Showing papers on "Morality published in 1992"

The idea of civil society

Abstract: Seligman examines the notion of the civil society. He argues that the combination of individal rights and interests with a social and political system based on a shared morality found its clearest concrete expression in 18th-century America. Since then, successive societies and social experiments have sought in vain to approximate to the society in which individual interests and the public good are identical. The problems of modern mass democracies which require intense centralization to be functional, and the growth of socialism and the notion of unearned entitlements have served to undermine the foundations of the civil society.

Mortality, immortality and other life strategies

Abstract: 1. Living with Death. 2. Bidding for Immortality. 3. The Selfish Species. 4. Modernity, or Deconstructing Mortality. 5. Postmodernity, or Deconstructing Immortality. Postscript: "To Die For..." or Death and Morality. About This Book. References.

Judging the Morality of Business Practices: The Influence of Personal Moral Philosophies

Abstract: Individuals' moral judgments of certain business practices and their decisions to engage in those practices are influenced by their personal moral philosophies: (a) situationists advocate striving for the best consequences possible irrespective of moral maxims; (b) subjectivists reject moral guidelines and base judgments on personal values and practical concerns; (c) absolutists assume that actions are moral, provided they yield positive consequences and conform to moral rules; (d) exceptionists prefer to follow moral dictates but allow for exceptions for practical reasons. These variations, which are based on two fundamental dimensions (concern for principles and concern for promoting human welfare) influence a variety of moral processes and have implications for ethical debates over business practices.

Superseding Historic Injustice

Abstract: The history of white settlers' dealings with the aboriginal peoples of Australia, New Zealand, and North America is largely a history of injustice. People, or whole peoples, were attacked, defrauded, and expropriated; their lands were stolen and their lives were ruined. What are we to do about these injustices? We know what we should think about them: they are to be studied and condemned, remembered and lamented. But morality is a practical matter, and judgments of just' and 'unjust' like all moral judgments have implications for action. To say that a future act open to us now would be unjust is to commit ourselves to avoiding it. But what of past injustice? What is the practical importance now of a judgment that injustice occurred in the past? In the first instance the question is one of metaethics. Moral judgments are prescriptive in their illocutionary force; they purport to guide choices.1 But since the only choices we can guide are choices in front of us, judgments about the past must look beyond the particular events that are their ostensible subject matter. The best explanation

Morality and the emotions

Abstract: This book argues that our emotions are directly morally significant. We often praise others for their emotional capacities, yet we possess deeply-held assumptions about the antipathy of emotions to reason and responsibility. Justin Oakley demonstrates that with a proper understanding of what emotions are we can see their fundamental role in our moral lives. He shows how a variety of important moral assessments may justifiably made of us because of our emotions, and he also reveals the extent to which we are responsible for those emotions. Justin Oakley takes as his starting point Aristotle's claim that moral goodness requires not only acting well, but also having the right emotions towards the appropriate object to the right degree. He shows the inadequacy of modern ethical theories' attempts to accommodate the emotions, and in doing so attacks philosophical and psychological theories which would have us believe that Aristotle was exhorting us merely to have the right beliefs or desires, or to encourage in ourselves certain bodily changes.

The age of light, soap, and water : moral reform in English Canada, 1885-1925

Abstract: "BACK IN PRINT WITH A NEW INTRODUCTION The turn of the last century saw a great wave of moral fervour among Protestant social reformers in English Canada. Their targets for moral reform were various: sex hygiene, immigration policy, slum clearance, prostitution, and "white slavery." Mariana Valverde's groundbreaking The Age of Light, Soap, and Water examines the work and the ideas of moralist clergy, social workers, politicians, and bureaucrats who sought to maintain -- or create -- a white Protestant Canada. The morality idealized by evangelical, feminist, and medical activists was not, as is often assumed, completely repressive and puritanical. On the contrary, the self-defined social purity movement at the centre of this book talked endlessly about sex in order to create a health sexuality among both native-born and immigrant Canadians. Sexual health was linked to racial purity, and both of these were in turn linked to efforts to abolish urban slums by means of symbolic as well as physical "light, soap, and water." Back in print with a new introduction by the author, this classic work offers fascinating insights on the social history of Canada." learance, prostitution, and "white slavery." Mariana Valverde's groundbreaking The Age of Light, Soap, and Waterexamines the work and the ideas of moralist clergy, social workers, politicians, and bureaucrats who sought to maintain - or create - a white Protestant Canada. The morality idealized by evangelical, feminist, and medical activists was not, as is often assumed, completely repressive and puritanical. On the contrary, the self-defined social purity movement at the centre of this book talked endlessly about sex in order to create a healthy sexuality among both native-born and immigrant Canadians. Sexual health was linked to racial purity, and both of these were in turn linked to efforts to abolish urban slums by means of symbolic as well as physical "light, soap, and water."This study uncovers a little known dimension of Canadian social history and shows that moral reform was not the project of a marginal puritanical group but was central to the race, class, and gender organization of modern English Canada.

