Do workers work more if wages are high? Evidence from a randomized field experiment

Abstract: Most previous studies on intertemporal labor supply found very small or insignificant substitution effects. It is not clear, however, whether these results are due to institutional constraints on workers’ labor supply choices or whether the behavioral assumptions of the standard life cycle model with time separable preferences are empirically invalid. We conducted a randomized field experiment in a setting in which workers were free to choose their working times and their efforts during working time. We document a large positive wage elasticity of overall labor supply and an even larger wage elasticity of labor hours, which implies that the wage elasticity of effort per hour is negative. While the standard life cycle model cannot explain the negative effort elasticity, we show that a modified neoclassical model with preference spillovers across periods and a model with reference dependent, loss averse preferences are consistent with the evidence. With the help of a further experiment we can show that only loss averse individuals exhibit a significantly negative effort response to the wage increase and that the degree of loss aversion predicts the size of the negative effort response.

Continuous Cumulative Prospect Theory and Individual Asset Allocation

Abstract: We implement the Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) framework (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) into a model of individual asset allocation, building on earlier work by Hwang and Satchell (2003) where they derive explicit formulae for the asset allocation decision using a loss aversion utility function We apply Prelec’s probability weighting function (1998) to continuous distributions and derive the formulae for the optimal asset allocation between risky and safe assets US equity returns data are used to examine the feasible parameter space The earlier results of Hwang and Satchell are confirmed and the more complex model is compatible with observed equity proportions The parameters are highly interconnected, but feasible combinations indicate that more inverse-S shaped deviations from linear probability weightings are associated with lower risk taking behaviour

Fixed Cost Magnitude, Fixed Cost Reporting Format, and Competitive Pricing Decisions: Some Experimental Evidence

Abstract: Although neoclassical economic theory predicts that fixed cost magnitude and fixed cost reporting format will not influence short-term pricing decisions, these factors systematically affected pricing decisions in a duopoly experiment. Increasing fixed cost magnitude (a pure sunk cost in this study) across experimental conditions caused participants to first lower, then raise, competitive prices. Consistent with the psychological phenomenon of loss aversion, this change in pricing behavior reduced the frequency of reported losses. This study further reveals that the accounting format for reporting fixed costs influenced pricing behavior. Specifically, participants receiving capacity costing feedback reports established increasingly lower selling prices relative to the prices established by participants receiving contribution margin feedback reports. Given that a very simple cosmetic reporting manipulation produced increasingly significant competitive pricing differences in a market setting, this study provides evidence that functional fixation is not necessarily eliminated by market forces.

Are Decisions under Risk Malleable

Abstract: Human decision making under risk and uncertainty may depend on individual involvement in the outcome-generating process. Expected utility theory is silent on this issue. Prospect theory in its current form offers little, if any, prediction of how or why involvement in a process should matter, although it may offer ex post interpretations of empirical findings. Well-known findings in psychology demonstrate that when subjects exercise more involvement or choice in lottery procedures, they value their lottery tickets more highly. This often is interpreted as an illusion of control, meaning that when subjects are more involved in a lottery, they may believe they are more likely to win, perhaps because they perceive that they have more control over the outcome. Our experimental design eliminates several possible alternative explanations for the results of previous studies in an experiment that varies the degree and type of involvement in lottery procedures. We find that in treatments with more involvement subjects on average place less rather than more value on their lottery tickets. One possible explanation for this is that involvement interacts with loss aversion by causing subjects to weigh losses more heavily than they would otherwise. One implication of our study is that involvement, either independently or in interaction with myopic loss aversion, may help explain the extreme risk aversion of bond investors.

Loss Aversion for Quality in Consumer Choice

Abstract: A reference price is an internal price that consumers are believed to use to compare actual prices. Reference effects for price have been demonstrated in many settings. Reference effects for quality also have been demonstrated using scanner data. Here we present experimental evidence. Firstly, it is shown that high quality goods will be valued more by consumers who consider trading down in quality than by those who consider trading up in quality. Secondly, we show that when all prices fall, more switching up in quality from the reference brand will occur than switching down in quality when all prices rise, and that when all prices fall, consumers will switch to higher quality up to, but not beyond, the price regularly paid.

Reference Points and Loss Aversion in Intertemporal Choice

Abstract: Based on the insights of Loewenstein's (1988) reference point model, we specify structural model for intertemporal choice that incorporates loss aversion and reference points. We consider four scenarios: Delay of gains, delay of losses, speed-up of gains, and speed-up of losses, using six years of panel data from a Dutch representative household survey. These data contain rich information on individual time preferences and other characteristics, and employ a non-linear random coefficients model with panel data to estimate reference points of delay and speedup, the coefficient of loss aversion and the discount rate. We find that on average the reference point of delay is larger than speedup, consistent with the hypothesis of Loewenstein; the mean coefficient of loss aversion is around two, females are more loss averse than males, and high education and age make people less loss-averse; high educated and older people are also more patient. The observed relationships of these parameters can be used to better predict and understand the behavior of households for policy purposes.

Myopic Loss Aversion: Information Feedback vs. Investment Flexibility

Abstract: We experimentally disentangle the effect of information feedback from the effect of investment flexibility on the investment behavior of a myopically loss averse investor. Our findings show that varying the information condition alone suffices to induce behavior that is in line with the hypothesis of Myopic Loss Aversion.

