Morality

About: Morality is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 22623 publications have been published within this topic receiving 545733 citations. The topic is also known as: moral & morals.

The idea of human rights : four inquiries

Abstract: Inspired by a 1988 trip to El Salvador, Michael J. Perry's new book is a personal and scholarly exploration of the idea of human rights. Perry is one of our nation's leading authorities on the relation of morality, including religious morality, to politics and law. He seeks, in this book, to disentangle the complex idea of human rights by way of four probing and interrelated essays. * The initial essay, which is animated by Perry's skepticism about the capacity of any secular morality to offer a coherent account of the idea of human rights, suggests that the first part of the idea of human rights-the premise that every human being is "sacred" or "inviolable"-is inescapably religious. * Responding to recent criticism of "rights talk", Perry explicates, in his second essay, the meaning and value of talk about human rights. * In his third essay, Perry asks a fundamental question about human rights: Are they universal? In addressing this question, he disaggregates and criticizes several different varieties of "moral relativism" and then considers the implications of these different relativist positions for claims about human rights. * Perry turns to another fundamental question about human rights in his final essay: Are they absolute? He concludes that even if no human rights, understood as moral rights, are absolute or unconditional, some human rights, understood as international legal rights, are-and indeed, should be-absolute. In the introduction, Perry writes: "Of all the influential-indeed, formative-moral ideas to take center stage in the twentieth century, like democracy and socialism, the idea of human rights (which, again, in one form or another, is an old idea) is, for many, the most difficult. It is the most difficult in the sense that it is, for many, the hardest of the great moral ideas to integrate, the hardest to square, with the reigning intellectual assumptions of the age, especially what Bernard Williams has called 'Nietzsche's thought': 'There is not only no God, but no metaphysical order of any kind...' For those who accept 'Nietzsche's thought', can the idea of human rights possibly be more than a kind of aesthetic preference? In a culture in which it was widely believed that there is no God or metaphysical order of any kind, on what basis, if any, could the idea of human rights long survive?" The Idea of Human Rights: Four Inquiries will appeal to students of many disciplines, including (but not limited to) law, philosophy, religion, and politics. Of all the influential-indeed, formative-moral ideas to occupy centre stage in the twentieth century, the notion of human rights is for many the most difficult.

Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice

Abstract: Introduction and Precis PART I: CONCEPTS 1: LYING Introduction 1.1 MY DEFINITION OF LYING 1.I.1 Lies and Falsehoods 1.I.2 Falsehoods and Lies 1.I.3 A Reformulation of the Dictionary Definitions 1.I.4 Lying and the Right to Know the Truth 1.I.5 That the Intent to Deceive is not Necessary for Lying 1.I.6 Chisholm and Feehan's Definition 1.I.7 My Definition of Lying (A Preliminary Version) 1.I.8 "A Defence of the Transparency Thesis" 1.I.9 The Concept of Warranting 1.I.10 Conditions for Warranting the Truth of a Statement 1.I.11 Yet Another Revision 1.I.12 A Complication of My Final Definition 1.I.13 Some Comments on this Definition 1.I.14 An Objection: The Concept of Assertion Fried Williams Chisholm and Feehan 1.I.15 Reasons to Accept my Definition 1.II REPLIES TO CRITICISMS OF MY DEFINITION 1.II.1 Sorensen 1.II.2 Fallis Conclusions Endnotes 2. DECEPTION AND RELATED CONCEPTS Introduction 2.I DECEPTION 2.I.2 Several Objections and Modified Versions of My Definition 2.I.3 Some Considerations Relevant to Later Parts of the Book 2.II KEEPING SOMEONE IN THE DARK 2.III THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LYING, DECEPTION, KEEPING SOMEONE IN THE DARK, CONCEALING INFORMATION, AND WITHHOLDING INFORMATION 2.III.1 The Difference between Lying and Deception 2.III.2 Deception Versus Witholding Information 2.III.3 Concealing Information, Withholding Information, and Deception 2.IV TWO RELATED NOTIONS: "SPIN" AND "HALF-TRUTHS" 2.V BULLSHIT 2.V.1 Frankfurt on Bullshit, Deception, and Lying 2.V.2 Bullshit and Lack of Concern with the Truth 2.V.3 Bullshit Does Not Require the Intention to Deceive 2.V.4 Lying Can Constitute Producing Bullshit 2.V.5 Bullshitters Can be Concerned with the Truth of What they Say 2.VI A VERY BRIEF NOTE ON HONESTY Endnotes PART II: MORAL THEORY IIA NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORY 3. KANT AND THE ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION AGAINST LYING Introduction 3.I KANT'S CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE 3.I.1 The Universal Law Formulation of the Categorical Imperative 3.I.2 Perfect and Imperfect Duties 3.I.3 The Second and Third Versions of the Categorical Imperative 3.II WHAT KANT SAYS ABOUT THE MORALITY OF LYING 3.II.1 The Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) 3.II.2 Metaphysics of Morals (1797) 3.II.3 "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropic Concerns" 3.II.4 Allan Wood's Alternative Reading of "On a Supposed Right..." 3.II.5 Lectures on Ethics 3.III DOES THE FIRST VERSION OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE IMPLY THAT LYING IS ALWAYS WRONG? 3.IV DOES THE SECOND VERSION OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE IMPLY THAT LYING IS ALWAYS WRONG? 3.V A ROSSIAN ARGUMENT FOR THINKING THAT LYING IS SOMETIMES MORALLY PERMISSABLE Conclusions Endnotes 4. ACT-UTILITARIANISM Introduction 4.I THE DEFINITION OF (ACT) UTILITARIANISM Act and Rule Utilitarianism/Consequentialism 4.II GUIDE TO ACTION VERSUS CRITERION OF RIGHT AND WRONG 4.III THE IMPLICATIONS OF ACT-UTILITARIANISM FOR ISSUES OF LYING AND DECEPTION Direct Bad Consequences of Lying and Deception Conclusions and Transition to Chapter 5 Endnotes 5. ROSS AND RULE-CONSEQUENTIALISM Introduction 5.I ROSS'S THEORY 5.I.1 The Concept of Prima Facie Duty 5.I.2 Ross's List of Prima Facie Duties 5.I.3 Applying Ross's Theory to Cases 5.I.4 How Strong is the Moral Presumption against Lying? 5.II ROSS'S CRITICISMS OF ACT-UTILITARIANISM 5.II.1 Ross and Utilitarianism on Promise Keeping 5.II.2 Ross's Arguments about Promise-Keeping Modified to Apply to Cases of Lying 5.III ROSS ON THE BASIS OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF FUNDAMENTAL MORAL PRINCIPLES 5.III.1 Self-Evidence 5.III.2 The Data of Ethics 5.IV CRITICISMS OF ROSS'S VIEW ABOUT THE BASIS OF MORAL KNOWLEDGE 5.IV.1 Self-Evident Knowledge 5.IV.2 The Moral Convictions of Thoughtful and Well-Educated People 5.IV.3 A Possible Reply for Ross 5.IV.4 Two Other Possible Lines for Ross to Take 5.V HOOKER'S RULE-CONSEQUENTIALISM 5.V.1 Hooker's Theory 5.V.2 Hooker's Arguments for Rule Consequentialism 5.V.3 Problems with Hooker's Arguments 5.VI CONCLUSIONS TO CHAPTERS 3-5 AND TRANSITION TO CHAPTER 6 Endnotes IIB MORAL REASONING 6. THE GOLDEN RULE AND A THEORY OF MORAL REASONING Introduction 6.I RATIONALITY CONDITIONS FOR MORAL JUDGEMENTS AND MORAL JUDGES 6.I.1 Consistency 6.I.2 Being Adequately Informed 6.I.3 Proper Cognitive Functioning 6.II THE GOLDEN RULE 6.II.1 Proof of the Golden Rule 6.II.2 Defense of Premises 1, 1a, 1b, and 1c 6.II.3 Defense of Premises 2, 2a, 2b, and 2c 6.III THE FORCE OF GOLDEN RULE ARGUMENTS An Example 6.IV OBJECTIONS TO THE GOLDEN RULE 6.IV.1 When are Differences Morally Relevant? 