Showing papers on "Majority opinion published in 2011"

How Public Opinion Constrains the U.S. Supreme Court

Abstract: Although scholars increasingly acknowledge a contemporaneous relationship between public opinion and Supreme Court decisions, debate continues as to why this relationship exists. Does public opinion directly influence decisions or do justices simply respond to the same social forces that simultaneously shape the public mood? To answer this question, we first develop a strategy to control for the justices' attitudinal change that stems from the social forces that influence public opinion. We then propose a theoretical argument that predicts strategic justices should be mindful of public opinion even in cases when the public is unlikely to be aware of the Court's activities. The results suggest that the influence of public opinion on Supreme Court decisions is real, substantively important, and most pronounced in nonsalient cases.

Why (and when) judges dissent: a theoretical and empirical analysis

Abstract: This paper develops and tests a model of self-interested judicial behavior to explore the phenomenon of judicial dissents, and in particular what we call ‘‘dissent aversion,’’ which sometimes causes a judge not to dissent even when he disagrees with the majority opinion. We examine dissent aversion using data from both the federal courts of appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court. Our empirical findings are consistent with the predictions of the model. In the court of appeals, the frequency of dissents is negatively related to the caseload and positively related to ideological diversity among judges in the circuit and circuit size (i.e., the fewer the judges, the greater the collegiality costs of dissenting and therefore, other things being equal, the fewer dissents). We also find that dissents increase the length of majority opinions (imposing collegiality costs by making the majority work harder) and are rarely cited either inside or outside the circuit (reducing the value of dissenting to dissenters). In the Supreme Court, we find that the dissent rate is negatively related to the caseload and positively related to ideological differences, that majority opinions are longer when there is a dissent, and that dissents are rarely cited in either the courts of appeals or the Supreme Court.

Lower Court Influence on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Content

Abstract: Despite the importance of Supreme Court opinions for the American polity, scholars have dedicated little systematic research to investigating the factors that contribute to the content of the justices’ opinions. In this article, we examine the ability of lower federal courts to shape the content of Supreme Court opinions. We argue that lower court opinions will influence the content of the Court’s opinions to the extent that the justices perceive that integrating language from lower court opinions will aid them in making efficacious law and policy. Utilizing plagiarism detection software to compare lower federal court opinions with the majority opinions of the Supreme Court during the 2002–2004 terms, we uncover evidence that the Court systematically incorporates language from the lower federal courts into its majority opinions.

Going Public When Opinion Is Contested: Evidence from Presidents' Campaigns for Supreme Court Nominees, 1930-2009

Abstract: The standard “political capital” model of going public assumes presidents do not face mobilized opponents. But often presidents must fight against opponents who themselves go public. We propose studying such situations with an “opinion contest” framework and use new data on Supreme Court nominations to contrast the political capital and opinion contest approaches. From 1930 to 2009 presidents went public over Supreme Court nominees primarily when groups mobilized against the nominee. Republican presidents did so particularly when their nominee would move the Supreme Court's median to the right. When going public, presidents typically engaged in “crafted talk.” Finally, going public was associated with more negative votes in the Senate, not fewer, because presidents went public over Supreme Court nominees only when battling an active opposition.

Confirmation Bias in the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database

Abstract: We ask whether the widely used direction of decision and direction of vote variables in the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database (USSCJD) are contaminated by confirmation bias, or have been affected by expectations about the likely effects of judicial preferences on case outcomes. Using a sample of generally comparable cases, we find evidence that the assignment of issue codes to these cases, codes that govern the subsequent assignment of “direction” to the Court's judgments, is conditional on both case disposition and the known preferences of the deciding court, in the direction predicted by the hypothesis of confirmation bias. We also find that the USSCJD direction variables overstate the effect of judicial preferences and understate the effect of congressional preferences on case outcomes, relative to objectively coded measures of the Court's judgments.

