Showing papers on "Majority opinion published in 2019"

Majority rules: how good are we at aggregating convergent opinions?

Abstract: Mathematical models and simulations demonstrate the power of majority rules, i.e. following an opinion shared by a majority of group members. Majority opinion should be followed more when (a) the relative and absolute size of the majority grow, the members of the majority are (b) competent, and (c) benevolent, (d) the majority opinion conflicts less with our prior beliefs and (e) the members of the majority formed their opinions independently. We review the experimental literature bearing on these points. The few experiments bearing on (b) and (c) suggest that both factors are adequately taken into account. Many experiments show that (d) is also followed, with participants usually putting too much weight on their own opinion relative to that of the majority. Regarding factors (a) and (e), in contrast, the evidence is mixed: participants sometimes take into account optimally the absolute and relative size of the majority, as well as the presence of informational dependencies. In other circumstances, these factors are ignored. We suggest that an evolutionary framework can help make sense of these conflicting results by distinguishing between evolutionarily valid cues – that are readily taken into account – and non-evolutionarily valid cues – that are ignored by default.

The Supreme People’s Court and the Political Economy of Judicial Empowerment in Contemporary China

Abstract: This article explores the transformation of the Chinese Supreme People's Court ("Court") from a state security agency into a relatively autonomous policy-making organization. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Court has reinterpreted virtually every major legislative act, made rules in numerous substantive law and regulatory fields, instructed lower judges to suspend ultra vires local enactments, appointed its own justices, and initiated nationwide judicial reform. This article addresses questions of why this court came to exercise such expanded powers and how this happened without the encouragement of the Leninist state. It argues that the Court's empowerment originated from the entrepreneurial choices of senior justices. A new judicial ideology that combines activist and professional values emerged under the auspices of entrepreneurs. By encouraging pro-empowerment preferences within the Court, supporting the interests of influential business actors, and reforming local courts in line with its ideology, the Court succeeded in constructing support bases for judicial empowerment. Increasingly fragmented political authority, breakneck economic development, and considerable legislative underperformance have all furthered the Court's aggrandizement. However, Chinese judicial empowerment is qualified by the inter-subjective perceptions of China's rulers regarding the proper boundaries of judicial power.

Spiral of Silence in Recommender Systems

Abstract: It has been established that, ratings are missing not at random in recommender systems. However, little research has been done to reveal how the ratings are missing. In this paper we present one possible explanation of the missing not at random phenomenon. We verify that, using a variety of different real-life datasets, there is a spiral process for a silent minority in recommender systems where (1) people whose opinions fall into the minority are less likely to give ratings than majority opinion holders; (2) as the majority opinion becomes more dominant, the rating possibility of a majority opinion holder is intensifying but the rating possibility of a minority opinion holder is shrinking; (3) only hardcore users remain to rate for minority opinions when the spiral achieves its steady state. Our empirical findings are beneficial for future recommendation models. To demonstrate the impact of our empirical findings, we present a probabilistic model that mimics the generation process of spiral of silence. We experimentally show that, the presented model offers more accurate recommendations, compared with state-of-the-art recommendation models.

