Showing papers on "Loss aversion published in 2016"

The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias

Abstract: most (all?) behavior can be explained by assuming that agents have stable, well-defined preferences and make rational choices consistent with those preferences in markets that (eventually) clear. An empirical result qualifies as an anomaly if it is difficult to "rationalize," or if implausible assumptions are necessary to explain it within the paradigm. This column presents a series of such anomalies. Readers are invited to suggest topics for future columns by

Behavioral Economics: Past, Present and Future

Abstract: There has been growing interest in the field come to me known as “behavioral economics” which attempts to incorporate insights from other social sciences, especially psychology, in order to enrich the standard economic model. This interest the underlying psychology of human behavior returns economics to its earliest roots. Scholars such as Adam Smith talked about such key concepts as loss aversion, overconfidence, and self-control. Nevertheless, the modern version of behavioral economics introduced in the 1980s met with resistance by some economists, who preferred to retain the standard neo-classical model. They introduced several arguments for why psychology could safely be ignored. In this essay I show that these arguments have been rejected, both theoretically and empirically, so it is time to move on. The new approach to economics should include two different kinds of theories: normative models that characterize the optimal solution to specific problems and descriptive models that capture how humans actually behave. The latter theories will incorporate some variables I call supposedly irrelevant factors. By adding these factors such as framing or temptation we can improve the explanatory power of economic models. If everyone includes all the factors that do determine economic behavior, then the field of behavioral economics will no longer need to exist.

Using Behavioral Economics to Design Physician Incentives That Deliver High-Value Care

Abstract: Behavioral economics provides insights about the development of effective incentives for physicians to deliver high-value care. It suggests that the structure and delivery of incentives can shape behavior, as can thoughtful design of the decision-making environment. This article discusses several principles of behavioral economics, including inertia, loss aversion, choice overload, and relative social ranking. Whereas these principles have been applied to motivate personal health decisions, retirement planning, and savings behavior, they have been largely ignored in the design of physician incentive programs. Applying these principles to physician incentives can improve their effectiveness through better alignment with performance goals. Anecdotal examples of successful incentive programs that apply behavioral economics principles are provided, even as the authors recognize that its application to the design of physician incentives is largely untested, and many outstanding questions exist. Application and rigorous evaluation of infrastructure changes and incentives are needed to design payment systems that incentivize high-quality, cost-conscious care.

Risk, Uncertainty, and Entrepreneurship: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment

Abstract: Theory predicts that entrepreneurs have distinct attitudes toward risk and uncertainty, but empirical evidence is mixed. To better understand the unique behavioral characteristics of entrepreneurs and the causes of these mixed results, we perform a large "lab-in-the-field" experiment comparing entrepreneurs to managers a suitable comparison group and employees n = 2,288. The results indicate that entrepreneurs perceive themselves as less risk averse than managers and employees, in line with common wisdom. However, when using experimental incentivized measures, the differences are subtler. Entrepreneurs are only found to be unique in their lower degree of loss aversion, and not in their risk or ambiguity aversion. This combination of results might be explained by our finding that perceived risk attitude is not only correlated to risk aversion but also to loss aversion. Overall, we therefore suggest using a broader definition of risk that captures this unique feature of entrepreneurs: their willingness to risk losses. This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.

Contract Preferences and Performance for the Loss-Averse Supplier: Buyback vs. Revenue Sharing

Abstract: Prior theory claims that buyback and revenue-sharing contracts achieve equivalent channel-coordinating solutions when applied in a dyadic supplier–retailer setting. This suggests that a supplier should be indifferent between the two contracts. However, the sequence and magnitude of costs and revenues (i.e., losses and gains) vary significantly between the contracts, suggesting the supplier’s preference of contract type, and associated contract parameter values, may vary with the level of loss aversion. We investigate this phenomenon through two studies. The first is a preliminary study investigating whether human suppliers are indeed indifferent between these two contracts. Using a controlled laboratory experiment, with human subjects taking on the role of the supplier having to choose between contracts, we find that contract preferences change with the ratio of overage and underage costs for the channel (i.e., the newsvendor critical ratio). In particular, a buyback contract is preferred for products wit...

Cheating and Loss Aversion: Do People Cheat More to Avoid a Loss?

