Showing papers on "Morality published in 1983"

Two Perspectives: On Self, Relationships, and Morality.

Abstract: Nona Plessner Lyons offers interview data from female and male children, adolescents, and adults in support of the assertions of Carol Gilligan (HER, 1977) that there are two distinct modes of describing the self in relation to others—separate/objective and connected— as well as two kinds of considerations used by individuals in making moral decisions— justice and care. She then describes a methodology, developed from the data, for systematically and reliably identifying these modes of self-definition and moral judgment through the use of two coding schemes. Finally, an empirical study testing Gilligan's hypotheses of the relationship of gender to self-definition and moral judgment is presented with implications of this work for psychological theory and practice.

Principles of biomedical ethics

Abstract: Morality and ethical theory types of ethical theory the principle of respect for autonomy the principle of nonmaleficence the principle of beneficence the principle of justice professional-patient relationships ideals, virtues and conscientiousness.

Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism

Abstract: Complaints about the social irresponsibility of the intellectuals typically concern the intellectual's tendency to marginalize herself, to move out from one community by interior identification of herself with some other community – for example, another country or historical period, an invisible college, or some alienated subgroup within the larger community. Such marginalization is, however, common to intellectuals and to miners. In the early days of the United Mine Workers its members rightly put no faith in the surrounding legal and political institutions and were loyal only to each other. In this respect they resembled the literary and artistic avant-garde between the wars. It is not clear that those who thus marginalize themselves can be criticized for social irresponsibility. One cannot be irresponsible toward a community of which one does not think of oneself as a member. Otherwise runaway slaves and tunnelers under the Berlin Wall would be irresponsible. If such criticism were to make sense there would have to be a supercommunity one had to identify with – humanity as such. Then one could appeal to the needs of that community when breaking with one's family or tribe or nation, and such groups could appeal to the same thing when criticizing the irresponsibility of those who break away. Some people believe that there is such a community. These are the people who think there are such things as intrinsic human dignity, intrinsic human rights, and an ahistorical distinction between the demands of morality and those of prudence.

The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer In Christian Ethics

Abstract: Stanley Hauerwas presents an overall introduction to the themes and method that have distinguished his vision of Christian ethics Emphasizing the significance of Jesus' life and teaching in shaping moral life, The Peaceable Kingdom stresses the narrative character of moral rationality and the necessity of a historic community and tradition for morality Hauerwas systematically develops the importance of character and virtue as elements of decision making and spirituality and stresses nonviolence as critical for shaping our understanding of Christian ethics

The attribution of morality.

Abstract: In two experiments, observers received information about a stimulus person and then attributed a given level of morality to that person. Attributions of morality based on the stimulus person's immoral (as opposed to moral) behavior were relatively unaffected by situational demands surrounding the behavior. That is, a person who stole or committed adultery was judged to be relatively immoral, regardless of situational pressures that appeared to facilitate the behavior. Varying the type of situational demand (reward vs. cost) did not alter this basic effect. Unlike morality attributions, causal attributions based on moral and immoral behavior were affected by situational demands to an equal extent. The results also indicated that impressions of morality formed in one context readily generalized to other aspects of morality. For example, a person who committed adultery was thought to be more likely to lie and steal than one who was not adulterous. It is well known that negative information weighs heavily in one's overall impression of a person (Kanouse & Hanson, 1972). For example, a single immoral behavior (such as stealing) is often enough to sour one's evaluation of a person. Further, this negative evaluation tends to persist even when the person is simultaneously credited with several very

