Showing papers on "Morality published in 2003"

The moral emotions.

Abstract: Morality dignifies and elevates. When Adam and Eve ate the forbidden fruit, God said "Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil" (Gen. 3:22). In many of the world's religious traditions, the good go up, to heaven or a higher rebirth, and the bad go down, to hell or a lower rebirth. Even among secular people, moral motives are spoken of as the "highest" and "noblest" motives, whereas greed and lust are regarded as "baser" or "lower" instincts. Morality is therefore like the temple on the hill of human nature: It is our most sacred attribute, a trait that is often said to separate us from other animals and bring us closer to God. For 2,400 years, the temple has been occupied by the high priests of reason. Plato (4th century B.C./1949) presented a model of a divided self in which reason, firmly ensconced in the head, rules over the passions, which rumble around in the chest and stomach (Timaeus, 69). Aristotle had a similar conception of reason as the wise master and emotion as the foolish slave: "anger seems to listen to reason, but to hear wrong, like hasty servants, who run off before they have heard everything their master tells them, and fail to do what they were ordered, or like dogs, which bark as soon as there is a knock without waiting to see if the visitor is a friend" (Ethics, 1962, 1149a). Throughout the long history of moral philosophy, the focus has generally been on moral reasoning, whereas the moral emotions have been regarded with some suspicion (Solomon, 1993). Even when moral psychology finally separated itself from moral philosophy and began to make its own empir-

Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for caring and Justice.

Abstract: Empathy and Moral Development represents the life’s work of Professor Hoffman, integrating over 30 years of research with information and ideas gleaned from the psychological and social development theories of the last century. Starting with biblical concepts of sin and guilt and drawing on the germinal theories of historical figures such as Rousseau, Freud and Piaget, the author also discusses Kohlberg’s theory and modifications by later followers. The first chapter begins with a brief overview of the previous and current theories and the historical sources for the book, giving clear definitions and outlining the theory to follow. Each of the seven sections of the book expands on important key concepts introduced earlier. There are frequent references to and review of the previously discussed material. The first section of the book explains the “innocent bystander” model that has been used for decades to explore human moral development. Concepts from animal arousal and behavior models are linked with human infant research on early affective and cognitive development. The research quoted is illustrative and extensive. The section ends with a discussion of the differences between empathy, guilt, sympathy and injustice. Parts Two and Three introduce the concept of guilt and how parental discipline interacts with a child’s cognitive skills to guide moral development. This first half of the book could have been expanded further through the use of more examples and further exploration of how genetics and innate brain processes contribute to the development of empathy. Hoffman also seemed to emphasize the psychosocial aspects over the behavioral cognitive and genetic aspects, but it is a good review of the field to date. The second half of the book is very interesting. The examples given are more current, complete and involved. The author shines as he discusses his integration of existing theory and research into a comprehensive model. He sketches a brief picture of different types of guilt, and a theoretical hierarchy. He expands on his assertion that both parental discipline and peer interaction are necessary for the development of guilt and morality. His collected statistics on parental discipline and its effects on children’s moral development are impressive. He explains why empathy can operate in some situations and can be overwhelmed in others, even when the individuals involved are highly empathic (i.e. therapist burnout). Numerous examples are given of how guilt and empathy are motivators for human action, especially prosocial and “altruistic” actions. In light of the events of September 11, 2001, Hoffman’s concepts explain much of the individual and social group actions which followed. Section Four of the book asks the question “Is Empathy Enough” to explain moral action. Types of bias which may affect empathy and moral action are examined. Empathy’s self-destructive and self-limiting qualities are explored and integrated in Darwinian fashion. Hoffman states that a morality based on empathy alone would not be fair in large mixed or larger human groups and would lead to bias and conflict. To live together peaceably, Hoffman insists that empathy must be embedded in moral principles, the subject of the fifth part of the book. Hoffman shows how empathy (affect) becomes linked or bonded to moral principles (of cognitive and social origin) as the person develops. The synthesis is used powerfully to explain the perpetuation of social attributes of caring and justice in western society. Useful definitions of key concepts in justice research are included. Parts six and seven of the book are the slimmest and cover culture, wherein issues of the universal applicability of the key concepts are examined, and intervention, which hopefully can someday be expanded into its own volume. A few directions in designing empathic training for use in young offenders and other children at risk are given, but not in the kind of depth currently desperately needed in the field. The book is well organized in its scant 300 pages and set up as a graduate course. It is an easy book from which to learn. It would make an ideal text and makes for a brilliant discussion overall, as it presents the author’s theory that will, no doubt, form the basis for future research and intervention in this area.

