Showing papers on "Morality published in 1969"

Idealism, Politics and History: Sources of Hegelian Thought

Abstract: Preface Part I: Introduction Part II. J.-J. Rousseau: The Land of Chimeras and the Land Prejudices: 1. History, anti-history and the moral ego 2. Images of integration Part III. Immanuel Kant: The Rationalization of the Chimera: 1. Introduction: the German political consciousness 2. Morality, knowledge and historical vision 3. Humanity, time and freedom 4. The ambivalence of progress 5. Problems of politics 6. The teleology of practical reason Part IV. J.G. Fichte: The Chimera Dogmatized: 1. Fichte: introduction and tendencies 2. Metaphysics and consciousness 3. Legality and morality 4. History as logic: the logic of history 5. Cosmic nationalism 6. Education and the future community Part V. G.W.F. Hegel: The Chimera Preserved: 1. Hegel denies the potency of the future 2. A political context Part VI: Epilogue: The Future Unredeemed Bibliography Index.

The Morality of Killing

Abstract: At first sight there doesn't seem to be any problem about killing. Most people would say that it is wrong to kill and that's all there is to it. The same opinion is proclaimed by many members of the Christian religion. They say that ‘Thou shalt not kill’ is an absolute command. But there are several issues involving the morality of killing where ordinary men, secular and religious alike, make judgements or evince perplexity which reveals that common sense morality is less clear about killing than it at first appears.

Chief, Council and Commissioner: Some Problems of Government in Rhodesia

Abstract: The first section, dealing with traditional religions, is organized according to the priorities of European theology: the Supreme Being, the lesser powers of the universe, ancestors, prayer, sacrifice, the life cycle, morality. No doubt Africans all do recognize a supreme God, but the primary focus of their religion is often elsewhere. Parrinder reduces myth and cosmology to so many Just-So stories or so much naive natural history and relegates many of the distinctive emphases of African religions to the margin. Healing, for example, is scarcely mentioned, and beliefs in witchcraft are treated as archaic superstitions which "ought to disappear with the growth of education" (pp. 65-6).

Morality and purpose

Abstract: I was fortunate enough to be introduced to J. L. Stocks’s writings on moral philosophy when I was an undergraduate. Ever since I have been puzzled by the lack of attention given to his work by contemporary moral philosophers. Stocks was interested in the difference moral considerations make to human action. How do moral questions enter into our assessment of actions? Stocks could say at the time he wrote these papers, and the same could be said today, that ‘From the time of Aristotle to the present day it has been more or less common form among philosophers to regard purposive action as the summit of human achievement on the practical side. Man was the rational animal, and in the field of conduct he proved his rationality so far as he made his action a well-conceived step towards a clearly-defined end’.1 Stocks argued, however, that the importance of moral considerations, or of artistic and religious considerations for that matter, cannot be understood or accounted for in terms of purposive action. The distinction between means and ends is central in purposive action. The means are the ‘well-conceived step towards a clearly-defined end’. In themselves the means are relatively unimportant. They are important only insofar as they lead to the proposed end. A purposive view of action, then, involves taking an abstract view of action: one element in the situation is abstracted from it, namely, the end in view, and all else is made subordinate to it.

Conflict resolution in the medieval morality plays

Abstract: From the dawn of history the drama has been one of society's principal mechanisms for resolving social and psychological conflicts. Dramatic narrative straightens out and simplifies a confused situation; it purifies and channels the release of conflicting emotions. Drama addresses itself to three general types of conflicts: 1) conflicts between socioeconomic classes or political factions; 2) conflicts between the individual and society or god; 3) intrapsychic conflicts. Although "theater for the elite," staged indoors and employing themes of interest only to the well-educated, may deal successfully with the second and third types of conflicts, a truly "popular theater" whose audience is comprised of all segments of the community has a more far-reaching practical effect in treating social or political conflicts. In England, the last great age of popular theater was the late Middle Ages. The mystery plays, vernacular presentations of the Biblical history of the world from the Creation to Doomsday, staged in the streets of scores of towns by members of the craft guilds, attracted large audiences from about 1350 until suppressed by the Reformation in about 1575 for political reasons. This universal popularity with all segments of the population over a period of two hundred years, without any change in the scripts, is unsurpassed by any other form of drama in English. The morality plays enjoyed a similar popularity from about 1400 to 1600. These moralities centered on the life of the individual Christian, portrayed as a generalized type-figure such as "Mankind" or "Everyman," and emphasized his fall from grace, his death, and his eventual salvation through the intercession of a divine figure, usually Christ or the Virgin. Unlike the mystery plays, which employed amateurs and did not charge admission, the morality plays, were acted by troops of wandering professional players who performed in innyards or on specially-constructed outdoor stages before paying audiences of country people, sometimes running as large as four thousand (Southern, 1958, pp. 58-59). Both the mystery and morality plays are interesting vehicles for the solution of both social and intrapsychic conflicts among the uneducated or partially-educated bulk of the population.

Moral Knowledge and Moral Principles

Abstract: What is the function of moral principles within the body of moral knowledge ? And what must be the nature of moral principles in order for them to carry out this function? A specific set of answers to these questions is widely accepted among moral philosophers — so widely accepted as almost to constitute a sort of orthodoxy. The answers embody a view of the place of principles within the body of morality which crosses the lines between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. Though I have put the question in cognitivist terms and shall discuss it in those terms, I think a similar question and a more or less parallel discussion could be given in non-cognitivist terms. Perhaps the time-honoured debate between the two positions can be suspended, at least temporarily, while we examine, not the nature of morality, but its structure.

