Showing papers on "Majority opinion published in 2001"

The impact of legal counsel on outcomes for poor tenants in New York City's housing court: Results of a randomized experiment

Abstract: This article presents results of the first randomized experimental evaluation of a legal assistance program for low-income tenants in New York City's Housing Court. The results demonstrate that the provision of legal counsel produces large differences in outcomes for low-income tenants in housing court, independent of the merits of the case. For example, only 22% of represented tenants had final judgments against them, compared with 51 % of tenants without legal representation. Similarly large advantages for tenants with an attorney also were found in eviction orders and stipulations requiring the landlord to provide rent abatements or repairs. In addition, the results suggest that a program of legal assistance for low-income tenants would not increase significantly the number of appearances in court, although it would increase the number of days to final judgment. The program may enhance the efficiency of adjudication by reducing the number of motions filed, particularly post-judgment motions. Limitations and policy implications of the study are discussed. Introduction This article reports findings from a randomized experiment to test the effects of a program that provided legal representation to low-income tenants in New York City's Housing Court. While almost all landlords in Housing Court have the benefit of legal representation, the vast majority of tenants do not (Task Force 1986; Community & Training Resource Center 1993). Legal advocates for the poor have thus argued for a right to legal counsel in Housing Court, similar to the right that exists in Criminal Court, on grounds that it would ensure due process of law and procedural safeguards in an area of vital interest to tenants, their families, and society (Gideon v. Wainwright 1963). Aside from the question of cost, arguments against a right to counsel in Housing Court center primarily on the administrative burden on the Court that such an expansion of legal assistance might entail (Heydebrand & Seron 1990). Briefly, the findings from this experiment show that low-income tenants with legal representation experience significantly more beneficial outcomes than their counterparts who do not have legal representation, independent of the merits of the case. Furthermore, the findings from this experiment suggest that the presence of legal representation may impose only modest time delays or other indicators of administrative burden on the court system and may even be more efficient for the courts in certain respects. The article begins with the background of the study, including the history and function of Housing Court, prior research on the operations and outcomes of Housing Court, and the design and development of the legal assistance program that was the object of the evaluation. It then presents the experimental design of the evaluation, presents empirical findings, and discusses the limitations as well as the implications of the findings for housing policy and the reform of Housing Court in New York City. Background In the early 1970s, the State of New York created a specialized Housing Court Part under the jurisdiction of the Civil Court of the City of New York (hereafter referred to as Housing Court) to enforce state and local laws regulating housing conditions and to adjudicate landlord-tenant disputes. A number of other large cities established specialized housing courts as well during this time (Galowitz 1999). While New York's Housing Court hears disputes between landlords and tenants over a range of issues, by far the most common case is a claim filed by a landlord to evict tenants for nonpayment of rent. Annually, New York's Housing Court handles about 300,000 cases and issues nearly 100,000 warrants of eviction (Galowitz 1999). Although the vast majority of tenants in Housing Court appear in court pro se (that is, they represent themselves without an attorney), most landlords have lawyers. For example, one study found that 21 % of tenants in Housing Court were represented by a lawyer, whereas 78% of landlords were represented by a lawyer (Citywide Task Force on Housing Court [Task Force] 1986). …

The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court

Abstract: For four decades scholars have sought to explain the rise of dissensus on the U.S. Supreme Court. While the specific explanations they offer vary, virtually all rest on a common story: during the nineteenth (and into the twentieth) century, the Supreme Court followed a norm of consensus. That is, the justices may have privately disagreed over the outcomes of cases but masked their disagreement from the public by producing consensual opinions. The problem with this story is that its underlying assumption lacks an empirical basis. Simply put, there is no systematic evidence to show that a norm of consensus ever existed on the Court. We attempt to provide such evidence by turning to the docket books of Chief Justice Waite (1874-1888) and making the following argument: if a norm of consensus induced unanimity on Courts of by-gone eras, then the norm may have manifested itself through public unanimity in the face of private conference disagreements. Our investigation, which provides systematic support for this argument and thus for the existence of a norm of consensus, raises important questions about publicly unified decision-making bodies, be they courts or other political organizations. ver the course of four decades, scholars have produced mounds of paper providing explanations for the cause of the dramatic phenomenon depicted in Figure 1: the rise of dissensus on the U.S. Supreme Court (e.g., Caldeira and Zorn 1998; Halpern and Vines 1977; Mason 1956; Murphy 1964; Pritchett 1948; Walker, Epstein, and Dixon 1988).1 Certainly the specific reasons they offer vary (compare Goldman 1982 and Haynie 1992), but the underlying story contemporary scholars tell does not. During most of the nineteenth (and into the twentieth) century dissent rates remained low, so the story goes, because Supreme Court justices followed a norm of consensus, reflecting their belief that unanimity would "greatly strengthen the authority" of the Court and its rulings (Rehnquist 1996, 58; see also Beveridge 1919; Goebel 1971). That is, the justices may have privately disagreed over the outcomes of cases but they masked their disagreements from the public by producing consensual