Law, Morality, and the Relations of States

Abstract: PrefaceMy aim in this book is to consider the ideas of law, morality,nand society as they pertain to the relations of states. Thesenideas are central and not, as many hold, peripheral to thenstudy of international relations. I want to defend the viewnthat the practices of international law and international moralitynconstitute the indispensable foundation of all durable internationaln association. To the extent that the relations of statesnachieve a significant degree of permanence, rising above thenlevel of mere episodes in the separate histories of isolatednpolitical communities, they must be understood as taking placenon the basis of common, authoritative practices and rules.nAnd this, I shall argue, means that they must be understoodnas occurring within a world of legal and moral ideas.Two topics often treated by theorists of international relationsnare also considered here. One is whether legal and moralnorder can exist at all in an international system lacking centralizedninstitutions for making and applying law and characterizednby deep cultural and ideological differences. The othernis the tension between what might be labeled qstate-centricqnand qcosmopolitanq conceptions of international society, law,nand morality -- an old topic recently revived in controversiesnover human rights and international distributive justice. Butnmy main concern is with an argument that has not been adequatelynconsidered in connection with international relations,nand this is that morality and law are best understoodnas authoritative practices constraining the pursuit of differentnpurposes rather than as instruments for the joint pursuit ofnshared purposes. International morality and international lawnare authoritative practices that have evolved in the course ofnrelations among separate political communities, practices bynwhich international conduct is to be guided and judged. It isnin terms of these practices that those who have different values,ninterests, and beliefs, and who may be engaged in thenpursuit of different and sometimes incompatible purposes, canncoexist with one another. It seems to me that the distinctionnbetween what I have chosen to identify as the qpracticalq andnqpurposiveq conceptions of international society is at least asnilluminating and important as any of the more familiar distinctionsnthat have occupied the attention of theorists of internationalnrelations. This book is largely an exploration ofnthat distinction and its implications.The main distinction is developed in the introductory chapter.nPart One is concerned with the idea of international society,nand in particular with the gradual emergence of thenidea of the society of states as a kind of practical association.nIt considers how the view that international law is an institutionnspecific to the society of states developed from an earliernunderstanding of the law of nations as a branch of naturalnlaw, and explores the historical fortunes of the practical conceptionnof international law in the unfolding of nineteenth andntwentieth-century international politics. Part Two containsnan analysis of the authoritative common practices andnrules of international society, where these are understood asncomprising a system of positive law. And Part Three examinesnthese practices and rules in their moral aspect, that is, as anset of ideas handed down within an independent moral traditionnor traditions. I also attempt to trace some of the implicationsnof the practice/purpose distinction for the topics ofninternational justice, human rights, and the just war. Thenquestion whether the view of international law and internationalnmorality I defend has any relevance to an ideologicallynand culturally diverse world is considered in the concludingnchapter.n n

The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility

Abstract: In the wake of Operation Desert Storm, the question of 'just war' has become a hotly contested issue, and this classic text on war and the ethics of modern statecraft written at the height of the Vietnam era in 1968 speaks to a new generation of readers. In defending just war against Christian pacifism, Ramsey joins a line of theological reasoning that traces its antecedents to Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas. Ramsey argues that decisions regarding war must be governed by 'political prudence.' Whether a particular war should be fought, and at what level of violence, depends, Ramsey writes, on one's count of the moral costs and benefits. Characterized by a sophisticated yet back-to-basics approach, his analysis begins with the assumption that force is a fact in political life which must either be reckoned with or succumbed to. He then grapples with modern challenges to traditional moral principles of 'just conduct' in war, the 'morality of deterrence,' and a 'just war theory of statecraft.'

Reason and Morality

Abstract: "Most modern philosophers attempt to solve the problem of morality from within the epistemological assumptions that define the dominant cultural perspective of our age. Alan Gewirth's "Reason and Morality" is a major work in this ongoing enterprise. Gewirth develops, with patience and skill, what he calls a 'modified naturalism' in which morality is derived by logic alone from the concept of action. . . . I think that the publication of "Reason and Morality" is a major event in the history of moral philosophy. It develops with great power a new and exciting position in ethical naturalism. No one, regardless of philosophical stance, can read this work without an enlargement of mind. It illuminates morality and agency for all." E. M. Adams, "The Review of Metaphysics" "This is a fascinating study of an apparently intractable problem. Gewirth has provided plenty of material for further discussion, and his theory deserves serious consideration. He is always aware of possible rejoinders and argues in a rigorous manner, showing a firm grasp of the current state of moral and political philosophy." "Mind ""