The Future of Human Nature

Abstract: Publisher's Note. Foreword. Are There Postmetaphysical Answers to the Question: What is the "Good Life"?. The Debate on the Ethical Self--Understanding of the Species. I Moralizing Human Nature?. II Human Dignity versus the Dignity of Human Life. III The Embedding of Morality in an Ethics of the Species. IV The Grown and the Made. V Natality, the Capacity of Being Oneself, and the Ban on Instrumentalization. VI The Moral Lmits of Eugenics. VII Setting the Pace for a Self--instrumentalization of the Species?. Postscript. Faith and Knowledge. Notes.

Moral identity and the expanding circle of moral regard toward out-groups.

Abstract: This article examines moral identity and reactions to out-groups during intergroup conflict. Four studies suggest that a highly self-important moral identity is associated with an expansive circle of moral regard toward out-group members (Study 1) and more favorable attitudes toward relief efforts to aid out-group members (Study 2). Study 3 examines moral identity and national identity influences on the provision of financial assistance to out-groups. Study 4 investigates the relationship between moral identity and (a) the willingness to harm innocent out-group members not involved in the conflict and (b) moral judgments of revenge and forgiveness toward out-group members directly responsible for transgressions against the in-group. Results are discussed in terms of self-regulatory mechanisms that mitigate in-group favoritism and out-group hostility.

Moral Development and Reality: Beyond the Theories of Kohlberg and Hoffman

Abstract: Foreword - Daniel K. Lapsley Preface 1. Introduction Social Perspective-Taking and the Moral Point of View The Right and the Good: The Moral Domain Introducing Chapters Two Through Nine 2. "The Right" and Moral Development: Fundamental Themes of Kohlberg's Cognitive Developmental Approach Early-Childhood Superficiality Beyond Centrations and Superficial Judgment Stages of Moral Reciprocity Assessing Stages of Immature and Mature Moral Judgment Concluding Comment 3. Kohlberg's Theory: A Critique and New View Background Kohlberg's Overhaul of Piaget's Phases Adult Moral Development in Kohlberg's Theory A New View of Lifespan Moral Judgment Development Conclusion 4. "The Good" and Moral Development: Hoffman's Theory The Empathic Predisposition Modes of Empathic Arousal Empathy and Cognitive Development: Stages of Empathic Distress The Empathic Predisposition, Cognition, and Affective Primacy The Empathic Predisposition, Socialization, and Moral Internalization Conclusion and Critique 5. Moral Development, Moral Sef-Relevance, and Prosocial Behavior Prosocial Behavior: A Rescue Individual Differences in Prosocial Behavior Conclusion: Two Spurious "Moral Exemplars" 6. Understanding Antisocial Behavior Limitations of Antisocial Youth A Case Study 7. Treating Antisocial Behavior The Mutual Help Approach The Psychoeducational or Skills Training Approach Evaluation of the Equip Program Perspective-Taking for Severe Offenders 8. Beyond the Theories: A Deeper Reality? Two Case Studies A Deeper Reality? Moral Insight and Inspiration Conclusion 9. Conclusion The Issue of Moral Motivation Moral Perception and Reality References Index Appendix About the Author

