Showing papers on "Morality published in 2007"

The Development of Morality

Abstract: Moral development is examined from the perspective of the major theoretical approaches. The chapter begins with discussion of historical roots of the psychology of morality. The issues accorded greatest emphasis in each approach organize the remainder of the chapter. The first section reviews conceptions of morality based on the idea that character traits constitute morality. The next section deals with approaches emphasizing emotions and processes of internalization of morality. Then comes a discussion of theories proposing that there are substantive differences between females and males in moral orientations. Next attention is given to approaches emphasizing cultural differences in individualism and collectivism, which result in the acquisition of moralities based on the centrality of individuals and rights or the group and duties. Much of the rest of the chapter focuses on approaches that emphasize the role of judgments in the development of morality defined in terms of welfare, justice, and rights. This work has examined how children's multifaceted experiences result in the development of distinct domains of judgment, including the moral, social conventional, and personal domains. The implications of the development of different domains of reasoning for contextual variations and heterogeneity within cultures are considered. Keywords: collectivism; constructivism; contexts; domains; individualism; internalization; justice; morality of care; reciprocal interactions; rights; welfare

Moral emotions and moral behavior

Abstract: Moral emotions represent a key element of our human moral apparatus, influencing the link between moral standards and moral behavior This chapter reviews current theory and research on moral emotions We first focus on a triad of negatively valenced “self-conscious” emotions—shame, guilt, and embarrassment As in previous decades, much research remains focused on shame and guilt We review current thinking on the distinction between shame and guilt, and the relative advantages and disadvantages of these two moral emotions Several new areas of research are highlighted: research on the domain-specific phenomenon of body shame, styles of coping with shame, psychobiological aspects of shame, the link between childhood abuse and later proneness to shame, and the phenomena of vicarious or “collective” experiences of shame and guilt In recent years, the concept of moral emotions has been expanded to include several positive emotions—elevation, gratitude, and the sometimes morally relevant experience o

The new synthesis in moral psychology.

Abstract: People are selfish, yet morally motivated. Morality is universal, yet culturally variable. Such apparent contradictions are dissolving as research from many disciplines converges on a few shared principles, including the importance of moral intuitions, the socially functional (rather than truth-seeking) nature of moral thinking, and the coevolution of moral minds with cultural practices and institutions that create diverse moral communities. I propose a fourth principle to guide future research: Morality is about more than harm and fairness. More research is needed on the collective and religious parts of the moral domain, such as loyalty, authority, and spiritual purity.

When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives Have Moral Intuitions that Liberals May Not Recognize

Abstract: Researchers in moral psychology and social justice have agreed that morality is about matters of harm, rights, and justice. With this definition of morality, conservative opposition to social justice programs has appeared to be immoral, and has been explained as a product of various non-moral processes, such as system justification or social dominance orientation. In this article we argue that, from an anthropological perspective, the moral domain is usually much broader, encompassing many more aspects of social life and valuing institutions as much or more than individuals. We present theoretical and empirical reasons for believing that there are in fact five psychological systems that provide the foundations for the world's many moralities. The five foundations are psychological preparations for detecting and reacting emotionally to issues related to harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. Political liberals have moral intuitions primarily based upon the first two foundations, and therefore misunderstand the moral motivations of political conservatives, who generally rely upon all five foundations.

When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives Have Moral Intuitions that Liberals may not Recognize

Abstract: Researchers in moral psychology and social justice have agreed that morality is about matters of harm, rights, and justice. On this definition of morality, conservative opposition to social justice programs appears to be immoral, and has been explained as a product of various non-moral processes such as system justification or social dominance orientation. In this article we argue that, from an anthropological perspective, the moral domain is usually much broader, encompassing many more aspects of social life and valuing institutions as much or more than individuals. We present theoretical and empirical reasons for believing that there are five psychological systems that provide the foundations for the worlds many moralities. The five foundations are psychological preparations for detecting and reacting emotionally to issues related to harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. Political liberals have moral intuitions primarily based upon the first two foundations, and therefore misunderstand the moral motivations of political conservatives, who generally rely upon all five foundations.

Group virtue: The importance of morality (vs. competence and sociability) in the positive evaluation of in-groups.