Culture and moral judgment: how are conflicts between justice and interpersonal responsibilities resolved?

Abstract: A 2-session study examined Indian and American adults' and children's (N = 140) reasoning about moral dilemmas involving conflicts between interpersonal and justice expectations. Most Indians gave priority to the interpersonal expectations, whereas most Americans gave priority to the justice expectations. Indians tended to categorize their conflict resolutions in moral terms. In contrast, when Americans gave priority to the interpersonal alternatives, they tended to categorize their resolutions in personal terms. Results imply that Indians possess a postconventional moral code in which interpersonal responsibilities are seen in as fully principled terms as justice obligations and may be accorded precedence over justice obligations. Findings also suggest that a personal morality of interpersonal responsiveness and caring is linked to highly rights-oriented cultural views, such as those emphasized in the United States.

Rationality, Morality, and Exit

Abstract: The morality and rationality issue is explored from an Axelrod-type perspective; that is, it is discussed in terms of recurrent-prisoner's-dilemma-type games and behavioral strategies or programs for playing them. We argue that intuitive notions of rationality and morality can be shown to be mutually compatible if two assumptions are made: (1) that morality is specified as a general behavioral disposition or program whose rationality is to be determined in comparison to alternative behavioral programs and (2) that the recurrent game is specified as a prisoner's dilemma game with an exit option. The results of a simulation experiment are presented, showing that a “moral program” (specified as one that never defects, but exits in response to an opponents defection) is successful in competition with a variety of alternative programs, including Tit for Tat.

From Morality to Virtue

Abstract: The principal objective of this treatise is to argue that "virtue ethics" should be seen as a foundational theory which accounts more accurately for a range of ideas about value, choice, obligation and rational action than Kantian ethics, common-sense ethics or utilitarianism. The author believes that while utilitarianism can provide one way of resolving certain difficulties, it is not without its own serious problems. Virtue ethics, on the other hand, provide a more cogent account of the original difficulties, avoid the problems that utilitarianism brings up and dispells the incoherencies of Kantian and common-sense ethics.

Respect And Care: Toward Moral Integration

Abstract: In her provocative discussion of the challenge posed to the traditional impartialist, justice-focused conception of morality by the new-wave care perspective in ethics, Annette Baier calls for 'a "marriage" of the old male and newly articulated female moral wisdom/ to produce a new 'cooperative' moral theory that 'harmonize[s] justice and care'2 1 want in this paper to play matchmaker, proposing one possible conjugal bonding: a union of two apparently dissimilar modes of what Nel

The Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Politics

Abstract: Acknowledgments A note on references Introduction Part I. The Religious Background to Hobbes's Philosophy: 1. Considerations upon the reputation and religion of Mr. Hobbes 2. Religion Part II. Law, Morality, and God: 3. Power, obligation, and justice 4. Law 5. The history and idea of covenants 6. Sovereign-making covenants Part III. Religion Within the Limits of Science and Politics: 7. God 8. Revelation, prophets, and miracles 9. Angels and eschatology 10. The Church 11. Scripture Conclusion Appendices Notes Bibliography Index.

