Showing papers on "Majority opinion published in 2012"

Who Controls the Content of Supreme Court Opinions

Abstract: Conventional arguments identify either the median justice or the opinion author as the most influential justices in shaping the content of Supreme Court opinions. We develop a model of judicial decision making that suggests that opinions are likely to reflect the views of the median justice in the majority coalition. This result derives from two features of judicial decision making that have received little attention in previous models. The first is that in deciding a case, justices must resolve a concrete dispute, and that they may have preferences over which party wins the specific case confronting them. The second is that justices who are dissatisfied with an opinion are free to write concurrences (and dissents). We demonstrate that both features undermine the bargaining power of the Court's median and shift influence towards the coalition median. An empirical analysis of concurrence behavior provides significant support for the model.

The political foundations of judicial independence in the European Union

Abstract: This contribution explores the political foundations of judicial independence in the European Union and asks to what degree the ECJ is insulated against court curbing mechanisms that might threaten judicial independence. The contribution reviews the major court curbing mechanisms identified in the literature on American law and politics and assesses the extent to which these mechanisms might be applied in restraining the ECJ. The evidence and analysis suggests that the ECJ is remarkably well insulated against each of the major court curbing mechanisms identified in the literature.

Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court? Possibly Yes (But We’re Not Sure Why)

Abstract: Using qualitative data and historical methods, Barry Friedman asserts with confidence that “we the people” influence the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Using quantitative data and statistical methods, political scientists are not so sure. Despite their best efforts to validate basic claims about the effect of public opinion on the Court, the evidence remains mixed at best.We enter this dialogue but in a voice distinct from existing political science work. Rather than explore the relationship between the public and the Court on a term-by-term basis, we analyze it at the level of the case. This allows us to exploit more nuanced public opinion data, as well as to attend to the many other case-level factors that may influence the Court’s decisions.Based on our analysis, we are prepared to say that Professor Friedman is on to something. When the “mood of the public” is liberal (conservative), the Court is significantly more likely to issue liberal (conservative) decisions. But why is anyone’s guess. Professor Friedman posits that the Justices will bend to the will of the people because the Court requires public support to remain an efficacious branch of government. Our analysis could be read to support this view, but it is equally consistent with another mechanism: that “the people” include the Justices. On this account, the Justices do not respond to public opinion directly, but rather respond to the same events or forces that affect the opinion of other members of the public. Our study proceeds as follows. In Part II, we briefly review the extant literature, emphasizing the similar methodology it invokes but the varying conclusions it reaches. Parts III and IV describe our methods and findings. We end, in Part V, with the implications of our statistical work for Professor Friedman’s claims, as well as for future research assessing the Court’s response to public opinion.

The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution

Abstract: Need a great e-book? the will of the people how public opinion has influenced the supreme court and shaped the meaning of the constitution by , the very best one! Wan na get it? Locate this superb electronic book by right here now. Download or check out online is readily available. Why we are the most effective site for downloading this the will of the people how public opinion has influenced the supreme court and shaped the meaning of the constitution Obviously, you can select guide in various documents kinds and also media. Seek ppt, txt, pdf, word, rar, zip, as well as kindle? Why not? Get them below, now!

Judicial Decision Making: Is Psychology Relevant?

Abstract: 1. How Do Judges Decide? 2. Opinion Formation and Expression. 3. Attempts to Influence Judges. 4. The Role of the Chief Justice. 5. Responses to Influence. 6. History of the Psychology - Law Relationship. 7. The American Psychological Association's. 8. The APA's Amicus Attempts to Influence the Supreme Court. 9. Unsuccessful Attempts to Influence the Court. 10. The Future of the Psychology - Law Relationship. References. Name Index. Subject Index.

