Showing papers on "Morality published in 2020"

The Elementary Forms of Religious Life

Abstract: "Karen Fields has given us a splendid new translation of the greatest work of sociology ever written, one we will not be embarrassed to assign to our students. In addition she has written a brilliant and profound introduction. The publication of this translation is an occasion for general celebration, for a veritable 'collective effervescence.' -- Robert N. Bellah Co-author of Habits of the Heart, and editor of Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society "This superb new translation finally allows non-French speaking American readers fully to appreciate Durkheim's genius. It is a labor of love for which all scholars must be grateful." --Lewis A. Coser

Ethics of Belief

Abstract: The broad question asked under the heading “Ethics of Belief” is: What ought one believe? An ethics of belief attempts to uncover the norms that guide belief formation and maintenance The dominant view among contemporary philosophers is that evidential norms do; I should always follow my evidence and only believe when the evidence is sufficient to support my belief This view is called “evidentialism,” although, as we shall see, this term gets applied to a number of views that can be distinguished from one another Evidentialists often cite David Hume (1999: 110) as their historic exemplar who said “a wise man … proportions his beliefs to the evidence” and thus argued against the reasonableness of believing in miracles (see Hume, David; Wisdom) Those who argue that there can be good practical reasons for believing, independent of one's evidence, can turn for inspiration to Blaise Pascal (1966: 124), who argued that the best reason to form a belief in God was a practical one, namely the possibility of avoiding eternal suffering (see Reasons; Reasons for Action, Morality and; Faith) Keywords: ethics; James, William; philosophy; Williams, Bernard; duty and obligation; knowledge; rationality; responsibility

Aligning AI With Shared Human Values

Abstract: We show how to assess a language model's knowledge of basic concepts of morality. We introduce the ETHICS dataset, a new benchmark that spans concepts in justice, well-being, duties, virtues, and commonsense morality. Models predict widespread moral judgments about diverse text scenarios. This requires connecting physical and social world knowledge to value judgements, a capability that may enable us to steer chatbot outputs or eventually regularize open-ended reinforcement learning agents. With the ETHICS dataset, we find that current language models have a promising but incomplete ability to predict basic human ethical judgements. Our work shows that progress can be made on machine ethics today, and it provides a steppingstone toward AI that is aligned with human values.

The moral psychology of obligation.

Abstract: Although psychologists have paid scant attention to the sense of obligation as a distinctly human motivation, moral philosophers have identified two of its key features: First, it has a peremptory, demanding force, with a kind of coercive quality, and second, it is often tied to agreement-like social interactions (e.g., promises) in which breaches prompt normative protest, on the one side, and apologies, excuses, justifications, and guilt on the other. Drawing on empirical research in comparative and developmental psychology, I provide here a psychological foundation for these unique features by showing that the human sense of obligation is intimately connected developmentally with the formation of a shared agent “we,” which not only directs collaborative efforts but also self-regulates them. Thus, children's sense of obligation is first evident inside, but not outside, of collaborative activities structured by joint agency with a partner, and it is later evident in attitudes toward in-group, but not out-group, members connected by collective agency. When you and I voluntarily place our fate in one another's hands in interdependent collaboration – scaled up to our lives together in an interdependent cultural group – this transforms the instrumental pressure that individuals feel when pursuing individual goals into the pressure that “we” put on me (who needs to preserve my cooperative identity in this “we”) to live up to our shared expectations: a we > me self-regulation. The human sense of obligation may therefore be seen as a kind of self-conscious motivation.

From ethics washing to ethics bashing: a view on tech ethics from within moral philosophy