Ethics and Animals

Abstract: Introduction: `Platonists' and `Aristotelians'.- Section I: Nonhumans in the Eyes and Minds of Humans.- Animal Rights, Human Wrongs.- Animal Rights Revisited.- Knowing Our Place in the Animal World.- The Clouded Mirror: Animal Stereotypes and Human Cruelty.- Section II: Morality, Legality, and Animals.- Moral Community and Moral Order: The Intensive and Extensive Limits of Interaction.- The Legal and Moral Bases of Animal Rights.- Section III: Humans and Other Animals-Killing.- Life, Death, and Animals.- Killing Persons and Other Beings.- Interspecific Justice and Animal Slaughter.- Section IV: Humans and Other Animals-Linkages and Likenesses.- Humans, Animals, and `Animal Behavior'.- Ecology, Morality, and Hunting.- Humans as Hunting Animals.- Apes and Language Research.- Section V: Human Interests, Porcine Interests, and Chipmunk Interests.- The Priority of Human Interests.- Comments on "The Priority of Human Interests,".- The Case Against Raising and Killing Animals for Food.- Postscript.- Section VI: Animal Rights?.- Do Animals Have a Right to Life?.- On Why We Would Do Better To Jettison Moral Rights.- Section VII: Breadth of Vision.- Philosophy, Ecology, Animal Welfare, and the `Rights' Question.- Deciding What to Kill.- Section VIII: Facts and Acts.- Chicken-Environment Interactions.- Against A Scientific Justification of Animal Experiments.- "Animal Liberation" as Crime: The Hawaii Dolphin Case.- Fighting for Animal Rights: Issues and Strategies.- Epilog.- Works Cited.

Aristotle's Theory of Natural Slavery

Abstract: IN BOOK 1 OF THE POLITICS, Aristotle develops a theory of natural slavery that is supposed both to secure the morality of enslaving such people and to provide the foundation for the uses of slaves he advocates in later books. But modern commentators have been nearly unanimous in finding that Aristotle's proffered theory does neither of these things. Specifically, critics have argued that the theory he offers is itself incoherent and that many of the uses to which he proposes putting slaves in subsequent books of the Politics are unwarranted, or even proscribed, by the theory in Book 1. But in a recent article on this issue,' W. W. Fortenbaugh has radically departed from this tradition. Though Fortenbaugh does not attempt to defend the morality of the institution of slavery itself, he argues that traditional criticisms have failed to consider adequately the moral psychology that informs Aristotle's theory. In this discussion, I wish to explore more carefully the logical consequences and potential advantages of Fortenbaugh's view and to provide explicit (if sometimes only speculative) answers to many of the traditional criticisms. Ultimately, however, I shall reject Fortenbaugh's interpretation as incomplete and thus inadequate. Specifically, I shall show how Aristotle's theory is developed according to the dictates of two distinct models for the relation of natural master and natural slave: one provided by the relationship of reason to emotion, and one provided by that of soul to body, or (for these purposes, equivalently) that of man to beast. Fortenbaugh's view relies on only one of these models, but both are required to complete the theory. I shall provide as complete a synthesis of these models' effects on the theory as I think can be given, but then conclude by showing precisely how and why such a synthesis still fails to make a success of Aristotle's defense of slavery.

What is a profession

Abstract: The Western world has long cherished the ideal and idea of professions, of groups who, because of the special nature of their activities, "profess" themselves dedicated to moral standards that oblige them to place the good of those they serve above their own self-interest. But for several decades this pristine ideal has undergone serious erosion, and the practical and moral consequences of this erosion for society are yet to be fully examined. Is there some justification for retaining the traditional idea of a profession? The author here argues that there is such a justification and that it can be found in the nature of the human needs the professions address and the human relationships peculiar to them. These are sufficiently distinct to warrant expectations of a higher morality and a greater commitment to the good of others than in most other human activities. The argument considers (1) the forces that have contributed to the erosion of the traditional notion, (2) what a true profession is not, (3) what distinguishes a profession philosophically from other activities, and (4) where in this schema the allied health and other "new" health professions fit.