The Supreme Court and Percolation in the Lower Courts: An Optimal Stopping Model

Abstract: The most prominent of the few stated criteria by which the Supreme Court decides to hear a case is the existence of a conflict among the lower courts. However, a lower court split does not automatically lead the Supreme Court to review a case, and the justices have often allowed lower court splits - and thereby the application of different legal standards across the country - to stand for long periods of time. What explains the Court's tolerance of conflict, and its eventual decision to resolve it? We model the Supreme Court's decision to intervene in a conflict as an optimal stopping problem. The Court faces a strategic trade-off between allowing conflict to continue while it learns about the implications of the possible policy choices and intervening to end a costly conflict between the lower courts. Our model provides the first theoretical framework for understanding when and how the Court decides to resolve lower court conflict.

Courts as Coordinators Endogenous Enforcement and Jurisdiction in International Adjudication

Abstract: Why do states build international courts, submit cases, and enforce court judgments? This article examines the role of a court that is neither a “decider” nor an “information provider.” Litigation is costly and does not reveal private information. The court’s ruling is not binding and bargaining can occur before and after the court has ruled. Nevertheless, an alternative dispute resolution mechanism emerges: court rulings can coordinate endogenous multilateral enforcement. Disinterested states will enforce to ensure that they can profitably use the court in the future. Accepting jurisdiction of the court allows a state to make efficiency-enhancing “trades,” winning high-value disputes in exchange for losing low-value disputes. This is possible because litigation is a screening device: states only sue when they derive relatively high value from the disputed asset. The use of the court as a coordination device for multilateral enforcement allows for the existence of a court with endogenous enforcement and j...

Political Influence and Career Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Administrative Review by the Spanish Supreme Court

Abstract: This article develops an empirical analysis of judicial behavior in the Spanish Supreme Court, a court of law dominated by career judiciary. We focus on administrative review. The evidence seems to confirm that a career judiciary is not strongly politically aligned and favors consensus, formalism, and dissent avoidance. Notwithstanding, we detect a significant relationship between the decisions of the Court and the interest of the government. We suggest that our empirical analysis makes a significant contribution to undermine the myth of political insulation by career judges. Unlike previous literature, however, we argue and illustrate that judicial politicization can be consistent with consensus and dissent avoidance.

Czech Constitutional Court Playing with Matches: the Czech Constitutional Court Declares a Judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU Ultra Vires ; Judgment of 31 January 2012, Pl. ÚS 5/12, Slovak Pensions XVII

Abstract: On 14 February 2012, the Czech Constitutional Court de clared1 the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Landtová2 a n ultra vires act. In what might otherwise look like a mundane case about the pension rights of workers from the former Czechoslovakia, the Czech constitutional judges, sitting in full court, concluded that the Court of Justice had wrongly applied an EU regulation on the coordination of social security schemes (Coordination Regulation)3 to facts devoid of any cross-border dimension. At a closer look, however, one can see that the Court of Justice’s authority (and the authority of EU law as a whole) was just collateral damage in a judicial war that had been raging between the Czech Constitutional Court and the Czech Supreme Administrative Court for several years. Seen in this context, the Constitutional Court’s decision appears to be an unmeasured response to the continuing

The Influence of Precedent on State Supreme Courts

Abstract: Studies of policy making by courts need to examine the actual policy adopted in the majority opinion rather than studying votes. The authors examine the responsiveness of state supreme courts to pr...