Abstract: The word 'ethics' is under siege in technology policy circles. Weaponized in support of deregulation, self-regulation or handsoff governance, "ethics" is increasingly identified with technology companies' self-regulatory efforts and with shallow appearances of ethical behavior. So-called "ethics washing" by tech companies is on the rise, prompting criticism and scrutiny from scholars and the tech community at large. In parallel to the growth of ethics washing, its condemnation has led to a tendency to engage in "ethics bashing." This consists in the trivialization of ethics and moral philosophy now understood as discrete tools or pre-formed social structures such as ethics boards, self-governance schemes or stakeholder groups. The misunderstandings underlying ethics bashing are at least threefold: (a) philosophy and "ethics" are seen as a communications strategy and as a form of instrumentalized cover-up or facade for unethical behavior, (b) philosophy is understood in opposition and as alternative to political representation and social organizing and (c) the role and importance of moral philosophy is downplayed and portrayed as mere "ivory tower" intellectualization of complex problems that need to be dealt with in practice. This paper argues that the rhetoric of ethics and morality should not be reductively instrumentalized, either by the industry in the form of "ethics washing," or by scholars and policy-makers in the form of "ethics bashing." Grappling with the role of philosophy and ethics requires moving beyond both tendencies and seeing ethics as a mode of inquiry that facilitates the evaluation of competing tech policy strategies. In other words, we must resist narrow reductivism of moral philosophy as instrumentalized performance and renew our faith in its intrinsic moral value as a mode of knowledgeseeking and inquiry. Far from mandating a self-regulatory scheme or a given governance structure, moral philosophy in fact facilitates the questioning and reconsideration of any given practice, situating it within a complex web of legal, political and economic institutions. Moral philosophy indeed can shed new light on human practices by adding needed perspective, explaining the relationship between technology and other worthy goals, situating technology within the human, the social, the political. It has become urgent to start considering technology ethics also from within and not only from outside of ethics.

Misinformation and Morality: Encountering Fake-News Headlines Makes Them Seem Less Unethical to Publish and Share:

Abstract: People may repeatedly encounter the same misinformation when it "goes viral." The results of four main experiments (two preregistered) and a pilot experiment (total N = 2,587) suggest that repeatedly encountering misinformation makes it seem less unethical to spread-regardless of whether one believes it. Seeing a fake-news headline one or four times reduced how unethical participants thought it was to publish and share that headline when they saw it again-even when it was clearly labeled as false and participants disbelieved it, and even after we statistically accounted for judgments of how likeable and popular it was. In turn, perceiving the headline as less unethical predicted stronger inclinations to express approval of it online. People were also more likely to actually share repeated headlines than to share new headlines in an experimental setting. We speculate that repeating blatant misinformation may reduce the moral condemnation it receives by making it feel intuitively true, and we discuss other potential mechanisms that might explain this effect.

Scruples: A Corpus of Community Ethical Judgments on 32,000 Real-Life Anecdotes

Abstract: As AI systems become an increasing part of people's everyday lives, it becomes ever more important that they understand people's ethical norms. Motivated by descriptive ethics, a field of study that focuses on people's descriptive judgments rather than theoretical prescriptions on morality, we investigate a novel, data-driven approach to machine ethics. We introduce Scruples, the first large-scale dataset with 625,000 ethical judgments over 32,000 real-life anecdotes. Each anecdote recounts a complex ethical situation, often posing moral dilemmas, paired with a distribution of judgments contributed by the community members. Our dataset presents a major challenge to state-of-the-art neural language models, leaving significant room for improvement. However, when presented with simplified moral situations, the results are considerably more promising, suggesting that neural models can effectively learn simpler ethical building blocks. A key take-away of our empirical analysis is that norms are not always clean-cut; many situations are naturally divisive. We present a new method to estimate the best possible performance on such tasks with inherently diverse label distributions, and explore likelihood functions that separate intrinsic from model uncertainty.

The Importance of Context in Moral Judgments

Abstract: There is a gap between morality as experienced and morality as studied. In our personal and professional lives, moral judgments are embedded within a specific context. We know the who, what, where,...

Morality and Mathematics

Abstract: This book explores arguments for and against moral realism and mathematical realism, how they interact, and what they can tell us about areas of philosophical interest more generally. It argues that our mathematical beliefs have no better claim to being self-evident or provable than our moral beliefs. Nor do our mathematical beliefs have better claim to being empirically justified. It is also incorrect that reflection on the “genealogy” of our moral beliefs establishes a lack of parity between the cases. In general, if one is a moral anti-realist on the basis of epistemological considerations, then one ought to be a mathematical anti-realist too. And yet, the book argues that moral realism and mathematical realism do not stand or fall together – and for a surprising reason. Moral questions, insofar as they are practical, are objective in a sense in which mathematical questions are not, and the sense in which they are objective can only be explained by assuming practical anti-realism. It follows that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which have been widely identified, are actually in tension. The author concludes that the objective questions in the neighborhood of questions of logic, modality, grounding, nature, and more are practical questions as well. Practical philosophy should, therefore, take center stage.