Vice in a Vicious Society: Crime and Convicts in Mid Nineteenth-Century New South Wales

Abstract: Between 1788 and 1840 about 80,000 male and female prisoners were transported from the United Kingdom to New South Wales. The social consequences of this migration were most forcefully stated by a British select committee in 1838. The committee sounded the death knell of convict transportation to the colony when it concluded that the system not only failed to reform criminals, but also created societies "most thoroughly depraved, as respects both the character and degree of their vicious propensities". According to the committee's chairman. Sir William Molesworth, there existed in Australia "a state of morality worse than that of any other community in the world". Historians concur that the credibility of the Molesworth Committee was seriously undermined by the prejudices and preconceptions of its chairman and principal witnesses. But they tend to attack the committee's motives rather than to contradict its conclusions. Indeed, Molesworth's portrayal of New South Wales represented less a new departure than the climax of British perceptions of the colony. The committee shared with most accounts of the colony's moral condition two basic assumptions. First, it assumed the existence of a "criminal class". Persons who committed criminal offences were believed to form a class, detached from the working classes, which lived entirely off the proceeds of crime and which threatened social order. As fear of revolutionary violence subsided in Britain, concern with the "criminal" or "dangerous classes" faded. However, the belief that offenders were mainly drawn from a professional criminal subculture prevailed during the first half of the nineteenth century. The conception of a "criminal class" provided part of the rationale for transportation, since it assumed that offenders were from a distinct group which could be exported. A second pervasive assumption was that criminality was contagious. Contemporaries summed up the demoralizing influence of criminals in the word "contamination". According to Sydney's superintendent of police, William Augustus Miles, "contamination" resulted because "a convict will talk over his deeds of guilt till crime becomes familiar and romantic". Others believed that the process of contamination was even more insidious. Chief Justice James Dowling, while offering some fatherly advice to his son, warned that, "Vice is so fascinating, that she cannot be looked upon without peril to the beholder .Some held as well that criminal traits were hereditary. Judge Alfred Stephen stated his conviction that "crime descends, as surely as physical properties and individual temperament". These same assumptions, if in a less virulent form, are reflected in the works of major writers on the convict period. Studies by C.M.H. Clark, L.L. Robson and A.G.L. Shaw tend to confirm that most convicts were drawn from a "criminal class". All three writers associate the typical convict with city-dwelling professional criminals. Central to their argument is the high proportion of convicts (estimated at two-thirds of all those transported) with prior convictions in Britain. The hardened and habitual criminals, more or less deserving of their fate, have become the textbook view of convicts exiled to Australia. The interpretations of Clark, Robson and Shaw serve to correct romanticized characterizations of the convicts. "Obvious victims", in the sense of Tolpuddle Martyrs or Canadian Rebels, comprised only a small percentage of the men and women transported. But the convicts' criminality remains debatable. The statistical data available hardly justify the conclusion that most convicts transported to New South Wales had prior convictions. In any case, changes in the judicial system, criminal law, police force and definitions of offences make prior convictions a very dubious indicator of the convicts' character. It should also be remembered that most people transported were convicted of simple larcenies, rather than robberies, burglaries or other offences usually associated with professional criminals. A study of crime in England's Black Country from 1835 to 1860 indicates that most persons prosecuted for criminal offences were normally employed, and although they occasionally supplemented their incomes by theft, they were not members of a "criminal class". Even assuming the reformatory nature of the transportation system, the high proportion of convicts with good records in the colonies appears as further mute testimony against their alleged recidivism. The concept of "contamination" is still more problematic, both because of its vague connotations in nineteenth-century usage, and because it is more subtly translated into historical interpretations. Some historians have accepted uncritically the demoralizing influence of convicts on the honesty and moral standards of the general population. More importantly, convict vices and values such as hard drinking, hard swearing and a hatred for the police are viewed as leaving a lasting imprint on Australian culture.Convict "contamination" becomes in effect a component in the development of a distinctively Australian ethos...

Religion, Socioeconomic Status, and Sexual Morality: An Application of Reference Group Theory

Abstract: Reference group theory is used to help resolve an anomaly: the relationships among religiosity, socioeconomic status, and sexual morality. Past research has shown that while SES and religiosity are...