Enlightenment against Empire

Abstract: In the late eighteenth century, an array of European political thinkers attacked the very foundations of imperialism, arguing passionately that empire-building was not only unworkable, costly, and dangerous, but manifestly unjust. "Enlightenment Against Empire" is the first book devoted to the anti-imperialist political philosophies of an age often regarded as affirming imperial ambitions. Sankar Muthu argues that thinkers such as Denis Diderot, Immanuel Kant, and Johann Gottfried Herder developed an understanding of humans as inherently cultural agents and therefore necessarily diverse. These thinkers rejected the conception of a culture-free "natural man." They held that moral judgments of superiority or inferiority could be made neither about entire peoples nor about many distinctive cultural institutions and practices.Muthu shows how such arguments enabled the era's anti-imperialists to defend the freedom of non-European peoples to order their own societies. In contrast to those who praise "the Enlightenment" as the triumph of a universal morality and critics who view it as an imperializing ideology that denigrated cultural pluralism, Muthu argues instead that eighteenth-century political thought included multiple Enlightenments. He reveals a distinctive and underappreciated strand of Enlightenment thinking that interweaves commitments to universal moral principles and incommensurable ways of life, and that links the concept of a shared human nature with the idea that humans are fundamentally diverse. Such an intellectual temperament, Muthu contends, can broaden our own perspectives about international justice and the relationship between human unity and diversity.

Solitary Sex: A Cultural History of Masturbation

Abstract: At a time when almost any victimless sexual practice has its public advocates and almost every sexual act is fit for the front page, the easiest, least harmful, and most universal one is embarrassing, discomforting, and genuinely radical when openly acknowledged. Masturbation may be the last taboo. But this is not a holdover from a more benighted age. The ancient world cared little about the subject; it was a backwater of Jewish and Christian teaching about sexuality. In fact, solitary sex as a serious moral issue can be dated with a precision rare in cultural history; Laqueur identifies it with the publication of the anonymous tract Onania in about 1722. Masturbation is a creation of the Enlightenment, of some of its most important figures, and of the most profound changes it unleashed. It is modern. It worried at first not conservatives, but progressives. It was the first truly democratic sexuality that could be of ethical interest for women as much as for men, for boys and girls as much as for their elders. The book's range is vast. It begins with the prehistory of solitary sex in the Bible and ends with third-wave feminism, conceptual artists, and the Web. It explains how and why this humble and once obscure means of sexual gratification became the evil twin--or the perfect instance--of the great virtues of modern humanity and commercial society: individual moral autonomy and privacy, creativity and the imagination, abundance and desire.

Evolution, Social Roles, and the Differences in Shame and Guilt

Abstract: risk serious physical injury or even death to avoid it. One of the reasons for this is because shame can indicate serious damage to social acceptance and a breakdown in a variety of social relationships. The evolutionary root of shame is in a self-focused, social threat system related to competitive behavior and the need to prove oneself acceptable/desirable to others (Gilbert, 1989; 2002a). Guilt, however, evolved from a care-giving and “avoiding doing harm to others” system (Gilbert, 1998; Tangney and Dearing, 2002). Guilt will be explored here primarily to offer a contrast with shame and thus clarify the self-focused nature of shame. The evolutionary precursors for shame can be traced back to the way all animals must be able to detect and cope with social threats (Gilbert and McGuire, 1998). For many animals, attentiveness to conspecifics that could inflict harm, and are threats to them, is highly adaptive, and social anxiety, flight, or submission/appeasement are salient defenses (Gilbert, 2001). Social threats (unlike nonsocial threats) often involve communicating signals that impact on the state of mind of the threatening other(s); for example, a submissive display may be sufficient to stop a more dominate from seriously attacking a subordinate. Although shame requires a symbolic sense of self (Lewis, 1992), it too is regulated by social threats and automatic defenses to protect the self from threats posed by others (Gilbert, 2002a). Indeed, there is now evidence that shame can act as an inner warning signal of threats and challenges to the self, with a trig-

From neural 'is' to moral 'ought': what are the moral implications of neuroscientific moral psychology?

Abstract: Many moral philosophers regard scientific research as irrelevant to their work because science deals with what is the case, whereas ethics deals with what ought to be. Some ethicists question this is/ought distinction, arguing that science and normative ethics are continuous and that ethics might someday be regarded as a natural social science. I agree with traditional ethicists that there is a sharp and crucial distinction between the 'is' of science and the 'ought' of ethics, but maintain nonetheless that science, and neuroscience in particular, can have profound ethical implications by providing us with information that will prompt us to re-evaluate our moral values and our conceptions of morality.

