Topic
Malleability
About: Malleability is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 481 publications have been published within this topic receiving 16358 citations.
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28 Oct 2007TL;DR: In this article, a CP-ABE scheme with AND gates on positive and negative attributes is proposed, which is proven to be chosen plaintext (CPA) secure under the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption.
Abstract: In ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE), every secret key is associated with a set of attributes, and every ciphertext is associated with an access structure on attributes. Decryption is enabled if and only if the user's attribute set satisfies the ciphertext access structure. This provides fine-grained access control on shared data in many practical settings, e.g., secure database and IP multicast.In this paper, we study CP-ABE schemes in which access structures are AND gates on positive and negative attributes. Our basic scheme is proven to be chosen plaintext (CPA) secure under the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption. We then apply the Canetti-Halevi-Katz technique to obtain a chosen ciphertext (CCA) secure extension using one-time signatures. The security proof is a reduction to the DBDH assumption and the strong existential unforgeability of the signature primitive.In addition, we introduce hierarchical attributes to optimize our basic scheme - reducing both ciphertext size and encryption/decryption time while maintaining CPA security. We conclude with a discussion of practical applications of CP-ABE.
729 citations
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13 Apr 2010TL;DR: This paper uniquely integrates the technique of proxy re-encryption with CP-ABE, and enables the authority to delegate most of laborious tasks to proxy servers, and shows that the proposed scheme is provably secure against chosen ciphertext attacks.
Abstract: Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE) is a promising cryptographic primitive for fine-grained access control of shared data. In CP-ABE, each user is associated with a set of attributes and data are encrypted with access structures on attributes. A user is able to decrypt a ciphertext if and only if his attributes satisfy the ciphertext access structure. Beside this basic property, practical applications usually have other requirements. In this paper we focus on an important issue of attribute revocation which is cumbersome for CP-ABE schemes. In particular, we resolve this challenging issue by considering more practical scenarios in which semi-trustable on-line proxy servers are available. As compared to existing schemes, our proposed solution enables the authority to revoke user attributes with minimal effort. We achieve this by uniquely integrating the technique of proxy re-encryption with CP-ABE, and enable the authority to delegate most of laborious tasks to proxy servers. Formal analysis shows that our proposed scheme is provably secure against chosen ciphertext attacks. In addition, we show that our technique can also be applicable to the Key-Policy Attribute Based Encryption (KP-ABE) counterpart.
720 citations
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TL;DR: A general framework that allows one to construct secure encryption schemes in a generic fashion from language membership problems that satisfy certain technical requirements is introduced, as does the Cramer-Shoup scheme based on the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Abstract: We present several new and fairly practical public-key encryption schemes and prove them secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. One scheme is based on Paillier's Decision Composite Residuosity assumption, while another is based in the classical Quadratic Residuosity assumption. The analysis is in the standard cryptographic model, i.e., the security of our schemes does not rely on the Random Oracle model. Moreover, we introduce a general framework that allows one to construct secure encryption schemes in a generic fashion from language membership problems that satisfy certain technical requirements. Our new schemes fit into this framework, as does the Cramer-Shoup scheme based on the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption.
636 citations
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07 Jul 2008TL;DR: This work presents the first construction of a ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption scheme having a security proof based on a number theoretic assumption and supporting advanced access structures and support access structures which can be represented by a bounded size access tree with threshold gates as its nodes.
Abstract: In a ciphertext policy attribute based encryption system, a user's private key is associated with a set of attributes (describing the user) and an encrypted ciphertext will specify an access policy over attributes A user will be able to decrypt if and only if his attributes satisfy the ciphertext's policy
In this work, we present the first construction of a ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption scheme having a security proof based on a number theoretic assumption and supporting advanced access structures Previous CP-ABE systems could either support only very limited access structures or had a proof of security only in the generic group model Our construction can support access structures which can be represented by a bounded size access tree with threshold gates as its nodes The bound on the size of the access trees is chosen at the time of the system setup Our security proof is based on the standard Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption
579 citations
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28 Oct 2007TL;DR: Ateniese et al. as discussed by the authors proposed a security against chosen ciphertext attacks for proxy re-encryption (PRE) schemes based on the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Abstract: In a proxy re-encryption (PRE) scheme, a proxy is given special information that allows it to translate a ciphertext under one key into a ciphertext of the same message under a different key. The proxy cannot, however, learn anything about the messages encrypted under either key. PRE schemes have many practical applications, including distributed storage, email, and DRM. Previously proposed re-encryption schemes achieved only semantic security; in contrast, applications often require security against chosen ciphertext attacks. We propose a definition of security against chosen ciphertext attacks for PRE schemes, and present a scheme that satisfies the definition. Our construction is efficient and based only on the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the standard model. We also formally capture CCA security for PRE schemes via both a game-based definition and simulation-based definitions that guarantee universally composable security. We note that, simultaneously with our work, Green and Ateniese proposed a CCA-secure PRE, discussed herein.
477 citations