The Integrity of Marriage

Abstract: While the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges resolved a dispute about access to legal marriage, it also exposed a rift between the Justices about what rights, obligations, and social meanings marriage should entail. The majority opinion described marriage as a “unified whole” comprised of “essential attributes,” both legal and extralegal. The dissents, in contrast, were more skeptical about marriage’s inherent legal content. Justice Scalia, for instance, characterized marriage as a mere bundle of “civil consequences” attached to “whatever sexual attachments and living arrangements [the law] wishes.” This side debate has taken center stage in several recent disputes. In the years following Obergefell, courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have considered whether the First Amendment limits a state’s authority to require public accommodations to provide equal access to services related to a wedding celebration, whether the right to marry encompasses the right to be deemed a parent to a child born to one’s spouse, and whether states can withhold valuable employment benefits from married same-sex couples. And numerous state legislatures have considered proposals to get states “out of the marriage business.” All of these disputes ultimately question how the positive law of marriage should be constituted and whether marriage is indeed a unified or integrated whole. Some scholars have analyzed these questions from a historical or functional perspective. This Article starts from a different point. It accepts Obergefell’s invitation to think of marriage as an institution that can be more or less “unified” or “integrated.” Along these lines, it proposes a new framework for analyzing questions about the positive law of marriage: the continuum of integration and disintegration. This continuum has two interrelated dimensions. The first involves the rights and duties that the law imposes upon spouses. The second involves the uniformity of those legal rules across jurisdictions. Marriage becomes more integrated when rights and social norms mutually reinforce each other, and less integrated when rights and norms conflict. The package of rights and norms becomes more integrated when it is uniform across jurisdictions, and less integrated when jurisdictional differences prevent marriage from acquiring a singular meaning. This integration framework has two benefits. First, by focusing attention on the relationship between the functions, laws, and norms of marriage, the integration framework provides a methodology for assessing claims that changes to marriage laws are bringing about marriage’s disintegration, rendering visible whether and how disintegration occurs. Second, it identifies benefits and costs of integration, demonstrating the extent to which marriage relies on effectively communicating information about its content but noting the downsides of centralization and state control. This integration framework enables a more principled analysis of efforts targeted at reforming marriage laws and recognizing nonmarital relationships.

Time Chart of the Justices Revisited: An Analysis of the Influences on the Time It Takes to Compose the Majority Opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court1

Abstract: What affects the amount of time it takes for a justice to construct a majority opinion? We hypothesize that the amount of time expended on constructing the majority opinion is a function of its aut...

7. the unbearable rightness of bush v. gore

Abstract: Bush v. Gore was a straightforward and legally correct decision. For more than a quarter century, the Supreme Court has treated the stuffing of ballot boxes as a paradigmatic violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Much more subtle and indirect forms of vote dilution have also been outlawed. Like some of those practices, the selective and partial recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court may have been an inadvertent form of vote dilution. But that recount had effects that were virtually indistinguishable from those in the paradigmatic case. There is no meaningful difference between adding illegal votes to the count and selectively adding legal votes, which is what the Florida court was doing. The Supreme Court rightly concluded that the vote dilution in this case violated well-established equal protection principles. Nor did the Supreme Court err in its response to this constitutional violation. Although the Court acted with unprecedented dispatch after the Florida court's December 8, 2000 decision, it was highly improbable that a legally proper recount could be conducted by the December 18 deadline set by federal law. And it was quite impossible for such a recount to meet the December 12 deadline that the Florida court itself had found in Florida law. Contrary to a widespread misconception, the U.S. Supreme Court properly accepted the Florida court's interpretation of state law and provided that court with an opportunity to reconsider its own interpretation of state law. When the clock ran out, it was entirely due to mistakes and delays attributable to the Florida court. The Supreme Court's majority opinion has been subjected to a barrage of political criticisms of a kind that might more fittingly be directed against a Senate Majority Leader or a Secretary of State. Ironically, it is precisely because the Justices correctly applied the law that they have been accused of having partisan motives.

Phase Transition in Democratic Opinion Dynamics.

Abstract: Consider a community where initially, each individual is positive or negative regarding a reform proposal. In each round, individuals gather randomly in fixed rooms of different sizes, and all individuals in a room agree on the majority opinion in the room (with ties broken in favor of the negative opinion). The Galam model---introduced in statistical physics, specifically sociophysics---approximates this basic random process. We approach the model from a more mathematical perspective and study the threshold behavior and the consensus time of the model.