Abstract: Does the extent of cheating depend on a proper reference point? We use a real-effort matrix task that implements a two (gain versus loss frame) times two (monitored performance versus unmonitored performance) between-subjects design with 600 experimental participants to examine whether the extent of cheating is reference dependent. Self-reported performance in the unmonitored condition is significantly higher than actual performance in the monitored condition—a clear indication of cheating. However, the level of cheating is by far higher in the loss frame than in the gain frame under no monitoring. The fear of a loss seems to lead to more dishonest behavior than the lure of a gain. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2313. This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.

Can Prospect Theory Explain the Disposition Effect? A New Perspective on Reference Points

Abstract: There is a recent debate on whether prospect theory can explain the disposition effect. Using both theory and simulation, this paper shows that prospect theory often predicts the disposition effect when lagged expected final wealth is the reference point, regardless of whether the reference point is updated or not. When initial wealth is the reference point, however, there is often no disposition effect. Reference point adjustment weakens the disposition effect, leads to more aggressive initial stock purchase strategies and predict history-dependence in stock holding. These findings also provide a explanation for why market experience reduces behavioral biases.

Risk taking for oneself and others: a structural model approach

Abstract: Economic theory makes no predictions about social factors affecting decisions under risk. We examine situations in which a decision maker decides for herself and another person under conditions of payoff equality, and compare them to individual decisions. By estimating a structural model, we find that responsibility leaves utility curvature unaffected, but accentuates the subjective distortion of very small and very large probabilities for both gains and losses. We also find that responsibility reduces loss aversion, but that these results only obtain under some specific definitions of the latter. These results serve to generalize and reconcile some of the still largely contradictory findings in the literature. They also have implications for financial agency, which we discuss.

Loss-Averse Preferences, Performance, and Career Success of Institutional Investors

Abstract: Using survey-based measures of mutual fund manager loss aversion, we study the effects of institutional investor preferences on their investment decisions, performance, and career outcomes. We find that managers with higher aversion to losses choose portfolios with lower downside risk, increase their risk-taking more in response to poor past performance, and display a stronger disposition effect. Further, we provide evidence that managers who are more loss-averse have lower performance and are more likely to have their contracts terminated.Received December 3, 2014; editorial decision May 25, 2016 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

Models of affective decision-making: how do feelings predict choice?

Abstract: Intuitively, how you feel about potential outcomes will determine your decisions. Indeed, an implicit assumption in one of the most influential theories in psychology, prospect theory, is that feelings govern choice. Surprisingly, however, very little is known about the rules by which feelings are transformed into decisions. Here, we specified a computational model that used feelings to predict choices. We found that this model predicted choice better than existing value-based models, showing a unique contribution of feelings to decisions, over and above value. Similar to the value function in prospect theory, our feeling function showed diminished sensitivity to outcomes as value increased. However, loss aversion in choice was explained by an asymmetry in how feelings about losses and gains were weighted when making a decision, not by an asymmetry in the feelings themselves. The results provide new insights into how feelings are utilized to reach a decision.

Real and hypothetical monetary rewards modulate risk taking in the brain.

Abstract: Both real and hypothetical monetary rewards are widely used as reinforcers in risk taking and decision making studies. However, whether real and hypothetical monetary rewards modulate risk taking and decision making in the same manner remains controversial. In this study, we used event-related potentials (ERP) with a balloon analogue risk task (BART) paradigm to examine the effects of real and hypothetical monetary rewards on risk taking in the brain. Behavioral data showed reduced risk taking after negative feedback (money loss) during the BART with real rewards compared to those with hypothetical rewards, suggesting increased loss aversion with real monetary rewards. The ERP data demonstrated a larger feedback-related negativity (FRN) in response to money loss during risk taking with real rewards compared to those with hypothetical rewards, which may reflect greater prediction error or regret emotion after real monetary losses. These findings demonstrate differential effects of real versus hypothetical monetary rewards on risk taking behavior and brain activity, suggesting a caution when drawing conclusions about real choices from hypothetical studies of intended behavior, especially when large rewards are used. The results have implications for future utility of real and hypothetical monetary rewards in studies of risk taking and decision making.

