Showing papers on "Loss aversion published in 2013"

Emotion regulation reduces loss aversion and decreases amygdala responses to losses

Abstract: Emotion regulation strategies can alter behavioral and physiological responses to emotional stimuli and the neural correlates of those responses in regions such as the amygdala or striatum. The current study investigates the brain systems engaged when using an emotion regulation technique during financial decisions. In decision making, regulating emotion with reappraisal-focused strategies that encourage taking a different perspective has been shown to reduce loss aversion as observed both in choices and in the relative arousal responses to actual loss and gain outcomes. In the current study, we find using fMRI that behavioral loss aversion correlates with amygdala activity in response to losses relative to gains. Success in regulating loss aversion also correlates with the reduction in amygdala responses to losses but not to gains. Furthermore, across both decisions and outcomes, we find the reappraisal strategy increases baseline activity in dorsolateral and ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the striatum. The similarity of the neural circuitry observed to that seen in emotion regulation, despite divergent tasks, serves as further evidence for a role of emotion in decision making, and for the power of reappraisal to change assessments of value and thereby choices.

Losses as Modulators of Attention: Review and Analysis of the Unique Effects of Losses over Gains.

Abstract: It has been shown that in certain situations losses exert a stronger effect on behavior than respective gains, and this has been commonly explained by the argument that losses are given more weight in people's decisions than respective gains However, although much is understood about the effect of losses on cognitive processes and behavior, 2 major inconsistencies remain First, recent empirical evidence fails to demonstrate that people avoid incentive structures that carry equivalent gains and losses Second, findings in experience-based decision tasks indicate that following losses, increased arousal is observed simultaneously with no behavioral loss aversion To account for these findings, we developed an attention-allocation model as a comprehensive framework for the effect of losses According to this model losses increase on-task attention, thereby enhancing the sensitivity to the reinforcement structure In the current article we examine whether this model can account for a broad range of empirical phenomena involving losses We show that as predicted by the attentional model, asymmetric effects of losses on behavior emerge where gains and losses are presented separately but not concurrently Yet, even in the absence of loss aversion, losses have distinct effects on performance, arousal, frontal cortical activation, and behavioral consistency The attentional model of losses thus explains some of the main inconsistencies in previous studies of the effect of losses

Executive stock options as mixed gambles: Revisiting the behavioral agency model

Abstract: Conceiving of stock options as providing CEOs with cues for the possibility of both greater prospective wealth and losses to current wealth, we revisit predictions of the behavioral effects of equity-based pay using the behavioral agency model (BAM). We refine the BAM's original formulation and provide an explanation for previous conflicting empirical results by theorizing that the anticipation of prospective wealth attenuates the negative effect of accumulated current equity wealth upon CEO strategic risk taking. In doing so, we offer an advancement of the dialectic between: (1) classical agency scholars, arguing that equity-based pay leads to more risk taking, and (2) behavioral scholars, arguing that equity wealth creates risk bearing, leading to less risk taking. We also suggest that the influences of prospective wealth and current wealth on strategic risk taking depend on the extent to which agents can manage the risk inherent in their compensation package and agent vulnerability to losses. Formal hypotheses to test these expectations are made by focusing on equity-based compensation. Our findings offer strong support for these theoretical expectations.

Fungibility and Consumer Choice: Evidence from Commodity Price Shocks*

Abstract: We formulate a test of the fungibility of money based on parallel shifts in the prices of different quality grades of a commodity. We embed the test in a discrete-choice model of product quality choice and estimate the model using panel microdata on gasoline purchases. We find that when gasoline prices rise consumers substitute to lower octane gasoline, to an extent that cannot be explained by income effects. Across a wide range of specifications, we consistently reject the null hypothesis that households treat "gas money" as fungible with other income. We compare the empirical fit of three psychological models of decision-making. A simple model of category budgeting fits the data well, with models of loss aversion and salience both capturing important features of the time series.