The Perfect Opinion

Abstract: In this Article I collate favorite judicial opinions to inductively derive an archetype of perfection. The question of which opinions we like the most is decidedly subjective, but it also reveals implied preferences for creative judging that might not register on citation counts or be prioritized when editing casebooks. Importantly, our choice of a favorite reflects something about *us*. So why do judges often select non-authoritative opinions (alternative concurrences, or dissents) or no-citation opinions (that don’t cite to prior case law) when asked of their favorite opinion? We might predict that most judges would select, for example, a Cardozo majority opinion that deftly marshals a wide swath of precedent to justify a remarkable turn in the doctrine. Instead it seems that at least some judges share a critical perspective that citation is a “mask hiding other considerations” , and regard over-citation with caution. Despite innovative thinking from academics like Frederick Schauer on the nature and use of authority, this topic remains under-theorized. I contribute to this literature by making a novel observation about implicit authority. Judges who rely on first principles reasoning are making both an empirical claim that these principles inform our positive law, and a normative claim that these principles are in fact a better reflection of our law than the “ordinary legal materials” (case law, etc.) we have to work with. This intellectual move requires tacit knowledge and feel, and so it’s not surprising these opinions write so effortlessly. These above-great opinions together limn an archetype of perfection that we can use as an ideal form. Not surprisingly, this theorizing echoes the work of Ronald Dworkin, who built his own normative theory of perfection in the construct of Hercules. None of us can be him. But perhaps one of our own has enjoyed the herculean moment. This Article searches for it.

Effect of Segregation on the Dynamics of Noise-Free Social Impact Model of Opinion Formation Through Agent-Based Modeling

Abstract: Knowing the current public opinion and predicting its trend using opinion formation models is very applicable. The social impact model of opinion formation is a discrete binary opinion model. It describes how interactions among individuals and sharing their opinions about a specific topic in a social network affect the dynamics of their opinions and form the opinion of society. The society could be an online social network. In this research, we considered the effect of segregation on opinion formation. Segregation is a phenomenon that happens due to homophily and is measured based upon network topology. Homophily is the tendency of individuals to interact with others who share similar traits. We used scale-free networks to model interactions between individuals. The social impact model includes a noise parameter, which is the stochastic part of the model, dealing with the inexplicable behavior of individuals and the effects of other influentials, e.g., mass media. Since this noise is a white noise with no bias toward any possible opinion, for simplicity, we assumed a noise-free social impact model, which is valid in equilibrium analysis we considered. The results reveal that with the same attributes for the individuals, the more segregated opinion group dominates the less segregated opinion group on average. Therefore, with the same population size and individual characteristics of both opinion groups, segregation is an overall influential factor for opinion formation. A more segregated opinion group attracts some individuals from the other group and becomes the majority opinion group of society in equilibrium.

Proportionality, Rights-Consistent Interpretation and Declarations under the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities: The Momcilovic Litigation and Beyond

Abstract: The meaning, scope and interaction of the key provisions relating to the rights-compatibility of legislation under the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) were analysed by the Victorian Court of Appeal inRv Momcilovic. On appeal, the High Court of Australia reviewed this analysis and considered the constitutionality of the key provisions. Although overall the High Court upheld the provisions as constitutional, no majority opinion emerged on the scope and operation of the provisions in Victoria, with similar differences of opinion refl ected in the Victorian superior courts. Opinions differed on: the role, if any, of limitations under s 7(2); whether s 32(1) is an ordinary rule of statutory construction or a ‘remedial’ rule of interpretation; and the constitutionality and role of s 36(2) declarations of inconsistent interpretation. Even where a degree of agreement was apparent on one provision, the reasoning underlying the agreement differed, and/or there was no agreement on the interlinking provisions. An overarching theme concerned the methodology by which to approach the key provisions, which again produced disagreement. This article will critically analyse the multiplicity of views in the High Court, both because of the importance of the decision and because its application in Victoria is unclear. Regarding the latter, the Victorian superior courts have considered the Court of Appeal decision to not be overruled by the High Court, and continue to rely on it in varying degrees, whilst also seeking to identify a ratio from the High Court. By way of background, the article will explore the choices facing the Court of Appeal and its decision. It will then analyse the fi ve High Court judgments, focussing on the thematic issues of limitations, ordinary/ remedial interpretation, declarations, and methodology. It concludes with a review of the Victorian superior courts’ reaction to the High Court decision. Analysis will be limited to consideration of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) as it operates in Victoria. In addition to the specifi c disagreements on the key provisions, broaderissues of parliamentary sovereignty, the proper role of the judiciary and democratic governance will be examined.