Explaining the Overruling of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent

Abstract: The decision to overrule U.S. Supreme Court precedent, we argue, results from the justices' pursuit of their policy preferences within intra- and extra-Court constraints. Based on a duration analysis of cases decided from the 1946 through 1995 terms, we show that ideological incongruence between a precedent and a subsequent Court increases the chance of it being overruled. Two legal norms also exert substantive effects as the Court is less likely to overrule statutory precedents and more likely to overrule precedents that previously have been interpreted negatively by the Court. While certain precedent characteristics also influence this decision, the political environment exerts no such effect. Consequently, one of the principal implications of this research is that legal norms influence Supreme Court decision making.

The Princely Court: Medieval Courts and Culture in North-West Europe, 1270-1380

Abstract: Introduction THE MATERIAL FOUNDATION OF COURT LIFE 1. Court and Household 2. Organization and Structures 3. Consumption and Expenditure 4. The Travelling Court CULTURE 5. Court Life and Court Culture 6. Art at Court: Investment in Culture? Conclusion Appendices Maps Bibliography

The Legitimacy-conferring Authority of the U.S. Supreme Court: An Experimental Design

Abstract: Convention holds that the Supreme Court, because of its special constitutional role, can confer an element of legitimacy on a policy simply by endorsing it. In this study, we conducted an experimen...

Information, Oral Arguments, and Supreme Court Decision Making

Abstract: Conventional wisdom in judicial politics is that oral arguments play little if any role in how the Supreme Court makes decisions. A primary reason for this view is that insufficient evidence exists to test this hypothesis. Thus, I ask, do Supreme Court justices use information from oral arguments that may help them make decisions as close as possible to their preferred goals? My answer is straightforward: An investigation of the oral arguments and the Court's majority opinions in a sample of cases from the Burger Court era shows that the Court gathers information during oral arguments and then uses this information when making substantive policy choices. This finding has clear implications for the way in which scholars view the Supreme Court's decision-making process, as it suggests that the accepted view of where oral arguments fit into this process is far from accurate.

Judicial Behavior and Public Opinion: Popular Expectations Regarding the Factors That Influence Supreme Court Decisions

Abstract: This article examines the mass public's perceptions of the factors that actually influence Supreme Court decisions as well those that ought to influence such decisions. We expect significant discrepancies between what the public believes ought to be the case and what it perceives to actually be the case with regard to Supreme Court decision making and that these discrepancies have a significant negative impact on the public's assessment of the Court. More specifically, we hypothesize that the public believes that political factors have more influence on the Court than “ought” to be the case and that the public perceives traditional legal factors to be less influential than they should be. We find that the expected discrepancies do exist and significantly detract from popular regard for the Court.

Selection of Law Clerks and Polarization in the U.S. Supreme Court

Abstract: Scholars have pointed to signs of growing polarization in American politics along partisan and ideological lines. This article probes for polarization in the Supreme Court by examining the role of ideological considerations in the selection of law clerks. For the 1975-1998 terms of the Court, we analyzed the relationship between the justices' ideological positions and the positions of the lower court judges from whom the justices drew their clerks. We found that this relationship became stronger over the course of that period, with a sharp increase in strength during the 1990s. This finding provides one significant piece of evidence that the Court has been changing as an institution.

Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeals En Banc

Abstract: The modern Supreme Court agrees to hear only a handful of cases each term. The Rehnquist Court has granted certiorari to less than four percent of petitions, accounting for less than one percent of all cases decided by courts of appeals. Some Court observers have hypothesized that the Court is more likely to review cases decided by courts of appeals en banc. They argue that, because legal issues heard en banc pose closer and more salient questions, these cases are more likely to be reviewed by the Supreme Court. The mere fact of en banc consideration is notable because all circuits combined sit en banc in only 80 or 90 cases a year. But other Court observers have proffered that the Supreme Court will be less likely to review a decision in which all judges of a circuit have participated because the legal issues have been more fully argued and exhaustively considered. This article considers systematically whether the Supreme Court is more likely to review an en banc court of appeals decision than a panel de...

