Showing papers on "Majority opinion published in 1979"

Lower Court Reactions to Supreme Court Decisions: A Quantitative Examination

Abstract: This article tests the widely assumed proposition that the greater the original support for a decision at the Supreme Court level, the greater the subsequent compliance with that decision by the lower courts. Five indicators of support were used in the analysis-size of the voting majority, size of the opinion majority, number of dissenting justices, number of dissenting opinions, and author of the majority opinion. Indexes of compliance, evasion, and discord based on Shepard's Citations listings of lower court reactions to 1961-1963 Supreme Court decisions from 1963 to 1967 were used as measures of lower court responses to Supreme Court decisions. The analysis failed to support any of the hypothesized relationships.

Who Speaks for the Court? Majority Opinion Assignment from Taft to Burger

Abstract: The designation of the majority opinion writer is one of the major prerogatives of the Chief Justiceship for influencing the formulation of judicial policy. The limited research on opinion assignment has focused almost exclusively on the ideological aspects of assignment decisions. Data sets employed have been small and noncomparable. This paper empirically examines several concerns operating in opinion assignment decision making in addition to ideology. These include the "equality" principle, distribution of "important" cases, self-assignment patterns, and judicial experience. The data base consists of the universe of over a half a century of opinion assignments made by Chief Justices Taft through Burger.

Judicial Career Patterns and Majority Opinion Assignment on the Supreme Court

Abstract: 1 Several studies of majority opinion assignment on the Supreme Court exist; yet none empirically examines the relationship between workload, seniority, and age. For representative works on opinion assignment see David J. Danelski, "Assignment of the Court's Opinion by the Chief Justice," (paper presented at the 1960 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting); S. Sidney Ulmer, "The Use of Power in the Supreme Court: The Opinion Assignments of Earl Warren," Journal of Public Law, 19 (Winter 1960), 4967; David W. Rohde, "Policy Goals, Strategic Choices, and Majority Opinion Assignments in the U.S. Supreme Court," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XVI (November 1972), 652-682; Gregory James Rathjen, "Policy Goals, Strategic Choices, and Majority Opinion Assignments in the Supreme Court: A Replication," American Journal of Political Science, XVIII (November, 1974), 713-724; and William P. McLauchlan, "Ideology and Conflict in Supreme Court Opinion Assignment, 1946-1962," Western Political Quarterly, 25 (March 1972), 16-27.

Is the Supreme Court of Canada Biased in Constitutional Cases

Abstract: This article addresses the allegation that the Supreme Court has been biased in deciding constitutional cases in favor of federal interests. The author concludes it is at least possible for judges to be biased, in light of positivist and realist views on how judges choose between conflicting interpretations of the law, but an examination of federal judicial appointments and the outcomes of constitutional cases from January 1950 to May 1979 leads him to conclude that the allegation of bias is unfounded. In tracing judicial doctrine, he insists the Supreme Court has adhered to principles laid down by the Privy Council, siding as much in favour of the provinces as Parliament when competing interpretations surface.

Major Changes in School Integration Litigation, 1954-1979:

Abstract: Since the United States Supreme Court's 1954 decision, which declared racially segregated schools unconstitutional, subsequent litigation in that area before the Court has resulted in several major changes. This paper assesses the nature of those changes as well as modifications in the Court's attitude toward equal rights issues. The changes are: standing to sue — the Court has narrowed qualifications for individuals who may sue a school district and has made it more difficult to bring class ac tion suits; test to evidence — in several school integration cases, the Court has shifted the burden of proof from the school district to the plaintiffs; de jure/de facto distinction — the Court has narrowed the distinction and has determined that de facto school segregation is not illegal unless plaintiffs can prove intent by the school district to segregate; and remedies required to integrate a segregated school district are now limited to the amount of the infraction. Current attitudes of the Court toward other ...

The Two-Edged Sword

Abstract: A unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court is an unusual phenomenon today, when it seems that almost every other decision of that august court is determined by a single vote. Furthermore, it is encouraging to read the opinion written by Chief Justice Warren Burger in the case of Addington vs Texas. The reader must appreciate the wisdom and sensitivity disclosed by the careful analysis in that opinion, which deals with the legal problems inherent in the civil commitment of the mentally ill.The Court's determination of the standard of proof required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for an involuntary commitment to a state mental hospital is wrapped in a comprehensive delineation of rights and duties. The main argument centered on use of the same standard of proof required in criminal actions, ie, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as opposed to the more moderate standard of clear

Nine old men and one New Deal -- the Supreme Court crisis of 1937 -- a political history