The Rise and Fall of the Rule of Law

Abstract: Holbrook challenges the view that the rule of law has been central to liberal democracy for over 200 years. By defining the rule of law as a legal quality that exists when the law reflects a broad consensus of societal standards and norms, it is clear that the rule of law has only been a feature of British society for a period of about 50 years, in the middle of the twentieth century. Before then the law was too weak to constitute the rule of law and its relationship to society was distant, because it could not engage with majority opinion, and antagonistic when it did. The change in the middle of the last century reflected law’s increased strength and ability to reflect a social consensus. This was a short-lived era during which the law enabled personal autonomy to flourish. During this era of about 50 years the law existed in the background to bolster socially agreed norms and only impacted coercively on that minority of individuals who strayed beyond its broad boundaries. In recent decades the law has retained its strength but now uses that strength to impose minority opinions on swathes of individuals who stray beyond law’s ever narrowing boundaries. The law’s relationship to society has once again become distant, because it does not engage with majority opinion, and antagonistic. Instead of the law enabling personal autonomy to flourish, the law now restricts it. In the present era the law fails to reflect a broad consensus of societal standards and norms and the rule of law has morphed into what is best described as the rule by law.

Five Unanswered Questions from Trump v. Hawaii

Abstract: Trump v. Hawaii upheld President Trump’s travel ban in its entirety. This article explores five questions left open by the majority opinion. First, what will happen on remand with respect to discovery? Second, how should lower courts treat “this President,” as opposed to “the President”? Third, how does the Constitution apply to aliens who are not seeking entry into the United States but have already crossed the border? Fourth, what is the scope of the president’s Article II power to exclude aliens? Lastly, what is the permissible scope of a nationwide injunction? The judiciary will likely have to address these issues in the near future.

An (Un)Exceptional Case: Strasbourg’s Court Reserved Nod to Religious Symbols in the Courtroom

Abstract: Given the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) placid attitude towards state limitations on individual religious symbols, its recent judgment in Hamidovic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, holding that the respondent state exceeded the margin of appreciation once a witness, a member of a fundamentalist Islamic group, was imprisoned for contempt of court after refusing to remove his headgear in the courtroom, appears exceptional. The exceptional nature of this judgment lies not only in the fact that the ECtHR held that an otherwise wide margin of appreciation granted to Council of Europe (CoE) states in matters involving state-religion issues was overstepped, but also in the fact that it is one of rare cases where the ECtHR more directly addressed the right of private individuals to wear religious symbols in the courtroom. Nevertheless, the Hamidovic judgment is narrowly confined, meticulously distinguished from earlier similar cases, and understandably distinguished from other potential cases on religious symbols, i.e., those involving the facial veil in the courtroom. Further, the majority opinion in Hamidovic did not clarify whether absence of clear regulations on a particular issue across CoE states is an indicator of the absence or presence of European consensus in matters related to religion. For two reasons, however, the Hamidovic judgment may just act as a weak signal of change. First, it fits the ECtHR’s tactics of using cases involving members of controversial religious groups and states with weak human rights records as experimental grounds for adjustment of its jurisprudence and a means to improve its own image. Second, the ECtHR is now carefully signaling its willingness to consider a disparate impact of state limitations on different religions and increase its evidentiary requirements on the adverse impact of religious symbols as a justification for limitations. The ECtHR’s recent judgment in Lachiri v. Belgium, disagreeing that a Belgian court can prohibit a party wearing a headscarf from attending a hearing, gives limited evidence for these two claims.

