Showing papers on "Morality published in 1974"

Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle

Abstract: In ancient Greece, as today, popular moral attitudes differed importantly from the theories of moral philosophers. While for the latter we have Plato and Aristotle, this insightful work explores the everyday moral conceptions to which orators appealed in court and political assemblies, and which were reflected in non-philosophical literature. Oratory and comedy provide the primary testimony, and reference is also made to Sophocles, Euripides, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and other sources. The selection of topics, the contrasts and comparisons with modern religious, social and legal principles, and accessibility to the non-specialist ensure the work's appeal to all readers with an interest in ancient Greek culture and social life.

The mediating role of cognitive development in moral judgment.

Abstract: TOMLINSON-KEASEY, C., and KEASEY, CHARLES BLAKE. The Mediating Role of Cognitive Development in Moral Judgment. CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1974, 45, 291-298. The hypothesized central role of cognitive development in resolving moral dilemmas was examined in subjects who had just begun to acquire formal operations (30 sixth-grade girls) and subjects who should be practiced in formal thought (24 college coeds). The high correlations and systematic relationships between the stages of cognitive development and moral development suggested that sophisticated cognitive operations are a prerequisite to advanced moral judgments, and that there is a lag or decalage between the acquisition of logical operations and their application to the area of morality.

Compensatory effects in moral judgment: two rights don't make up for a wrong.

Abstract: Ratings of the morality of persons described as having committed moral and immoral behaviors indicate that good deeds do not make up for bad ones. The overall goodness of a person is determined mostly by his worst bad deed, with good deeds having lesser influence. Addition of moral deeds does improve ratings of sets containing low-valued items, but, consistent with previous research, this compensation appears to be. limited. Data suggest that performance of very immoral deeds limits the highest level of morality a person can achieve. The value of that limit appears to depend upon both the immorality of the bad deeds and the virtue of the good ones.

Beyond the new morality;: The responsibilities of freedom

Abstract: First published in 1974, with a second, revised edition in 1980, Beyond the New Morality has been used widely in introductory ethics courses at the undergraduate level. The book appeals to those who want something not overburdened with theory, and presented in a contemporary idiom. In this third edition of the now standard classroom text, Grisez and Shaw retain the best elements of the earlier versions, including their clear, straightforward presentation and use of nontechnical language. Although the basic approach, content, and organization remain substantially the same, the new edition does develop and amend some aspects of the theory. For example, the community dimension of morality is brought out more clearly and the first principle of morality is now formulated more accurately in terms of willing in line with integral human fulfillment.

The Effect of Cognitive Moral Development Upon the Selection of Premarital Sexual Standards.

Abstract: A sample of 160 college students from eight different colleges was solicited and tested. Using Kohlberg's method of assessing cognitive moral development and questions about premarital sexual attitudes, the present study discovered a strong relationship between these variables. Subjects with low levels of cognitive moral development chose either traditional morality, the double standard, or permissiveness without affection standard. Those with a moderate degree of cognitive moral development chose permissiveness with affection. Those with a high level of cognitive moral development chose a nonexploitive permissiveness without affection standard. The formulation of premarital sexual standards was discussed and theoretical implications were drawn.

Kant's Treatment of Animals

Abstract: Some of the greatest writers on moral philosophy have claimed that their theories about morality do not run counter to the moral views of ordinary men, but on the contrary are an elucidation of such views, or provide them with a sound philosophical underpinning. Aristotle, for example, made it quite clear that he could not take seriously a moral view that was at odds with the heritage of moral wisdom deeply imbedded in his society. His doctrine of the mean was based on a philosophical consideration of such wisdom. And Immanuel Kant thought that his moral philosophy articulated the moral views of ordinary men.

The Phenomenology: Beyond Morality

Abstract: FROM his earliest to his last years Hegel looked upon Kant's moral philosophy as "the autocracy of the subjective."' Both terms of this indictment are important. The Kantian moral law is seen as both too repressive and too private. Its rigor sets it apart from all the less rational forms of moral individualism. These might be self-centered and self-deluding, but not oppressive. That is why they must be summoned to social order. The discussion of Kant, however, ends with a plea for tolerance. Nevertheless, though there is some unfairness and much severity in Hegel's criticisms of Kant, he never heaped upon him the contempt with which he treated the great man's various self-appointed disciples.2 Deplorable as much of Kant's practical philosophy might be, it was clearly not a trivial episode in our moral history. On the contrary, it was the most important of the phenomena of the human spirit. It was also the spirit of the age.

Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment

Abstract: The jurisprudential inquiry into the relation of law and morals has recently taken a striking new form that promises to reinvigorate the classical inquiry in a fruitful and controversial way. In the place of the traditional inquiry into the necessary logical relations between concepts of law, or legal systems, and substantive moral values, this new approach starts from the premise that in America written state and federal constitutions literally incorporate substantive moral criteria. Thus recent commentary gives voice to the deep intellectual need for a satisfactory fusion of constitutional law and moral theory in the absence of which "[c]onstitutional law can make no genuine advance."' Concurrently, it is natural to apply moral theory to the analysis of particular constitutional provisions. The relation between morality and constitutional law is not, obviously, an exact one.2 Nonetheless, certain provisions of the Constitution, such as the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, crucially implicate moral ideas so that the analysis of the moral idea fundamentally illuminates the interpretation of the constitutional provision.3

Morality, Decision and Social Organization: Toward a Logic of Ethics

Abstract: I. Common Traits of the Classical Systems of Ethics: An Introductory Letter About what will not be Said.- II. Five Epistemological Notes About Good and Evil.- 1. The Development of a Person's Sense of Morality.- 2. The Ideals.- 3. The Logical Role of the Ideals.- 4. The Essence of the Good. The Meaningless.- 5. The Development of the Epistemology of Morality.- III. The Ethics of Decisions: A Dialog on Demystified Ethics.- 1. Whether investigations according to the principles suggested in the preceding notes belong to ethics at all.- 2. Whether there do not exist still other ethical questions.- 3. Whether ethics is analogous to geometry.- 4. Whether systems of norms might not be combined by logical operations.- 5. Whether decisions are the only basis for morality.- 6. Whether rational foundations for decisions are possible.- 7. What role faith plays in morality.- 8. What demystified ethics might be able to achieve...- 9. ... except for a logic of norms.- 10. ... and except for a logic of desires.- IV. Five Logico-mathematical Notes on Voluntary Associations.- 1. The Partitions of People Induced by Norms.- 2. Duality.- 3. Disjunctive Norms.- 4. A Person's Demands on Himself and on Others.- 5. Several Modes of Behavior.- V. Logic, Imagination, Reality, Evaluations: A Concluding Letter about what has been said.- Postscript to the English Edition.- Karl Menger: Principal Dates.- Fields of Research.- Publications in Book Form.

Aristotle: The Value of Man and the Origin of Morality

Abstract: One of the purposes of this paper is to explore a number of questions which-to judge from what he assumes–Aristotle might well have asked, but which he apparently did not ask. It is often informative in the history of philosophy to point out the (apparently obvious) questions which are not raised; it sets those which are raised in a more precise frame. It can be argued that Aristotle implies that it is possible to look like a human being–and indeed be called a human being–without “really” or “fully” being one. Leaving aside the status of females (who for Aristotle are males manques, analogous to the blind or deaf, and of children, we cannot be certain that all adult males of the class whose members look like men “really” are men.

The Internal Morality of Law: Fuller and His Critics

Abstract: ion. General moral principles-for example, "keep promises" -may mean different things in different contexts, so that a morality of law does not simply restate moral principles but gives them special application.66 Dworkin, in turn, has replied that this does not meet his point. He agrees that "there is a morality particularly concerned with law and its enforcement" but denies that IML states the principles of this special morality of law.67 However, if Fuller's reasons, stated above, for regarding IML as moral are accepted, Dworkin's argument here is not incompatible with Fuller's. A lawmaker's act could be immoral both because it breached a moral principle of IML and because it breached some other moral principle. Dworkin's point does not conflict with Fuller's account, can supplement it, and cannot itself serve as a criticism of it. Third, it was contended that IML imposes no moral duties on the lawmaker. But on Fuller's assumptions, IML is moral and does impose moral duties (and provide aspirations). Of special importance here is a distinction which he has drawn in the second edition of The Morality of Law, between law and "managerial direction."68 A manager has to observe most of the principles of IML for his orders to be effective. But not all its principles; not generality, and not, above all, congruence: In actual practice managerial control is normally achieved by standing orders that will relieve the superior from having to give a step-by-step direction to his subordinate's 65. See Morality, pp. 202-4. 66. "A Reply to Professors Cohen and Dworkin," p. 659. 67. "The Elusive Morality of Law," pp. 636-37. 68. See esp. pp. 207-16. My account greatly simplifies Fuller's. This content downloaded from 207.46.13.77 on Tue, 17 May 2016 04:39:22 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

The Storm Has Many Eyes: A Personal Narrative

Abstract: For many years, de Waal has observed chimpanzees soothe distressed neighbors and bonobos share their food. Now he delivers fascinating fresh evidence for the seeds of ethical behavior in primate societies that further cements the case for the biological origins of human fairness. Interweaving vivid tales from the animal kingdom with thoughtful philosophical analysis, de Waal seeks a bottom-up explanation of morality that emphasizes our connection with animals. In doing so, de Waal explores for the first time the implications of his work for our understanding of modern religion. Whatever the role of religious moral imperatives, he sees it as a "Johnny-come-lately" role that emerged only as an addition to our natural instincts for cooperation and empathy. But unlike the dogmatic neo-atheist of his book's title, de Waal does not scorn religion per se. Instead, he draws on the long tradition of humanism exemplified by the painter Hieronymus Bosch and asks reflective readers to consider these issues from a positive perspective: What role, if any, does religion play for a well-functioning society today? And where can believers and nonbelievers alike find the inspiration to lead a good life? Rich with cultural references and anecdotes of primate behavior, The Bonobo and the Atheist engagingly builds a unique argument grounded in evolutionary biology and moral philosophy. Ever a pioneering thinker, de Waal delivers a heartening and inclusive new perspective on human nature and our struggle to find purpose in our lives.