The Emergence of Moral Leadership

Abstract: The emergence of “moral leadership,” discussed here as a situation wherein individuals take a moral stance on an issue, convince others to do the same, and together spur change in a moral system, a...

The malleable morality of conspicuous consumption.

Abstract: Conspicuous consumption has often been decried as immoral by many philosophers and scholars, yet it is ubiquitous and widely embraced. This research sheds light on the apparent paradox by proposing that the perceived morality of conspicuous consumption is malleable, contingent upon how different moral lenses highlight the different characteristics embedded in the behavior. Utilizing the Moral Foundations Theory, we demonstrate that the individualizing values (i.e., equality and welfare) make people focus on the self-enhancing characteristics of conspicuous consumption, making it seem morally objectionable. However, the binding values (i.e., deference to authority, in-group loyalty, and purity) make people focus on the social identity signaling characteristic of conspicuous consumption, making it seem morally permissible. First, an archival dataset shows that the prevalence of the different moral values predicts per-capita spending on luxury goods across different countries. Then, 6 studies (N = 2903) show that the trait endorsement and the momentary salience of the different moral foundations can influence the moral judgment of conspicuous consumption as well as the propensity to engage in conspicuous consumption. Further, analyses show that the effect of the binding values (individualizing values) is mediated by heightened sensitivity to the social identity signaling (self-enhancing) aspects of conspicuous consumption. Finally, the studies demonstrate that the effect is moderated by the extent of social visibility during consumption. Thus, this research suggests that some moral values can, somewhat paradoxically, increase conspicuous consumption. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

What we owe to family: The impact of special obligations on moral judgment

Abstract: Although people often recognize the moral value of impartial behavior (i.e., not favoring specific individuals), it is unclear when, if ever, people recognize the moral value of partiality. The current studies investigated whether information about special obligations to specific individuals, particularly kin, is integrated into moral judgments. In Studies 1 and 2, agents who helped a stranger were judged as more morally good and trustworthy than those who helped kin, but agents who helped a stranger, instead of kin were judged as less morally good and trustworthy than those who did the opposite. In Studies 3 and 4, agents who simply neglected a stranger were judged as less morally bad and untrustworthy than those who neglected kin. Study 4 also demonstrated that the violation (vs. fulfillment) of perceived obligations underlaid all judgment patterns. Study 5 demonstrated boundary conditions: When occupying roles requiring impartiality, agents who helped a stranger instead of kin were judged as more morally good and trustworthy than agents who did the opposite. These findings illuminate the importance of obligations in structuring moral judgment.

HONNETH, Axel. Luta por reconhecimento: a gramática moral dos conflitos sociais. São Paulo: Editora 34, 2003.

Abstract: The present review aims to synthesize the theory of recognition developed by Axel Honneth in his work “The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts". His study contains three chapters that interconnect within the methodology used by Critical Theory. First, the author proposes a historical presentification, indicating Hegel's original idea. Subsequently, Honneth updates the structure of social relations of recognition proposed by Hegel; and concludes, pointing out the perspectives of social philosophy, by indicating the aspects of morality and the evolution of society.

Sex differences in moral judgements across 67 countries.

Abstract: Most of the empirical research on sex differences and cultural variations in morality has relied on within-culture analyses or small-scale cross-cultural data. To further broaden the scientific und...

Moral incongruence and compulsive sexual behavior: Results from cross-sectional interactions and parallel growth curve analyses.

Abstract: Despite controversies about the diagnosis, the World Health Organization recently elected to include compulsive sexual behavior disorder in the 11th edition of the International Classification of Diseases. Both recent and remote works have suggested that various cultural factors such as personal religiousness and morality can influence both the experience and expression of compulsive sexual behaviors. Because prior works have indicated that pornography use is likely to be the most common expression of compulsive sexual behavior, the present work sought to examine whether moral incongruence about pornography use may account for a substantive part of self-reports of compulsive sexual behavior. In 2 studies involving 4 samples, the present work tested the hypothesis that moral incongruence would positively predict self-reported compulsivity in pornography use. In Study 1, across 3 samples (Sample 1, N = 467; Sample 2, N = 739; Sample 3, N = 1,461), including 2 matched to U.S. nationally representative norms (Samples 2 and 3), results indicated that moral incongruence was a substantive and robust predictor of self-reported compulsivity. In Study 2 (baseline N = 850), parallel process latent growth curve analyses over the course of 1 year revealed that the trajectories of pornography use, self-reported compulsivity, and moral disapproval of such use covaried together over time. Collectively, these results underscore the contention that personal morality may influence individuals' self-perceptions of their sexual behaviors, which, in turn, may complicate efforts to accurately diagnose compulsive sexual behavior disorder. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