The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan

Abstract: The Supreme Court of Japan is widely and justifiably considered the most conservative constitutional court in the world. Drawing on interviews conducted in Japan with a variety of judges, officials, and scholars – including seven current and former members of the Supreme Court itself – this article offers a political and institutional account of why the Court has failed to take an active role in the enforcement of Japan's postwar constitution. This account yields a number of insights into the relationship between judicial politics and electoral politics, and the role of institutional design in mediating between the two. The fact that the Court is conservative is perhaps only to be expected given its longtime immersion in a political environment dominated almost continuously by the center-right Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Much of the government’s influence over the Court has been disguised, however, by the institutional design of the judiciary, which appears to enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy to manage its own affairs and even to decide who will serve on the Supreme Court. In effect, the government delegated political control of the judiciary to ideologically reliable agents within the judiciary itself – namely, the enormously powerful Chief Justice and his aides in the Court's administrative arm, the General Secretariat. Like the Chief Justice, the leaders of the General Secretariat are reliably orthodox jurists who have reached positions of power via a lifelong process of ideological vetting that all career judges must undergo. This group of judicial bureaucrats performs a wide range of sensitive activities ranging from the training and screening of new judges to the selection of Supreme Court law clerks, who are themselves elite career judges with both the ability and the inclination to oppose any liberal escapades on the part of the justices. The Japanese experience holds valuable lessons for students of judicial politics and institutional design. There is no plausible way of designing or structuring a court so as to insulate it entirely from political influence. The institutional characteristics of the court can, however, determine how responsive it will be to its political environment. An obviously relevant characteristic is the frequency with which political actors have the opportunity to shape the composition of the court. A less obvious, but no less relevant, characteristic is the extent to which power within the court is centralized or diffuse. The Supreme Court of Japan illustrates the importance of these characteristics: its organization and structure render it highly unlikely to depart from the wishes of the government for any meaningful period of time. The sheer number of seats on the Court, paired with a deliberate strategy of appointing justices close to mandatory retirement age, ensures a high degree of turnover that gives the government opportunities to adjust and correct the ideological direction of the Court on an ongoing basis. Similarly, the concentration of power in the hands of a single individual who is subject to replacement at relatively frequent intervals - namely, the Chief Justice - obviates sustained and repeated efforts to influence the direction of the Court.

Do Reasons Matter? The Impact of Opinion Content on Supreme Court Legitimacy:

Abstract: Is Supreme Court legitimacy affected by the way justices explain their decisions to the public? Existing work shows a link between legitimacy and case outcomes but often overlooks the impact of opinion content. Using a novel experimental design, the author measures the effect of three different types of judicial arguments on public support for the Court. The results suggest that the rationales used by justices in their opinions can affect institutional legitimacy, but to a lesser degree than conventional wisdom suggests. Taken together with other recent legitimacy research, these findings have important implications and set the stage for follow-up research.

Consensus, Disorder, and Ideology on the Supreme Court

Abstract: Ideological models are widely accepted as the basis for many academic studies of the Supreme Court because of their power in predicting the justices' decision-making behavior. Not all votes are easily explained or well predicted by attitudes, however. Consensus in Supreme Court voting, particularly the extreme consensus of unanimity, has often puzzled Court observers who adhere to ideological accounts of judicial decision making. Are consensus and (ultimately) unanimity driven by extreme factual scenarios or extreme lower court rulings such that even the most liberal and most conservative justice can agree on the case disposition? Or are they driven by other, nonattitudinal influences on judicial decisions? In this article, we rely on a measure of deviations from expected ideological patterns in the justices' voting to assess whether ideological models provide an adequate explanation of consensus on the Court. We find that case factors that predict voting disorder also predict consensus. Based on that finding, we conclude that consensus on the Court cannot be explained by ideology alone; rather, it often results from ideology being outweighed by other influences on justices' decisions.

Race and Gender Bias in Three Administrative Contexts: Impact on Work Assignments in State Supreme Courts

Abstract: Do certain types of administrative processes better inhibit race and gender prejudices that may surface in the public workplace? We compare the effects of three distinct administrative settings on race, gender, and other biases in the workload assignments of state supreme court justices—important public policy making settings that have been understudied in public administration. In particular, we model the extent to which majority opinion– writing assignment processes exhibit prejudice in states that use randomized assignments, rotated assignments, or fully discretionary assignments, respectively. Our findings confirm that administrative process matters. We use theories of status characteristics and administrative oversight to explain the relationship between administrative context and workload assignment patterns. Based on data from all 50 states, we discover that prejudice exists but that certain administrative processes serve better than others to suppress race and gender biases.