The Supreme Court Opinion As Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court

Abstract: The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice explores historical transformations in practices of Supreme Court decision-making and opinion-writing. It compares the Court's modern practices to those that existed during the era of the Taft Court, from 1921 through 1929. Many of these differences should be understood in the context of the Judiciary Act of 1925, which transformed the Court from a tribunal of last resort into a supervisor of the development of federal law. The article discusses in detail two major changes in the Court's decision-making practices. The first concerns dissent. During the 1921 through 1928 Terms, 84% of the Court's published opinions were unanimous, whereas during the 1993 through 1998 Terms, only 27% of the Court's published opinions were unanimous. Examination of docket books, however, reveals that in the Taft Court era only about 50% of the Court's cases were unanimous at conference. Intra-Court memoranda indicate that there was a strong "norm of acquiescence", which induced Justices to join opinions with which they disagreed. This norm was sustained by a view of law as primarily embodying the virtues of certainty and reliance. When the Court came to see law as an instrument for the achievement of human purposes, the norm of acquiescence was undermined from within. Also undercutting the norm was the Court's growing recognition of the interdependence of law and political will. The second decision-making practice discussed in detail concerns the citation of law review literature. Between the 1921-1928 Terms and the 1997 Term, references to this literature have increased more than twenty-fold. This change reflects a transformation of the Court's concept of its own judicial authority, from a view primarily grounded in the positive authorization of the state to a view primarily oriented toward the attainment of legal purposes.

Bush v. Gore : the court cases and the commentary

Abstract: On December 12, 2000, a controversial decision by the Supreme Court of the United States effectively ended the disputed presidential contest between George W. Bush and Albert Gore Jr. with a 5-4 ruling that revealed the court to be as bitterly divided as the electorate. Four days earlier, the Florida Supreme Court had abruptly changed the dynamics of the election by reversing a lower court and ordering hand recounts of ""undervotes"" statewide. The U.S. Supreme Court quickly stepped in to halt the recounts and agreed to hear Bush v. Gore. After brief oral arguments and a short period of deliberation, the high court reversed the state court decision. The justices in both cases were bitterly divided, and passionate language emerged in both the majority rulings and the dissents. The drama and divisiveness of this extraordinary saga come to life in the rulings, opinions, and dissents from these two cases: U.S. Supreme Court case 00-949 (Bush v. Gore) and Florida Supreme Court case 00-2431 (Gore v. Harris). The first section of this volume gathers the complete text of both rulings, along with selections from oral arguments in the U.S. Supreme Court case. The second section of the book gathers the most significant opinion pieces from journalists and scholars on both sides of the political fence. Selected and organized by political analysts E.J. Dionne and William Kristol, these articles illuminate the perspectives of both sides about the various twists and turns in the post-election campaign, and the landmark judicial intervention. A companion website will provide links to documents from additional legal proceedings and other related documents and writings. The legal and historical significance of the 2000 election will be studied and debated for years to come. This volume combines the most important source documents with the most intelligent opinion and analysis about the conflict and its controversial resolution.

The Road Not Taken: Dred Scott, Judicial Authority, and Political Questions

Abstract: The Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford is widely regarded as among the worst decisions it has ever made. In addition to embracing reviled substantive values, the decision deeply wounded the Court's status and authority. By embracing a theory of judicial supremacy that held that the Court alone could resolve all important constitutional disputes, however, the Court had been gradually moving toward such a debacle. An important Jeffersonian tradition criticized the Court for encouraging political actors to forego their own constitutional responsibilities. The dissenting opinion of Justice Benjamin Curtis suggested a more appropriate course for the Court, one that carved out a clear place for the exercise of judicial review but that recognized an important sphere of constitutional politics outside the judiciary.

Science and law. Cell phone lawsuits face a scientific test.

Abstract: SCIENCE AND LAWClaims that radiation from cell phones increases the risk of brain cancer have not fared well in the court of scientific opinion; are they acceptable in the court of law? A new wave of such lawsuits has been filed by plaintiff lawyers across the United States since last spring. One case currently working its way through the courts could have broad implications for other cases, because it will use some new, science-based standards to determine whether these claims should be examined by the court.