Guilt and Shame in Chinese Culture: A Cross‐cultural Framework from the Perspective of Morality and Identity

Abstract: Olwen Bedford and Kwang-Kuo Hwang, Guilt and Shame in Chinese Culture: A Cross-cultural Framework from the Perspective of Morality and Identity, pp. 127–144. This article formulates a cross-cultural framework for understanding guilt and shame based on a conceptualization of identity and morality in Western and Confucian cultures. First, identity is examined in each culture, and then the relation between identity and morality illuminated. The role of guilt and shame in upholding the boundaries of identity and enforcing the constraints of morality is then discussed from the perspective of each culture. The developed framework is then applied the emotions of guilt and shame in Chinese culture drawing on previous field research. Implications for future research are discussed.

Humanism of the Other

Abstract: In "Humanism of the Other", Emmanuel Levinas argues that it is not only possible but of the highest exigency to understand one's humanity through the humanity of others. Based in a new appreciation for ethics, and taking new distances from the phenomenology of Hegel, Heidegger, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty, the idealism of Plato and Kant, and the skepticism of Nietzsche and Blanchot, Levinas rehabilitates humanism and restore its promises. He expresses disappointment with the revolutions that became bureaucracies and totalitarian governments, and the national liberation movements that eventually led to oppression and international wars. Defining the human as subject, ego, synthesis, identification, cognition, and mood all too easily lead to subjugation, persecution, and murder. Painfully aware of the long history of dehumanization which reached its apotheosis in Hitler and Nazism, Levinas does not underestimate the difficulty of reconciling oneself with another. The humanity of the human, Levinas argues, is not discoverable through mathematics, rational metaphysics or introspection. Rather, it is found in the recognition that the suffering and mortality of others are the obligations and morality of the self.

The intelligence of the moral intuitions: comment on Haidt (2001).

Abstract: The social intuitionist model (J. Haidt, 2001) posits that fast and automatic intuitions are the primary source of moral judgments. Conscious deliberations play little causal role; they are used mostly to construct post hoc justifications for judgments that have already occurred. In this article, the authors present evidence that fast and automatic moral intuitions are actually shaped and informed by prior reasoning. More generally, there is considerable evidence from outside the laboratory that people actively engage in reasoning when faced with real-world moral dilemmas. Together, these facts limit the strong claims of the social intuitionist model concerning the irrelevance of conscious deliberation.

“... As you Would have Them Do Unto You”: Does Imagining Yourself in the Other's Place Stimulate Moral Action?

Abstract: Philosophers, psychologists, and religious teachers have suggested that imagining yourself in another's place will stimulate moral action. The authors tested this idea in two different situations. In Experiment 1, participants had the opportunity to assign themselves and another research participant to tasks, with one task clearly more desirable than the other. Imagining oneself in the other's place did little to increase the morality (fairness) of the decision. A different form of perspective taking, imagining the other's feelings, increased direct assignment of the other to the desirable task, apparently due to increased empathy. In Experiment 2, participants confronted a different decision: either accept an initial task assignment that would give them highly positive consequences and the other participant nothing or change the assignment so they and the other would each receive moderately positive consequences. In this situation, imagining oneself in the other's place did significantly increase moral action.

The Role of Moral Reasoning on Socioscientific Issues and Discourse in Science Education