Bargaining and Strategic Voting on Appellate Courts

Abstract: We explore the properties of voting rules and procedures employed by appellate courts in the US. Our model features: (1) a two-stage decision-making process (first over case disposition, then over majority opinion content), (2) dispositional consistency (the new rule must yield the Court's indicated case disposition when applied to the instant case), (3) restricted bargaining entree (only members of the winning dispositional coalition bargain over policy), (4) competitive offers (potentially many competitive majority opinions), and (5) absolute majority in joins (a majority of the court must endorse the rule in the majority opinion if it is to have precedential power). We show that the median judge is pivotal over case dispositions, although she (and others) may not vote sincerely. Strategic voting becomes more likely as the location of the case becomes more extreme, resulting in majority coalitions that give the appearance of less polarization on the court, than is truly the case. The equilibrium policy depends on the composition of the dispositional majority, and generically does not coincide with the ideal policy of the median judge either in the dispositional majority or the bench as a whole. Rather, opinions are drawn toward a weighted center of the dispositional majority but often reflect the preferences of the opinion author.

Goodbye to Concurring Opinions

Abstract: Modern Supreme Court opinions are too long. They are too fractured. And they often lack clarity. Separate opinions, particularly concurring opinions, are largely to blame. Today’s justices are more inclined to publish separate opinions than their predecessors. The justices do not want to read lengthy briefs but appear willing to publish lengthy opinions. Yet the justices owe us clarity. They should want the law to be understandable—and understood. In hopes of achieving greater legal clarity, this article calls for an end to concurring opinions. The modern Court writes more separate opinions than past courts. It is becoming far too common that in a given term there will be more separate opinions than majority opinions. This is causing problems for judges, lawyers, law students, and ordinary Americans. Surely most cases do not necessitate separate writing. Whether these separate opinions are driven by ego, politics, law clerks, celebrity, a desire to be a part of the legal “conversation,” or the refusal to accept that a particular justice’s approach failed to garner sufficient votes to serve as the majority opinion, they should stop. A return to seriatim opinions poses institutional risks. Rarely do concurring opinions become future law. Little is gained through concurring opinions. It is time to discard the myth that an add-on opinion will one day become binding precedent. It rarely happens. And the regular costs are not worth the rare advantages. This article seeks Supreme Court reform. The justices should voluntarily agree to stop writing concurring opinions. My thesis is simple: it is time to say goodbye to concurring opinions.

The American Express Case: Back to the Future

Abstract: This paper examines what the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in the American Express case, which is the only U.S. antitrust case that has explicitly addressed the unique issues raised by so-called platform or multi-sided markets, might tell us about the attitudes of the Court’s five-Justice majority about antitrust law.The majority opinion conflated the enduring normative contributions of the Chicago School with its embrace of empirical propositions from 40 years ago that have not stood the test of time and some of which are, in any event, not applicable to two-sided markets. The majority was willing to decide novel issues on the basis of abstract ideas about vertical restraints and free riding that were central to Chicago School analysis 40 years ago but which have since been shown to require more qualification and modification depending on factual context. The majority ignored the fact findings of the district court, and it was plainly willing to increase the risk of false negatives. Its decision was a triumph of ideology over fact-based decision-making.

'Remarkable Influence': The Unexpected Importance of Justice Scalia's Deceptively Unanimous and Contested Majority Opinions