Abstract: Although previous research has focused on competence and sociability as the characteristics most important to positive group evaluation, the authors suggest that morality is more important. Studies with preexisting and experimentally created in-groups showed that a set of positive traits constituted distinct factors of morality, competence, and sociability. When asked directly, Study 1 participants reported that their in-group's morality was more important than its competence or sociability. An unobtrusive factor analytic method also showed morality to be a more important explanation of positive in-group evaluation than competence or sociability. Experimental manipulations of morality and competence (Study 4) and morality and sociability (Study 5) showed that only in-group morality affected aspects of the group-level self-concept related to positive evaluation (i.e., pride in, or distancing from, the in-group). Consistent with this finding, identification with experimentally created (Study 2b) and preexisting (Studies 4 and 5) in-groups predicted the ascription of morality, but not competence or sociability, to the in-group.

The Emotional Construction of Morals

Abstract: Preamble: Naturalism and Hume's Law PART I. MORALITY AND EMOTION 1. Emotionism 2. Emotions: Nonmoral and Moral 3. Sensibility Saved 4. Against Objectivity PART II. CONSTRUCTING MORALS 5. Dining with Cannibals 6. The Genealogy of Morals 7. The Limits of Evolutionary Ethics 8. Moral Progress: Beyond Good and Evil?

Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence, and the Future

Abstract: Scientists from various disciplines have begun to focus renewed attention on the psychology and biology of human morality. One research program which has gained attention and has been profiled in Science, Nature, The New York Times, and other publications is universal moral grammar (UMG). UMG seeks to describe the nature and origin of moral knowledge by using concepts and models similar to those used in Chomsky's program in linguistics. This approach is thought to provide a fruitful perspective from which to investigate human moral competence from computational, ontogenetic, behavioral, physiological, and phylogenetic perspectives. In this forthcoming article in Trends in Cognitive Sciences, I outline a framework for UMG and describe some of the evidence supporting it, including recent findings in developmental psychology, legal anthropology, comparative criminal law, and cognitive neuroscience. I also propose a novel computational analysis of trolley problem intuitions, which draws on a diverse set of ideas and traditions, including lexical semantics, common law theory, the philosophy of action, and Marr's three-level approach to cognitive science. Finally, I distinguish UMG from the dual-process model of moral judgment advocated by researchers such as Joshua Greene, Jonathan Haidt, and Cass Sunstein. Unlike Greene, I argue that the critical issue in the theory of moral cognition is not whether moral intuitions are linked to emotions - clearly they are - but how to characterize the appraisal system those intuitions presuppose, and in particular whether that system incorporates elements of a sophisticated jurisprudence. Chomsky transformed linguistics and cognitive science by showing that ordinary language is susceptible to precise formal analysis and by rooting principles of grammar in the human bioprogram. UMG holds out the prospect of doing the same for aspects of ordinary human moral cognition. Initial efforts to explain trolley problem intuitions within this framework suggest that individuals are intuitive lawyers capable of drawing intelligent distinctions between superficially similar cases, although their basis of doing so is often obscure. Future research on moral grammar should begin from this premise, moving beyond the limited example of trolley problems and other doctrinally marginal "dilemmas" to the core concepts of universal fields like torts, contracts, and criminal law, which investigate the rules and representations implicit in common moral intuitions with unparalleled care and sophistication. Chomsky emphasized that rigorous formulation in linguistics is not merely a pointless technical exercise but an important diagnostic and heuristic tool, because only by pushing a precise but inadequate formulation to an unacceptable conclusion can we gain a better understanding of the relevant data and of the inadequacy of our existing attempts to explain them. Likewise, Marr warned against making inferences about cognitive systems from neurophysiological findings without "a clear idea about what information needs to be represented and what processes need to be implemented." Cognitive scientists who take these ideas seriously and who seek to understand human moral cognition must devote more attention to developing computational theories of moral competence. Legal theory will play an important part in this process.

The Ethics of Care and Empathy

Abstract: Eminent moral philosopher Michael Slote argues that care ethics presents an important challenge to other ethical traditions and that a philosophically developed care ethics should, and can, offer its own comprehensive view of the whole of morality. Taking inspiration from British moral sentimentalism and drawing on recent psychological literature on empathy, he shows that the use of that notion allows care ethics to develop its own sentimentalist account of respect, autonomy, social justice, and deontology. Furthermore, he argues that care ethics gives a more persuasive account of these topics than theories offered by contemporary Kantian liberalism. The most philosophically rich and challenging exploration of the theory and practice of care to date, The Ethics of Care and Empathy also shows the manifold connections that can be drawn between philosophical issues and leading ideas in the fields of psychology, education, and women's studies.