Abstract: Acknowledgements. Introduction N.G. Lederman. Section I: Moral Reasoning. 1. The Role of Moral Reasoning and the Status of Socioscientific Issues in Science Education D.L. Zeidler, M. Keefer. Section II: Nature of Science Issues. 2. Socioscientific Issues in Pre-college Science Classrooms F. Abd-El-Khalick. 3. Exploring the Role of NOS Understandings in Decision-Making R.L. Bell. 4. Beliefs in the Nature of Science and Responses to Socioscientific Issues M.L. Simmons, D.L. Zeidler. Section III: Classroom Discourse Issues. 5. The Role of Argument During Discourse about Socioscientific Issues D.L. Zeidler, J. Osborne, S. Erduran, S. Simon, M. Monk. 6. Integrating Science Education and Character Education M.W. Berkowitz, P. Simmons. 7. The Assessment of Argumentation and Explanation R. Duschl. Section IV: Cultural Issues. 8. Morality, Spirituality and Science in the Elementary Classroom K. Witz, N. MacGregor. 9. Recognizing and Solving Ethical Dilemmas in Diverse Science Classrooms C.C. Loving, S.W. Lowy, C. Martin. 10. The Morality of Inclusive Verses Exclusive Settings J.R. McGinnis. Section V: Science-Technology-Society-Environment Social and Case-Based Issues. 11. Teaching Science, Technology, Society and Environment (STSE) Education E. Pedretti. 12. Moral Reasoning and Case-based Approaches to Ethical Instruction in Science M. Keefer. 13. Scientific Errors, Atrocities, and Blunders T.D. Sadler, D.L. Zeidler. Section VI: Concluding Remarks. 14. Unifying Themes in Moral Reasoning on Socioscientific Issues and Discourse D.L. Zeidler, J. Lewis. Notes on the Contributing Authors.

Morals and the human brain: A working model.

Abstract: Morality has been at the center of informal talks and metaphysical discussions since the beginning of history. Recently, converging lines of evidence from evolutionary biology, neuroscience and experimental psychology have shown that morality is grounded in the brain. This article reviews the main lines of investigation indicating that moral behavior is a product of evolutionary pressures that shaped the neurobehavioral processes related to the selective perception of social cues, the experience of moral emotions and the adaptation of behavioral responses to the social milieu. These processes draw upon specific cortical-subcortical loops that organize social cognition, emotion and motivation into uniquely human forms of experience and behavior. We put forth a model of brain-behavior relationships underlying moral reasoning and emotion that accommodates the impairments of moral behavior observed in neuropsychiatric disorders. This model provides a framework for empirical testing with current methods of neurobehavioral analysis.

Moral Solidarity, Identification with the Community, and the Importance of Procedural Justice: The Police as Prototypical Representatives of a Group's Moral Values*

Abstract: In this paper we demonstrate that people's cooperation with the police is motivated in part by their judgment that the police are prototypical representatives of the group's moral values, as is predicted by the social identity approach. We further show that people evaluate the degree to which the police reflect the group's moral values by assessing the fairness of the procedures they use to exercise their authority, as is argued by the relational model of authority. Finally, the social identity approach and the relational model of authority are shown to interact:.people who are uncertain about their status in the group are shown to be concerned more strongly about procedural justice issues than about issues of distributive justice. In this paper we attempt to clarify why people support and cooperate with the police. We are concerned about three types of support: compliance with the law, cooperation with the police, and willingness to empower the police with discretionary authority. Our interest is in the motivations that shape these types of public support. We contrast two motivations-instrumental and moral-and explore the importance of each.

Risk and morality

Abstract: Risk and Morality examines how decisions about risk and uncertainty relate to moral principles and ethical conduct. Editors Richard Ericson and Aaron Doyle have brought together in this volume a selection of original essays on the topic by renowned scholars in the disciplines of philosophy, sociology, law, political science, geography, criminology, and accounting from Canada, the United States, England, France, and Australia. Presenting cutting-edge theory and research, the essays analyse the broader social, political, economic and cultural dimensions of risk and morality. The concept of risk has become pervasive in recent years in political discourse, popular culture, organizational communications, and everyday life. The contributors' respective research projects on risk and morality in politics, business, legal regulation, crime prevention, insurance, extreme sports, and biotechnology provide original empirical evidence to substantiate their theories and address the ideological and policy relevance of their work. Collectively, the contributors explain why risk is such a key aspect of Western culture, and demonstrate that new regimes for risk management are transforming social integration, value-based reasoning and morality. Further, they illustrate that these new regimes do not necessarily foster more responsible conduct or greater accountability in institutions.