Abstract: What constitutes judicial influence and how should it be measured? Curious about the broader role that rhetoric plays in judicial influence over time, we undertook a rhetorical-computational analysis of the 282 majority opinions that Justice Scalia wrote during his 30 years on the Supreme Court. Our analysis is the first to examine the full majority opinion output of a Supreme Court justice using a unique “medium data” approach that combines rhetorical coding with quantitative analysis relying on Shepard’s Citations and LexisNexis headnotes. The resulting study casts doubt on the ability of judicial authors, including Justice Scalia, to control the extent of their influence on later courts. One important finding from our study is that relying on only the vote counts of the Justices obscures the actual failures of unanimity that may generate long-lasting uncertainty. When there are concurring opinions in decisions whose vote counts are unanimous—opinions we reclassified as “deceptively unanimous”—later courts may continue to debate one or more issues over a long period of time, and that may result in a “long tail” of more frequent citations, not because of the majority opinion’s influence but because of the continuing conversation. If later courts diverge about the meaning or application of the rules established in the majority opinion, they may rely on a concurring opinion that gains or loses adherents over time. In these circumstances, both the original majority opinion and the concurring opinion will continue to be cited. And more frequent citations—to both the majority and the concurrence or concurrences—will extend long after the debate is settled as still-later cases recount the history of the dispute. A second finding emerging from our analysis is that JusticeScalia’s rhetorical statements appeared to be more or less attractive to later courts depending on the particular rhetorical context of the later judicial author. Although this finding may seem obvious, our analysis provided specific details. The federal courts of appeals, for example, were more likely to “cite” than to “follow” Justice Scalia’s precedential rules. Perhaps reflecting both their institutional role and their greater resources, the federal courts of appeals tended to more extensively discuss both the arguments made and the rules established in Justice Scalia’s majority opinions while the federal district courts and the state courts were somewhat more likely to simply follow the rules. Finally, our analysis illuminates how difficult and complex it is to discern and describe the effects of rhetorical structures, argument frames, and word choices on judicial decisionmaking and opinion writing. For example, we suspect that Justice Scalia’s stated preferences for constructing particular kinds of rhetorical rule statements—bright lines, broad categories, strict limits—may in fact have resulted in more frequent citations, which some observers might translate into an inference of greater influence. Our analysis, however, indicates that these more frequent citations over time often were the result of Scalia rule statements that either created or contributed to lingering disputes.

Mifepristone Protocol Legislation— The Anti-Choice Movement’s Disingenuous Method of Attack on the Reproductive Rights of Women and How Courts Should Respond

Abstract: INTRODUCTION In the past decade, five states have passed laws prohibiting the off-label use of the abortion-inducing drug mifepristone. (1) While these laws are ostensibly passed to protect women from misuse of a dangerous drug, in actuality they represent one of the latest steps in the anti-choice movement's efforts to dismantle the abortion right iterated in Roe v. Wade (2) and controlled by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey? These laws prevent doctors from practicing evidence-based medicine in the manner that they believe best serves their patients, and cost women time and money while potentially exposing them to unnecessary side effects and risks. In addition, these laws force (4) women with pregnancies of forty-nine to sixty-three days of gestation to undergo surgical abortions when medical abortions would be equally appropriate. As with most anti-choice initiatives, the women who are the most affected are those who are most vulnerable. (5) Women without economic or family resources, those in abusive relationships, and teenagers, who often discover their pregnancies later than adult women, are required to undergo unnecessary surgical procedures and spend money and time that they cannot afford because of politically-motivated legislation without a legitimate medical rationale. Courts examining mifepristone-regulating legislation have come to different conclusions. Two state courts have addressed these laws and determined that they are unconstitutional: Judge Wickham Corwin of North Dakota's East Central Judicial District enjoined North Dakota's law requiring adherence to the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) protocol pending further proceedings, (6) and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that Oklahoma's FDA protocol law was unconstitutional under Casey. (7) This issue has also come up in federal court. In a constitutional challenge to Ohio's ban on off-label use of mifepristone, a Sixth Circuit panel affirmed the state's motion for summary judgment on Planned Parenthood's claims that the law was unconstitutionally vague, violated patients' right to bodily integrity, and that it posed an undue burden to women seeking an abortion in the state of Ohio. (8) On June 27, 2013, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether Oklahoma's mifepristone protocol legislation violates the constitution under Casey. (9) Due perhaps to re-election concerns in a state with strong anti-choice leanings, (10) the Supreme Court of Oklahoma was very succinct in the opinion being appealed. In affirming the trial court's determination that the law was unconstitutional, the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not fully explain its reasoning, but instead wrote briefly that the "matter is controlled by the United States Supreme Court decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey" and "this Court is duty bound by the United States and the Oklahoma Constitutions to 'follow the mandate of the United States Supreme Court on matters of federal constitutional law.'" (11) The United States Supreme Court sought clarification from the Oklahoma Supreme Court on the breadth of H.B. No. 1970, Section 1, Chapter 216, O.S.L. 2011, the Oklahoma mifepristone protocol law, before proceeding with the case, (12) and dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted after the answer was received. (13) Because the Oklahoma opinion is so brief, this Note focuses on the Sixth Circuit and North Dakota opinions in more detail because they fully set forth the constitutional reasoning of courts upholding and striking down mifepristone protocol legislation. This Note argues that courts should strike down legislation restricting mifepristone use to the FDA protocol because it fails rational basis review, the lowest standard for judging legislation. (14) There is no evidence that the protocol approved by the FDA is any safer for women than the protocol currently being used by abortion providers, and the risks from mifepristone are lower than those of many other medications commonly prescribed offlabel. …