Decision Making by the Modern Supreme Court

Abstract: There are three general models of Supreme Court decision making: the legal model, the attitudinal model and the strategic model But each is somewhat incomplete This book advances an integrated model of Supreme Court decision making that incorporates variables from each of the three models In examining the modern Supreme Court, since Brown v Board of Education, the book argues that decisions are a function of the sincere preferences of the justices, the nature of precedent, and the development of the particular issue, as well as separation of powers and the potential constraints posed by the president and Congress To test this model, the authors examine all full, signed civil liberties and economic cases decisions in the 1953–2000 period Decision Making by the Modern Supreme Court argues, and the results confirm, that judicial decision making is more nuanced than the attitudinal or legal models have argued in the past

Keeping the Dream Alive - The European Court of Justice and the Transnational Fabric of Integrationnist Jurisprudence

Abstract: How does the European Court of Justice firmly maintain a now 45-years old consistent pan-European jurisprudence when exerting virtually no control over the recruitment of its members (a selection left to national governments) and lacking most of the warrants of a State? The paper identifies the conditions for the Court's perennial pan-European jurisprudence in the national and transnational mobilization of "its" lawyers. Based on a variety of commemorative materials produced within the Court (Festschriften, tributes, eulogies, and jubilees) never studied so far, the paper stresses the manner in which EU's judicial elite manufactures discourses both of the Court and on the Court and its jurisprudence while at the same time repeatedly managing the national and transnational networks of the Court's epigones from which it draws its authority to render its 'verdicts' on Europe.

The Limits of Global Judicial Dialogue

Abstract: The notion that "global judicial dialogue" is contributing to the globalization of constitutional law has attracted considerable scholarly attention. Numerous scholars have characterized the citation of foreign law by constitutional courts as a form of "dialogue" that both reflects and fosters the emergence of a common global enterprise of constitutional adjudication. It has also been claimed that an increasing amount of direct interaction between judges, face-to-face or otherwise, fuels the growth of a global constitutional jurisprudence.This Article challenges these claims on empirical grounds and offers an alternative account of the reasons for which constitutional courts engage in comparative analysis. The first part argues that it is both conceptually and factually inaccurate to characterize the manner in which constitutional courts cite and analyze foreign jurisprudence as a form of “dialogue.” The second part shows empirically that judicial interaction is neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause of constitutional globalization, and that the actual impact of such interaction on the extent to which judges engage in comparativism is dwarfed by institutional and structural variables that lie largely beyond judicial control.The basis of our empirical argument concerning the actual effects of judicial interaction and reasons for judicial comparativism is a comparative case study of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of China (Taiwan), which constitutes a natural experiment in the capacity of a constitutional court to make use of foreign law even when it is largely deprived of contact with other courts. Taiwan’s precarious diplomatic situation ensures that the members of its Constitutional Court are effectively precluded from participating in international judicial gatherings or visits to foreign courts. Nevertheless, Taiwan’s Constitutional Court nearly always engages in extensive comparative constitutional analysis, either expressly or implicitly, when rendering its decisions. To explain how and why the Court makes use of foreign law notwithstanding its isolation, we combine statistical analysis of citations to foreign law in the Court’s published opinions with in-depth interviews of numerous current and former members of the Court and their clerks.We conclude that "global judicial dialogue" plays a much smaller role in shaping a court's utilization of foreign law than institutional factors such as (a) the rules and practices governing the composition and staffing of the court and (b) the extent to which the structure of legal education and the legal profession incentivizes judges and academics to possess expertise in foreign law. Our conclusion that institutional factors outweigh judicial dialogue in determining a court's reliance on foreign law helps to explain the behavior of not only the Taiwanese Constitutional Court, but also the United States Supreme Court. Notwithstanding the fact that American justices enjoy extensive, if not unrivaled, opportunities to interact with judges from other countries, comparative analysis plays a less frequent role in their own constitutional jurisprudence than in that of their foreign counterparts. Openness on the part of individual justices to foreign law ultimately cannot compensate for the fact that the hiring and instructional practices of American law schools neither demand nor reward the possession of foreign legal expertise.Our research also demonstrates that judicial opinions are a highly misleading source of data about judicial usage of foreign law. As our interviews with members of the Taiwanese Constitutional Court reveal, the frequency with which a court cites foreign law in its opinions does not necessarily reflect the extent to which it actually considers foreign law. Analysis of judicial opinions alone may lead scholars to conclude mistakenly that a court rarely engages in comparative analysis when, in fact, such analysis is highly routine.

