Managerial economics

About: Managerial economics is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1524 publications have been published within this topic receiving 83965 citations.

Environmental Economics: In Theory and Practice

Abstract: Introduction - The Economy and the Environment: Two Parts of a Whole Technical Note: Game Theory - Market Failure - Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection: An Overview - Technical Note: Mathematical Programming - Pollution Taxes for the Efficient Control of Pollution -Tradeable Pollution Permits - Transboundary Pollution Problems - An Introduction to Comparative Dynamics and the Economics of Natural Resource Exploitation - Natural Resources: Types, Classification and Scarcity - An Economic Analysis of Nonrenewable Natural Resources - Renewable Resource Economics - The Economics of Forestry Exploitation - The Theory of Nonmarket Valuation - Methods for Valuing Environmental Costs and Benefits - The Economics of Sustainable Development

Game theory with applications to economics

Abstract: This is an advanced textbook covering topics in game theory which are of potential use in economics. The presentation of game theory is rigorous with theorems stated formally. Also included are a large number of integrated economic examples taken from current economics literature. The book maintains a balance between cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, and exercises and problems are included.

Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination

Abstract: It is traditional in the theory of the firm to define the production opportunity set available to the firm in terms of its boundary-the maximum attainable set of output quantities for various input quantities, given the state of technology and knowledge. This boundary is the production function of the firm. One of our purposes here is to point up the dependence of suchproduction functions on the structure of property rights and contracting rights within which the firm exists. We redefine the production function in order to recognize the dependence of output on the structure of property and contracting rights. That We redefine the production function to incorporate its dependence on the structure of property and contracting rights within which the firm exists. The problems surrounding the role of labor in the firm for a variety of rights str-uctures are analyzed recognizing this dependence. These structures include (1) the "labor-managed firm" system (in which common stock claims are legally prohibited), (2) the codetermination and industrial democracy movements (in which the law requires management participation by labor), (3) cooperatives and professional partnerships (i.e., quasi-labormanaged firms which arise out of voluntary contracting), and (4) the capitalist corporation. We criticize the claim that labor-managed firms are efficient. Presented at the Conference on the Effects of Labor Participation in the Management of Business Firms in the Western World, Dallas, February 1977, sponsored by the Liberty Fund; and at the Fourth Annual Interlaken Seminar on Analysis and Ideology, Interlaken, June 1977, sponsored by the Center for Research in Government Policy and Business at the University of Rochester. We are indebted to David Henderson, Eugene Fama, Keith Leffler, Frank Milne, Tom Russell, Jerold Zimmerman, and the participants in the Economics Workshop at the University of Rochester Graduate School of Management for discussions on these issues, but they should not be held responsible for our refusal to accept some of their suggestions. We are also indebted to an anonymous referee and John Gould for comments, and to Armen Alchian for helping us over the years to understand more clearly the importance of rights in determining human behavior. This work has been partially supported by the Managerial Economics Research Center at the University of Rochester, Graduate School of Management.

New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking Development

Abstract: As strategies for achieving sustainable growth in developing countries are re-examined in light of the financial crisis, it is critical to take into account structural change and its corollary, industrial upgrading. Economic literature has devoted a great deal of attention to the analysis of technological innovation, but not enough to these equally important issues. The new structural economics outlined in this paper suggests a framework to complement previous approaches in the search for sustainable growth strategies. It takes the following into consideration: First, an economy's structure of factor endowments evolves from one stage of development to another. Therefore, the optimal industrial structure of a given economy will be different at different stages of development. Each industrial structure requires corresponding infrastructure (both"hard"and"soft") to facilitate its operations and transactions. Second, each stage of economic development is a point along the continuum from a low-income agrarian economy to a high-income industrialized economy, not a dichotomy of two economic development stages ("poor"versus"rich"or"developing"versus"industrialized"). Industrial upgrading and infrastructure improvement targets in developing countries should not necessarily draw from those that exist in high-income countries. Third, at each given stage of development, the market is the basic mechanism for effective resource allocation. However, economic development as a dynamic process requires industrial upgrading and corresponding improvements in"hard"and"soft"infrastructure at each stage. Such upgrading entails large externalities to firms'transaction costs and returns to capital investment. Thus, in addition to an effective market mechanism, the government should play an active role in facilitating industrial upgrading and infrastructure improvements.