Beyond a critique of pure reason: From policy to politics to praxis in environmental and social research

Abstract: Sustainability – in the sense of a system of deep‐rooted social justice and a fair and responsible allocation and use of ecological resources – requires a political philosophy adequate to its unique task in effecting change. Traditional Cartesian epistemes, that rely on formalistic policy declarations and which appeal to morality, are seen as inadequate without a rigorous historical and politically informed praxis, wherein our own cognitive, spiritual, and aesthetic development is seen as integral to developing processes “out there”. Several examples of attempts to form organic ties are provided to illustrate the use of praxis as a methodology of intervention.

The Social Construction of Sexuality

Abstract: In The Social Construction of Sexuality, Steven Seidman questions such assumptions and investigates the political and social consequences of privileging certain sexual practices and identities while stigmatizing others. Addressing a range of topics from gay and lesbian identities to sex work, he delves into issues of social control that inform popular beliefs and moral standards. The Social Construction of Sexuality widens the public discussion of the morality and politics of sexuality. With this insightful exploration of society s effect on our sexual choices, Seidman once again makes a significant contribution to the sociological study of sexuality. The Social Construction of Sexuality is part of the Contemporary Societies series."

Why Do Men Barbecue?: Recipes for Cultural Psychology

Abstract: Introduction: Anti-Postculturalism (or, The View from Manywheres) 1. Who Sleeps by Whom Revisited (with Lene Balle-Jensen and William Goldstein) 2. The "Big Three" of Morality (Autonomy, Community, Divinity) and the "Big Three" Explanations of Suffering (with Nancy C. Much, Manamohan Mahapatra, and Lawrence Park) 3. Cultural Psychology of Emotions: Ancient and New (with Jonathan Haidt) 4. "What about Female Genital Mutilation?" And Why Understanding Culture Matters 5. The Return of the "White Man's Burden" and the Domestic Life of Hindu Women (with Usha Menon) 6. Culture and Mental Development in Our Poststructural Age 7. A Polytheistic Conception of the Sciences and the Virtues of Deep Variety 8. Fundamentalism for Highbrows: The Aims of Education Address at the University of Chicago Conclusion: From Manywheres to the Civilizing Project, and Back Notes References Acknowledgments Index

The Neural Mechanisms of Moral Cognition: A Multiple-Aspect Approach to Moral Judgment and Decision-Making

Abstract: We critically review the mushrooming literature addressing the neural mechanisms of moral cognition (NMMC), reaching the following broad conclusions: (1) research mainly focuses on three inter-related categories: the moral emotions, moral social cognition, and abstract moral reasoning. (2) Research varies in terms of whether it deploys ecologically valid or experimentally simplified conceptions of moral cognition. The more ecologically valid the experimental regime, the broader the brain areas involved. (3) Much of the research depends on simplifying assumptions about the domain of moral reasoning that are motivated by the need to make experimental progress. This is a valuable beginning, but as more is understood about the neural mechanisms of decision-making, more realistic conceptions will need to replace the simplified conceptions. (4) The neural correlates of real-life moral cognition are unlikely to consist in anything remotely like a "moral module" or a "morality center." Moral representations, deliberations and decisions are probably highly distributed and not confined to any particular brain sub-system. Discovering the basic neural principles governing planning, judgment and decision-making will require vastly more basic research in neuroscience, but correlating activity in certain brain regions with well-defined psychological conditions helps guide neural level research. Progress on social phenomena will also require theoretical innov- ation in understanding the brain's distinctly biological form of computation that is anchored by emotions, needs, drives, and the instinct for survival.

Chaos and rules: Should responses to violent crises always be constitutional?