Judicial Choice among Cases for Certiorari

Abstract: How does the Supreme Court choose among cases to grant cert? In a model with a strategic Supreme Court, a continuum of rule-following lower courts, a set of potential cases for revision, and a dist...

When to Step Down: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the Supreme Court

Abstract: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has been a pioneering woman lawyer, legal scholar, and judge for over five decades. In 2013 Ginsburg celebrated two important milestones—20 years serving on the Supreme Court, and her eightieth birthday—and faced an important decision: Should she retire from the bench? This was a question not only of personal preference, but also of politics. The federal court system purports itself to be apolitical, but its decisions have far-reaching political implications and it is staffed by human beings, none of whom are without bias. As a liberal justice, would it be better for the court, and for Ginsburg’s legacy, to retire under democratic President Barack Obama, or to continue to serve for as long as possible regardless of who would appoint her successor? Ginsburg’s decision was weighed down by her position as the second ever female Supreme Court justice, and the possibility that her successor might not be another woman. She also had to contend with societal norms that expected women to forbear any personal ego and to bow to the majority opinion that would see her retire.

Disaggregating Market Definition: AmEx and a Plural View of Market Definition

Abstract: The orthodox view of market definition in antitrust cases is that the same principles of market definition should apply at all stages of an antitrust analysis, and, in particular, that markets should be defined for virtually all purposes by reference to demand-side substitutability. Commentators have struggled to reconcile the Supreme Court's recent decision in Ohio v. American Express Co. --in which the majority combined services to cardholders and services to merchants into a single antitrust market, despite the evident lack of substitutability between them -- with that familiar view. In this short Article, we suggest that this effort at reconciliation may be unnecessary, and perhaps even undesirable. Against the orthodox view, we claim that market definition should be "disaggregated" such that the correct approach to market definition may vary depending on the element of the antitrust analysis for which it is being used. Thus, while market definition based on substitutability is an appealing tool for the assessment of market power, it may not be appropriate for the evaluation of competitive effects in all cases under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The majority opinion in AmEx can (and perhaps should) be understood as an implicit-albeit cryptic-endorsement of a disaggregated approach to market definition.

Subreddit R/unpopularopinion: Against the Spiral of Silence.

Abstract: As a social animal, human conforms to the customs of society, and their behavior and opinions are greatly influenced by social norms [5]. Accordingly, people choose to hide their opinion in front of others when they feel their idea is against majority opinion. This social phenomenon is called the spiral of silence [4]. Recently, the advent of internet technology and online communication has made people to stand up and express their opinion openly in online space and to break the wall of the spiral of silence [12]. The subreddit r/unpopularopinion has been designed to allow users to share and discuss socially unpopular thought frankly. In this study, we introduce a descriptive study to show how the subreddit r/unpopularopinion helps its users to get over the spiral of silence. The r/unpopularopinion was analyzed based on the findings from community observation and participant interviews. Even though the environment of r/unpopularopinion encourages the users to freely express their opinion, the dominant population of this community is young white males, and the opinions representing their group are supported by general users and come up to the front page. Consequently, the minority opinions are neglected, and it results in another spiral of silence phenomenon. In future research,