The Nature of Risk Preferences: Evidence from Insurance Choices

Abstract: We use data on households’ deductible choices in auto and home insurance to estimate a structural model of risky choice that incorporates "standard" risk aversion (concave utility over …nal wealth), loss aversion, and nonlinear probability weighting. Our estimates indicate that nonlinear probability weighting plays the most important role in explaining the data. More speci…cally, we …nd that standard risk aversion is small, loss aversion is nonexistent, and nonlinear probability weighting is large. When we estimate restricted models, we …nd that nonlinear probability weighting alone can better explain the data than standard risk aversion alone, loss aversion alone, and standard risk aversion and loss aversion combined. Our main …ndings are robust to a variety of modeling assumptions. JEL classi…cations: D01, D03, D12, D81, G22

The “bomb” risk elicitation task

Abstract: This paper presents the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET), an intuitive procedure aimed at measuring risk attitudes. Subjects decide how many boxes to collect out of 100, one of which contains a bomb. Earnings increase linearly with the number of boxes accumulated but are zero if the bomb is also collected. The BRET requires minimal numeracy skills, avoids truncation of the data, allows the precise estimation of both risk aversion and risk seeking, and is not affected by the degree of loss aversion or by violations of the Reduction Axiom. We validate the BRET, test its robustness in a large-scale experiment, and compare it to three popular risk elicitation tasks. Choices react significantly only to increased stakes, and are sensible to wealth effects. Our experiment rationalizes the gender gap that often characterizes choices under uncertainty by means of a higher loss rather than risk aversion.

Associations and the accumulation of preference.

Abstract: This paper presents a theory of multi-alternative, multi-attribute preferential choice. It is assumed that the associations between an attribute and an available alternative impact the attribute’s accessibility. The values of highly accessible attributes are more likely to be aggregated into preferences. Altering the choice task by adding new alternatives or by increasing the salience of preexisting alternatives can change the accessibility of the underlying attributes and subsequently bias choice. This mechanism is formalized by use of a preference accumulation decision process, embedded in a feed-forward neural network. The resulting model provides a unitary explanation for a large range of choice-set-dependent behaviors, including context effects, alignability effects, and less is more effects. The model also generates a gain–loss asymmetry relative to the reference point, without explicit loss aversion. This asymmetry accounts for all of the reference-dependent anomalies explained by loss aversion, as well as referencedependent phenomena not captured by loss aversion.

Complementary Cognitive Capabilities, Economic Decision-Making, and Aging

Abstract: Fluid intelligence decreases with age, yet evidence about age declines in decision-making quality is mixed: Depending on the study, older adults make worse, equally good, or even better decisions than younger adults. We propose a potential explanation for this puzzle, namely that age differences in decision performance result from the interplay between two sets of cognitive capabilities that impact decision making, one in which older adults fare worse (i.e., fluid intelligence) and one in which they fare better (i.e., crystallized intelligence). Specifically, we hypothesized that older adults’ higher levels of crystallized intelligence can provide an alternate pathway to good decisions when the fluid intelligence pathway declines. The performance of older adults relative to younger adults therefore depends on the relative importance of each type of intelligence for the decision at hand. We tested this complementary capabilities hypothesis in a broad sample of younger and older adults, collecting a battery of standard cognitive measures and measures of economically important decision-making “traits” — including temporal discounting, loss aversion, financial literacy, and debt literacy. We found that older participants performed as well as or better than younger participants on these four decision-making measures. Structural equation modeling verified our hypothesis: Older participants’ greater crystallized intelligence offset their lower levels of fluid intelligence for temporal discounting, financial literacy, and debt literacy, but not for loss aversion. These results have important implications for public policy and for the design of effective decision environments for older adults.