The Drug Court as a Sentencing Model

Abstract: The sentencing model of the drug court puts a single judge into repeated contact with defendants under supervision. The drug court sentencing model, first, provides court monitoring and immediate, tangible punitive consequences for noncompliance with program requirements and, second, offers a strongly supportive group that provides a range of treatment options with which the defendant must be involved. Data in this article are from (a) a database developed on cases accepted or rejected by the drug court, (b) interviews with treatment providers, and (c) interviews with judges and administrators and attendance at court hearings and drug court graduation ceremonies. The article presents data on the conduct of the drug court judge and completion and attrition rates in the program, and it concludes that the activist judge role is the pivotal feature of the drug court.

Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice between Property Rights and Securities Fraud

Abstract: This article argues that the colloquial understanding of path dependence offers a heuristically powerful metaphor for grappling with the problem of regulating insider trading. The metaphor focuses attention on the proper issues-how did the law arrive at its present form, what paths are available for the future, which of those paths are feasible, and what costs would be entailed in choosing one of the various feasible alternatives over the others. A pragmatic answer to those questions begins with the recognition that insider trading is more closely akin to the class of problems dealt with by state corporate law than that dealt with by federal securities law. The article argues the law has gone too far down the federal regulatory path to turn back, however. Settled expectations and interests of both the regulators and the regulated, institutional competence, the status quo bias, and comparative advantages all argue for preserving the prohibition as a species of federal common law. The article therefore proposes a legal regime that is sensitive to the competing policy and doctrinal concerns that pervade this area of the law, while also taking into account the path dependent nature of the present prohibition. The article then turns to an analysis of the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1998), arguing that the court failed to grapple with the very serious doctrinal and policy issues presented to it. In developing that argument, the article also contends that O'Hagan sheds light on interpretation of Supreme Court opinions in technical statutory areas. Because the justices are subject to bounded rationality, and their incentive system does not reward developing institutional expertise in such areas, the court is generally not competent to address such issues. As a result, the court appears to defer to specialists in the field. Although deference to expert opinion is a rational response to the conditions under which the justices must operate, such deference may lead the court astray when the experts to whom they defer are also parties to an adversary proceeding before the court, as was the case in O'Hagan. Although further research will be necessary to fully develop this theory of Supreme Court decision making, the present analysis is highly suggestive and, in conjunction with the path dependence metaphor, provides an important aid for understanding the Supreme Court's insider jurisprudence.

The Supreme Court's Ruling in Bush v. Gore: A Rhetoric of Inconsistency

Abstract: This critique of the Supreme Court ruling in Bush v. Gore establishes judicial and political contexts to ground a critical reading of the text. It finds that a majority on the Court, and some dissenters, violated their previously established realms of legitimate linguistic possibilities to make their arguments. The majority's rhetorical inconsistencies with their past rulings, particularly those immediately preceding Bush v. Gore, prevented consensus and attempted to rationalize a politically charged decision. This study explains how the Court's credibility was damaged.

Playing it Safe: How the Supreme Court Sidesteps Hard Cases and Stunts the Development of Law

Abstract: It is one of the unspoken truths of the American judicial system that courts go out of their way to avoid having to decide important and controversial issues. Even the Supreme Court from which the entire nation seeks guidance frequently engages in transparent tactics to avoid difficult, politically sensitive cases. The Court's reliance on avoidance has been inconsistent and at times politically motivated. For example, liberal New Deal Justices, responding to the activism of a conservative Court, promoted deference to Congress and the presidency to protect the Court from political pressure. Likewise, as the Warren Court recognized new constitutional rights, conservative judges and critics praised avoidance as a foundational rule of judicial restraint. And as conservative Justices have constituted the majority on the Court in recent years, many liberals and moderates have urged avoidance, for fear of disagreeable verdicts. By sharing the stories of litigants who struggled unsuccessfully to raise before the Supreme Court constitutional matters of the utmost importance from the 1970s-1990s, Playing it Safe argues that judges who fail to exercise their power in hard cases in effect abdicate their constitutional responsibility when it is needed most, and in so doing betray their commitment to neutrality. Lisa Kloppenberg demonstrates how the Court often avoids socially sensitive cases, such as those involving racial and ethnic discrimination, gender inequalities, abortion restrictions, sexual orientation discrimination, and environmental abuses. In the process, the Court ducks its responsibility to check the more politically responsive branches of government when "majority rule" pushes the boundaries of constitutional law. The Court has not used these malleable doctrines evenhandedly: it has actively shielded states from liability and national oversight, and aggressively expanded standing requirements to limit the role of federal courts.

