Morality

About: Morality is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 22623 publications have been published within this topic receiving 545733 citations. The topic is also known as: moral & morals.

Is it better to be moral than smart? The effects of morality and competence norms on the decision to work at group status improvement.

Abstract: Three studies examined strategies of status improvement in experimentally created (Study 1 and 2) and preexisting (Study 3) low-status groups. Theory and prior research suggested that an in-group norm that established a particular strategy of status improvement as moral (rather than competent) would have a greater effect on individuals' decision to work at this strategy. Both Study 1 and Study 2 found that morality norms had a greater impact than competence norms on individuals' decision to work at group (rather than individual) status improvement. In both studies participants also needed less time to decide on a strategy of status improvement when it is was encouraged by a morality norm rather than a competence norm. Study 3 used a preexisting low-status group (i.e., Southern Italians) to further confirm that morality norms have a greater effect on the decision to work at group status improvement than do competence norms. Results are discussed in terms of social influence and identity management strategies.

Going with the Grain in African Development

Abstract: In view of the disappointing performance of the Good Governance agenda in Africa, policy-makers are asking whether better results could be obtained with approaches that attempt to ‘work with the grain’ of African societies. This article explores what this might mean. It identifies a core set of beliefs and values – concerning power, accountability and social morality – that have proved extremely durable and remain powerful drivers of behaviour across sub-Saharan Africa. It finds that, in general, Western institutions sit ill with these traditions. The question is, therefore, how to redirect development efforts so that they stop working against, and start to build upon, the extant notions of moral obligation and interpersonal accountability in the region.

License to Ill: The Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility and CEO Moral Identity on Corporate Social Irresponsibility

Abstract: Although managers and researchers have invested considerable effort into understanding corporate social responsibility (CSR), less is known about corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR). Drawing on strategic leadership and moral licensing research, we address this gap by considering the relationship between CSR and CSiR. We predict that prior CSR is positively associated with subsequent CSiR because the moral credits achieved through CSR enable leaders to engage in less ethical stakeholder treatment. Further, we hypothesize that leaders� moral identity symbolization, or the degree to which being moral is expressed outwardly to the public through actions and behavior, will moderate the CSR�CSiR relationship, such that the relationship will be stronger when CEOs are high on moral identity symbolization rather than low on moral identity symbolization. Through an archival study of 49 Fortune 500 firms, we find support for our hypotheses.

Moral conflict and political consensus

Abstract: When citizens reasonably disagree about the morality of a public policy, on what principles can they agree to conduct their public life? The hope of liberal political theory, and the basis of the most common solution to the problem of moral conflict in a pluralist society, is that citizens can still agree on principles that would remove decisions about the policy from the political agenda. Liberals typically invoke higher-order principles (such as neutrality or impartiality) that are intended to transcend disagreement on specific policies: these principles purport to determine which issues are appropriate subjects for public policy and which are not. When there is no reasonable basis for resolving the moral conflict on an issue of policy, the principles preclude state action on the issue and leave each citizen free to act on the basis of his or her own morality (to the extent possible without state action). A consensus on these principles thus insulates the political process from fundamental moral conflict. We want to challenge, at least in part, this familiar liberal way of dealing with moral conflict. The consensus on these higher-order principles that liberals propose is not sufficient to eliminate moral conflict from politics, and a more robust set of principles is necessary to govern the conflict that inevitably and legitimately remains. The higher-order principles that constitute the core of the consensus, we suggest, must permit greater moral disagreement about policy and greater moral agreement on how to disagree about policy. Two kinds of higher-order principles should be distinguished, corresponding to different purposes that the consensus is supposed to serve. First, there are what may be called principles of preclusion, which serve the more familiar purpose of determining which policies deserve a place on the political agenda in the sense of being a legitimate subject for legislation. These principles preclude fundamental moral conflict by denying certain