Microsoft Windows

About: Microsoft Windows is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2962 publications have been published within this topic receiving 117838 citations. The topic is also known as: Windows & MS Windows.

RNAshapes: an integrated RNA analysis package based on abstract shapes

Abstract: Summary: We introduce RNAshapes, a new software package that integrates three RNA analysis tools based on the abstract shapes approach: the analysis of shape representatives, the calculation of shape probabilities and the consensus shapes approach. This new package is completely reimplemented in C and outruns the original implementations significantly in runtime and memory requirements. Additionally, we added a number of useful features like suboptimal folding with correct dangling energies, structure graph output, shape matching and a sliding window approach. Availability: RNAshapes is freely available at http://bibiserv.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de/rnashapes/ as C source code, and as compiled binaries for the most common computer architectures. For Microsoft Windows, we also offer a graphical user interface with convenient access to the complete functionality of the package. Contact: psteffen@techfak.uni-bielefeld.de

Instructional design theory

Abstract: This pack contains two guides to Microsoft Windows 98. "Windows 98 User Manual" teaches how to use Windows and "Windows 98 Hints and Hacks" provides advanced information for the user already familiar with Windows.

SLAM and Static Driver Verifier: Technology Transfer of Formal Methods inside Microsoft

Abstract: The SLAM project originated in Microsoft Research in early 2000. Its goal was to automatically check that a C program correctly uses the interface to an external library. The project used and extended ideas from symbolic model checking, program analysis and theorem proving in novel ways to address this problem. The SLAM analysis engine forms the core of a new tool called Static Driver Verifier (SDV) that systematically analyzes the source code of Windows device drivers against a set of rules that define what it means for a device driver to properly interact with the Windows operating system kernel.

Rootkits: Subverting the Windows Kernel

Abstract: "It's imperative that everybody working in the field of cyber-security read this book to understand the growing threat of rootkits." --Mark Russinovich, editor, Windows IT Pro / Windows & .NET Magazine"This material is not only up-to-date, it defines up-to-date. It is truly cutting-edge. As the only book on the subject, Rootkits will be of interest to any Windows security researcher or security programmer. It's detailed, well researched and the technical information is excellent. The level of technical detail, research, and time invested in developing relevant examples is impressive. In one word: Outstanding." --Tony Bautts, Security Consultant; CEO, Xtivix, Inc."This book is an essential read for anyone responsible for Windows security. Security professionals, Windows system administrators, and programmers in general will want to understand the techniques used by rootkit authors. At a time when many IT and security professionals are still worrying about the latest e-mail virus or how to get all of this month's security patches installed, Mr. Hoglund and Mr. Butler open your eyes to some of the most stealthy and significant threats to the Windows operating system. Only by understanding these offensive techniques can you properly defend the networks and systems for which you are responsible." --Jennifer Kolde, Security Consultant, Author, and Instructor"What's worse than being owned? Not knowing it. Find out what it means to be owned by reading Hoglund and Butler's first-of-a-kind book on rootkits. At the apex the malicious hacker toolset--which includes decompilers, disassemblers, fault-injection engines, kernel debuggers, payload collections, coverage tools, and flow analysis tools--is the rootkit. Beginning where Exploiting Software left off, this book shows how attackers hide in plain sight. "Rootkits are extremely powerful and are the next wave of attack technology. Like other types of malicious code, rootkits thrive on stealthiness. They hide away from standard system observers, employing hooks, trampolines, and patches to get their work done. Sophisticated rootkits run in such a way that other programs that usually monitor machine behavior can't easily detect them. A rootkit thus provides insider access only to people who know that it is running and available to accept commands. Kernel rootkits can hide files and running processes to provide a backdoor into the target machine. "Understanding the ultimate attacker's tool provides an important motivator for those of us trying to defend systems. No authors are better suited to give you a detailed hands-on understanding of rootkits than Hoglund and Butler. Better to own this book than to be owned." --Gary McGraw, Ph.D., CTO, Cigital, coauthor of Exploiting Software (2004) and Building Secure Software (2002), both from Addison-Wesley"Greg and Jamie are unquestionably the go-to experts when it comes to subverting the Windows API and creating rootkits. These two masters come together to pierce the veil of mystery surrounding rootkits, bringing this information out of the shadows. Anyone even remotely interested in security for Windows systems, including forensic analysis, should include this book very high on their must-read list." --Harlan Carvey, author of Windows Forensics and Incident Recovery (Addison-Wesley, 2005)Rootkits are the ultimate backdoor, giving hackers ongoing and virtually undetectable access to the systems they exploit. Now, two of the world's leading experts have written the first comprehensive guide to rootkits: what they are, how they work, how to build them, and how to detect them. Rootkit.com's Greg Hoglund and James Butler created and teach Black Hat's legendary course in rootkits. In this book, they reveal never-before-told offensive aspects of rootkit technology--learn how attackers can get in and stay in for years, without detection.Hoglund and Butler show exactly how to subvert the Windows XP and Windows 2000 kernels, teaching concepts that are easily applied to virtually any modern operating system, from Windows Server 2003 to Linux and UNIX. Using extensive downloadable examples, they teach rootkit programming techniques that can be used for a wide range of software, from white hat security tools to operating system drivers and debuggers.After reading this book, readers will be able to Understand the role of rootkits in remote command/control and software eavesdropping Build kernel rootkits that can make processes, files, and directories invisible Master key rootkit programming techniques, including hooking, runtime patching, and directly manipulating kernel objects Work with layered drivers to implement keyboard sniffers and file filters Detect rootkits and build host-based intrusion prevention software that resists rootkit attacksVisit rootkit.com for code and programs from this book. The site also contains enhancements to the book's text, such as up-to-the-minute information on rootkits available nowhere else.

Characterizing and predicting which bugs get fixed: an empirical study of Microsoft Windows

Abstract: We performed an empirical study to characterize factors that affect which bugs get fixed in Windows Vista and Windows 7, focusing on factors related to bug report edits and relationships between people involved in handling the bug. We found that bugs reported by people with better reputations were more likely to get fixed, as were bugs handled by people on the same team and working in geographical proximity. We reinforce these quantitative results with survey feedback from 358 Microsoft employees who were involved in Windows bugs. Survey respondents also mentioned additional qualitative influences on bug fixing, such as the importance of seniority and interpersonal skills of the bug reporter. Informed by these findings, we built a statistical model to predict the probability that a new bug will be fixed (the first known one, to the best of our knowledge). We trained it on Windows Vista bugs and got a precision of 68% and recall of 64% when predicting Windows 7 bug fixes. Engineers could use such a model to prioritize bugs during triage, to estimate developer workloads, and to decide which bugs should be closed or migrated to future product versions.