Military capability

Abstract: : There are four basic questions related to efficiency and capability which are of particular interest to officials in the military services who are interested in better ways of evaluating military capability and efficiency: (1) What level of military capability can the services achieve with available resources? (2) What capability is required, and where are the shortfalls? (3) What resource acquisitions or redistributions are needed to achieve maximum improvement in efficiency and effectiveness? and (4) How can management systems be changed to improve the identification and correction of factors which limit the readiness and efficiency of our military operations? The last question, which differs in its emphasis from the other three, provides an opening to the topics that will be addressed in this report. In particular, reported are results from a study of DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) as a method for evaluating the efficiency of Air Force Wings--or, more precisely, their maintenance operations--as elements in Numbered Units in the U.S. Air Force.

Abstract: It is ironic that at a time when the momentum for integration in Europe is at one of its lowest ebbs for a long time following the debacle of the European Constitu tion, the EU is seeking to position itself as a global player with a broad spectrum of civilian and military capabilities?an ambition which touches on the highly sensitive issues of member states' sovereignty and nationhood. The Union of 27 is in search of a new sense of collective purpose and legitimacy and this, it appears, is to be found in foreign and security relations. This external role is articulated in a discourse of universal ethics which defines the EU as a 'power for good' and a 'peacebuilder' in the world. The acquisition of a military capability has gone hand in hand with an emphasis on the EU as a 'force for good', thereby justifying these new power capabilities in European foreign policy. Underpinning this notion of 'ethical power Europe' (EPE) is a conceptual shift in the EU's role and aspirations from what it 'is' to what it 'does': from simply representing a 'power of attraction' and a positive role model to proac tively working to change the world in the direction of its vision of the 'global common good'. In the words of the European Security Strategy, the EU should be more 'capable' and 'responsible' and take on new tasks in the areas of crisis management, peacekeeping, state-building, and reconstructing failing states? complementing the important role it has already played in the fields of develop ment aid and humanitarian assistance.2 According to this discourse, in conceiving

Abstract: The arrival of post-industrial society has transformed the traditional bases of national power, and thus the methods used to measure the relative power of nations should be reassessed as well. Appreciating the true basis of national power requires not merely a meticulous detailing of visible military assets but also a scrutiny of larger capabilities embodied in such variables as the aptitude for innovation, the soundness of social institutions, and the quality of the knowledge base - all of which may bear upon a country's capacity to produce the one element still fundamental to international politics: effective military power. The authors reconfigure the notion of national power to accommodate a wider understanding of capability, advancing a conceptual framework that measures three distinct areas - national resources, national performance, and military capability - to help the intelligence community develop a better evaluation of a country's national power. The analysis elaborates the rationale for assessing each of these and offers ideas on how to measure them in tangible ways.

Abstract: Successful deterrence, it is argued, requires a combination of military capabilities and bargaining behavior that enhances a defender's credibility without provoking a potential attacker. Hypotheses on the political and military conditions under which extended-immediate deterrence is likely to succeed or fail are formulated and tested by probit analysis on fifty-eight historical cases. The empirical results indicate that (1) the military capability of the defender to deny the potential attacker a quick and decisive victory on the battlefield enhances deterrence; (2) a policy of reciprocity in diplomacy and military actions by the defender contributes strongly to deterrence success; and (3) a past record of backing down under pressure or intransigence in confrontations with the potential attacker increases the likelihood of deterrence failure.

Abstract: From the original 34-man Armed Propaganda Team of the 1930s, headed by Vo Nguyen Giap and managed by Ho Chi Minh, the People's Army of Vietnam has grown into the third largest military force in the world, exceeded only by the armies of the USSR and China. When viewed in terms of military capability and success, it is a phenomenon. Since its inception, the PAVN has taken on two major powers - France and the United States - and won decisive victories. It is this phenomenon that Douglas Pike describes in this work. At the same time, there also appears a picture of the use of force in politics, the nature of organizations and the limits of both technology and ideology. The book is aimed at those interested in the inner workings of the army that won the Vietnam War.