Supreme Court Justices: A Biographical Dictionary

Abstract: Since the U.S. Constitution became the law of the land on March 4, 1789, 106 men and two women have served on the United States Supreme Court. Among the most powerful individuals of their time, some justices have wielded more influence than the presidents who appointed them. In their position as interpreters of the Constitution, they have exercised great influence on the political opinions of legislators and citizens alike. Supreme Court Justices is an ideal ready-reference resource for high school and college students and general readers alike. An introductory essay discusses the creation of the Supreme Court and its place in American history. In addition to providing basic biographical Information, each entry: Details the decisions for which the justice is known; Analyzes the impact the justice had on the Court and American law overall; Includes suggestions for further reading. Also included are appendixes providing additional information on the succession of justices, appointments to the Supreme Court by each president, and important cases; a glossary; a bibliography; and a detailed chronology.

Church-State Constitutional Issues: Making Sense of the Establishment Clause@@@That Godless Court?: Supreme Court Decisions on Church-State Relationships

Abstract: Preface The Supreme Court and the Establishment Clause The Quest for the Historical Establishment Clause Church and State under the Establishment Clause: The First One Hundred and Fifty Years Establishing a New Approach Bibliography Index

Admissibility of scientific evidence post-Daubert.

Abstract: Proof of medical causation is the key element in cases involving alleged radiation injury. Until 1993, the use of scientific testimony in the courtroom was governed by the Frye doctrine requiring that a theory be "generally accepted" before it can be the basis of an expert's opinion. Applying that rule trial courts adopted a "let it all in" approach resulting in a near overdose of pseudoscience presented to juries. With its decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court announced a new five-factor, non-exclusive test for federal district courts to consider when assessing the opinion of scientific experts. The Court further directed that the trial courts, acting as a gatekeeper for expert evidence, must evaluate whether there is an adequate "fit" between the expert's data and the opinion offered. This article examines how the Daubert standard has been implemented in federal court to combat junk science. Examples from recent case law dealing with operational health physics issues are presented as an illustration of the use of the five-factor test to challenge questionable testimony on causation. Guidance is offered to prospective expert witnesses in radiation-related litigation to insure that proposed testimony will be admissible in district court.

The International Court of Justice: Revision of Articles 79 and 80 of the Rules of Court

Abstract: On 5 December 2000 the International Court of Justice adopted amended texts of Articles 79 and 80 of the Rules of Court, dealing respectively with preliminary objections and with counter-claims. The present paper introduces the new articles in the light of the 1978 version of the texts.

Attacks on the Warren Court by State Officials: A Case Study of Why Court-Curbing Movements Fail

Abstract: The Warren Court's many decisions expanding federal power provoked a series of state-based Court-curbing proposals that would have reduced the Court's power over the states so radically as to transform the nation into a virtual confederation. In addition to reviving the doctrine of interposition, state officials developed and promoted constitutional amendments that would have excluded Congress from the amendment process and would have created a so-called "Court of the Union" composed of the fifty state chief justices, which could have overruled the Supreme Court on issues affecting the states. These amendments made considerable headway and generated much controversy but are now virtually forgotten. In addition to analyzing the origins, progress, and defeat of these and other measures, the article places this neo-confederate movement in the larger context of Court-curing movements through U.S. history, explaining that the efforts failed because the proposals were largely tactical rather than practical; even the state officials who opposed Warren Court decisions had reasons to wish to preserve the Court's power; organizational and institutional obstacles impeded the proposals; elites successfully rallied public opposition to the proposals; the Court's opinions were broadly consistent with public opinion; public respect for the Court remained resilient; and economic conditions discouraged Court-curbing.

"Partial-birth abortion" and the Supreme Court.

Abstract: Abortion has long been, and remains, the most politicized medical procedure in the United States. It has been the subject of more state and federal legislation than all other medical procedures combined. The U.S. Supreme Court, which almost never hears cases about medical procedures, has regularly heard cases over the past 25 years concerning the constitutionality of various state laws designed to limit abortion. Thus, it was only a matter of time before the Court would hear a case on the constitutionality of laws restricting so-called partial-birth abortion.1 When the Court heard a challenge to Nebraska's law, statutes relating to . . .