The Supreme Court's Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions

Abstract: A brusque opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court in a patent case has launched a revolution in the law of equitable remedies. The Court’s opinion in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. asserted that it was merely upholding “traditional principles” regarding when injunctions should issue. But in circuit after circuit and for subject matter ranging from federal constitutional law to state tort law, lower courts have understood eBay to abrogate longstanding approaches. Focusing on the law for permanent injunctions, this Article examines the eBay opinion and the far-reaching changes that have resulted. For a better perspective on these changes, this Article discusses how courts historically have addressed equity’s traditional concerns with risks of irreparable injury and the balance of hardships. Finally, this Article provides a normative account of the structured sets of equitable presumptions and safety valves that current understandings of eBay threaten to sweep aside.

Governing from the Bench: The Supreme Court of Canada and the Judicial Role

Abstract: Introduction 1 Studying Judicial Behaviour 2 The Evolution of the Court and Its Justices 3 Setting the Stage: Exploring Court Processes Leading to Decisions 4 The Decision: Collegiality, Conflict, and Consensus 5 A Question of Competence: Examining Judicial Policy Making 6 The Court in Government and Society: Dialogue, Public Opinion, and the Media Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index

A Positive Theory And Empirical Analysis Of Strategic Word Choice In District Court Opinions

Abstract: Supported by numerous empirical studies on judicial hierarchies and panel effects, Positive Political Theory (PPT) suggests that judges engage in strategic use of opinion content—to further the policy outcomes preferred by the decision-making court In this study, we employ linguistic theory to study the strategic use of opinion content at a granular level—investigating whether the specific word choices judges make in their opinions is consistent with the competitive institutional story of PPT regarding judicial hierarchies In particular, we examine the judges’ pragmatic use of the linguistic operations known as “hedging”—language serving to enlarge the truth set for a particular proposition, rendering it less definite and therefore less assailable—and “intensifying”—language restricting the possible truth-value of a proposition and making a statement more susceptible to falsification Our principal hypothesis is that district court judges not ideologically aligned with the majority of the overseeing circuit judges use more hedging language in their legal reasoning in order to insulate these rulings from reversal We test the theory empirically by analyzing constitutional criminal procedure, racial and sexual discrimination, and environmental opinions in the federal district courts from 1998 to 2001 Our results demonstrate a statistically significant increase in the use of certain types of language as the ideological distance between a district court judge and the overseeing circuit court judges increases

The Supreme Court Decision

Abstract: The Supreme Court of Ohio FILED: JUN 14 2000 Home Builders Association. of Dayton Case and the Miami Valley et al., Appellees, v. City of Beavercreek, Appellant. COURT OF APPEAL JUDGMENT ENTRY No. 98-2572 This cause, here on appeal from the Court of Appeals for Greene County, was considered in, the manner prescribed by law. On consideration thereof, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated, consistent with the opinion rendered herein. It is further ordered that the appellant recover from the appellees its costs herein expended; and that a mandate be sent to the Court of Common Pleas for Greene County to carry this judgment into execution; and that a copy of this entry be certified to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals for Greene County for entry. COSTS: Docket Fee, $40.00, paid by Calfee, Halter Griswold L.L.P. Greene County Court of Appeals• No• 97CA113 and 97CA115) THOMAS J. MOYER Chief Justice 00 Ohio St.3d HOME BUILDERS ASSN. w. BEAVERCREEK Statement of the Case HOME BUILDERS ASSOCIATION OF DAYTON AND THE MIAMI VALLEY ET APPELLEES, v. CITY OF BEAVERCREEK APPELLANT. [Cite as Home Builders Assn, of Dayton & the Miami Valley v Beavercreek (2000), • Ohio St.3d .] Municipal corporations••Streets highway-Impact fee adopted by ordinance that partially funds new roadway projects is constitutional when.