Moral Identity and Judgments of Charitable Behaviors

Abstract: In several studies, the authors examine the potential to leverage a consumer's moral identity to enhance brand and company identification and promote goodwill through community relations. Studies 1a and 1b show that even when opportunity costs are equivalent (subjectively or economically), consumers who also have a highly self-important moral identity perceive the act of giving time versus money as more moral and self-expressive. The authors extend these findings to self-reported preferences and establish boundary conditions in two additional studies. Consumers with higher organizational status prefer to give money versus time, but this preference is weaker for those with a highly self-important moral identity (Study 2), and the preference for giving time versus money is more likely to emerge when the moral self is primed and the time given has a moral purpose (Study 3).

Universalism Values and the Inclusiveness of Our Moral Universe

Abstract: Inclusiveness of the moral universe refers to the breadth of the community to which people apply moral values and rules of fairness. A preliminary study establishes the values typically viewed as moral. The author indexes moral inclusiveness at the societal level by the number of value items focused on the welfare of non-in-group members that form a distinct region in a multidimensional scaling analysis (MDS), rather than intermixing with moral values that usually relate to the in-group. Three societal characteristics predict inclusiveness of the moral universe across 66 societies: cultural egalitarianism, cultural embeddedness, and level of democratization. Using representative national samples from 21 countries, the author assesses how the societal level of moral inclusiveness influences relations between individuals' universalism values and their perceptions of immigration, opposition to immigrants from different racial or ethnic groups, and participation in activities that benefit the wider society. F...

Moral breakdown and the ethical demand: A theoretical framework for an anthropology of moralities

Abstract: Recently social scientists in general and anthropologists in particular have invoked the concept of morality in their studies. The use of this concept is seen by many as a way to bypass the complexities and contradictions of such traditional social scientific concepts as culture, society and power. Nevertheless, it is becoming increasingly evident that in many of these studies morality is used in a way that may be more reminiscent of the moral understanding of the social scientist than that of their subjects. Therefore, a well-founded anthropology of moralities must break from this assumption and rethink the ways in which the moral can be explicitly studied. By engaging in a dialogue with 20th-century continental philosophies of sociality and ethics, this article articulates a theory and model by which an explicit anthropology of moralities becomes possible. Two ethnographic examples, utilizing very different methodological techniques and focusing on two very different societies, are used to illustrate th...

Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory

Abstract: * Contents * I. The Tasks of Social Philosophy * Pathologies of the Social: The Past and Present of Social Philosophy * The Possibility of a Disclosing Critique of Society: The Dialectic of Enlightenment in Light of Current Debates in Social Criticism * The Social Dynamics Of Disrespect: On The Location Of Critical Theory Today * Moral Consciousness and Class Domination: Some Problems in the Analysis of Hidden Morality * II. Morality and Recognition * The Other of Justice: Habermas and the Ethical Challenge of Postmodernism. Between Aristotle and Kant: Recognition and Moral Obligation * Between Justice and Affection: The Family as a Field of Moral Disputes * Love and Morality: On the Moral Content of Emotional Ties * Decentered Autonomy: The Subject After the Fall * III. Problems of Political Philosophy * Is Universalism a Moral Trap? The Presuppositions and Limits of a Politics of Human Rights * Democracy as Reflexive Cooperation: John Dewey and the Theory of Democracy Today * Negative Freedom and Cultural Belonging: An Unhealthy Tension in the Political Philosophy of Isaiah Berlin * Post-traditional Communities: A Conceptual Proposal

Moral sentiments and cooperation: Differential influences of shame and guilt

Abstract: For centuries economists and psychologists (Frank, 1988; Ketelaar, 2004; Smith, 1759) have argued that moral emotions motivate cooperation. Ketelaar and Au (2003) recently found first evidence that guilt increases cooperation for proselfs in social bargaining games. We investigated whether this effect would also occur for shame, another moral emotion. Using a dyadic social dilemma game in Experiment 1 and an everyday cooperation measure in Experiment 2 as measures for short-term cooperation, we replicated Ketelaar and Au's findings for guilt. However, as predicted on the basis of previous emotion research, we found no such effect for shame. These results clearly indicate that the effects of moral emotions on cooperative behaviour can only be understood if the specific moral emotion is known.

Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm

Abstract: INTRODUCTION SECTION I: NONCONSEQUENTIALISM AND THE TROLLEY PROBLEM: 1. Nonconsequentialism 2. Aggregation and Two Moral Methods 3. Intention, Harm, and the Possibility of a Unified Theory 4. The Doctrines of Double and Triple Effect and Why a Rational Agent Need Not Intend the Means to His End 5. Toward the Essence of Nonconsequentialist Constraints on Harming: Modality, Productive Purity, and the Greater Good Working Itself Out 6. Harming People in Peter Ungers Living High and Letting Die SECTION II: RIGHTS: 7. Moral Status 8. Rights beyond Interests 9. Conflicts of Rights: A Typology SECTION III: RESPONSIBILITIES: 10. Responsibility and Collaboration 11. Does Distance Matter Morally to the Duty to Rescue? 12. The New Problem of Distance in Morality SECTION IV: OTHERS ETHICS: 13. Peter Singers Ethical Theory 14. Moral Intuitions, Cognitive Psychology, and the Harming/Not-Aiding Distinction 15. Harms, Losses, and Evils in Gerts Moral Theory 16. Owing, Justifying, and Rejecting BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX

Primates and philosophers: how morality evolved

Abstract: A publicação, em 1859, da obra seminal de Charles Darwin (1809-1882) “A Origem das Espécies”, afetou de forma drástica nossa visão de mundo. Com ela, completava-se a demolição do mito de que seríamos o centro do universo, iniciada três séculos atrás com a demonstração de que o sol, e não a Terra, era o centro de nosso sistema solar. A elucidação dos fundamentos do processo evolucionário, que culminou recentemente com a chamada “revolução molecular”, deixou claro que a nossa irmandade com os outros seres vivos não é mais uma alegoria, mas uma fria constatação científica. Com isso, ficava abalada uma tradição judaico-cristã de milênios, de que o mundo fora criado para nos servir e que éramos completamente distintos dos animais, seres sem alma. Essas considerações foram determinadas pela leitura da excelente obra de Frans de Waal. O livro compõe-se de uma Introdução (11 páginas) feita pelos editores da Série do Centro Universitário para Valores Humanos da Universidade de Princeton, Stephen Macedo e Josiah Ober, seguida por três grandes subdivisões. Na Parte I, o autor, membro do Departamento de Psicologia da Universidade de Emory, em Atlanta, EUA, apresenta um resumo de seus estudos de várias décadas sobre o comportamento de primatas, especialmente do chimpanzé (gênero Pan) e do macaco sul-americano Cebus. O eixo mestre deste primeiro ensaio é um ataque decidido ao que ele denominou “Teoria do Verniz”, segundo a qual os seres humanos seriam basicamente maus, e a moralidade humana apenas uma fina camada de verniz desenvolvida pela cultura sobre um conteúdo anti-social, amoral e egoísta. Ao contrário, argumenta ele, uma visão evolucionária da ética permite vislumbrar suas raízes em nossos parentes biológicos mais próximos, como os chimpanzés, nos quais se observa empatia (a condição de poder se colocar na posição de outro ser), simpatia (resposta afetiva ao sofrimento dos outros), comportamento de consolo, gratidão, imparcialidade e preocupação com a comunidade. Em três apêndices, ele considera: a) antropomorfismo e antropo-negação (o perigo de transferir a outros características humanas, ou a fobia para evitar isto); b) sobre se os grandes macacos têm uma teoria da mente; e c) direitos dos animais. No total, são 78 páginas.

Anger at unfairness: is it moral outrage?