Measuring Loss Aversion under Ambiguity: A Method to Make Prospect Theory Completely Observable

Abstract: We propose a simple, parameter-free method that, for the first time, makes it possible to completely observe Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) prospect theory. While methods exist to measure event weighting and the utility for gains and losses separately, there was no method to measure loss aversion under ambiguity. Our method allows this and thereby it can measure prospect theory’s entire utility function. Consequently, we can properly identify properties of utility and perform new tests of prospect theory. We implemented our method in an experiment and obtained support for prospect theory. Utility was concave for gains and convex for losses and there was substantial loss aversion. Both utility and loss aversion were the same for risk and ambiguity, as assumed by prospect theory, and sign-comonotonic trade-off consistency, the central condition of prospect theory, held.

‘I want this firm to be in good hands’: Emotional pricing of resigning entrepreneurs

Abstract: Given the importance of non-economic considerations throughout the entrepreneurial life cycle, I aim to investigate the drivers of owner-managers' "emotional pricing" when they wish to sell their firms to successors. Emotional pricing thereby denotes those elements of the owner-managers' price expectations that cannot be traced back to economic considerations. Building on arguments from behavioral finance, I hypothesize that "emotional pricing," which in this study reflects owner-managers' willingness to sell the firm at a discount, is driven by the reluctance to lose access to information about the firm and to lose influence on the firm, and by an aversion to putting the firm's future at risk. In particular, I argue that a long-term relationship between an owner-manager and a firm, a familiar relationship between an owner-manager and a successor, and situational contingencies-especially unsatisfactory firm performance-increase the owner-manager's emotional-pricing component. I test the hypotheses using a sample of 1,354 owner-managers of Swiss SMEs, who provided their views on their exit intentions. I subsequently compare those results to 455 actual ownership transfers involving Swiss SMEs.

Expectations‐based reference‐dependent preferences and asset pricing

Abstract: This paper incorporates expectations-based reference-dependent preferences into the canonical Lucas-tree asset-pricing economy. Expectations-based loss aversion increases the equity premium and decreases the consumption-wealth ratio, because uncertain fluctuations in consumption are perceived to be more painful. Moreover, because unexpected cuts in consumption are particularly painful, the agent wants to postpone such cuts to let his reference point decrease. Thus, even though shocks are i.i.d., loss aversion induces variation in the consumption-wealth ratio, which generates variation in the equity premium, expected returns, and predictability. The level and variation in the equity premium and the predictability in returns match historical moments, but the associated variation in intertemporal substitution motives results in excessive variation in the risk-free rate. This effect can be partially offset with variation in expected consumption growth, heteroskedasticity in consumption growth, or time-variant disaster risk. As a key contribution, I show that the preferences resolve the equity-premium puzzle and simultaneously imply plausible risk attitudes towards small and large wealth bets.

A behavioural finance approach to working capital management

Abstract: This paper documents the behaviour of corporate treasurers who are involved in the decision-making process in the areas of cash, inventory, accounts receivable, accounts payable and risk management during the global financial crisis. Using a survey questionnaire, we attempt to find out if working capital managers are prone to certain heuristic-driven biases, such as loss aversion, high confidence level, anchoring and self-serving biases. Our findings show that these professionals exhibit signs of behavioural biases. Although the biases lead to sub-optimal decisions in certain areas of working capital management (WCM), they can also be desirable attributes in other aspects of WCM. We propose a profile of a good working capital manager.

Optimal management of DC pension plan under loss aversion and Value-at-Risk constraints

Abstract: This paper studies the risk management in a defined contribution (DC)pension plan. The financial market consists of cash, bond and stock. The interest rate in our model is assumed to follow an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process while the contribution rate follows a geometric Brownian Motion. Thus, the pension manager has to hedge the risks of interest rate, stock and contribution rate. Different from most works in DC pension plan, the pension manger has to obtain the optimal allocations under loss aversion and Value-at-Risk(VaR) constraints. The loss aversion pension manager is sensitive to losses while the VaR pension manager has to ensure the quality of wealth at retirement. Since these problems are not standard concave optimization problems, martingale method is applied to derive the optimal investment strategies. Explicit solutions are obtained under these two optimization criterions. Moreover, sensitivity analysis is presented in the end to show the economic behaviors under these two criterions.