6.IV.2 Masochists and People with Unusual Preferences 6.IV.3 Punishing People and Doing Things that they Do Not Want One to Do 6.IV.4 People who are Depressed and Do Not Care what Happens to them 6.V APPLICATIONS: RATIONAL CONSISTENT MORAL JUDGES WILL ALL AGREE IN THEIR JUDGEMENTS ABOUT CERTAIN ISSUES 6.V.1 Nazis 6.V.2 Fraud 6.V.3 Another Case of Fraud 6.V.4 Ethical Egoism 6.VI WHY BE CONSISTENT? Question 1 Question 2 An Objection 6.VII MORAL NIHILISM/AMORALISM (OPTING OUT OF MORAL DISCOURSE) 6.VII.1 Consistency Arguments Only Apply to People Who Make Moral Judgements 6.VII.2 Reasons to Accept Morality 6.VII.3 A Reservation 6.VIII A NOTE ON R. M. HARE 6.IX LIMITATIONS/CAVEATS Endnotes IIC THE IMPLICATIONS OF IIA AND IIB FOR QUESTIONS ABOUT LYING AND DECEPTION 7. THE PARTIAL OVERLAP/CONVERGENCE OF REASONABLE VIEWS Introduction 7.I WHAT RATIONALITY/CONSISTENCY TESTS CAN AND CANNOT SHOW An Objection 7.II ABSOLUTISM 7.III REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM 7.IV THE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE RESULTS FOR THE REST OF THE BOOK Endnotes PART III: APPLICATIONS 8. DECEPTION AND WITHHOLDING INFORMATION ON SALES Introduction Caveat Emptor 8.I THE OBLIGATIONS OF SALESPEOPLE 8.I.1 My View 8.I.2 A Justification for My View A Qualification An Objection Reply The Justification of Duties 5 and 6 8.II CASE STUDIES 8.II.1 Deception in Sales Case 1: The Sales Tactics of the Holland Furnace Company Case 2: Falsifying an Odometer Case 3: College Admissions Case 4: Shoe Sales What about Cases in Which a Person Benefits by Being Deceived? Case 5: Paternalistic Deception 8.II.2 WithHolding Information in Sales Case 1: Health Insurance Case 2: Steering Customers Case 3: Withholding Information about Defects Endnotes 9. DECEPTION IN ADVERTISING Introduction 9.I DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING 9.I.1 The Harmfulness of Deceptive Advertising: Case Studies Sears Dishwasher Listerine Vioxx R. J. Reynolds 9.I.2 The Wrongness of Deceptive Advertising 9.II WHY FOLLOWING THE LAW IS NOT ENOUGH 9.II.1 The FTC's Definition of Deceptive Advertising 9.II.2 Why it's not Enough to Follow the Law 9.III TWO OBJECTIONS 9.III.1 Cases of Small Harms to Many People 9.III.2 What if Being Honest gives Dishonest Competitors an Advantage? Endnotes 10. BLUFFING AND DECEPTION IN NEGOTIATIONS Introduction 10.I WHAT IS BLUFFING? 10.II THE ECONOMICS OF BLUFFING 10.III IS IT MORALLY PERMISSIBLE TO MISSTATE ONE'S NEGOTIATING POSITION? An Objection 10.IV APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DEFENSE An Objection Replies A Related Objection Endnotes 11. HONESTY, PROFESSIONALS, AND THE VULNERABILITY OF THE PUBLIC Introduction 11.I THE FREQUENT INCENTIVE/TEMPTATION TO DECEIVE CLIENTS 11.II INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATIONS 11.III INFORMED CONSENT Exceptions Endnotes 12. LYING AND DECEPTION ABOUT QUESTIONS OF WAR AND PEACE: CASE STUDIES Introduction 12.I LYING AND DECEPTION IN ORDER TO CREATE A JUSTIFICATION OR PRETEXT FOR WAR 12.I.1 Hearst and the Spanish American War 12.I.2 Franklin Roosevelt and World War II 12.I.3 Lyndon Johnson and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 12.II ANOTHER CASE: GEORGE W. BUSH, DICK CHENEY, AND THE IRAQ WAR OF 2003 12.II.1 Claims About Iraq's "Weapons of Mass-Destruction" 12.II.2 Claims About the Connection between Iraq and Al Qaeda 12.II.3 The Falsity of Claims about Iraq's Weapons and its Connections with Al Qaeda 12.II.4 Reasons to Think that Some of the Claims about Iraq's Weapons and Ties to Al Qaeda Constituted Lying or (Attempted) Deception 12.II.5 Lying and Deception about Other Matters Related to the Iraq War 12.III A CASE OF LYING/DECEPTION TO AVOID WAR? 12.IV A MORAL ASSESSMENT OF (SOME OF) THE CASES 12.IV.1 Lyndon Johnson 12.IV.2 Bush and Cheney 12.IV.3 Over-optimism as a Major Cause of Wars 12.IV.4 Franklin Roosevelt 12.IV.5 Acheson, Dulles, and Eisenhower Endnotes 13. HONESTY, CONFLICTS, AND THE TELLING OF HISTORY: MORE CASE STUDIES Introduction 13.I GERMANY, WORLD WAR I, AND THE MYTH OF THE "STAB IN THE BACK" American Versions of the Dolchstosslegenge? 13.II REWRITING HISTORY 13.II.1 Feel-Good Confederate History and the Post-Civil War South 13.II.2 Lying About the Crimes of Joseph Stalin 13.II.3 An Objection 13.III HALF-TRUTHS AND GROUP CONFLICT 13.III.1 Half-Truths 13.III.2 Examples of Harmful Half-Truths The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict The US and Iran Hitler and Germany's Suffering after WWI 13.III.3 Half-Truths in Personal Relations 13.IV INTELLECTUAL HONESTY Endnotes 14. HONESTY AS A VIRTUE Introduction 14.I DISSENTERS FROM CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 14.I.1 Lying, Deception, and Privacy 14.I.2 Lying, Honesty, and Interpersonal Conflicts 14.I.3 Lying, Deception, and Self-Esteem 14.II IN WHAT SENSE HONESTY IS AND IS NOT A VIRTUE Endnotes Bibliography Index

Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory

Abstract: 1. Introduction 2. The context for Kant's moral philosophy Part I. The Nature of Morality: 3. The nature of human action 4. Prudence: taking care of our own interests 5. Morality: living autonomously 6. Morally obligatory ends 7. The defense of morality 8. The primacy of morality Part II. The Moral Norm for Persons: 9. Moral character: part I 10. Moral character: part II Part III. The Norm for Moral Judgment: 11. The categorical imperative 12. The formula of autonomy or of universal law: part I 13. The formula of autonomy or of universal law: part II 14. The formula of respect for the dignity of persons 15. The formula of legislation for a moral community Part IV. Kant on History, Politics, and Religion: 16. Autonomy and the state 17. Civil justice and republicanism 18. Kant's philosophy of religion Appendixes: 1. Kant's two-viewpoints doctrine 2. Kant's philosophy of moral education.

The Moral Laboratory: Experiments examining the effects of reading literature on social perception and moral self-concept

Abstract: The idea that reading literature changes the reader seems as old as literature itself. Through the ages philosophers, writers, and literary scholars have suggested it affects norms, empathic ability, self-concept, beliefs, etc. This book examines what we actually know about these effects. And it finds strong evidence for the old claims. However, it remains unclear what aspects of the reading experience are responsible for these effects. Applying methods of the social sciences to this particular problem of literary theory, this book presents a psychological explanation based upon the conception of literature as a moral laboratory. A series of experiments examines whether imagining oneself in the shoes of characters affects beliefs about what it must be like to be someone else, and whether it affects beliefs about consequences of behavior. The results have implications for the role literature could play in society, for instance, in an alternative for traditional moral education.