Explaining the endowment effect through ownership: The role of identity, gender, and self-threat

Abstract: The price people are willing to pay for a good is often less than the price they are willing to accept to give up the same good, a phenomenon called the endowment effect. Loss aversion has typically accounted for the endowment effect, but an alternative explanation suggests that ownership creates an association between the item and the self, and this possession-self link increases the value of the good. To test the ownership account, this research examines three moderators that theory suggests should affect the possession-self link and consequently the endowment effect: self-threat, identity associations of a good, and gender. After a social self-threat, the endowment effect is strengthened for in-group goods among both men and women but is eliminated for out-group goods among men (but not women). These results are consistent with a possession-self link explanation and therefore suggest that ownership offers a better explanation for the endowment effect.

The Functional and Structural Neural Basis of Individual Differences in Loss Aversion

Abstract: Decision making under risk entails the anticipation of prospective outcomes, typically leading to the greater sensitivity to losses than gains known as loss aversion. Previous studies on the neural bases of choice-outcome anticipation and loss aversion provided inconsistent results, showing either bidirectional mesolimbic responses of activation for gains and deactivation for losses, or a specific amygdala involvement in processing losses. Here we focused on loss aversion with the aim to address interindividual differences in the neural bases of choice-outcome anticipation. Fifty-six healthy human participants accepted or rejected 104 mixed gambles offering equal (50%) chances of gaining or losing different amounts of money while their brain activity was measured with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We report both bidirectional and gain/loss-specific responses while evaluating risky gambles, with amygdala and posterior insula specifically tracking the magnitude of potential losses. At the individual level, loss aversion was reflected both in limbic fMRI responses and in gray matter volume in a structural amygdala-thalamus-striatum network, in which the volume of the "output" centromedial amygdala nuclei mediating avoidance behavior was negatively correlated with monetary performance. We conclude that outcome anticipation and ensuing loss aversion involve multiple neural systems, showing functional and structural individual variability directly related to the actual financial outcomes of choices. By supporting the simultaneous involvement of both appetitive and aversive processing in economic decision making, these results contribute to the interpretation of existing inconsistencies on the neural bases of anticipating choice outcomes.

On the descriptive value of loss aversion in decisions under risk: Six clarifications

Abstract: Previous studies of loss aversion in decisions under risk have led to mixed results. Losses appear to loom larger than gains in some settings, but not in others. The current paper clarifies these results by highlighting six experimental manipulations that tend to increase the likelihood of the behavior predicted by loss aversion. These manipulations include: (1) framing of the safe alternative as the status quo; (2) ensuring that the choice pattern predicted by loss aversion maximizes the probability of positive (rather than zero or negative) outcomes; (3) the use of high nominal (numerical) payoffs; (4) the use of high stakes; (5) the inclusion of highly attractive risky prospects that creates a contrast effect; and (6) the use of long experiments in which no feedback is provided and in which the computation of the expected values is difficult. In addition, the results suggest the possibility of learning in the absence of feedback: The tendency to select simple strategies, like ``maximize the worst outcome'' which implies ``loss aversion'', increases when this behavior is not costly. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

Money, Well-Being, and Loss Aversion: Does an Income Loss Have a Greater Effect on Well-Being Than an Equivalent Income Gain?

Abstract: Higher income is associated with greater well-being, but do income gains and losses affect well-being differently? Loss aversion, whereby losses loom larger than gains, is typically examined in relation to decisions about anticipated outcomes. Here, using subjective-well-being data from Germany (N = 28,723) and the United Kingdom (N = 20,570), we found that losses in income have a larger effect on well-being than equivalent income gains and that this effect is not explained by diminishing marginal benefits of income to well-being. Our findings show that loss aversion applies to experienced losses, challenging suggestions that loss aversion is only an affective-forecasting error. By failing to account for loss aversion, longitudinal studies of the relationship between income and well-being may have overestimated the positive effect of income on well-being. Moreover, societal well-being might best be served by small and stable income increases, even if such stability impairs long-term income growth.

