Loss aversion

About: Loss aversion is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2898 publications have been published within this topic receiving 115198 citations.

Team Incentives and Reference-Dependent Preferences

Abstract: We investigate a multi-agent moral-hazard model where agents have expectation-based reference-dependent preferences a la Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). We show that even when each agent's probability of success in a project is independent, team incentives can be optimal. Because the agents are loss averse, they have first-order risk aversion to wage uncertainty. This causes the agents to work harder when their own failure is stochastically compensated through other agents' performance. In the optimal contract, both high- and low-performance agents are equally rewarded if most agents accomplish their projects; otherwise only high-performance agents are rewarded.

Are Decisions under Risk Malleable

Abstract: Human decision making under risk and uncertainty may depend on individual involvement in the outcome-generating process. Expected utility theory is silent on this issue. Prospect theory in its current form offers little, if any, prediction of how or why involvement in a process should matter, although it may offer ex post interpretations of empirical findings. Well-known findings in psychology demonstrate that when subjects exercise more involvement or choice in lottery procedures, they value their lottery tickets more highly. This often is interpreted as an illusion of control, meaning that when subjects are more involved in a lottery, they may believe they are more likely to win, perhaps because they perceive that they have more control over the outcome. Our experimental design eliminates several possible alternative explanations for the results of previous studies in an experiment that varies the degree and type of involvement in lottery procedures. We find that in treatments with more involvement subjects on average place less rather than more value on their lottery tickets. One possible explanation for this is that involvement interacts with loss aversion by causing subjects to weigh losses more heavily than they would otherwise. One implication of our study is that involvement, either independently or in interaction with myopic loss aversion, may help explain the extreme risk aversion of bond investors.

Consumption-based asset pricing with loss aversion

Abstract: I incorporate loss aversion in a consumption-based asset pricing model with recursive preferences and solve for asset prices in closed-form. I find loss aversion increases expected returns substantially relative to the standard recursive utility model. This feature of my model improves the ability to match moments on asset prices. Further, I find loss aversion induces important nonlinearities into the expected excess returns as a function of the exposure to the consumption shocks. In particular, the elasticities of expected returns with respect to the exposure to the consumption shocks are greater for assets with smaller exposures to the shocks, thus generating interesting predictions for the cross-section of returns. I provide empirical evidence supporting this outcome. The model with loss aversion correctly predicts both a negative premium for skewness and a security market line, the excess returns as a function of the exposure to market risk, flatter than the CAPM.

Optimal Currency Hedging

Abstract: This paper characterizes optimal currency hedging in several models of downside risk. We consider, in turn, three models of hedging: (i) a firm that chooses its hedging policy in the presence of bankruptcy costs; (ii) an all equity firm that faces a convex tax schedule; and (iii) a firm whose manager is subject to loss aversion. In all these models, and contrary to conventional wisdom, we show that forwards dominate options as hedges of downside risk.