The Moral Microfoundations of Institutional Complexity: Sustainability implementation as compromise-making at an oil sands company:

Abstract: Research on institutional complexity has overlooked the fact that moral judgements are likely involved when individuals face a plurality of logics within organizations. To analyse the moral microfo...

How Do People Evaluate Foreign Aid To ‘Nasty’ Regimes?

Abstract: Recent theories of foreign aid assume that moral motives drive voters’ preferences about foreign aid. However, little is known about how moral concerns interact with the widely accepted instrumental goals that aid serves. Moreover, what effects does this interplay have on preferences over policy actions? This article assesses these questions using a survey experiment in which respondents evaluate foreign aid policies toward nasty recipient regimes (those that violate human rights, rig elections, crack down on media, etc.). The results indicate that the public does have a strong aversion to providing aid to nasty recipient regimes, but that it also appreciates the instrumental benefits that aid helps acquire. Contrary to a mainstay assertion in the literature, the study finds that moral aversion can largely be reversed if the donor government engages more with the nasty country. These findings call into question the micro-foundations of recent theories of foreign aid, and produce several implications for the aid literature.

What do we owe to intelligent robots

Abstract: Great technological advances in such areas as computer science, artificial intelligence, and robotics have brought the advent of artificially intelligent robots within our reach within the next century. Against this background, the interdisciplinary field of machine ethics is concerned with the vital issue of making robots “ethical” and examining the moral status of autonomous robots that are capable of moral reasoning and decision-making. The existence of such robots will deeply reshape our socio-political life. This paper focuses on whether such highly advanced yet artificially intelligent beings will deserve moral protection (in the form of being granted moral rights) once they become capable of moral reasoning and decision-making. I argue that we are obligated to grant them moral rights once they have become full ethical agents, i.e., subjects of morality. I present four related arguments in support of this claim and thereafter examine four main objections to the idea of ascribing moral rights to artificial intelligent robots.

Individual moral disengagement and bystander behavior in bullying: the role of moral distress and collective moral disengagement

Abstract: Objective: Bullying research has recently focused on how moral cognitions and emotions shape the bullying context, though research has less assessed whether and how morality influences the bystande ...

Greater Goods: Morality and Attitudes toward the Use of Nuclear Weapons:

Abstract: Recent research into the public’s attitude toward the use of nuclear weapons repeats long-standing mistakes in how international relations theorists think about morality. Falsely equating consequen...

On the Moral Justification of Statistical Parity

Abstract: A crucial but often neglected aspect of algorithmic fairness is the question of how we justify enforcing a certain fairness metric from a moral perspective. When fairness metrics are proposed, they are typically argued for by highlighting their mathematical properties. Rarely are the moral assumptions beneath the metric explained. Our aim in this paper is to consider the moral aspects associated with the statistical fairness criterion of independence (statistical parity). To this end, we consider previous work, which discusses the two worldviews "What You See Is What You Get" (WYSIWYG) and "We're All Equal" (WAE) and by doing so provides some guidance for clarifying the possible assumptions in the design of algorithms. We present an extension of this work, which centers on morality. The most natural moral extension is that independence needs to be fulfilled if and only if differences in predictive features (e.g. high school grades and standardized test scores are predictive of performance at university) between socio-demographic groups are caused by unjust social disparities or measurement errors. Through two counterexamples, we demonstrate that this extension is not universally true. This means that the question of whether independence should be used or not cannot be satisfactorily answered by only considering the justness of differences in the predictive features.