Piaget Misunderstood: A Critique of the Criticisms of His Theory of Moral Development.

Abstract: Piaget has provided, in The Moral Judgment of the Child (1965), what is probably the most widely discussed theory of how children's understand ing of morality develops. It may also be the most misunderstood. Descrip tions of his position on the nature of moral development frequently bear only the slightest resemblance to what he actually said. Many investiga tions purporting to test Piaget's ideas are conducted or interpreted in a way that reveals little understanding of his formulations. The purpose of this paper is to call attention to the misinterpretations of Piaget that have passed unchallenged into the literature on moral development, and to ex amine some of the ways in which research reflecting these misunderstand ings has been used to discredit his theory. What follows are statements of eight criticisms of Piaget's theory, each followed by an attempt to clarify his position on the particular issues raised by the critics. The discussion of these issues will also serve as a framework for elucidating some of the broader aspects of Piaget's view of child de velopment.

Morality, Prudence, and Obligations to Oneself

Abstract: I wish to discuss two contentions: (a) there are no obligations to oneself, and (b) morality is other-regarding (morality is concerned only with our behavior in regard to other persons). Different arguments have been proposed in support of (a), and one of these arguments depends upon (b). Roughly this argument is: Morality cannot be self-regarding since self-regarding matters are matters of prudence. If the moral and prudential are kept distinct, it will be clear that selfregarding obligations or obligations to oneself are impossible. Now as far as I can see, this argument rests on a confused view of (1) the relation between morality and prudence, and (2) the relation between the concept of morality and the concept of moral obligation. I believe that a clarification of these relationships, besides being in itself worthwhile, will prove the argument to be insubstantial. In my discussion I will take as representative of the view, or views, I wish to consider, the positions advanced by Marcus Singer and Kurt Baier.

On Assessing the Court in History: Some Comments on the Roper and Burke Articles

Abstract: The idea that there is a symbiotic relationship between American culture and American law is not new. But American historians, as Paul Murphy reminds us,1 have been reluctant to explore this relationship. Mr. Roper and Mr. Burke are not among the laggards. Each from his own point of departure sets out to explore the relationship between law and culture. Both agree that considerations of politics, economics, and morality bear on the judges, influence judicial strategy, and shape Supreme Court decisions; both agree that the decisions of the Court, in turn, leave a cultural mark that often goes beyond the formal rule of law established. There are, however, some special problems facing the historian who attempts to put law in a cultural context. The Supreme Court lives in the world, to be sure. Judges make law, not find it. When they do they are swayed by ordinary human passions and are inclined to political, social, and economic predilections deriving from their own background and experience.' Yet there is an important qualification. The Court is not a legislature. Its procedures and intellectual assumptions are not those of Congress. Judges have biases that shape policy decisions, but they also have commitments to the institutional tradition of the Court and to the methodology of the law. However much the Court is part of the real world of interests and political power, it does not cease being a court of law. The obligation of the constitutional historian is twofold in this regard. He must go beyond the narrow, formal view of the law into the realm of politics, economics, and intellectual history. At the same time, he must do justice to the legal side of the Court; he must show how, within the limits of unique legal institutions, the Justices accomplish their cultural mission. With these observations as a point of critical departure, let me turn to the essays of Mr. Roper3 and Mr. Burke.4

Rational Morality for Empirical Man

Abstract: “It Seems natural to suppose”, wrote Mill, “that rules of action must take their whole character … from the end to which they are subservient”. Many moralists have agreed. If we could establish the Summum Bonum, the foundation of morality, the rational basis of moral thinking, this would constitute a criterion, a rule, by means of which men could actually make good practical judgments. This view is radically mistaken. I first try to show this by means of an a priori argument, and then urge the replacement of the “rational model” of practical thinking embodied in this view by an “empirical model”, which should take account of man's actual capacities and limitations. This has important consequences for morality, some of which I investigate.

Patterns of Use of Science in Ethics

Abstract: It is commonly recognised that the question of the relation of science to ethics has been a troubled one, especially in the 20th century. There is an interesting history to the question. Scientists have occasionally attempted to legislate for ethics. They thought to determine morality from their biological results — for example, their conclusions about human evolution. Or else, they offered lists of instincts or needs out of which they expected a conception of the good to be constructed. They framed concepts of mental health to serve as a basis for morals, or attempted to apply to moral inquiry the latest model from the latest science. Philosophers reacted with emphasis, often with impatience. They attempted to establish and maintain a concept of moral autonomy which would free them from an incipiently authoritarian science as it had freed them from an authoritarian religion. Sometimes they fell instead into the clutches of an authoritarian linguistics, and they confused autonomy with isolation. Many philosophers felt that the whole question had really been settled when G. E. Moore worked out the idea of the naturalistic fallacy in his Principia Ethica at the beginning of the century, and separated the moral sphere from the natural sphere; in one form or another, it has won assent in the analytic world. In more popular vein, and among perhaps most scientists, it has seemed enough to say ‘Science can give us only means, not ends.’