The Pragmatic Court: Reinterpreting the Supreme People’s Court of China

Abstract: This paper examines the institutional motivations that underlie several major developments in the Supreme People’s Court of China’s recent policy-making. Since 2007, the Court has sent off a collection of policy signals that escapes sweeping ideological labeling: It has publicly embraced a populist view of legal reform, encouraging the use of mediation in dispute resolution and popular participation in judicial policy-making, but continues to advocate legal professionalization as a long-term policy objective. It has also eagerly attempted to enhance its own institutional competence by promoting judicial efficiency, simplifying key areas of civil law, and expanding its control over lower court adjudication. This paper argues that the strongest institutional motivation underlying this complex pattern of activity is, contrary to some common assumptions, neither simple obedience to the Party leadership nor internalized belief in some legal reform ideology, whether legal professionalism or populism. Instead, it is the pragmatic strengthening of the Court’s own financial security and sociopolitical status – the Court is, in many ways, a “rational actor” that pursues its institutional self-interest. This theory of “institutional pragmatism” brings unique analytical cohesion to the Court’s recent behavior, giving us a clearer sense of its current priorities and, perhaps, its future outlook.

Why is the Japanese Supreme Court so Conservative

Abstract: The Constitution of Japan, enacted on November 3, 1946, and effective as of May 3, 1947, gave the judicial power to the Supreme Court and the inferior courts established by the Diet, the national legislature, and gave the power of judicial review to the judiciaryEquipped with the power of judicial review, the Japanese Supreme Court was expected to perform a very significant political role in safeguarding the Constitution, especially its Bill of Rights, against infringement by the government Yet, it has developed a very conservative constitutional jurisprudence ever since its establishmentThis article examines why the Japanese Supreme Court has developed such a conservative constitutional jurisprudence First, the power of judicial review and the system of judicial review in Japan in examined Second, it points out how the Japanese Supreme Court is reluctant to entertain constitutional litigation and how the Japanese Supreme Court is unwilling to apply close scrutiny or strike-down statutes Finally, the historical, organizational, institutional, and strategic reasons for the conservative constitutional jurisprudence is explored In conclusion, the author argues that the most fundamental reason lies in the reluctance of Japanese judges to view the Constitution as a source of positive law to be enforced by the judiciary

Changing the constitutional landscape for firearms: the US Supreme Court's recent Second Amendment decisions

Abstract: In 2 recent cases-with important implications for public health practitioners, courts, and researchers-the US Supreme Court changed the landscape for judging the constitutionality of firearm laws under the Constitution's Second Amendment. In District of Columbia v Heller (2008), the court determined for the first time that the Second Amendment grants individuals a personal right to possess handguns in their home. In McDonald v City of Chicago (2010), the court concluded that this right affects the powers of state and local governments. The court identified broad categories of gun laws-other than handgun bans-that remain presumptively valid but did not provide a standard to judge their constitutionality. We discuss ways that researchers can assist decision makers.

Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket

Abstract: In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has decided fewer cases than at any other time in its recent history. Scholars and practitioners alike have criticized the drop in the Court’s plenary docket. Some even believe that the Court has reneged on its duty to clarify and unify the law. A host of studies examine potential reasons for the Court’s change in docket size but few rely on an empirical analysis of this change and no study examines the correlation between ideological homogeneity and docket size. In the first comprehensive study of its kind, the authors analyze ideological and contextual factors to determine the conditions that are most likely to influence the size of the plenary docket. Drawing on empirical data from every Supreme Court Term between 1940 and 2008, the authors find that both ideological and contextual factors have led to the Court’s declining plenary docket. First, a Court composed of Justices who largely share the same world view is likely to hear 42 more cases per Term than an ideologically-fractured Court. Second, internal and external mechanisms, such as membership change and mandatory jurisdiction are also important. Congress’s decision to remove much of the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction is associated with the Court deciding roughly 54 fewer cases per Term. In short, the data suggest that ideology and context have led to a Supreme Court that decides fewer cases.The Court’s docket is not likely to increase significantly in the near future. Unless Congress expands the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction or the President makes a series of unconstrained nominations to the Court that increase its ideological homogeneity the size of the Court’s docket will remain comparably small compared to the past. As other studies have shown, because the Court’s case selection process is an important aspect of the development of the law, this Article provides the basis for further normative and empirical evaluations of the Court’s plenary docket.

