Majority opinion

About: Majority opinion is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 4107 publications have been published within this topic receiving 54845 citations. The topic is also known as: opinion of the court.

Decision making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals

Abstract: Contents Illustrations 00 Prologue 00 1. Political Ideology and Circuit Court Decision Making 00 2. The Law and Circuit Court Decision Making 00 3. Judicial Background and Circuit Court Decision Making 00 4. Other Institutions and Circuit Court Decision Making 00 5. Litigants and Circuit Court Decision Making 00 6. Panel Effects and Circuit Court Decision Making 00 7. Procedural Threshold Effects and Circuit Court Decision Making 00 8. Circuit Court Decision Making and Precedential Impact 00 Epilogue 00 Notes 00 Index 00

Perceived legitimacy of supreme court decisions: three functions of source credibility

Abstract: Public reaction to a Supreme Court decision hinges, in part, on the level of diffuse support enjoyed by the Court prior to announcement of the ruling. Previous investigators have exchanged adamant claims concerning the legitimacy-conferring ability of the Supreme Court, yet these studies have consistently ignored theoretical explanations of the psychological determinants of a receiver's response to an authoritative edict. Examined from the context of a cognitive view of persuasion, the credibility of the Supreme Court as a message source should not be expected to have a simple positive effect on opinion. Instead, unique effects may result from the interaction of source credibility and other components of the process of persuasion. This paper reports the results of a series of experiments that demonstrate that the credibility of the Supreme Court can serve three unique persuasive functions: Source credibility can cue a simple positive response, prompt increased cognitive effort, and serve as evidence in support of a persuasive claim.

In Defense of a Political Court

Abstract: Can the Supreme Court be free of politics? Do we want it to be? Normative constitutional theory has long concerned itself with the legitimate scope and limits of judicial review. Too often, theorists seek to resolve that issue by eliminating politics from constitutional decisionmaking. In contrast, Terri Peretti argues for an openly political role for the Supreme Court.Peretti asserts that politically motivated constitutional decisionmaking is not only inevitable, it is legitimate and desirable as well. When Supreme Court justices decide in accordance with their ideological values, or consider the likely political reaction to the Court's decisions, a number of benefits result. The Court's performance of political representation and consensus-building functions is enhanced, and the effectiveness of political checks on the Court is increased. Thus, political motive in constitutional decision making does not lead to judicial tyranny, as many claim, but goes far to prevent it. Using pluralist theory, Peretti further argues that a political Court possesses instrumental value in American democracy. As one of many diverse and redundant political institutions, the Court enhances both system stability and the quality of policymaking, particularly regarding the breadth of interests represented.

Partisans in Robes: Party Cues and Public Acceptance of Supreme Court Decisions

Abstract: The public perceives the Supreme Court to be a legal institution. This perception enables the Court's legitimacy-conferring function, which serves to increase public acceptance of its decisions. Yet, the public acknowledges a political aspect to the Court as well. To evaluate how the public responds to the different images of the Supreme Court, we investigate whether and how depictions of specifically partisan (e.g., Republican) Court rulings shape public acceptance of its decisions while varying institutional, legal, and issue characteristics. Using survey experiments, we find that party cues and partisanship, more so than the imprimatur of the Court, affect public acceptance. We also find that polarization diminishes the effect of party cues. Attributing a decision to the Court does little to increase baseline acceptance or attenuate partisan cue effects. The Court's uniqueness, at least in terms of its legitimacy-conferring function, is perhaps overstated.

Congress, the Supreme Court, and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model

Abstract: Scholars dispute whether the Supreme Court is constrained by the threat of Congressional override of its decisions. In the context of judicial review of the constititutionality of federal legislation, tensions between the two branches are arguably at their peak. In this paper, therefore, we test two tracks to Congressional inference: the rational anticipation of the separation of powers model and a more boundedly rational institutional maintenance model. We do this by estimating the preferences of the current Court's and the current Congress over the challenged legislation to determine whether the Court rationally anticipates being overturned in the instant case and proactively capitulates. We test the institutional maintenance model by examining factors that do not require the Court to know whether any particular case will be overturned, but nevertheless might cue the Court that it is acting in a hostile environment, and thus should be wary. In this initial analysis of our data, we find that the Court does not appear to be constrained by expectations of Congressional override. On the other hand, the Court is substantially less likely to strike legislation when it is ideologically distant from the House and Senate, as Congress could then act institutionally against the judiciary.