Morality

About: Morality is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 22623 publications have been published within this topic receiving 545733 citations. The topic is also known as: moral & morals.

The I in We: Studies in the Theory of Recognition

Abstract: Preface I. Hegelian Roots From Desire to Recognition: Hegel's Grounding of Self-Consciousness The Realm of Actualized Freedom: Hegel's Notion of a "Philosophy of Right" II. Systematic Consequences The Fabric of Justice: On the Limits of Contemporary Proceduralism Labour and Recognition: A Redefinition Recognition as Ideology: The Connection between Morality and Power Dissolutions of the Social: The Social Theory of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thevenot Philosophy as Social Research: David Miller's Theory of Justice III. Social and Theoretical Applications Recognition between States: On the Moral Substrate of International Relations Organized Self-Realisation: Paradoxes of Individualisation Paradoxes of Capitalist Modernisation: A Research Programme (with Martin Hartmann) IV. Psychoanalytical Ramifications The Work of Negativity: A Recognition-Theoretical Revision of Psychoanalysis The I in the We: Recognition as a Driving Force of Group Formation Facets of the Presocial Self: A Rejoinder to Joel Whitebook Disempowering Reality: Secular Forms of Consolation

Rationality, Morality, and Exit

Abstract: The morality and rationality issue is explored from an Axelrod-type perspective; that is, it is discussed in terms of recurrent-prisoner's-dilemma-type games and behavioral strategies or programs for playing them. We argue that intuitive notions of rationality and morality can be shown to be mutually compatible if two assumptions are made: (1) that morality is specified as a general behavioral disposition or program whose rationality is to be determined in comparison to alternative behavioral programs and (2) that the recurrent game is specified as a prisoner's dilemma game with an exit option. The results of a simulation experiment are presented, showing that a “moral program” (specified as one that never defects, but exits in response to an opponents defection) is successful in competition with a variety of alternative programs, including Tit for Tat.

Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory

Abstract: Is there a limit to the legitimate demands of morality? In particular, is there a limit to people's responsibility to promote the well-being of others, either directly or via social institutions? Utilitarianism admits no such limit, and is for that reason often said to be an unacceptably demanding moral and political view. In this original new study, Murphy argues that the charge of excessive demands amounts to little more than an affirmation of the status quo. The real problem with utilitarianism is that it makes unfair demands on people who comply with it in our world of nonideal compliance. Murphy shows that this unfairness does not arise on a collective understanding of our responsibility for others' well being. Thus, according to Murphy, while there is no general problem to be raised about the extent of moral demands, there is a pressing need to acknowledge the collective nature of the demands of beneficence.

Embodying the Faith: Religious Practice and the Making of a Muslim Moral Habitus

Abstract: Despite a number of contemporary theoretical works in sociology and moral philosophy arguing that the project of modern selfhood is necessarily a deeply moral endeavor, there are few empirical studies examining the specific ways in which social actors construct moral selves and lives. Utilizing ethnographic fieldwork and in-depth interviews, this article examines how a group of adult Muslim converts in Missouri produced new moral selves in and through the use of embodied religious practices. Drawing on the theoretical insights of Bourdieu, I demonstrate how the embodied religious practices of ritual prayer, fasting and covering formed within converts the moral dispositions, or habitus, associated with becoming a "good Muslim".

Where in the brain is morality? Everywhere and maybe nowhere.

Abstract: The neuroscience of morality has focused on how morality works and where it is in the brain. In tackling these questions, researchers have taken both domain-specific and domain-general approaches—searching for neural substrates and systems dedicated to moral cognition versus characterizing the contributions of domain-general processes. Where in the brain is morality? On one hand, morality is made up of complex cognitive processes, deployed across many domains and housed all over the brain. On the other hand, no neural substrate or system that uniquely supports moral cognition has been found. In this review, we will discuss early assumptions of domain-specificity in moral neuroscience as well as subsequent investigations of domain-general contributions, taking emotion and social cognition (i.e., theory of mind) as case studies. Finally, we will consider possible cognitive accounts of a domain-specific morality: Does uniquely moral cognition exist?