Measuring Loss Aversion under Ambiguity: A Method to Make Prospect Theory Completely Observable

Abstract: We propose a simple, parameter‐free method that, for the first time, makes it possible to completely observe Tversky and Kahneman's (1992) prospect theory. While methods existed to measure event weighting and the utility for gains and losses separately, there was no method to measure loss aversion under ambiguity. Our method allows this and thereby it can measure prospect theory's entire utility function. Consequently, we can properly identify properties of utility and perform new tests of prospect theory. We implemented our method in an experiment and obtained support for prospect theory. Utility was concave for gains and convex for losses and there was substantial loss aversion. Both utility and loss aversion were the same for risk and ambiguity, as assumed by prospect theory, and sign‐comonotonic trade‐off consistency, the central condition of prospect theory, held.

Emotion-induced loss aversion and striatal-amygdala coupling in low anxious individuals

Abstract: Adapting behavior to changes in the environment is a crucial ability for survival but such adaptation varies widely across individuals. Here, we asked how humans alter their economic decision-making in response to emotional cues, and whether this is related to trait anxiety. Developing an emotional decision-making task for functional magnetic resonance imaging, in which gambling decisions were preceded by emotional and non-emotional primes, we assessed emotional influences on loss aversion, the tendency to overweigh potential monetary losses relative to gains. Our behavioral results revealed that only low-anxious individuals exhibited increased loss aversion under emotional conditions. This emotional modulation of decision-making was accompanied by a corresponding emotion-elicited increase in amygdala-striatal functional connectivity, which correlated with the behavioral effect across participants. Consistent with prior reports of 'neural loss aversion', both amygdala and ventral striatum tracked losses more strongly than gains, and amygdala loss aversion signals were exaggerated by emotion, suggesting a potential role for this structure in integrating value and emotion cues. Increased loss aversion and striatal-amygdala coupling induced by emotional cues may reflect the engagement of adaptive harm-avoidance mechanisms in low-anxious individuals, possibly promoting resilience to psychopathology.

Loss-averse newsvendor problem with supply risk

Abstract: Modeling the manufacturer as a newsvendor, in this paper we study the ordering decisions of a loss-averse newsvendor with supply and demand uncertainties. Using the stylized newsvendor models, we analyse several key issues, including the effect of the newsvendor’s loss aversion, the effect of demand uncertainty, and the effect of supply uncertainty on the decision maker’s optimal decision under the procurement model, in which the decision maker only pays for the actual quantity received. Through our analysis, we find the following facts: the optimal order quantity decreases with respect to the degree of loss-aversion; the supply uncertainty induces the decision maker to order more than that in a deterministic environment; a stochastically larger demand always results in a larger order quantity and a larger expected utility; the optimal expected utility decreases in the demand volatility while the optimal order quantity may increase or decrease. Moreover, with numerical experiments, we demonstrate that the supply risk negatively affects the utility more than the demand risk does.

Individual Differences in Loss Aversion Conscientiousness Predicts How Life Satisfaction Responds to Losses Versus Gains in Income

Abstract: Loss aversion is considered a general pervasive bias occurring regardless of the context or the person making the decision. We hypothesized that conscientiousness would predict an aversion to losses in the financial domain. We index loss aversion by the relative impact of income losses and gains on life satisfaction. In a representative German sample (N = 105,558; replicated in a British sample, N = 33,848), with conscientiousness measured at baseline, those high on conscientiousness have the strongest reactions to income losses, suggesting a pronounced loss aversion effect, whereas for those moderately unconscientious, there is no loss aversion effect. Our research (a) provides the first evidence of personality moderation of any loss aversion phenomena, (b) supports contextual perspectives that both personality and situational factors need to be examined in combination, (c) shows that the small but robust relationship between income and life satisfaction is driven primarily by a subset of people experiencing highly impactful losses.

Incidental fear cues increase monetary loss aversion.

Abstract: In many everyday decisions, people exhibit loss aversion-a greater sensitivity to losses relative to gains of equal size. Loss aversion is thought to be (at least partly) mediated by emotional--in particular, fear-related--processes. Decision research has shown that even incidental emotions, which are unrelated to the decision at hand, can influence decision making. The effect of incidental fear on loss aversion, however, is thus far unclear. In two studies, we experimentally investigated how incidental fear cues, presented during (Study 1) or before (Study 2) choices to accept or reject mixed gambles over real monetary stakes, influence monetary loss aversion. We find that the presentation of fearful faces, relative to the presentation of neutral faces, increased risk aversion-an effect that could be attributed to increased loss aversion. The size of this effect was moderated by psychopathic personality: Fearless dominance, in particular its interpersonal facet, but not self-centered impulsivity, attenuated the effect of incidental fear cues on loss aversion, consistent with reduced fear reactivity. Together, these results highlight the sensitivity of loss aversion to the affective context.

