Majority opinion

About: Majority opinion is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 4107 publications have been published within this topic receiving 54845 citations. The topic is also known as: opinion of the court.

Patent litigation in the UK: an empirical survey 2000–2008

Abstract: Over the course of this article we analyse the complete set of patent cases filed at the Patents Court in England and Wales during the period 2000–2008. The data cover all types of patent-related cases brought before the Patents County Court, the Patents Court at the High Court, the Court of Appeal, as well as the House of Lords/Supreme Court. We combine the detailed information on court cases with information on the patents in dispute as well as firm-level data for the litigating parties. Our analysis looks at patent cases from three different angles: litigant-level, patent-level, and case-level. In this respect we draw a number of conclusions about the types of claims brought, and by whom, as well as the value of the patents litigated and the case outcomes.

District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism

Abstract: On June 26, 2008, the United States Supreme Court handed down its 5-4 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, striking a District of Columbia statute that prohibits the possession of useable handguns in the home on the ground that it violated the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. Justice Scalia's majority opinion drew dissents from Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer. Collectively, the opinions in Heller represent the most important and extensive debate on the role of original meaning in constitutional interpretation among the members of the contemporary Supreme Court. This Article investigates the relationship between originalist constitutional theory and judicial practice in the context of the United States Supreme Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller. Part I introduces Heller and the role of originalism in the opinions of the Justices. Part II contextualizes Heller by tracing the evolution of contemporary originalist theory. Part III examines the reasoning of the Heller majority and identifies the unarticulated assumptions that would be required to square the result in Heller with a fully articulated originalist theory of constitutional interpretation. Part IV examines the role of intentionalist and teleological reasoning in Justice Steven's dissenting opinion. Part V considers the implications of Heller's originalist theory for the question whether the Second Amendment will be applied to the states via the Due Process Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part VI considers the relationship of the Heller to the distinction between constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction that has emerged from contemporary originalist theory. Finally Part VII draws conclusions about the implications of Heller for the relationship between originalist theory and originalist practice. This version of "District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism" was created on November 11, 2008, and it replaces all prior versions.

The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court

Abstract: The United States Supreme Court's connection to the ideal of the rule of law is often taken to be the principal basis of the Court's political legitimacy.1 In the Supreme Court's practices, however, the ideal of the rule of law and the Court's political legitimacy do not always coincide. This Note argues that the ideal of the rule of law and the Court's legitimacy part company with respect to the Court's practice of dissent. Specifically, this Note aims to demonstrate that the practice of dissent?the tradition of Justices publishing their differences with the judgment or the reasoning of their peers2?cannot be justified on the basis of an appeal to the ideal of the rule of law, but that other bases ofthe Court's political legitimacy provide a justification for this practice. The Note thus has two aspirations. First, it seeks to provide a justification for the practice of dissent in the Supreme Court. Second, in pursuit of that

Constitutional Language: An Interpretation of Judicial Decision

Abstract: This book examines theories of language for their contribution to understanding the interpretation of constitutional law by the Supreme Court.