Abstract: Anger at unfair treatment has been called moral outrage. However, moral outrage—anger at the violation of a moral standard—should be distinguished from personal anger at being harmed and empathic anger at seeing another for whom one cares harmed. Across a preliminary experiment and a main experiment, both designed to manipulate the appraisal conditions for these three forms of anger, we found evidence of personal anger and empathic anger, but little evidence of moral outrage. Participants perceived unfair treatment of another, even another for whom they had not been induced to feel empathy, to be as unfair as participants perceived unfair treatment of themselves. But the appraisal conditions that evoked anger were unfair treatment of self and unfair treatment of a cared-for other, not unfairness per se. In the absence of empathic concern, unfair treatment of another evoked little anger. Possible implications for understanding moral emotion and moral motivation are suggested. Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Institutions and Culture

Abstract: How and why does distant political and economic history shape the functioning of current institutions? This paper argues that individual values and convictions about the scope of application of norms of good conduct provide the "missing link". Evidence from a variety of sources points to two main findings. First, individual values consistent with generalized (as opposed to limited) morality are widespread in societies that were ruled by non-despotic political institutions in the distant past. Second, well functioning institutions are often observed in countries or regions where individual values are consistent with generalized morality, and under different identifying assumptions this suggests a causal effect from values to institutional outcomes. The paper ends with a discussion of the implications for future research.

Moral personality of brave and caring exemplars.

Abstract: Two contrasting types of moral exemplars were examined so as to identify personality variables associated with moral action. The sample comprised 50 Canadian awardees for either exceptional bravery or caring, as well as 50 comparison participants. Participants responded to a set of personality questionnaires and a life-review interview. Personality variables were found to substantially augment moral cognition in the prediction of exemplary action. In support of the notion that there is a personological core to the moral domain, it was found that moral exemplars were distinguished from the comparison groups by themes embodied in their life narratives. Specifically, moral exemplars had stronger motivational themes of both agency and communion, were more likely to construe critical life events redemptively, more frequently identified helpers in early life, and reported more secure attachments. Furthermore, the personality of caring exemplars was more nurturant, generative, and optimistic than that of brave exemplars; these somewhat divergent personality profiles imply multiple ideals of moral maturity.

Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory

Abstract: Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory. By Simon Caney. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 319p. 24.95 paper.The author's aim in this book is the defense of a “cosmopolitan political morality” that pits cosmopolitan ethics against its communitarian competitors (e.g., realism, the “society of states” tradition, and nationalism) and finds them wanting in relation to a number of key issues: human rights, distributive justice, political institutions, war, and intervention. These issues are addressed in specific chapters, which outline the cosmopolitan positions and then negatively evaluate the alternatives. At the outset, we are informed that this is not intended to be a “neutral account” (p. 3), and the author consistently and methodically picks his way through the book at every turn seeking to reinforce his defense.

Deciding Versus Reacting: Conceptions of Moral Judgment and the Reason-Affect Debate

Abstract: Recent approaches to moral judgment have typically pitted emotion against reason. In an effort to move beyond this debate, we propose that authors presenting diverging models are considering quite different prototypical situations: those focusing on the resolution of complex dilemmas conclude that morality involves sophisticated reasoning, whereas those studying reactions to shocking moral violations find that morality involves quick, affect-laden processes. We articulate these diverging dominant approaches and consider three directions for future research (moral temptation, moral self-image, and lay understandings of morality) that we propose have not received sufficient attention as a result of the focus on these two prototypical situations within moral psychology.

The self as a moral agent: Linking the neural bases of social agency and moral sensitivity

Abstract: The human brain is inherently able to understand the world in moral ways, endowing most of us with an intuitive sense of fairness, concern for others, and observance of cultural norms. We have argued that this moral sensitivity ability depends on a sophisticated integration of cognitive, emotional, and motivational mechanisms, which are modulated by individual experience in different cultural milieus. Different lines of investigation on agency and morality have pointed to overlapping neural systems. Therefore, understanding the relationships between morality and agency may provide key insights into the mechanisms underlying human behavior in several clinical and societal settings. We used functional MRI to investigate the contribution of agency and of specific moral emotions to brain activation using action scripts. Results showed that emotionally neutral agency recruited neural networks previously associated with agency, intentionality and moral cognition, encompassing ventral and subgenual sect...

Harm, Affect, and the Moral/Conventional Distinction.

