Missile

About: Missile is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 12829 publications have been published within this topic receiving 94307 citations. The topic is also known as: guided missile & missiles.

Dual mode guidance system

Abstract: A dual mode missile guidance system employing a passive anti-radiation ser for midcourse guidance and an alternate sensor for terminal guidance. A broadband, body mounted conformal antenna comprises the midcourse sensor, and the alternate sensor is mounted on a stabilized platform within the missile radome. Detected video guidance signals from the midcourse sensor are video processed and utilized to adjust the system phase shifters for null tracking as well as for driving the stabilized platform to keep the alternate sensor directed at the target. Upon the occurrence of a predetermined condition, a handover switch connects the detected video guidance signals provided by the alternate guidance sensor processor for video processing and for control of the stabilized platform. Auto pilot signals are derived from the rate gyros mounted on the stabilized platform.

China's Cruise Missile Program

Abstract: DURING OPERATIONS Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the U.S. Navy launched 288 Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles. Eighty percent hit their targets. (1) The Tomahawk is so accurate that after a 1,600-kilometer (km) journey, its 454-kilogram (kg) warhead usually impacts within 3 meters of the aim point. (2) The People's Republic of China took note of the magnificent performance of these weapons and focused its efforts on acquiring cruise missiles. During the 1991 Persian Gulf war, China also learned that the United States is too powerful to be challenged directly by military means. Having a stockpile of cruise missiles would enable China to influence U.S. decisions without becoming involved in a major conflict. Cruise missiles would offer China a precision-strike capability at a much lower cost than developing and training a modern air force would. Missiles require less maintenance than a fleet of modern jet aircraft; are suitable against land- and sea-based targets; are relatively cheap and reliable; and have few vulnerable parts. (3) Cruise missiles also do not entail political risks because, unlike disgruntled pilots, they cannot defect. (4) China's effort to acquire cruise missiles is a disturbing development. Robert Walpole, a national intelligence officer for strategic and nuclear programs, testified before Congress that "[w]e may not be able to provide much, if any, warning of a forward based ballistic missile or land-attack cruise missile threat to the United States. Moreover, land-attack cruise missile development can draw upon dual-use technologies." (5) Missile Acquisition Technologies available on the commercial market have eliminated many of the barriers to cruise-missile proliferation, and many components used in cruise missiles are common to commercial aircraft. Companies manufacture cruise missile airframes using the same technologies as for manufacturing light aircraft. A country like China, which can build manned aircraft, can easily produce cruise missiles. China is also acquiring these systems by direct purchase and indigenous development. Direct purchase. The best option for acquiring missiles is to procure the entire cruise missile system directly from another country. The National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC) estimates that by the end of the decade, at least nine countries will be capable of producing land-attack cruise missiles. (6) Many such countries will offer their cruise missiles for export in order to maintain their military industrial complex because their nation's defense budgets are in decline. This rapid increase in the number of cruise-missile suppliers means that China will find itself seeking cruise missiles during a "buyer's market." Purchased missiles will give China an immediate precision-strike capability and the opportunity to use a proven system. Since the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident and the curtailment of U.S. foreign military sales to China, China has turned to Russia to acquire most of its current weapons systems and has cloaked its military development in secrecy. China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) subscribes to Deng Xiaoping's strategy of hiding capabilities to maximize options for the future. (7) It is difficult, therefore, to assess the full extent of China's cruise missile acquisition program. However, the open literature suggests that China has purchased the Russian Kh-41 Moskit supersonic, sea-skimming, anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM). As an air-launched ASCM, the Kh-41 Moskit has a range of 250 kilometers, can attack ships at speeds greater than Mach 2, carries a 200-kg payload, and can make 10-G turns to defeat a ship's defensive capabilities. (8) The Kh-41 can "defeat U.S. Navy Aegis ship defense systems and destroyers," which is daunting because the U.S. and Japan expect the Aegis to play a key role in any future Japanese or U.S. theater missile defense system. (9) New Su-27 fighters and Su-30 long-range interceptors equipped with Kh-41s give China the capability to sink U. …

A Crude Threat: The Limits of an Iranian Missile Campaign against Saudi Arabian Oil

Abstract: The United States and its Persian Gulf allies have been increasingly concerned with the growing size and complexity of Iran's ballistic missile programs. At a time when the United States and its allies remain locked in a standoff with Iran over the latter's nuclear program, states around the Persian Gulf fear that Iran would retaliate for an attack on its nuclear program by launching missiles at regional oil installations and other strategic targets. An examination of the threat posed by Iran's missiles to Saudi Arabian oil installations, based on an assessment of Iran's missile capabilities, a detailed analysis of Saudi Arabian oil infrastructure, and a simulated missile campaign against the network using known Iranian weapons, finds no evidence of a significant Iranian missile threat to Saudi infrastructure. These findings cast doubt on one aspect of the Iranian threat to Persian Gulf oil while offering an analytic framework for understanding developments in the Iranian missile arsenal and the vulnerability of oil infrastructure to conventional attack.

F-111 generic weapons bay acoustic environment

Abstract: A wind tunnel test was conducted on a generic weapons bay model to define the acoustic environment in the bay and how it is affected by various missiles, suppressors, and flow conditions. Two different depth bays were tested. Three different missile designs were installed in the bay with the capability of putting one, two, or three in the bay at a time. One of the missiles was tested at three vertical positions to measure the effect it has while being deployed. Two leading-edge sawtooth suppressors were evaluated along with a slanted rear bulkhead. Overall levels as high as 163 dB were measured in the bay. Narrowband tones were strongly excited. The sawtooth spoilers were partially effective in suppressing the tones. In some cases the levels were amplified. The slanted aft bulkhead was very effective in suppressing the levels. The missiles generally reduced the acoustic levels in the bay, with the most reduction when a missile was partially out of the bay interacting with the shear layer. The measured levels were of high enough intensity to result in severe fatigue problems for sensitive missiles and components.

Transom missile launcher module

Abstract: A transom missile launching system is configured to mount rigidly above the water line on the stern of ships designated to carry missile type ordnance. The missile launcher consists of two symmetrical modules containing eight missile cells each. Missiles are launched in the normal mode from a "all up round" canister at a fixed angle of about 60° from a line athwartship both to port and to starboard. At this angle the probability of launch into a wave in heavy seas due to ship roll is eliminated. The missiles propulsion motor exhaust gases are vented directly overboard at launch without being directed either within the ship or across the weather deck. At ignition a water tight cover at the base of the launching chamber is blown directly overboard into the water by the exhaust gas pressure and a path is therefore provided for the exhaust gas to be discharged directly into the sea.