Moral Development and Moral Learning

Abstract: in these spheres, so too a determinate notion of 'morality' is an es sential precondition for any serious approach to moral education. It might be argued, too, that it is particularly important for philoso phers to do this because of the covert way in which ethical assump tions are smuggled into empirical work in this field. Any psycholog ical account of moral development or moral education must be from a particular standpoint in ethics; for the delimitation of 'moral' is not a neutral matter. Psychologists working within Piagetian, Freud ian, or social learning frameworks are too apt to work with an im plicit ethical position. The job of the philosopher is, therefore, to make such ethical positions explicit and to discuss the arguments that might be given for them. I have done some work previously along these lines2 and do not want, in this paper, to go over that kind of ground again in any detailed way. Instead I propose to explore another range of issues which are equally appropriate for a philosopher of education. These are issues about types of learning. It might be objected straight away that these are empirical issues about which a philosopher could have little to say. But this is not true. Processes of learning and of

All's Well That Ends Well and the Morality Play

Abstract: HAT elements of the Morality Play frequently appear in the more sophisticated drama of the late Renaissance is a fact that has not been seriously questioned by literary historians. Implicitly basing their comments on this survival of Morality elements in later drama, critics have suggested, during the last few decades, that All's Well That Ends Well reveals an underlying Morality structure in which Bertram, as the figure of Everyman, stands between the opposing forces of Helena and Parolles. Representing Virtue, Helena draws him toward creativity and unity in marriage, while Parolles, the Vice, lures Bertram to the Italian Wars and the division and destruction they symbolize. In the end, Bertram rejects the Vice and is led by Helena to see his errors in judgment. Described in this manner, the structure of All's Well reminds us strongly of such early Morality Plays as Mankind and Everyman.1 "The weakness of this design," Jonas Barish suggests, "is that too much of it remains blueprint. Bertram's progress is diagramed rather than fully realized poetically, assumed rather than demonstrated." Upon closer examination, however, the Morality pattern of All's Well seems to be far different from the fifteenth-century Morality structure that Barish sees behind the action. Of course, some differences are only to be expected. There were complex developments in the Late Morality as it grew more and more secular in nature. The Protestant Moralities, as these later plays are sometimes called, became less interested in metaphysical problems and began to investigate other themes, chiefly, the importance of nurture and breeding, and the "evils of social corruption."3 Concomitantly, the Vice figure, from the beginning inherently comic, developed into such characters as Ambidexter and Shift. Since the Morality Tradition was not static, we may legitimately expect All's Well to be different from Everyman. Nevertheless, the Morality Tradition seems to have had a common ethical

Sex Differences in Moral Judgment

Abstract: with their sense of justice. Recent research has not been directly germane to Freud’s position, but findings in a quite different tradition, Kohlberg’s cognitive developmental stage theory of moral judgment, suggests quite clearly that males and females use qualitatively different styles of reasoning in the resolution of moral dilemmas and the judgment of the rightness of actions. The research reported here was designed to probe some of the causes of these sex differences in moral judgment. The cognitive developmentalists have been more concerned with the description and determinants of universals of development than with individual or group variations. For instance, in several of the experimental studies of induced change (Turiel, 1966; Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg, 1969; Rest, 1973) the question of sex differences in stage usage was not raised and no differences were reported. Kohlberg (1969) claimed, however, without substantiating data, that the modal adult male stage was stage 4 (authority and social order orientation) while the moda3 adult female stage was stage 3 (good boy/bood girl orientation) in his six-stage delineation. Subsequent reports have supported this view, as well as the view that these differences appear earlier. The stage 4 male mode and stage 3 female mode has been reported by Gilligan, Kohlberg, Lerner, and Belendy (1971) and Holstein (1973) for high school students, and by Haan, Smith, and Block (1968) and Alker and Poppen (1973) for college students. For junior high students Holstein (1973) reported males were modally stage 2 while females were stage 3. On an adult sample, Holstein found both males and females modally and predominantly stage 1+, although many more women than men use stage 3 reasoning. All of these studies consistently found more males at the highest stages (stages 5 and 6) and at the lowest stages (stage 2) than females, although the largest difference was invariable between stages 3 and 4. Kohlberg (1969) has claimed that the respective adult stages are functional for males and females. Holstein (1973) questioned whether the derivation of the stages from an all-boy sample has biased the system against females, citing that females less often follow the prescribed invariant sequence through the stages. The issue being raised in the present research is wheth-

Love and Morality

Abstract: It is commonly thought that love and other affective personal connections are separate from, even in essential tension with, moral requirement, especially as Kantian moral theory understands it. I argue here that the supposed essential tension relies on a idea of love that is defective, or at the least, limited, and that on a more psychologically plausible account of love as a force in human development, the ability to love well and the capacity for moral agency depend on each other. This leads to some interesting ideas about the nature of our moral abilities and about the kind of sensitivity to our psychology a sensible moral theory will show.