The Information Dynamics of Vertical Stare Decisis

Abstract: We propose a dynamic model of precedent in a judicial hierarchy which incorporates a “bottom-up” informational component. When a high court establishes precedents it has uncertainty regarding how these precedents will play out when applied to future legal disputes. Lower court implementation of these precedents can inform the high court about the contemporary policy implications of the precedent. If lower court usage of a precedent is informative, the high court will consider the revealed location of the precedent when contemplating reducing the precedent’s authority and applicability to future cases. Using data on U.S. Supreme Court precedents and U.S. Courts of Appeals citations to these precedents, we estimate a model of the Court’s negative treatment of precedent. We find that lower court usage of precedent can provide new, useful information on the policy content of a precedent, helping the Court in shape law in a way consistent with its preferences.

The democratic fallacy in matters of clinical opinion: implications for analysing cause-of-death data.

Abstract: Arriving at a consensus between multiple clinical opinions concerning a particular case is a complex issue - and may give rise to manifestations of the democratic fallacy, whereby a majority opinion is misconstrued to represent some kind of "truth" and minority opinions are somehow "wrong". Procedures for handling multiple clinical opinions in epidemiological research are not well established, and care is needed to avoid logical errors. How to handle physicians' opinions on cause of death is one important domain of concern in this respect. Whether multiple opinions are a legal requirement, for example ahead of cremating a body, or used for supposedly greater rigour, for example in verbal autopsy interpretation, it is important to have a clear understanding of what unanimity or disagreement in findings might imply, and of how to aggregate case data accordingly.In many settings where multiple physicians have interpreted verbal autopsy material, an over-riding goal of arriving at a single cause of death per case has been applied. In many instances this desire to constrain findings to a single cause per case has led to methodologically awkward devices such as "TB/AIDS" as a single cause. This has also usually meant that no sense of disagreements or uncertainties at the case level is taken forward into aggregated data analyses, and in many cases an "indeterminate" cause may be recorded which actually reflects a lack of agreement rather than a lack of data on possible cause(s).In preparing verbal autopsy material for epidemiological analyses and public health interpretations, the possibility of multiple causes of death per case, and some sense of any disagreement or uncertainty encountered in interpretation at the case level, need to be captured and incorporated into overall findings, if evidence is not to be lost along the way. Similar considerations may apply in other epidemiological domains.

Choices in Context: How Case-Level Factors Influence the Magnitude of Ideological Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court

Abstract: Most scholarship on Supreme Court decision making assumes that justices’ ideological preferences exhibit a uniform impact on their choices across a variety of situations. I develop a theoretical framework positing the importance of case-level context in shaping the magnitude of ideological voting on the Court. I hypothesize how issue-related factors influence this magnitude. I test the hypotheses using a multilevel modeling framework on data from the 1953-2004 terms. The results provide support for several of the hypotheses; issue salience, issue attention, the authority for the decision (statutory interpretation versus constitutionality of federal or state laws), intercourt conflict, the presence of a lower court dissent, and mandatory versus discretionary jurisdiction all significantly influence ideological voting. Overall, the article adds significant qualifications to extant theories of judicial decision making by showing how ideological voting on the Court is shaped by the varying situations that con...

Judicial lawmaking and precedent in Supreme Courts

Abstract: What does it mean for a supreme court to ‘make law?’ When is it possible to say that its decisions are ‘precedents?’ To what extent should a supreme court’s pronouncements be taken into account by others – lower courts and political branches? And how should these other actors reason with such precedents? This article shows how a particular approach to judicial lawmaking and precedent shapes answers to these questions and examines them in relation to the US Supreme Court and the French Cour de cassation. The findings are then used for a critical analysis of the European Court of Justice’s case law. It is suggested that while the US and French systems have found some ways of reconciling judicial lawmaking with the basic premises of their constitutional and political systems (although they are not entirely satisfactory), the EU system is still waiting for an account of the Court’s lawmaking and precedent. The conclusion indicates directions of possible further research relevant for all courts examined.

Judicial Decision-Making and Transnational Law: A Survey of Common Law Supreme Court Judges

Abstract: This is a survey study of 43 judges from the British House of Lords, the Caribbean Court of Justice, the High Court of Australia, the Constitutional Court of South Africa, and the Supreme Courts of Ireland, India, Israel, Canada, New Zealand and the United States on the use of foreign law in constitutional rights cases. We find that the conception of apex judges citing foreign law as a source of persuasive authority (associated with Anne-Marie Slaughter, Vicki Jackson and Chris McCrudden) is of limited application. Citational opportunism and the aspiration to membership of an emerging international ‘guild’ appear to be equally important strands in judicial attitudes towards foreign law. We argue that their presence is at odds with Ronald Dworkin’s theory of legal objectivity, and is revealed in a manner meeting his own methodological standard for attitudinal research.