Institutional Lessons from the 2000 Presidential Election

Abstract: This essay discusses two issues raised by the 2000 presidential election that are relevant to institutional design and institutional choice and that have applicability beyond the presidential contest. First, the election aftermath illustrates the importance of adopting frameworks to shape decisionmaking before an actual controversy arises. If rules and procedures are determined before it is clear which interests are benefited from particular procedures and which are harmed, it is more likely that rules will be chosen that serve public-regarding objectives rather than self-interested goals of participants. This analysis suggests that Congress was the institution best suited to resolve any lingering disputes from Florida because the Electoral Count Act, which had been adopted over one hundred years before, would have structured deliberation to reduce opportunistic behavior and to ensure that decisions were made transparently. Second, the interplay between the United States Supreme Court and the Florida Supreme Court is a fascinating case study of institutional dynamics, with the federal court decisively outmaneuvering the state supreme court to advance the outcome preferred by a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court justices. In particular, the first unanimous per curiam decision in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board contained hints about the effect of Article II on judicial interpretation that discouraged the state supreme court from specifying substandards for any manual recounts. In the end, the real tragedy of the institutional interplay was not that the Florida supreme court was reversed but that Congress, the institution most suited to make any final determination, was prevented from playing that role. The Court's analysis and actions reinforced the unfortunate tendency of the political branches to rely on the unelected federal judiciary to set in and save the country from the "chaos" of democracy.

Freedom of Religion in the Case Law of the Spanish Constitutional Court

Abstract: I. INTRODUCTION This article briefly examines the case law of the Spanish Constitutional Court in the field of freedom of religion with respect to the legal status of churches and religious groups as well as the protection of individual freedom of conscience. Due to the limited space available, this study focuses only on the Court's most significant decisions.1 My goal is to provide an overview of the main issues concerning religious liberty that have come to the jurisdiction of the Spanish Constitutional Court and analyze the way in which the Court has applied constitutional principles. This analysis will reveal some deficiencies that can be-and must be-corrected, especially with regard to the individual aspects of freedom of conscience. As we will see, on the whole, the Court's approach to these issues does not differ much from the one taken by the European Court of Human Rights, which acts as a sort of Constitutional Court, interpreting the freedoms included in the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950. Part II of this article describes briefly the historical antecedents of the current Spanish constitutional treatment of religious freedom. Part III outlines the fundamental principles that undergird Spanish law regarding religious issues, i.e., the "ecclesiastical law of the State."2 Part IV subsequently examines the Court's case law regarding the basic legal position of churches, including the Catholic Church, non-Catholic churches, and new religious movements. Part IV focuses on the manner in which the Court's decisions affect the protection of the individual's freedom of conscience. Finally, Part V provides several conclusory observations. As an introductory remark, it may be useful to note that the Spanish Constitutional Court's structure and function is very different from the U.S. Supreme Court. Indeed, the Spanish Court most closely resembles the German and Italian Constitutional Courts, which served as models and sources of guidance for the Spanish Court.3 In Spain, the Constitutional Court is the only court entitled to declare a law unconstitutional.4 The Court can do this by deciding a motion of unconstitutionality (recurso de inconstitucionalidad) or a question of unconstitutionality (cuestion de inconstitucionalidad). The former involves an examination of the constitutionality of a statute in abstracto, i.e., independently from its application to a particular case, and can be filed by the government, the Spanish Ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo), fifty congressmen or senators, and some collegial bodies of Spain's autonomous regional communities. The latter can be submitted by any Spanish court that considers that a statute applicable to a particular controversy may be unconstitutional. An ordinary court cannot itself declare a statute unconstitutional, but can propose its opinion on the issue in the form of a "question" and ask the Constitutional Court to decide the issue. In addition, the Constitutional Court decides motions of protection (recursos de amparo), i.e., petitions filed by individual or legal persons that believe that their constitutional rights and freedoms have been violated. Aggrieved parties may file such petitions after having exhausted the judicial remedies available before the ordinary courts. The majority of Constitutional Court decisions resolve recursos de amparo. This is true also with regard to the general issue of religious freedom, although some interesting issues on religion have been decided through the other two channels. Finally, those readers who belong to common law systems should bear in mind that case law is only a part of the law-and not the most important part-in a civil law system like Spain. This fact applies to the case law of the Constitutional Court as well, notwithstanding the Court's significance as the supreme oracle of the Spanish Constitution. Church-state relations and religious freedom are matters that are strongly regulated by statutory law and by-laws, as well as by formal agreements between the state and the most influential religious communities. …