The Effect of Payment Schemes on Inventory Decisions: The Role of Mental Accounting

Abstract: Does the payment scheme have an effect on inventory decisions in the newsvendor problem? Keeping the net profit structure constant, we examine three payment schemes that can be interpreted as the newsvendor's order being financed by the newsvendor herself scheme O, by the supplier through delayed order payment scheme S, and by the customer through advanced revenue scheme C. In a laboratory study, we find that inventory quantities exhibit a consistent decreasing pattern in the order of schemes O, S, and C, with the order quantities of scheme S being close to the expected-profit-maximizing solution. These observations are inconsistent with the expected-profit-maximizing model, contradict what a regular or hyperbolic time-discounting model would predict, and cannot be explained by the loss aversion model. Instead, they are consistent with a model that underweights the order-time payments, which can be explained by the “prospective accounting” theory in the mental accounting literature. A second study shows that the results hold even if all physical payments are conducted at the same time, suggesting that the framing of the payment scheme is sufficient to induce the prospective accounting behavior. We further validate the robustness of our model under different profit conditions. Our findings contribute to the understanding of the psychological processes involved in newsvendor decisions and have implications for supply chain financing and contract design. This paper was accepted by Christian Terwiesch, operations management.

Complementary cognitive capabilities, economic decision making, and aging.

Abstract: Fluid intelligence decreases with age, yet evidence about age declines in decision-making quality is mixed: Depending on the study, older adults make worse, equally good, or even better decisions than younger adults. We propose a potential explanation for this puzzle, namely that age differences in decision performance result from the interplay between two sets of cognitive capabilities that impact decision making, one in which older adults fare worse (i.e., fluid intelligence) and one in which they fare better (i.e., crystallized intelligence). Specifically, we hypothesized that older adults' higher levels of crystallized intelligence can provide an alternate pathway to good decisions when the fluid intelligence pathway declines. The performance of older adults relative to younger adults therefore depends on the relative importance of each type of intelligence for the decision at hand. We tested this complementary capabilities hypothesis in a broad sample of younger and older adults, collecting a battery of standard cognitive measures and measures of economically important decision-making "traits"--including temporal discounting, loss aversion, financial literacy, and debt literacy. We found that older participants performed as well as or better than younger participants on these four decision-making measures. Structural equation modeling verified our hypothesis: Older participants' greater crystallized intelligence offset their lower levels of fluid intelligence for temporal discounting, financial literacy, and debt literacy, but not for loss aversion. These results have important implications for public policy and for the design of effective decision environments for older adults.

Uncertain demand, consumer loss aversion, and flat-rate tariffs

Abstract: We consider a model of firm pricing and consumer choice, where consumers are loss averse and uncertain about their future demand. Possibly, consumers in our model prefer a flat rate to a measured tariff, even though this choice does not minimize their expected billing amount—a behavior in line with ample empirical evidence. We solve for the profit-maximizing two-part tariff, which is a flat rate if (a) marginal costs are not too high, (b) loss aversion is intense, and (c) there are strong variations in demand. Moreover, we analyze the optimal nonlinear tariff. This tariff has a large flat part when a flat rate is optimal among the class of two-part tariffs.

Tempus Fugit: Time Pressure in Risky Decisions

Abstract: We study the effects of time pressure on risky decisions for pure gain prospects, pure loss prospects, and mixed prospects involving both gains and losses. In two experiments we find that time pressure has no effect on risk attitudes for gains, but increases risk aversion for losses. For mixed prospects, subjects become simultaneously more loss averse and more gain seeking under time pressure, depending on the framing of the prospects. The results suggest the importance of aspiration levels, and thus the overall probability to break even, under time pressure. We discuss the implications of our findings for decision-making situations that involve time pressure.