Why Has Judicial Review Failed in Japan

Abstract: There are two senses in which judicial review in Japan has failed. First, the Supreme Court of Japan strikes down laws so rarely that judicial review exists more in theory than in practice. Second, history demonstrates that the Court faces a very real risk of government noncompliance on the rare occasions that it does address politically important or sensitive constitutional issues. This Article critically evaluates a wide range of historical, cultural, political, and institutional explanations for the effective failure of judicial review in Japan. A number of the most frequently invoked explanations call for a considerable degree of skepticism. In particular, cultural explanations that emphasize the characteristics of “the Japanese” – such as their supposed penchant for group harmony and unwillingness to defy authority – tend to rest on inaccurate stereotypes, ignore the scope of social and political conflict in postwar Japan, and minimize the rationality and intelligence of individual judges. Meanwhile, historical explanations that emphasize such factors as the impact of the Cold War and the novelty of judicial review are increasingly difficult to maintain in light of both the passage of time and the counterexamples furnished by the experience of other countries. To a greater extent, the failure of Japanese judicial review is the product of interaction between the internal organization of the judiciary and the relatively conservative political environment in which the judiciary has long operated. For decades, an entrenched bureaucracy staffed by career judges has regulated the behavior of the judiciary, including the Supreme Court itself, in ways that have obviated more overt forms of political control. At least in the short to medium term, the Japanese Supreme Court is unlikely to discharge its responsibility for performing judicial review with greater vigor absent institutional reforms that reduce its dependence for essential resources upon this bureaucracy. The Article concludes by discussing a number of reforms that might have such a liberating effect on the Court.

Relating Values in a Series of Supreme Court Decisions.

Abstract: In recent years it has become quite usual to view legal decisions in terms of consideration of the values affected by deciding the case for or against a particular party. Often deciding for, say, the plaintiff will promote one value at the expense of another. Precedents are then supposed to guide the way in which this conflict is resolved. In this paper we will consider a series of cases exploring the so-called automobile exception to the requirement of the Fourth Amendment protecting against unreasonable search of persons, houses, papers, and effects. These cases highlight a conflict between the value of law enforcement and the value of privacy as protected by the Fourth Amendment, and will be used to illuminate questions about the treatment of value conflicts arising from previous work in AI and Law.

Judicial Activism in the European Court of Justice – The Case of LGBT Rights

Abstract: INTRODUCTION 639 I. THE ROLE OF THE COURT IN THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS ... 642 A. Jurisdiction, Composition, and Case–Load 642 B. Landmark Rulings and Overall Performance 643 1. Supremacy, Direct Effect and State Liability 643 2. Extending its Judicial Review Competence 645 3. Entrenching the Internal Market 647 4. Proclaiming Absolute Autonomy 648 II. THE ACADEMIC DEBATES ON THE ROLE OF THE COURT 649 A. The Debate in Legal Doctrine 649 B. The Debate in Political Science 651 III. THE CASE OF LGBT RIGHTS 653 A. LGBT Rights in European and National Context 653 B. Transgender Rights 655 C. Lesbian and Gay Rights 657 IV. CONCLUSION 663

Avoiding Constitutional Cases

Abstract: Why does the Supreme Court avoid deciding cases it accepts for review? In this article, I contend that the Court uses procedural access doctrines such as standing, ripeness, and mootness to sidestep constitutional cases when confronted with certain internal and external pressures. Using data from 1946-2001, the results suggest that the Court utilizes procedural tools to dismiss constitutional cases when preference heterogeneity on the Court increases and when the justices are confronted with issues about which groups feel strongly and are deeply divided. Although the Court does not appear to be influenced by the threat of political opposition, it is more reluctant to resolve disputes when members of Congress file an amicus brief. The results offer a first glimpse into how often the Court invokes the “passive virtues.” They also have implications for our understanding of agenda setting, decision-making in access cases, and normative constitutional theory.

