Loss aversion

About: Loss aversion is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2898 publications have been published within this topic receiving 115198 citations.

Modeling the Psychology of Consumer and Firm Behavior with Behavioral Economics

Abstract: Marketing is an applied science that tries to explain and influence how firms and consumers behave in markets. Marketing models are usually applications of standard economic theories, which rely on strong assumptions of rationality of consumers and firms. Behavioral economics explores the implications of the limits of rationality, with the goal of making economic theories more plausible by explaining and predicting behavior more accurately while maintaining formal power. This article reviews six behavioral economics models that are useful to marketing. Three models generalize standard preference structures to allow for sensitivity to reference points and loss aversion, social preferences toward outcomes of others, and preference for instant gratification. The other three models generalize the concept of game-theoretic equilibrium, allowing decision makers to make mistakes, encounter limits on the depth of strategic thinking, and equilibrate by learning from feedback. The authors also discuss a sp...

The Behavioralist Visits the Factory: Increasing Productivity Using Simple Framing Manipulations

Abstract: Recent discoveries in behavioral economics have led to important new insights concerning what can happen in markets. Such gains in knowledge have come primarily via laboratory experiments---a missing piece of the puzzle in many cases is parallel evidence drawn from naturally occurring field counterparts. We provide a small movement in this direction by taking advantage of a unique opportunity to work with a Chinese high-tech manufacturing facility. Our study revolves around using insights gained from one of the most influential lines of behavioral research---framing manipulations---in an attempt to increase worker productivity in the facility. Using a natural field experiment, we report several insights. For example, conditional incentives framed as both “losses” and “gains” increase productivity for both individuals and teams. In addition, teams more acutely respond to bonuses posed as losses than as comparable bonuses posed as gains. The magnitude of this framing effect is roughly 1%: that is, total team productivity is enhanced by 1% purely due to the framing manipulation. Importantly, we find that neither the framing nor the incentive effect lose their significance over time; rather, the effects are observed over the entire sample period. Moreover, we learn that repeated interaction with workers and conditionality of the bonus contract are substitutes for sustenance of incentive effects in the long run. This paper was accepted by Gerard P. Cachon, decision analysis.

Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial

Abstract: Plea-bargaining literature predicts that parties strike plea bargains in the shadows of expected trial outcomes. In other words, parties forecast the expected sentence after trial, discount it by the probability of acquittal, and offer some proportional discount. This oversimplified model ignores how structural distortions skew bargaining outcomes, causing them to diverge from trial outcomes. Part I of this Article explores the various structural forces that warp plea bargains. Agency costs, attorney compensation and workloads, resources, sentencing and bail rules, and information deficits all skew bargaining. In addition, psychological biases and heuristics warp judgments. Part II applies recent research from behavioral law and economics and cognitive psychology to critique plea bargaining. Overconfidence, denial, discounting, risk preferences, loss aversion, framing, and anchoring all affect bargaining decisions. Skilled lawyers can partly counteract some of these problems, but they can also overcompensate. The oversimplified shadow-of-trial model of plea bargaining needs to be supplemented by a structural-psychological perspective. On this perspective, uncertainty, money, self-interest, and demographic variation greatly influence plea bargains. Part III explores how to respond to the various structural and psychological influences that warp plea bargains. Reforming systems of defense counsel, bail rules, and the structure of sentencing rules, and increasing use of mediators and judges in bargaining could ameliorate some of these influences. Other problems, such as demographic variations in psychology, are very difficult to correct. These influences cast light on how civil and criminal bargaining differ in important respects.

An Experimental Test of Loss Aversion

Abstract: This paper experimentally investigates a preference condition for loss aversion in the framework of cumulative prospect theory (CPT) We propose the concepts of absolute and relative loss premiums in order to measure the extent of loss aversion and to derive notions of increasing, constant, and decreasing loss aversion While in only one of the 28 choice situations analyzed loss neutrality and loss seeking can be rejected, about 51% of all choices are loss averse and, due to the large extent of loss aversion revealed by these choices, the average loss premium is positive for most choice situations Female subjects exhibit both a more frequent occurrence and a larger extent of loss aversion

Alternative Models for Capturing the Compromise Effect

Abstract: The compromise effect denotes the finding that brands gain share when they become the intermediate rather than extreme option in a choice set. Despite the robustness and importance of this phenomenon, choice modelers have neglected to incorporate the compromise effect in formal choice models and to test whether such models outperform the standard value maximization model. In this article, the authors suggest four context-dependent choice models that can conceptually capture the compromise effect. Although the models are motivated by theory from economics and behavioral decision research, they differ with respect to the particular mechanism that underlies the compromise effect (e.g., contextual concavity versus loss aversion). Using two empirical applications, the authors (1) contrast the alternative models and show that incorporating the compromise effect by modeling the local choice context leads to superior predictions and fit compared with the traditional value maximization model and a stronge...