Abstract: The moral/conventional task has been widely used to study the emergence of moral understanding in children and to explore the defi cits in moral understanding in clinical populations. Previous studies have indicated that moral transgressions, particularly those in which a victim is harmed, evoke a signature pattern of responses in the moral/conventional task: they are judged to be serious, generalizable and not authority dependent. Moreover, this signature pattern is held to be pan-cultural and to emerge early in development. However, almost all the evidence for these claims comes from studies using harmful transgressions of the sort that primary school children might commit in the schoolyard. In a study conducted on the Internet, we used a much wider range of harm transgressions, and found that they do not evoke the signature pattern of responses found in studies using only schoolyard transgressions. Paralleling other recent work, our study provides preliminary grounds for skepticism regarding many conclusions drawn from earlier research using the moral/conventional task.

Between Reproduction and Freedom: Morality, Value, and Radical Cultural Change

Abstract: Two broad trends mark the emerging anthropology of morality. One, following Durkheim, sees all routine, normative social action as moral. The other, in direct opposition to this, defines an action as moral only when actors understand themselves to perform it on the basis of free choices they have made. I argue that both approaches capture aspects of the social experience of morality. In light of this, a key question becomes how to explain why in any given society some cultural domains are dominated by Durkheimian moralities of reproduction while others encourage people to construe moral action in terms of freedom and choice. I argue that a model of cultures as structured by values can help us explain why cultural domains differ in this way and that the study of situations of radical cultural change reveals this with great clarity, as I show with data from Papua New Guinea.

Moral Hypocrisy: Social Groups and the Flexibility of Virtue

Abstract: People are capable of performing unambiguously immoral acts (Darley, 1992; Staub, 1989), but appear equipped with the psychological mechanisms to relieve themselves of responsibility (Bandura, 1990, 1996). Indeed, moral hypocrisy has been conceptualized as an individual’s ability to hold a belief while acting in discord with it (Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997). An equally unsettling, and perhaps more socially relevant, type of hypocrisy could be an interpersonal phenomenon whereby individuals’ evaluations of their own moral transgressions differ substantially from their evaluations of the same transgressions enacted by others. If such hypocrisy is common, there is good reason to theorize that this asymmetric charity might extend beyond the self. Specifically, group affiliation might stand as a limit on the radius of one’s ‘‘moral circle,’’ qualifying in-group members for the same leniency that individuals apply to their own transgressions. To the extent that the group stands as an important source of self-definition, one may have an interest in protecting the sanctity of that entity. Indeed, ‘‘in-group morality’’ has been posited as a fundamental moral intuition (Haidt & Graham, in press). To examine these hypotheses, we modified a paradigm developed by Batson et al. (1997). In one condition, subjects were required to distribute a resource (i.e., time and energy) to themselves and another person, and could do so either fairly (i.e., through a random allocation procedure) or unfairly (i.e., selecting the better option for themselves). They were then asked to evaluate the morality, or fairness, of their actions. In another condition, subjects viewed a confederate acting in the unfair manner, and subsequently evaluated the morality of this act. We defined hypocrisy as the discrepancy between the fairness judgments for this same transgression when committed by the self or by the other. To determine if hypocrisy would extend beyond the self, we included two additional conditions in which subjects judged the unfair action of a confederate who was either a member of their in-group or a member of an out-group. If hypocrisy emerged in these conditions as well, it would suggest flexibility in the radial boundaries of hypocrisy as a function of the target’s affiliation with the self. Using minimal groups to demonstrate such variability would constitute themost strict and compelling test of our hypothesis, revealing the deep-seated nature of hypocrisy.

Aristotle, emotions, and education

Abstract: What can Aristotle teach us that is relevant to contemporary moral and educational concerns? What can we learn from him about the nature of moral development, the justifiability and educability of emotions, the possibility of friendship between parents and their children, or the fundamental aims of teaching? The message of this book is that Aristotle has much to teach us about those issues and many others. In a formidable display of boundary-breaking scholarship, drawing upon the domains of philosophy, education and psychology, KristjAin KristjAinsson analyses and dispels myriad misconceptions about Aristotle’s views on morality, emotions and education that abound in the current literature - including the claims of the emotional intelligence theorists that they have revitalised Aristotle’s message for the present day. The book proceeds by enlightening and astute forays into areas covered by Aristotle’s canonical works, while simultaneously gauging their pertinence for recent trends in moral education. This is an arresting book on how to balance the demands of head and heart: a book that deepens the contemporary discourse on emotion cultivation and virtuous living and one that will excite any student of moral education, whether academic or practitioner.