The Politics of Precedent in the U.S. Supreme Court

Abstract: List of Figures and Tables ix Acknowledgments xi Chapter One: Introduction 1 Chapter Two: Explaining the Interpretation of Precedent 16 Chapter Three: Measuring the Interpretation of Precedent 43 Chapter Four: The Interpretation of Precedent over Time 55 Chapter Five: The Overruling of Precedent 78 Chapter Six: The Interpretation of Precedent in Majority Opinions 93 Chapter Seven: Lower Federal Court Responses to the Supreme Court's Interpretation of Precedent 109 Chapter Eight: Concluding Remarks and Broader Implications 124 Appendix 135 References 139 Index 151

Structure Matters: The Impact of Court Structure on the Indian and U.S. Supreme Courts

Abstract: The United States Supreme Court sits as a unified bench of nine justices. The Indian Supreme Court sits in panels, and can have up to thirty-one judges. This article uses the divergent structures of the U.S. and Indian Supreme Courts to explore how specific court structures are adopted to promote different values or understandings of what a supreme court should be. It analyzes how structure impacts: (1) access to these courts; (2) the cohesiveness of the doctrine they produce; (3) inter-judge relations; and (4) perceptions about these courts, including perceived politicization. It argues a comparative analysis of court structure can challenge common assumptions about the ideal role of a court, as well as aid in judicial institutional design and reform. Such an analysis helps make explicit how law is permeated by the structure of the courts that interpret it.

The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment

Abstract: In the Supreme Court's recent decision on GPS surveillance, United States v. Jones, five justices authored or joined concurring opinions that applied a new approach to interpreting Fourth Amendment protection. Before Jones, Fourth Amendment decisions had always evaluated each step of an investigation individually. Jones introduced what we might call a "mosaic theory" of the Fourth Amendment, by which courts evaluate a collective sequence of government activity as an aggregated whole to consider whether the sequence amounts to a search.This Article considers the implications of a mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment. It explores the choices and puzzles that a mosaic theory would raise, and it analyzes the merits of the proposed new method of Fourth Amendment analysis. The Article makes three major points. First, the mosaic theory represents a dramatic departure from the basic building block of existing Fourth Amendment doctrine. Second, adopting the mosaic theory would require courts to answer a long list of novel and challenging questions. Third, courts should reject the theory and retain the traditional sequential approach to Fourth Amendment analysis. The mosaic approach reflects legitimate concerns, but implementing it would be exceedingly difficult in light of rapid technological change. Courts can better respond to the concerns animating the mosaic theory within the traditional parameters of the sequential approach to Fourth Amendment analysis.IntroductionThe Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures,1 and the most challenging and important threshold question in interpreting the Fourth Amendment is what counts as a "search."2 Identifying Fourth Amendment searches traditionally has required analyzing police action sequentially. 3 If no individual step in a sequence counts as a search, then the Fourth Amendment is not triggered. No Fourth Amendment violation has occurred.In United States v. Maynard,4 the D.C. Circuit introduced a different approach, which could be called a "mosaic theory" of the Fourth Amendment.5 Under the mosaic theory, searches can be analyzed as a collective sequence of steps rather than as individual steps.6 Identifying Fourth Amendment searches requires analyzing police actions over time as a collective "mosaic" of surveillance; the mosaic can count as a collective Fourth Amendment search even though the individual steps taken in isolation do not.7 The D.C. Circuit applied that test in Maynard to GPS surveillance of a car. The court held that GPS surveillance of a car's location over twenty-eight days aggregates into so much surveillance that the collective sequence triggers Fourth Amendment protection.8When the Supreme Court reviewed Maynard in United States v. Jones,9 concurring opinions signed or joined by five of the justices endorsed some form of the D.C. Circuit's mosaic theory.10 The majority opinion resolved the case without reaching the mosaic theory, and neither concurring opinion gave the issue extensive analysis. But Justice Alito's concurring opinion for four justices clearly echoed the basic reasoning of the D.C. Circuit in concluding that long-term GPS monitoring of a car counts as a search even though short-term monitoring does not.11 Justice Sotomayor's separate concurrence also voiced support for the mosaic approach.12The concurring opinions in Jones raise the intriguing possibility that a five-justice majority of the Supreme Court is ready to endorse a new mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment protection. That prospect invites lower courts to consider whether the mosaic theory is viable and if so, how it should be applied. A handful of courts have begun to do so in the short time since the Court handed down Jones, with mixed results so far.13 Law enforcement is paying close attention as well. Soon after Jones, the General Counsel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation informed a law school audience that the mosaic opinions in Jones were causing significant turmoil inside the FBI. …