Morality, utilitarianism, and rights

Abstract: Sources 1. Introductory comments Part I. Metaethical Preliminaries: 2. Moral philosophy and the analysis of language 3. Rational desires 4. The explanation of moral language 5. Morality and its critics 6. Rationality, egoism, and morrality Part II. Normative Ethics: Utilitarianism: 7. Some merits of one form of rule - utilitarianism 8. Fairness to indirect optimific theories in ethics 9. Two concepts of utility Part III. Utilitarianism and Rights: 10. The concepts of a moral right and its function 11. Utilitarianism and moral rights Part IV. Determinism, Excuses, and Character: 12. A utilitarian theory of excuses 13. A motivational theory of excuses in the criminal law 14. Traits of character: a conceptual analysis 15. The structure of virtue Part V. Implications of Utilitarian Theory: 16. The morality and rationality of suicide 17. Utilitarianism and the rules of war 18. Public policy and life and death decisions regarding defective newborns 19. Utilitarianism and welfare legislation Index.

Non-consequentialism, the person as an end-in-itself, and the significance of status.

Abstract: Recently, several outstanding discussions of the structure of non-consequentialism have appeared. Two of these are Shelly Kagan's The Limits of Morality and a pair of articles by Warren Quinn, "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing" and "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: the Doctrine of Double Effect." I would like to examine several related issues discussed by these authors. Another outstanding work to which I will refer in this article, but not discuss at great length, is Judith Jarvis Thomson's The Realm of Rights. The general topic with which I shall be concerned is the structure of a non-consequentialist moral theory. Non-consequentialism has two important features. In a non-consequentialist moral theory, (1) there is a permission not to maximize overall best consequences (this is sometimes referred to as an option), and (2) there are constraints on promoting overall best consequences (for example, we must not kill one innocent, non-threatening person for his organs to save five others). I shall use the works by Kagan, Quinn, and Thomson to help characterize further the elements of the non-consequentialist structure and to justify them.

Artificial Morality: Virtuous Robots for Virtual Games

Abstract: From the Publisher: Artificial Morality shows how to build moral agents that succeed in competition with amoral agents. Peter Danielson's agents deviate from the received theory of rational choice. They are bound by moral principles and communicate their principles to others. The central thesis of the book is that these moral agents are more successful in crucial tests, and therefore rational. Artificial Morality is inspired by artificial intelligence. The solution presented to the problem of rationality and morality is constructive: the building of better moral robots. Danielson uses robots paired in abstract games that model social problems, such as environmental pollution, which reward co-operators but even more those who benefit from others' constraint. It is shown that virtuous, not vicious, robots do better in these virtual games.

Children's Obligatory and Discretionary Moral Judgments.

Abstract: This study examined children's obligatory moral judgments (which reflect a moral requirement) and discretionary moral judgments (which reflect moral worthiness, but not a requirement). 72 children participated across grades 2, 5, and 8 (mean ages, 8-3, 11-0, and 13-11). Children were interviewed in response to stimulus stories that controlled for the degree of agent's cost (low and high) for performing positive moral acts (giving money for food to an impoverished, hungry person) and negative moral acts (not stealing money for food). Results showed that negative moral acts were more often conceived as obligatory than positive moral acts. In addition, the results support the proposition that children's concepts of obligation underlie judgments to codify law, that justice reasoning builds on concepts of welfare, and that with increasing age discretionary moral reasoning incorporates such character traits as benevolence, sacrifice, and supererogation. Discussion includes consideration of how the study's conceptualization and analysis can provide guidance to a moral-developmental research program.

Motivating political morality

Abstract: Introduction. 1. Motives, Moral and Otherwise. Part I: The Moral Tack:. 2. Reciprocity and the Duty of Fair Play. 3. Uncertainty and Impartiality. 4. Non--exploitation. Part II: The Political Tack:. 5. Extending the Franchise. 6. Entrenched Rights and Constitutional Restraints. 7. Publicity, Accountability and Discursive Defensibility. Part III: Conclusions:. 8. Infusing Morality into Politics. 9. Taking Morality out of Politics. References.

On War and Morality.