Abstract: Nine Old Men and One New Deal; Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the Supreme Court Crisis of 1937. a political history. is a review of the development, causes. and resolution of the Supreme Court Crisis of 1937. The Supreme Court Crisis of 1937 resulted from the expression of divergent social and economic theories by the Supreme Court and the President. This work explores the conflict that resulted fram this expression, and reviews the resolution of this conflict. For further copies write to; Dwight D. Darrow 134 Cold Spring Road East Haddam, CT 06423

Documents on the International Court of Justice

Abstract: This edition differs from its predecessors in that, at the request of many French-speaking and other jurists, it is now completely bilingual, in the two official languages of the International Court of Justice under Article 39 of the Statute -- English and French. As before, this compilation aims to provide the practitioner in the Court, the diplomat, the politician and the student with a handy and complete collection of documents relating to the operation of the International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. In order to increase the usefulness of this compilation, the unofficial translations of the Rules of Court of 1978 into Arabic, Chinese, Russian and Spanish -- the official languages of the United Nations -- have been included.

The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Western Sahara Case

Abstract: Background Western Sahara is a large territory, 100,000 square miles in area and occupied by a considerable number ofnomadic tribes, although there are certain townships such as El Aiaun and Amara. 1 The territory was divided into two provinces, Rio de Oro and Sakiet el Hamra under Spanish administration. It is difficult to estimate the population of the territory, but it appears to be between 70,000 and 100,000. Most of the people of the territory are Arabic speaking, as are those of Mauritania, but certain of the Tekna class speak Berber. In their migrations in search of pastures and water, the inhabitants of the territory traversed what is now Mauritania and part of Western Morocco. Large deposits of phosphates have recently been found at Bu Cra, near El Aiaun, the Spanish capital, whilst there are considerable deposits of magnetite in the South. The fact that much of the territory is a desert and its population nomadic in character, has made the continuous exercise of political authority over it difficult in the past, although it may have been subjected to such authority under the Almoravids, an eleventh and early twelfth century Moroccan dynasty. For a short time Sheikh Ma ul-Aineen, a charismatic political and religious figure who came from what is now S.E. Mauritian and who was politically active during the later part of the nineteenth century, also managed to exercise considerable authority in much of the area, according to Morocco's, pleadings before the International Court on behalf of the Sulton. In 1884, the Spanish protectorate was proclaimed of part of the African coast reaching from Cape Blanc to Cape Bojador, and thus not including the Sakiet el Hamra. The Emir of Adrar purported to ceile territory stretching 150 miles inland, and abutting on this part of the coast in 1886, (Treaty of Idjil) , but

Gender Discrimination in Pension Plans Revisited: The Results of Court Ordered Implementation

Abstract: After five years of debate in learned journals, in court, and before professional associations, the question of sex discrimination in pension plans refuses to disappear. The core of the argument, however, is shifting. The original topic of debate was whether discrimination existed, and that has now been settled in the courts. The current debate is on-how to implement a nondiscriminatory plan. This note presents four subjects: first, what has been settled in the courts; second, how two employers implemented nondiscriminatory plans; third, implications to insurers; fourth, what is still to come. In 1974, several independent cases began their slow movement through various courts and, from time to time, the progress of those cases has been reported in this Journal [2, 6, 7, 8]. The primary issue has been whether group pension plans are discriminatory by sex. By 1978, two of the cases had reached the U.S. Supreme Court. Now final decisions have been made. The first to be acted on was the case involving the public school teachers of Indiana and the Indiana State Teachers Retirement Fund (hereafter the Robertson case) [11]. In Robertson, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld the lower court ruling that periodic pension benefits must be equal for both sexes. The defendant board petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was denied. By this denial the U.S. Supreme Court permitted the Indiana Supreme Court decision to stand. The second case to reach the U.S. Supreme Court was that brought by the female employees of the California Power and Light Company (hereafter the Manhart case). The Court heard this case and ruled that periodic contributions made by employees to the pension fund must be equal for both sexes [5]. The Robertson and Manhart decisions, when viewed together, indicate that all employees shall receive equal periodic benefits and make equal periodic contributions. This, of course, refers to similarly situated persons in terms of years of service, pay levels, age, etc. The decisions do not appear to be directly applicable to noncontributory defined benefit plans.

The Equality Principle & Majority Opinion Assignment on the United States Supreme Court

Abstract: The importance judicial scholarship attaches to the criteria applied by the chief justice in assigning the writing of majority opinions to members of the Supreme Court reflects the belief that authorship matters. The reason is the role majority opinions have in establishing controlling legal and constitutional principles governing not only the case at hand but also future decisions. The central importance of the chief justice's prerogative has been noted by David Rohde. "The primary responsibility for formulating the policy to be made in a case rests with the justice to whom the majority opinion is assigned." 1 The reasoning employed by the chief justice is complex. No single, reductionist interpretation can explain why justice x was assigned case Y. According to Felix Frankfurter, "The grounds for assignment may not always be obvious to the outsider. Indeed, they are not always so to the members of the Court. The reasons normally remain within the breast of the chief justice. But these involve, if the duty is wisely discharged, perhaps the most delicate judgment demanded of the chief justice." 2 Chief justices themselves have stressed the "equality norm" whereby every justice is given equal opportunity to serve as the spokesman of the Court. Thus, according to William Howard Taft, "The chief justice ... assigns all cases... distributing them to the members of the Court

New U. S. Supreme Court Philosophy on Advertising Faces Opposition.