Actions, Factions, and Interactions: Newsworthy Influences on Supreme Court Coverage*

Abstract: Objectives We test whether Supreme Court media coverage (in terms of both overall volume and specific frames) is driven by Court actions, by factional battles on the Court, by the Court's interaction with other governmental actors, or by all three. Methods We link elements of the Spaeth Supreme Court Database and real-world Supreme Court and political events to Associated Press media coverage of the judicial branch over a nearly three-decade span. Content analysis of the media coverage is performed and empirical relationships between decisions, events, and coverage are analyzed using error correction modeling. Results We find that overall coverage of the Court is driven by the ideological nature of decisions rendered and by judicial retirements. Legal coverage of the Court is driven by issues of constitutionality. Political coverage of the Court is driven by majority size and judicial retirements. Conclusions The findings speak to the newsworthiness of Court action, factional battles on the Court, and moments where the Court interacts with outsiders. Elements of all three shapes the types of stories journalists tell and the ways in which said stories are told.

Reviving the Schoolmaster: Reevaluating Public Opinion in the Wake of Roe v. Wade

Abstract: Many recent studies of the judiciary and public opinion adopt a model that views court decisions as aggravating division within the public The authors question the image of Court as polarizer, arg

Argentoratum Locutum: Is Strasbourg or the Supreme Court Supreme?

Abstract: This article takes its title from Lord Rodger's oft cited dictum in Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No 3): ' locutum: iudicium finitum ^ Strasbourg has spoken, the case is closed'. The article focuses upon the following two questions: What should be the approach of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom to interpreta- tions of the European Convention on Human Rights by the Strasbourg Court and what should be the approach of the Strasbourg Court to the decisions of the highest courts in member states? On the first question, the 'mirror' approach and criticisms of it are considered and examples are given of the Supreme Court following its own, rather than a pan- European, approach. On the second question, the view of the new presi- dent of the Strasbourg Court is welcomed.

Judging democracy in Pakistan: Conflict between the executive and judiciary

Abstract: This article deals with the judicialization of politics in Pakistan under the Supreme Court Chief Justice Choudhry (2009–). Confrontation between the executive and judiciary under him led to speculation about the imminent collapse of the democratic system, given the history of military take-over in the country. The use of judicial review, whereby the Court exercised the power of interpreting the Constitution with impunity, was widely criticized as an attempt to encroach on the territory of the legislature through case law. At the institutional level, the Court sought to exercise veto power over the appointment of judges and to deny the right of oversight to any government agency. The Court's pursuit of public interest litigation through frequent suo motu actions taken in a populist mode led to brinkmanship on the part of the executive and judiciary. Despite this power play, the Court's operations fell into the category of modus operandi, instead of being a fight to the finish. However, the Court's pursuit...

The Triumph of Politics: Reflections on the Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union Validating the Inclusion of Non-EU Airlines in the Emissions Trading Scheme

Abstract: The planned extension of the EU emissions trading scheme to non-EU carriers has provoked vociferous opposition and prompted debate among scholars and practitioners of international and environmental law. U.S. airlines challenged the relevant EU directive in the English High Court, arguing that it is incompatible with international law. The High Court made a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union. Advocate General Juliane Kokott provided an advisory opinion in October 2011 that upheld the validity of the directive. On December 21, 2011, the Court issued a judgment that largely adopts the Advocate General's reasoning. The article contends that the Advocate General and the Court, in their juristic pronouncements regarding the novel legal issues in this case, exalt political concerns over adherence to traditional understandings of fundamental principles of international aviation law, notably sovereignty, extraterritoriality, and the applicability of the Chicago Convention. The authors conclude that the integrity of the international aviation system depends upon levels of international cooperation that are inconsistent with the unilateralist, interest-driven readings of legal principle evident in both the Opinion and Judgment.