Estimating the four Hicksian measures for a public good: A contingent valuation investigation

Abstract: Using equivalent loss (the mone- tary loss equivalent to a proposed amenity reduc- tion, EL) and equivalent gain (the gain equivalent to a proposed amenity increase, EG) alongside traditional welfare measures in a contingent valu- ation study of traffic disamenity, we report an ex- periment designed to test theoretical explanations of the well-known disparity between compensat- ing surplus and equivalent surplus measures of welfare. No compelling evidence is found in favor of loss aversion as a cause of the disparity. Mean- while, as valuation measures, the performance of EL is similar to the traditional willingness to pay for a gain, while EG performs poorly. (JEL Q26)

Eyes on the Prize?: Evidence of Diminishing Attention to Experienced and Foregone Outcomes in Repeated Experiential Choice

Abstract: Recently, there has been increased interest in decisions-from-experience (where decision makers learn from observing the outcomes of previous choices), which provide valuable insights into the learning and preference construction processes underlying many daily decisions. Several process models have been developed to capture these processes, and while such models often fit the data well, many assume that the decision maker is a vigilant observer, processing each outcome. In two studies, we provide a critical test of this assumption using eye tracking to record directed visual attention when participants choose repeatedly among two options, each time being shown the outcome for their chosen option and for the foregone option. Consistently, we find that the vigilance assumption is not supported, with decision makers often not attending to outcome information. Moreover, (in)attention to outcomes is predictable, with vigilance decreasing as more choices are made, and being greater for obtained than for foregone outcomes, and when options deliver only gains as opposed to losses or a mixture of gains and losses. Furthermore, we find that this variation in attentional allocation plays a central role in the apparent indecisiveness (inconsistency) in choice, with increased attention to foregone outcomes predicting switches to that option on the next choice. Together, these findings highlight the value of eye tracking in investigations of decisions-from-experience, providing novel insight into the cognitive processes underlying them.

Modeling Adversaries in Counterterrorism Decisions Using Prospect Theory.

Abstract: Counterterrorism decisions have been an intense area of research in recent years. Both decision analysis and game theory have been used to model such decisions, and more recently approaches have been developed that combine the techniques of the two disciplines. However, each of these approaches assumes that the attacker is maximizing its utility. Experimental research shows that human beings do not make decisions by maximizing expected utility without aid, but instead deviate in specific ways such as loss aversion or likelihood insensitivity. In this article, we modify existing methods for counterterrorism decisions. We keep expected utility as the defender's paradigm to seek for the rational decision, but we use prospect theory to solve for the attacker's decision to descriptively model the attacker's loss aversion and likelihood insensitivity. We study the effects of this approach in a critical decision, whether to screen containers entering the United States for radioactive materials. We find that the defender's optimal decision is sensitive to the attacker's levels of loss aversion and likelihood insensitivity, meaning that understanding such descriptive decision effects is important in making such decisions.

A model of price discrimination under loss aversion and state-contingent reference points

Abstract: We study optimal price discrimination when a monopolist faces a continuum of consumers with reference-dependent preferences. A consumer's valuation for product quality consists of an intrinsic valuation affected by a private state signal (type) and a gain–loss valuation that depends on deviations of purchased quality from a reference point. Following [Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006], we consider loss-averse buyers who evaluate gains and losses in terms of changes in the consumption valuation, but in our model each buyer evaluates consumption outcomes relative to his own state-contingent reference quality level. We capture the process by which reference qualities are formed via a reference consumption plan, and use a generalization of the Mirrlees representation of the indirect utility to fully characterize optimal contracts for loss-averse consumers. We find that, depending on the reference plan, optimal price discrimination may exhibit (i) downward distortions beyond the standard downward distortions due to screening, (ii) efficiency gains relative to second-best contracts without loss aversion, and (iii) upward distortions above first-best quality levels without loss aversion. We consider ex ante and ex post consistent contracts in which quality offers by the firm coincide, in expectations or at every state realization, respectively, with the reference quality levels. We find the firm's unique preferred ex ante and ex post consistent contract menu and specify conditions under which, for the second case, it also constitutes the consumers' preferred menu.