Abstract: ,The U.S. Supreme Court is currently in the process of establishing a revolutionary doctrine that assures the right of consumers to receive certain information and the right of proprietors of the information to disseminate it. In establishing this doctrine, the Court is pulling together dicta from both "access" and "commercial speech" cases. At the same time, there appears to be a movement under way in some segments of society that in many ways is in direct conflict with the Court's developing doctrine. The resolution of this conflict may have profound implications for the future of advertising.

A Comparison of Coverage of Speech and Press Verdicts of Supreme Court.

Abstract: b It is argued that press advocacy of free expression is largely self-serving, that the press is more concerned with freedom of the commercial press than with the broader concepts of freedom of press for dissidents and freedom of speech for ordinary citizens. This view holds that when the press invokes its constitutional right of freedom of press, its main concern is for laissezzfaire rights and freedom of economic action. Thus when the press focuses attention on First Amendment press freedom, it primarily is interested in running a privately owned business with a minimum of government interference, an interest that it shares with other businesses in the free enterprise system. In support of this viewpoint a journalism historian has observed: \"American publishers have always been willing to allow suppression of the radical press; often they have led the efforts to punish it.\"l Kansas editor William Allen White commented: \"The people have a keen and accurate sense that much of editorial anxiety about the freedom of the press

Harvard’s View of the Supreme Court: A Response

Abstract: In this essay Professor Deutsch examines the legitimacy ofjudicial review, in part as a response to recent works by three faculty members of the Harvard Law School-John Hart Ely, Laurence Tribe, and Frank Michelman. Because of the nature of the response, this essay may also be read as a counterpoint to the articles by Professors Mark Tushnet and Gary Leedespresented in this issue. Professor Deutsch contends that questions of legitimacy are endemic to processes ofpolitical choice, whether legislative orjudicial Thus, criticisms or justfications ofjudicial review areflawed to the extent they assume the burden of legitimacy to be differentfor courts than for otherpolitical actors in a democracy. For Professor Deutsch, the legitimacy of allpoliticalprocesses-that is, their ability to reach outcomes about which people may disagree without endangering fundamental institutional values-turns instead on whether those processes achieve what the polity acknowledges in retrospect to have been acceptable goals, a judgment that wi/I itself be shaped byprecedingpolitical choices. Institutionalfeatures such as the traditions ofjudicial conference and opinion-and the special role ofprecedent identfied by Professor Deutsch-help to ensure the legitimacy ofjudicial choices in conflict with those of representative bodies. While changes in modern society may render the task of understanding the precedential value of recent judicial opinions uncertain, it is still the bond ofprecedent that fortifies the foundations of judicial review.

Non-Identification of the Majority and Minority in the Practice of the International Court of Justice

Abstract: On 9 May 1973 separate applications were filed by Australia and New Zealand, instituting proceedings against France in respect of the holding of atmospheric nuclear tests by France in the Pacific Ocean. The Court was asked to declare such testing contrary to international law and to prohibit any further tests. Australia on 9 May 1973 and New Zealand on 14 May 1973 asked the Court, pending a final decision, to grant interim measures of protection. These would require France to desist from any further atmospheric nuclear tests pending the judgment of the Court. On 16 May 1973 France informed the Registrar by letter that the Court was manifestly not competent and that the French government could not accept its jurisdiction. Nor would it appoint an agent in the case. It is not our purpose here to examine the claims, in so far as they are related to the competence of the Court to indicate provisional measures, of Australia, New Zealand or France; 1 or the response of the Court. Rather, we note that the Court, by a vote of 8-6, indicated certain measures including an instruction to France to avoid nuclear tests causing the deposit of radioactive fall out on Australia, New Zealand or its dependencies. The Court also decided that in the next phase written proceedings should first be addressed to the questions of the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the dispute, and of the admissibility of the applications. Dissenting opinions were attached by Judges Forster, Gros, Petren and Ignacio Pinto. These judges were four in number, whereas the interim awards record a vote of six dissenting judges. The Orders of the Court were, as is customary, collegiate and anonymous. Declarations were attached by Judges Jimenez de Arechaga, Waldock, and Singh, and by Judge ad hoc Sir Garfield Barwick. It will readily be noted that it is not possible to see from Orders of 22 June 1973, granting interim measures, the full Composition of the majority and minarity in the Court.