End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress

Abstract: This Article considers the likely effects of continued political polarization on the relative power of Congress and the Supreme Court. Polarization already is leading to an increase the power of the Court against Congress, whether or not the Justices affirmatively seek that additional power. The governing model of Congressional-Supreme Court relations is that the branches are in dialogue on statutory interpretation: Congress writes federal statutes, the Court interprets them, and Congress has the power to overrule the Court’s interpretations. The Court’s interpretive rules are premised upon this dialogic model, such as the rule that Supreme Court statutory interpretation precedents are subject to 'super strong' stare decisis protection because Congress can always correct an errant court interpretation. Legislation scholars also write as though congressional overriding remains common. In fact, in the last two decades the rate of Congressional overriding of Supreme Court statutory decisions has plummeted dramatically, from an average of 12 overrulings of Supreme Court cases in each two-year Congressional term during the 1975-1990 period to an average of 5.8 overrides for each term from 1991-2000 and to a mere 2.8 average number of overrides for each term from 2001-2012. Although some of the decline seems attributable to the lower volume of Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions, the decline in overridings greatly outpaces this decline in cases. Instead, partisanship seems to have strongly diminished the opportunities for bipartisan overridings of Supreme Court cases, in which Democrats and Republicans come together to reverse the Supreme Court. In its place we see a new, but rarer, phenomenon, partisan overriding, which appears to require conditions of near-unified control of both branches of Congress and the presidency. The two recent examples are the Military Commissions Act of 2006, in which Republicans overturned the Court’s statutory interpretation decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld on the habeas corpus rights of enemy combatants, and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, in which Democrats overturned the Court’s statutory interpretation decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company on how to measure the statute of limitations period in certain employment discrimination lawsuits. In a highly polarized atmosphere and with Senate rules usually requiring 60 votes to change the status quo, the Court’s word on the meaning of statutes is now final almost as often as its word on constitutional interpretation.Although political polarization has benefited the Supreme Court’s power relative to Congress in the short term, the longer term power relations are more uncertain. Aside from the statutory interpretation dialogue, Congress interacts with the Supreme Court in other ways, including through Senate confirmation of Supreme Court judicial nominees. The recent partisan realignment of the Supreme Court makes it more likely that a Supreme Court judicial nominee will be filibustered in the Senate, thanks to the increasing willingness of Senators to oppose nominees on ideological grounds and increased partisan polarization in the Senate. The number of Senators from the opposing party of the nominating president voting against Supreme Court nominees is approaching or exceeding the filibuster level. Depending upon how the politics plays out in a possible filibuster of a Supreme Court judicial nominee, we may see either an erosion of the use of the filibuster in the Senate or a compromise which would weaken the power of the judiciary, such as term limits imposed upon future Supreme Court Justices.Part I of this Article demonstrates that despite the model of Congress-Court dialogue, and Supreme Court statutory interpretation tools premised on dialogue, congressional overridings of Supreme Court statutory interpretation precedents have become exceedingly rare. The effect of this change is to empower the Court over Congress. Part II argues that the steep decline in overridings over the last two decades appears due in large part to increased polarization in Congress and not simply to a decline in the number of Supreme Court statutory interpretation cases. When Congress does override a Supreme Court case, it is now more likely to be a partisan overriding, pushed through in periods of unified government. Part III is more speculative. It considers how polarization in Congress and the partisan realignment of the Supreme Court — a Court in which all the conservative Justices are Republicans and all the liberal Justices are Democrats — may eventually lead to a major confrontation in Congress over the power of the Senate filibuster. That confrontation may leave the Senate, the Supreme Court, or both, looking very different than they are today. Furthermore, partisan realignment has the potential to harm the Supreme Court’s legitimacy in a way which we have not witnessed in modern times.