Marx's ethics of freedom

Abstract: Part 1: The Ethical Foundations 1. Marxism, Moralism and Ethics 2. Ethics and Historical Materialism 3. Ideology and Moral Justification Part 2: Marx's Ethics 4. The Ethics of Freedom 5. Capitalism and Justice 6. Revolutionary Morals, Violence and Communism Part 3: An Evaluation of Marx's Ethics 7. Moral Implications and Ethical Conclusions

A defensible divine command theory

Abstract: The term 'The Divine Command Theory of Ethics' is similar to 'The Ontological Argument' in that there is no unique entity deserving of that title. Rather, there is a multiplicity of theories, each of which is appropriately taken to be a divine command theory. The strongest versions are, if not the finest, at least definist. That is, according to these versions moral predicates, such as 'is obligatory,' are to be defined in terms of such theological predicates as, 'is commanded by God,' or moral properties, such as the property of being obligatory, are to be identified with such theological properties as, being commanded by God. Perhaps the most famous defender of this sort of divine command theory is Euthyphro ([ 15]: 9D). However, even if Plato did not succeed in refuting Euthyphro's definition of the pious as that which is loved by the gods-showing at most that Euthyphro's definition is inconsistent with certain other premisses also held by Euthyphro'-definitionai divine command theories are widely held to be at best implausible. I think that the most persuasive consideration against such theories is that most persons, including many theists, who have thought about whether moral and theological predicates are synonymous have not concluded that they are. And, most persons, including many theists, who have thought about whether moral properties are identical with theological ones have not concluded that they are. Perhaps the weakest forms of the divine command theory assert simply that what God commands is coextensive with what is right. Such versions of the theory are compatible with the view that God is not a moral authority in the sense that He has or exercises the right to determine morality, but only in the sense that He gives expert moral advice.2 Other weak versions are possible. According to Richard Swinburne,3 God can bring about the obligation that we obey His commands by placing us in certain circumstances, for example, the circu-mstances of having been created and sustained by Him or of being allowed to use His property. But according to this theory, some of God's commands

The Moral Order: An Introduction to the Human Situation

Abstract: A distinguished cross-cultural researcher presents a brave, heartfelt and exciting challenge to the social sciences: the creation of an international, moral order. He advocates the use of cross-cultural research to uncover a common core of values and morality. This research would then be used to ameliorate problems and guide policy in the light of those values. He shows his procedures at work in the study of ten major social and personal ills, such as mental illness, divorce, sex roles, and child abuse. His research leads him inexorably to the concept of the moralnet -- the social group that provides values and support. When these are disrupted, problems are aggravated or even created. 'The work of Naroll fits in well with the work of earlier sociologists. But his work is considerably more comprehensive and rich. He brings the whole world into perspective. His model for a moral order theory is a universal one...' -- Norwegian Medical Journal, 1983 'The book The Moral Order is recommended reading...because it gives us guidelines for the future development of our society.' -- Aftenposten, Oslo 'This is a significant book: it focuses on an important set of problems, and it treats them with considerable originality and care. The Moral Order will stimulate a good deal of future research on the topics that Naroll raises.' -- Anthropology and Humanism Quarterly, Vol 8 No 4, December 1983 'The Moral Order is extraordinary in its range, the social life of the whole world, and in its purpose. Sometimes the book appears charmingly naive, but on the whole, the author's strength of purpose and grasp of basics is admirable.' -- Sociology, September/October 1983 '...a highly informative and useful book.' -- Ethics, January 1985

Music as propaganda: art at the command of doctrine in the people's republic of china

Abstract: T he political control of music and other arts for propaganda by totalitarian governments has frequently provoked the censure of observers in the Western democracies.l The control of art for official information goes against the grain of the creative spirit, we suppose. Can an artistic mind function fully if bound to the strictures of a political ideology? Our judgment, colored by the nineteenth-century attitude of the artist's will as paramount and inviolable, is that extramusical controls must ultimately diminish quality and inhibit imagination. But in this setting if the artist concurs with the official ideology, is there an inhibition to the artistic will?2 Which comes first, the "success" (aesthetic quality) of the art or the success (the accuracy and effectiveness) of the ideological message? The Westerner's presumptions arise in part because the term propaganda has acquired an odious meaning: it is a technique of distortion, often with evil intent. A more neutral definition, however, is that it is "the spreading of ideas, information or rumor for the purpose of helping or injuring an institution, a cause, or a person" (Webster-Merriam). By such a definition, music to enhance religious practice is a medium for propaganda. In fact, the medium, the musical substance, may itself be a nonverbal information of clear intent and effectiveness. The sound of a pipe organ will immediately suggest a religious service to many Americans, so limited has the venue for hearing organ literature become in this country. Beethoven's choice of the "Ode to Joy" for the Ninth Symphony was to "spread ideas." Surely no one will disagree that the singing commercials of radio and television are an art of persuasion, if not rumor. Many songs of protest, satire, praise or hate from all times fall into the category of propaganda as seductive or militant tools for mind control.3 What is the difference between such musical messages in historical or current use in Western societies and the function of music as a political tool in totalitarian states? The difference is that the content of the musical work is not left to the composer's free choice, nor to the practice of censorship-whether explicit or by prevailing morality (which may fall