A characterization of S-shaped utility functions displaying loss aversion

Abstract: This paper deals with utility (or value) function for reference dependent models. A new characterization of S-shaped utility functions displaying loss aversion is put forward. Then it is used to analyze some standard forms commonly used in the literature. It is shown that, unless some parameters’ restrictions are imposed, power and exponential S-shaped utilities can lead to prefer fair symmetric games to the status quo and do not display loss aversion. Finally two new examples of simple S-shaped utility functions exhibiting loss aversion are presented.

Essays in behavioral finance

Abstract: I derive indifference curves in mean-standard deviation space for investors with prospect theory preferences when returns are normally distributed. The normality assumption creates a mapping between model parameters and the investment opportunity set. The model is then calibrated to historical return data for various assumptions regarding the set of admissible risky assets. It is found that the parameter for loss aversion must be higher than three for investors to hold finitely leveraged portfolios. For lower rates of loss aversion, in particular those proposed in the earlier experimental literature, the allocation to risky assets is infinite. Numerical simulations produce similar results when the normality assumption is abandoned.

Learning to reoptimize consumption at new income levels: a rationale for prospect theory

Abstract: This paper provides a theoretical rationale for three experimental results of Prospect Theory: risk preferences are over gains and losses, loss aversion, and diminishing sensitivity. We consider a (boundedly rational) decision maker who does not e nd her new optimal consumption bundle with certainty when she is faced with a new income level. This alters her indirect utility function and makes her more risk averse at her current reference income level and less risk averse for a range of incomes below her reference income level. (JEL: D11)

Starving the beast: The psychology of budget deficits

Abstract: The strategy of "starving the beast" involves cutting taxes today with the expectation that spending cuts will follow tomorrow. Various heuristics and biases help to explain the likely effects of the strategy. In four experiments conducted on the World Wide Web, subjects chose general levels of taxation and public spending from differing hypothetical starting points. In general, subjects wanted to reduce both taxes and spending, preferring balanced budgets and even surpluses to deficits. When asked about specific spending cuts, subjects showed a reluctance to make cuts, leading to large and persistent deficits. "Starving the beast," by pairing specific tax cuts with the general, abstract idea of spending cuts, can thus succeed in a population preferring fiscal balance. Once the deficit is created, it will likely persist, influencing future policy preferences, due to an anchor and underadjustment bias. Left indeterminate is what happens in any subsequent period of deficits, when a balanced budget constraint is imposed: in such cases, loss aversion vis a vis tax increases is pitted against loss aversion vis a vis spending decreases. Our experiments suggest a role for framing in making policy choices under these conditions.

Loss Aversion and Trade Policy

Abstract: Freund and Ozden provide new survey evidence showing that loss aversion and reference dependence are important in shaping people's perception of trade policy. Under the assumption that agents' welfare functions exhibit these behavioral elements, they analyze a model with a welfare-maximizing government and with the lobbying framework of Grossman and Helpman (1994). The policy implications of the augmented models differ in three important ways: - There is a region of compensating protection, where a decline in the world price leads to an offsetting increase in protection, such that a constant domestic price is maintained. - Protection following a single negative price shock will be persistent. - Irrespective of the extent of lobbying, there will be a deviation from free trade that tends to favor loss-making industries. The augmented models are more consistent with the observed structure of protection and, in particular explain why many trade policy instruments are explicitly designed to maintain prices at a given level. This paper - a product of the Trade Team, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to analyze trade policy formulation.

Behavioral biases and portfolio choice

Abstract: We investigate the way investors react to prior gains/losses. We use a new and unique dataset with detailed information on investors’ various components of wealth, income, demographic characteristics and portfolio holdings identified at the stock level. We test the theory of loss aversion against the alternative provided by standard utility theory and the house-money effect. We show that, on a yearly horizon, investors do not behave according to loss aversion and more in line with standard utility theory or the housemoney effect. We also show that investors do not suffer from the mental accounting bias. Investors consider wealth in its entirety and risk taking in the financial market is affected by gains/losses in overall wealth, financial wealth and real estate wealth.

Does Format of Pricing Contract Matter

Abstract: The use of linear wholesale price contract has long been recognized as a threat to achieving channel effciency. Many formats of nonlinear pricing contract have been proposed to achieve vertical channel coordination. Examples include two-part tariff and quantity discount. A two-part tariff charges the downstream party a fixed fee for participation and a uniform unit price. A quantity discount contract does not include a fixed fee and charges a lower unit price for each additional unit. Extant economic theories predict these contracts, when chosen optimally, to be revenue and division equivalent in that they all restore full channel effciency and give the same surplus to the upstream party assuming constant relative bargaining power. We conduct a laboratory experiment to test the empirical equivalence of the two pricing formats. Surprisingly, both pricing formats fail to coordinate the channel even in a well-controlled market environment with subjects motivated by significant monetary incentives. The observed channl effciencies were significantly lower than 100%. In fact, they are statistically no better than that of the linear wholesale price contract. Revenue equivalence fails because the quantity discount scheme achieves a higher channel effciency than the two-part tariff. Also, division equivalence does not hold because the quantity discount scheme accords a higher surplus to the upstream party than the two-part tariff. To account for the observed empirical regularities, we allow the downstream party to have a reference-dependent utility in which the upfront fixed fee is framed as loss andn the subsequent contribution margin as gain. The proposed model nests the standard economic model as a special case with a loss aversion coeffcient of 1.0. The estimated loss aversion coeffcient is 1.6, thereby rejecting the standard model. We rule out other plausible explanations such as parties having fairness concerns and non-linear risk attitudes.