Is There One Unifying Concept of Utility?An Experimental Comparison of Utility Under Risk and Utility Over Time

Abstract: The nature of utility is controversial. Whereas decision theory commonly assumes that utility is context specific, applied and empirical decision analysis typically assumes one unifying concept of utility applicable to all decision problems. This controversy has hardly been addressed empirically because of the absence of methods to measure utility outside the context of risk. We introduce a method to measure utility over time and compare utility under risk and utility over time. We distinguish between gains and losses and also measure loss aversion. In two experiments we found that utility under risk and utility over time differed and were uncorrelated. Utility under risk was more curved than utility over time. Subjects were loss averse both for risk and for time, but loss aversion was more pronounced for risk. Loss aversion over risk and time were uncorrelated. This suggests that loss aversion, although important in both decision contexts, is volatile and subject to framing.

Expectations-Based Reference-Dependent Life-Cycle Consumption

Abstract: I incorporate expectations-based reference-dependent preferences into a dynamic stochastic model to explain three major life-cycle consumption facts; the intuitions behind these three implications constitute novel connections between recent advances in behavioral economics and prominent ideas in the macro consumption literature. First, expectations-based loss aversion rationalizes excess smoothness and sensitivity in consumption, the puzzling empirical observation of lagged consumption responses to income shocks. Intuitively, in the event of an adverse shock, the agent delays painful cuts in consumption to allow his reference point to decrease. Second, the preferences generate a hump-shaped consumption profile. Early in life, consumption is low due to a first-order precautionary-savings motive, but as uncertainty resolves, this motive is dominated by time-inconsistent overconsumption, forcing consumption to decline toward the end of life. Third, consumption drops at retirement. When uncertainty is absent, the agent does not overconsume because he dislikes the associated certain loss in future consumption. Additionally, I obtain several new predictions about consumption; compare the preferences with habit formation, hyperbolic discounting, and temptation disutility; and structurally estimate the preference parameters.

Do financial professionals behave according to prospect theory? An experimental study

Abstract: Prospect theory is increasingly used to explain deviations from the traditional paradigm of rational agents. Empirical support for prospect theory comes mainly from laboratory experiments using student samples. It is obviously important to know whether and to what extent this support generalizes to more naturally occurring circumstances. This article explores this question and measures prospect theory for a sample of private bankers and fund managers. We obtained clear support for prospect theory. Our financial professionals behaved according to prospect theory and violated expected utility maximization. They were risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses and their utility was concave for gains and (slightly) convex for losses. They were also averse to losses, but less so than commonly observed in laboratory studies and assumed in behavioral finance. A substantial minority focused on gains and largely ignored losses, behavior reminiscent of what caused the current financial crisis.

Eliciting Prospect Theory When Consequences Are Measured in Time Units: "Time Is Not Money"

Abstract: We elicited the prospect theory components (utility, probability weighting, and loss aversion) when consequences are expressed as the time dedicated to a specific task or activity. A similar elicitation was performed for monetary consequences to allow an across-attribute (time/money) comparison of the elicited components (at the individual level). We obtained less concave utility and smaller loss aversion for time than for money. Moreover, while the probability weighting was predominantly inverse S-shaped for both attributes, it was less sensitive to probabilities and more elevated for time than for money. This finding implies more optimism for gains and more pessimism for losses.

Do financial professionals behave according to prospect theory? An experimental study

Abstract: Prospect theory is increasingly used to explain deviations from the traditional paradigm of rational agents. Empirical support for prospect theory comes mainly from laboratory experiments using student samples. It is obviously important to know whether and to what extent this support generalizes to more naturally occurring circumstances. This article explores this question and measures prospect theory for a sample of private bankers and fund managers. We obtained clear support for prospect theory. Our financial professionals behaved according to prospect theory and violated expected utility maximization. They were risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses and their utility was concave for gains and (slightly) convex for losses. They were also averse to losses, but less so than commonly observed in laboratory studies and assumed in behavioral finance. A substantial minority focused on gains and largely ignored losses, behavior reminiscent of what caused the current financial crisis.