The Morality of the Sublime: To John Dennis

Abstract: HE SUBLIME was first delineated as an aesthetic experience in England at the beginning of the eighteenth century, above all in the writings of the :third earl of Shaftesbury and of John Dennis. An analogous experience had long been known in religious and poetic as well as political and oratorical contexts, and the moral significance that had accrued to it persisted as an aspect of the newly recognized aesthetic character of the sublime. Dennis understood the experience-taken principally as a response to literary texts-in the light of a psychology of feeling and passion which gave its ethical implications a new, revolutionary turn. Drawing on achievements in psychology and poetry from the preceding century, in the writings of Hobbes and Milton, Dennis essentially renewed a conception which he found in the classical locus of the sublime, the HEpt' kqov; of "Longinus." Thus, while he emphasized the religious associations of sublime experience, Dennis in effect reversed the main direction which had been given to its conception, and so to the experience itself, in Christian tradition starting with Saint Augustine. Elsewhere I have discussed the morality of the sublime in Kant and Schiller, two competing versions of its eighteenth-century culmination, showing how the aesthetic experience retained its relevance to ethical (as well as to cognitive) concerns.' For Kant and Schiller the term "aesthetic" depended for its meaning on renewed connection with its

The clinical encounter : the moral fabric of the patient-physician relationship

Abstract: Section I / Historical Inquiries and Perspectives.- Evolution of the Patient-Physician Relationship: Antiquity Through the Renaissance.- The Legacy of Modern Anglo-American Medical Ethics: Correcting Some Misperceptions.- American Medical Ethics and the Physician-Patient Relationship.- Section II / Models of the Patient-Physician Relationship.- Veatch, May, and Models: A Critical Review and a New View.- The Case for Contract in Medical Ethics.- A Rejoinder.- Legal Models of the Patient-Physician Relation.- The Common Law as a model of the Patient-Physician Relationship: A Response to Professor Brody.- Jewish Religious Law as a Model of the Patient-Physician Relationship: A Comment on Professor Brody's Essay.- Response to Franck and White.- Section III / Conceptual and Theoretical Analyses.- The Healing Relationship: The Architectonics of Clinical Medicine.- The Psychiatric Patient-Physician Relationship.- The Physician as Stranger: The Ethics of the Anonymous Patient-Physician Relationship.- The Internal Morality of Medicine: An Essential Dimension of the Patient-Physician Relationship.- Scope of the Therapeutic Relationship.- Section IV / Morality in the Patient-Physician Relationship.- The Physician-Patient Relationship in a Secular, Pluralist Society.- The Therapeutic Relationship: Is Moral Conduct a Necessary Condition?.- A Theological Context for the Relationship Between Patient and Physician.- Notes on Contributors.

Hegel's Views on War, the State, and International Relations

Abstract: In this article I argue a thesis about Hegel's views on war different from most previous interpreters, e.g., Popper and Hook on the one side and A vineri and Pelczynski on the other. In particular I argue that his reflections on war are an attempt to answer the problem of political obligation or the question of why should anyone willingly die for the state. Accordingly, I examine briefly Hegel's critique of Kantian morality for its inability to account for political obligation proper and although ultimately I conclude that Hegel never completely extricated himself from Kant's belief in a providentialist historicism leading to a condition of "perpetual peace, " I still want to suggest that war remains for Hegel an essential moment in the "ethical" life of the state and perhaps the chief means whereby the dignity and autonomy of the state can be exerted over the network of private interests that constitutes civil society.