Abstract: Two broad categories of constitutional models have traditionally been invoked in the context of fashioning legal responses to emergencies. According to the "Business as Usual" model, ordinary legal rules continue to be strictly followed with no substantive change even in times of crisis. The law in times of war remains the same as in times of peace. Other models of emergency powers may be grouped together under the general category of "models of accommodation," insofar as they attempt to accommodate, within the existing normative structure, security considerations and needs. Though the ordinary system is kept intact as much as possible, some exceptional adjustments are introduced to accommodate for exigency. The article suggests that these traditional models may not always be adequate. Rather, there may be circumstances when the appropriate method of tackling grave threats entails going outside the legal order, at times even violating otherwise accepted constitutional principles. Such a response, if pursued in appropriate circumstances and properly applied, may strengthen rather than weaken, and result in more rather than less, long-term constitutional fidelity and commitment to the rule of law. The "Extra-Legal Measures" model proposed in the Article informs public officials that they may act extralegally when they believe that such action is necessary for protecting the nation and the public in the face of calamity, provided that they openly and publicly acknowledge the nature of their actions. It is then up to the people to decide, either directly or indirectly (e.g., through their elected representatives in the legislature), how to respond to such actions. The people may decide to hold the actor to the wrongfulness of her actions, demonstrating commitment to the violated principles and values. The acting official may be called to answer, and make legal and political reparations, for her actions. Alternatively, the people may act to approve, post facto, the extralegal actions of the public official. The process leading up to the ratification (or rejection) of those actions promotes deliberation after the fact, as well as establishes the individual responsibility of each member of the relevant community for the actions taken on behalf of the public during the emergency. That very process, with its uncertain outcomes, also serves an important function of slowing down any possible rush to use extralegal powers by governmental agents. By separating the issues of action and ratification, the model adds an element of uncertainty hanging over the head of the public official who needs to decide how to act. That uncertainty raises the cost of taking an extralegal course of action. The model seeks to preserve the long-term relevance of, and obedience to, legal principles, rules, and norms. While going outside the legal order may be a "little wrong," it is advocated in order to facilitate the attainment of a "great right," namely the preservation not only of the constitutional order, but also of its most fundamental principles and tenets. The model promotes, and is promoted by, ethics of political and popular responsibility, political morality, and candor.

Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy

Abstract: In this paper I trace the development of one of the central debates of late twentieth-century moral philosophy-the debate between realism and what Rawls called "constructivism." Realism, I argue, is a reactive position that arises in response to almost every attempt to give a substantive explanation of morality. It results from the realist's belief that such explanations inevitably reduce moral phenomena to natural phenomena. I trace this belief, and the essence of realism, to a view about the nature of concepts-that it is the function of all concepts to describe reality. Constructivism may be understood as the alternative view that a normative concept refers schematically to the solution to a practical problem. A constructivist account of a concept, unlike a traditional analysis, is an attempt to work out the solution to that problem. I explain how the philosophies of Kant and Rawls can be understood on this model.

The Ethics of the Caring Conversation

Abstract: The aim of this study was to explore the ethical foundations for a caring The analysis is based on the ethics of Paul Ricoeur and deals with questions such as what kind of person the nurse ought to be and how she or he engages in caring conversations with suffering others. According to Ricoeur, ethics (the aim of an accomplished life) has primacy over morality (the articulation of aims in norms). At the ethical level, self-esteem and autonomy were shown to be essential for a person (nurse) to act with respect and responsibility. The ethical relationship of a caring conversation was found to metrical, because of the passivity inflicted by suffering. This asymmetry was found to be potentially unethical if not balanced with reciprocity. In the ethical context, the caring conversation is one in which the nurse makes room through the ethos of caritas for a suffering person to regain his or her self-esteem, and thus makes a good life possible.

A Defense of the Common Morality

Abstract: Phenomena of moral conflict and disagreement have led writers in ethics to two antithetical conclusions: Either valid moral distinctions hold universally or they hold relative to a particular and contingent moral framework, and so cannot be applied with universal validly. Responding to three articles in this issue of the Journal that criticize his previously published views on the common morality, the author maintains that one can consistently deny universality to some justified moral norms and claim universality for others. Universality is located on the common morality and nonuniversality in other parts of the moral life, called "particular moralities." The existence of universal moral standards is defended in terms of: (1) a theory of the objectives of morality, (2) an account of the norms that achieve those objectives, and (3) an account of normative justification (both pragmatic and coherentist).

Account episodes in family discourse: the making of morality in everyday interaction:

Abstract: This article investigates account episodes in Italian family dinner conversations and illustrates how sequential patterns and participation are organized in terms of preferences indexical of moral ...