Abstract: The threat to the survival of humankind posed by nuclear weapons has been a frightening and essential focus of public debate for the last four decades and must continue to be so if we are to avoid destroying ourselves and the natural world around us. One unfortunate result of preoccupation with the nuclear threat, however, has been a new kind of \"respectability\" accorded to conventional war. In this radical and cogent argument for pacifism, Robert Holmes asserts that all war--not just nuclear war--has become morally impermissible in the modern world. Addressing a wide audience of informed and concerned readers, he raises dramatic questions about the concepts of \"political realism\" and nuclear deterrence, makes a number of persuasive suggestions for nonviolent alternatives to war, and presents a rich panorama of thinking about war from St. Augustine to Reinhold Niebuhr and Herman Kahn.Holmes's positions are compellingly presented and will provoke discussion both among convinced pacifists and among those whom he calls \"militarists.\" \"Militarists, \" we realize after reading this book, include the majority of us who live a friendly and peaceful personal life while supporting a system which, if Holmes is correct, guarantees war and risks eventual human extinction.

Morality and partiality

Abstract: The great moral theories that have dominated moral philosophy for at least the last forty years have taken impartiality to be a core defining feature of morality. That is, they have identified morality with the idea of acting from a position that acknowledges and appreciates the fact that all persons (or even, on some views, all sentient beings) are in an important sense equal, and that, correspondingly, all are equally entitled to fundamental conditions of wellbeing and respect. Recently, however, many have called attention to the fact that relationships of friendship and love seem to call for the very opposite of an impartial perspective. Since such relationships unquestionably rank among the greatest goods of life, a conception of morality that is in tension with their maintenance and promotion is unacceptable. Thus a debate has arisen between, as we may call them, the impartialists and the partialists. In defense of their position, the impartialists note that someone' s being your friend or relative does not make her more morally deserving than anyone else, and they point to the grave moral dangers of moving that acknowledgment from the center of moral thought. Rather than allow our personal affections to compromise our commitments to justice and equality, they argue, we must shape our ideals of friendship and love to fit the demands of impartial morality. The partialists reply that this denigrates the value of special relationships to friends and loved ones, at best according them the status of acceptable extracurricular activities and at worst regarding them as a consequence of human nature to be warily tolerated. For my own part, I am quite sympathetic to the partialists' concerns. But I think that they locate the problem in the wrong theoretical place. The problem is not that impartiality is too closely or centrally identified with morality, but that morality as a whole is being expected to do too much. I shall, then, defend a conception of morality that, in the context of the debate sketched above, might be labelled a moderate impartialism. But at least as

International business, morality, and the common good

Abstract: The author sets out a realist defense of the claim that in the absence of an international enforcement agency, multinational corpo? rations operating in a competitive international environment cannot be said to have a moral obligation to contribute to the international common good, provided that interactions are nonrepetitive and pro? vided effective signals of agent reliability are not possible. Examples of international common goods that meet these conditions are sup? port of the global ozone layer and avoidance of the global greenhouse effect. Pointing out that the conclusion that multinationals have no moral obligations in these areas is deplorable, the author urges the establishment of an international enforcement agency. DURING the last few years an increasing number of voices have urged that we pay more attention to ethics in international business, on the grounds that not only are all large corporations now internationally struc- tured and thus engaging in international transactions, but that even the smallest domestic firm is increasingly buffeted by the pressures of interna? tional competition.1 This call for increased attention to international busi? ness ethics has been answered by a slowly growing collection of ethicists who have begun to address issues in this field. The most comprehensive work on this subject to date is the recent book The Ethics of International Business by Thomas Donaldson.2 I want in this article to discuss certain realist objections to bringing ethics to bear on international transactions, an issue that, I believe, has not yet been either sufficiently acknowledged nor adequately addressed but that must be resolved if the topic of international business ethics is to proceed on solid foundations. Even so careful a writer as Thomas Donaldson fails to address this issue in its proper complexity. Oddly enough, in the first chapter where one would expect him to argue that, in spite of realist objections, businesses have international moral obligations, Donaldson argues only for the less perti- nent claim that, in spite of realist objections, states have international moral obligations.3 But international business organizations, I will argue, have special features that render realist objections quite compelling. The question I want to address, here, then, is a particular aspect of the question Donaldson and others have ignored: Can we say that businesses operating in a competitive interna? tional environment have any moral obligations to contribute to the interna- ?1992. Business Ethics Quarterly, Volume 2, Issue 1. ISSN 1052-150X. 0027-0040.

Disgust and Moral Taboos

Abstract: Disgust is not a pleasant subject. It is perhaps partly for this reason that it has not been much discussed in philosophical literature, or, indeed anywhere else. Disgust has considerable moral significance however, and appreciating its significance will illuminate the present state of our morality. One may be led to this view by reflecting on several recent works on pollution. The pollution in question, of course, is not of the air, soil, or water, but that of people who have violated moral taboos of their society'.