The generation and function of moral emotions in teams: An integrative review

Abstract: By considering moral emotions in light of a team context, we offer a new way of thinking about the socially embedded nature of moral emotions and how they influence various types of ethical behaviors in teams. To achieve this goal, we review the key literature on moral emotions within teams. We integrate this literature with Bandura's (1991, 2002, 2008) theory of moral thought and action, coupled with the social functional account of emotions (Keltner & Haidt, 1999) to examine how team norms are connected, through their influence on individual team members' moral emotions, to ethical behavior within team contexts. This review and integration highlights how team norms regarding moral approbation and moral perspective taking influence members' proscriptive (e.g., fear, guilt, shame, embarrassment) and prescriptive (e.g., sympathy/compassion, pride) moral emotions. In turn, each of these moral emotions has unique action tendencies linked to 1 or more of 3 different types of ethical behaviors witnessed in teams: compliance behaviors, humanistic behaviors, and supererogatory behaviors. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Ethical Decision Making in Autonomous Vehicles: The AV Ethics Project.

Abstract: The ethics of autonomous vehicles (AV) has received a great amount of attention in recent years, specifically in regard to their decisional policies in accident situations in which human harm is a likely consequence. Starting from the assumption that human harm is unavoidable, many authors have developed differing accounts of what morality requires in these situations. In this article, a strategy for AV decision-making is proposed, the Ethical Valence Theory, which paints AV decision-making as a type of claim mitigation: different road users hold different moral claims on the vehicle's behavior, and the vehicle must mitigate these claims as it makes decisions about its environment. Using the context of autonomous vehicles, the harm produced by an action and the uncertainties connected to it are quantified and accounted for through deliberation, resulting in an ethical implementation coherent with reality. The goal of this approach is not to define how moral theory requires vehicles to behave, but rather to provide a computational approach that is flexible enough to accommodate a number of 'moral positions' concerning what morality demands and what road users may expect, offering an evaluation tool for the social acceptability of an autonomous vehicle's ethical decision making.

Persistence and Change in Morality Policy: The Role of the Catholic Church in the Politics of Abortion in Ireland and Poland:

Abstract: On the issue of abortion, Ireland and Poland have been among the most conservative countries in Europe. Their legal and cultural approaches to this issue have been deeply influenced by the institut...

Causation, Responsibility, and Harm: How the Discursive Shift from Law and Ethics to Social Justice Sealed the Plight of Nonhuman Animals.

Abstract: Moral and political philosophers no longer condemn harm inflicted on nonhuman animals as self-evidently as they did when animal welfare and animal rights advocacy was at the forefront in the 1980s, and sentience, suffering, species-typical behavior, and personhood were the basic concepts of the discussion. The article shows this by comparing the determination with which societies seek responsibility for human harm to the relative indifference with which law and morality react to nonhuman harm. When harm is inflicted on humans, policies concerning negligence and duty of care and principles such as the 'but for' rule and the doctrine of double effect are easily introduced. When harm is inflicted on nonhumans, this does not happen, at least not any more. As an explanation for the changed situation, the article offers a shift in discussion and its basic terminology. Simple ethical considerations supported the case for nonhuman animals, but many philosophers moved on to debate different views on political justice instead. This allowed the creation of many conflicting views that are justifiable on their own presuppositions. In the absence of a shared foundation, this fragments the discussion, focuses it on humans, and ignores or marginalizes nonhuman animals.

Theorizing Moral Cognition: Culture in Action, Situations, and Relationships:

Abstract: Dual-process theories of morality are approaches to moral cognition that stress the varying significance of emotion and deliberation in shaping judgments of action. Sociological research that build...

Retracted: Corporate social responsibility, work meaningfulness, and employee engagement: The joint moderating effects of incremental moral belief and moral identity centrality

Abstract: This study investigated the mediating role of work meaningfulness on the relationship between employees' perception about organization's corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices and their engagement. Moreover, the joint moderating effects of incremental moral belief and moral identity centrality were also tested. Utilizing survey‐based data, this study analyzed the responses of 622 employees working in various industries. Results showed that incremental morality beliefs strengthened the effect of CSR perceptions on work meaningfulness, especially when moral identity centrality was weaker. Specifically, CSR perceptions had the strongest positive effect on work meaningfulness among employees with stronger incremental morality beliefs and weaker moral identity centrality. Another interesting finding of this study was that incremental morality beliefs strengthened the effect of CSR perception on employee engagement via work meaningfulness, especially when moral identity centrality was lower. This study found that CSR perceptions had the strongest positive effect on employee engagement via work meaningfulness among employees with stronger incremental morality beliefs and weaker moral identity centrality. The findings confirmed that incremental morality beliefs and moral identity centrality jointly moderated these relationships.