The Politics of Amendment Processes. Supreme Court Influence in the Design of Judicial Councils

Abstract: This Article studies amendment processes, their specific characteristics, and how these characteristics shape institutional design outcomes. Amendment processes are in between the extraordinary creation of new constitutions and the ordinary process of lawmaking. Our central claim is that the design of institutions through amendments is influenced by variables that do not regularly figure in the analysis of constitution making because of their bias toward new constitutions and the “politics of the extraordinary.” In particular, we argue that the design of the existing institutions and the political leverage of actors that do not participate directly in constitutional reform may exert an important influence in the design of institutions created by amendments. In other words, the more institutional power and political leverage actors have, the more likely the amendment will reflect their interests, even if they do not partake of the constituent body. To explore this hypothesis, we analyze the leverage that supreme courts have to shape the amendment processes that adopt or reform judicial councils. We claim that the more powerful supreme court judges are, the more likely they will successfully influence amendments that shape the composition and functions of judicial councils in a way that serves their interests. We offer empirical evidence from all the cases of amendments that created or reformed judicial councils in Latin America.

Condorcet admissibility: Indeterminacy and path-dependence under majority voting on interconnected decisions

Abstract: Judgement aggregation is a model of social choice where the space of social alternatives is the set of consistent evaluations (‘views’) on a family of logically interconnected propositions, or yes/no-issues. Unfortunately, simply complying with the majority opinion in each issue often yields a logically inconsistent collection of judgements. Thus, we consider the Condorcet set: the set of logically consistent views which agree with the majority in as many issues as possible. Any element of this set can be obtained through a process of diachronic judgement aggregation, where the evaluations of the individual issues are decided through a sequence of majority votes unfolding over time, with earlier decisions possibly imposing logical constraints on later decisions. Thus, for a fixed profile of votes, the ultimate social choice can depend on the order in which the issues are decided; this is called path dependence. We investigate the size and structure of the Condorcet set —and hence the scope and severity of path-dependence —for several important classes of judgement aggregation problems.

Securities Law in the Roberts Court: Agenda or Indifference?

Abstract: Historically, securities law has not been a high priority for the Supreme Court. The first six years of the Roberts Court, however, suggest an upsurge of interest in the federal securities laws. The Roberts Court's average of two cases per year marks a significant increase from the Rehnquist Court’s average. These numbers are deceptive. Analysis of the opinions deciding these cases – and more importantly, the issues debated by the justices – suggests that the Court is not interested in the substance of the securities laws or the policies that animate them. Instead, securities law serves as a backdrop for debates over statutory interpretation and the relationship of the judiciary to the administrative state. Only in the area of securities class actions is there an inkling of engagement with the specific subject matter. Notwithstanding charges that the Roberts Court is “pro business,” the Court has not charted a consistent course favoring corporate defendants. Instead, the Court has demonstrated a bias toward the status quo, resisting attempts to both restrict and expand – the reach of Rule 10b-5 class actions.

The Kosovo Advisory Opinion Scrutinized

Abstract: In the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice took the position that Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence did not violate any applicable rules of international law. This article does not dispute the final finding, but rather critically examines the Court's somewhat controversial reasoning and considers the added value of the opinion for the clarification of legal doctrine in relation to unilateral declarations of independence. An argument is made that the Court's interpretation of the question and the identification of the authors of the declaration had significant implications for the Court's final finding. Yet, the Court cannot be criticized for not answering the question of whether or not Kosovo is a state, whether Kosovo Albanians are beneficiaries of the right of self-determination, or even whether the ‘right to remedial secession’ is applicable. However, the Court may well have implicitly answered that recognition of Kosovo is not illegal.

Extending Enforcement: The Coalition for the International Criminal Court

Abstract: With judges chosen, cases underway, and judgments rendered, the International Criminal Court has officially begun operations. As the Court has proceeded with its activities, its potential has become enhanced. The creation of the Court through the 1998 Rome Statute came through cooperation of an exceptionally broad coalition of NGOs with like-minded states. This article examines the historical background to the Court’s establishment, exploring why seemingly favorable conditions after the World Wars failed to result in a permanent judicial institution. Even post-1948 genocides in Southeast Asia, Central Africa, and elsewhere did not lead to international steps. Unexpected events, including the end of the Cold War and special tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, reopened the possibility for action. Despite opposition from most Permanent Members of the Security Council, the Coalition for the International Criminal Court—the major focus of this study—coordinated a network of citizen groups to exert pressure successfully. The 2010 Review Conference for the International Criminal Court reaffirmed the Court’s basic directions, and broadened the areas over which it exercises powers of judgment. The 1998 “miracle on the Tiber” and subsequent steps strengthening the Court thus call into question long-standing assumptions about the relative significance of states and civil society.