A Kantian approach to codes of ethics

Abstract: The paper discusses whether codes of ethics are Kantian notions through an analysis of their intention and structure. The article also discusses some of the ideas put forward by William Starr in his article, ‘Codes of Ethics — Towards a Rule-Utilitarian Justification’,Journal of Business Ethics 2(2) (May 1983). The paper refers to recent definitions of codes of ethics and considers reasons for the proliferation of such codes. It examines the moral justification for these codes and analyses the underlying ethical theory particularly in relation to Kantian ethics. There is an account of how Kant's views of the source of morality and moral obligation, the structure and nature of Kantian moral law and the role of the individual and his/her relationship with others, which is relevant to the development of a theoretical base for codes of ethics. There is some discussion of potential problems in the practical application of Kantian ethics to a specific code.

Prejudice and the Unfinished Mind: A New Look at an Old Failing

Abstract: Three approaches to the nature of human rationality are considered: Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky on decision making, David Hume on causation, and Peter Strawson on morality. All are seen as deploring the state of rational thought and despairing of the human capacity for logic. Their implicit model of the perfectly rational human is explored with the help of Mr. Spock and found to be of doubtful value considered in terms of evolutionary survival, where "prejudgment" is essential to decision making under stress. The glimmerings of this insight are found in Hume's "therapeutic" solution to his existential dilemma, and a general argument is made-with the help of side glances at prototype theory, linguistics, categorical thinking, and archetypes-that rationality cannot be equated with "logic" as generally understood but rather consists of a series of pragmatic prejudgments of reality that have stood the test of natural selection. This leads to a reconstruction of the idea of "prejudice" from a negative to a mildly positive attribute, with examples drawn from Charles Lamb and Paul Robeson, and hence to the conclusion that prejudice is not a warpedform of thought but that thought is a particular form of prejudice.

Situational variation in moral judgment: In a stage or on a stage?

Abstract: Two issues were examined in this study—the consistency of moral judgment across different types of dilemma and different social contexts, and the relationship between the structure (stage) of moral judgment and the content of moral decisions. Forty subjects were given two hypothetical dilemmas about business decisions and two standard Kohlberg dilemmas. Half the subjects directed their responses to a business audience, half to a philosophical audience. Responses to the moral dilemmas were scored in accordance with the Colby and Kohlberg (1987) scoring manual. Stage of moral reasoning was found to be significantly higher on the Kohlberg dilemmas than on the business dilemmas. A significant interaction between type of dilemma and audience was attributed to the tendency of subjects directing their responses to a business audience to interpret one of the business dilemmas in terms of the moral order of business, but for subjects directing their responses to a philosophy audience to treat it as a philosophical dilemma. The other business dilemma evoked uniformly low-level moral judgments. The amount of selfishness intrinsic in subjects' moral choices on the business dilemmas was significantly negatively correlated with moral maturity on the business dilemmas, but not with their moral maturity on Kohlberg's test. These results are interpreted as more consistent with models of moral development such as those advanced by C. G. Levine ([1979] “Stage Acquisition and Stage Use: An Appraisal of Stage Displacement Explanations of Variation in Moral Reasoning, ” Human Development, Vol. 22, pp. 145–164), J. Rest ([1983] “Morality,” in: P. H. Mussen [ed.], J. H. Flavell and E. Markman [Vol. eds.], Handbook of Child Psychology [Vol. 3, 4th ed.], John Wiley & Sons, New York), and R. Harre ([1984]) Personal Being: A Theory for Individual Psychology, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts), which posit a relatively wide range of within-person stage use and emphasize the determining power of social situations, than with the more constructivistic model of moral development of Colby and Kohlberg (1987).

Morality and Moral Theory: A Reappraisal and Reaffirmation

Abstract: Contemporary philosophers have grown increasingly sceptical toward both morality and moral theory. Some argue that moral theory is a radically misguided enterprise which does not illuminate moral practice, while others simply deny the value of morality in human life. In this book, Robert Louden attempts to respond to the arguments of both 'anti-morality' and 'anti-theory' sceptics.