Natural disaster

About: Natural disaster is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 5456 publications have been published within this topic receiving 104808 citations. The topic is also known as: natural calamity & natural hazard.

Hurricanes and Economic Research: An Introduction to the Hurricane Katrina Symposium

Abstract: [Author Affiliation]Bradley T Ewing, Jerry S. Rawls College of Business and Wind Science and Engineering Research Center, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX 79409-2101, USAJamie Brown Kruse, Center for Natural Hazards Research, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC, 27858-4353, USA; krusej@ecu.edu; corresponding authorDan Sutter, Department of Economics, University of Texas-Pan American, Edinburg, TX, 78539-2999, USA1. IntroductionHurricane Katrina wreaked havoc on the United States. The tropical depression that became tropical storm Katrina on August 24, 2005, was the 11th named storm in a busy Atlantic hurricane season. Just one day later, Hurricane Katrina made its first landfall in Southern Florida as a Category One storm, causing both death and destruction. After moving into the Gulf of Mexico, it intensified and made its second landfall August 29, 2005, near the Louisiana-Mississippi border as a strong Category Four storm. The total impact of this killer storm in all of its human and environmental dimensions will not be determined for several years. Estimates of the monetary impact indicate that Katrina was the costliest storm in U.S. history. More than a million Gulf Coast residents were displaced by the storm.On the other side of the world, nine months before Katrina, the December 26, 2004, Indian Ocean tsunami created devastation that was unimaginable. We learned that people had virtually no warning of the killer wave according to news bulletins that arrived minutes after the natural disaster. In contrast, the tropical depression that became Hurricane Katrina was tracked for more than six days before it made landfall in Mississippi. Again, we watched in disbelief as news commentators showed us the damage and suffering that resulted from destructive wind, waves, and rain. Scenarios projecting a major hurricane making landfall near New Orleans have been studied for the last 20 years. Yet Katrina overwhelmed us in every way. Surely we can do better than this.As researchers, the failure of the system to deal adequately with the disaster provokes us to apply our intelligence and expertise to understanding the problem and to identify ways to protect our capital stock--both human and physical. We cannot and probably should not interfere with the natural processes that create hurricanes. Therefore, the challenge is to identify and adopt strategies that allow a region to reduce the disruption and promote recovery that improves the quality of life for all segments of the population. Resilience is the goal for structural, environmental, and human systems.The destruction caused by a hurricane is undeniable and has moved front and center on the national stage. Katrina disabled and destroyed much of the region's capital stock, including businesses, production facilities, lifelines, and housing. The forced migration prompted by Katrina highlights the potential for an area to also lose its human capital. The loss of physical and human capital by a region has significant short-term and possibly long-term effects on regional economic growth.2. Regional Economic Consequences of HurricanesHurricanes and natural disasters disrupt the economic activity of regions in a number of ways as business activity is interrupted and infrastructure is destroyed. In fact, a number of studies have documented the extent to which hurricanes, tornadoes, and other catastrophes interrupt business activity with some of the work geared toward determining how long these effects might last (Rose et al. 1997; Tierney 1997; Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhammer 2000; Rose and Lim 2002).A number of factors contributed to the findings reported in the literature, such as the type and severity of the event, the economic and political environment of the communities affected, and the state of the economy at the time of the disaster. Recognition of these factors is what has led to a small but growing body of literature that focuses on issues related to recovery and resilience (Burrus et al. …

Regional Characteristics of Tsunami Risk Perception among the Tsunami Affected Countries in the Indian Ocean

Abstract: The Indian Ocean Tsunami of December 2004 was a massive disaster of a magnitude rarely seen in human history. It resulted in more than 220,000 fatalities and caused more than $10 billion of damage (UN Office of the Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery, 2005). The reasons for the enormity of this disaster are complex, and include not only the enormity of the tsunami that struck, but a combination of several other factors. It is argued that one of the most important of these was the infrequency of tsunami events in this part of the world, which is thought to explain the lack of knowledge concerning tsunamis in the affected regions. To prevent similar disasters from recurring in future, it is essential that efforts be made to ascertain the conditions in the affected regions and examine local perceptions of tsunami risk. A variety of surveys have been conducted in the tsunamiaffected regions, but virtually none have focused on people’s attitudes and perceptions. A perception study in Sri Lanka was reported by Kurita et al. (2006), but to date, no comparative studies have been conducted across all 12 affected countries. In this study, we conducted a questionnaire survey among more than 1,000 subjects (including residents, students, teachers, and government officials) in each of the three countries severely impacted by the tsunami, namely: Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. Many of the coastal areas of these countries sustained damage of catastrophic proportions. We launched this study primarily to examine and evaluate the ability of communities to respond to natural disasters. The survey results show the diversity of tsunami risk perceptions in each country. Another purpose of this study is to quantitatively identify the regional characteristics of tsunami risk perception and to provide information that will contribute to the restoration of the affected countries. Because the areas examined in this study have diverse geographical, cultural, and social backgrounds, we extracted regional differences by conducting cross-national comparisons. This paper offers yet another perspective on some interesting insights for the interpretation of empirical findings.

Recovery from Disaster: resilience, adaptability and perceptions of climate change

Abstract: Focused on four disaster-impacted communities: Beechworth and Bendigo (VIC) and Ingham and Innisfail (QLD) this report makes recommendations for emergency management and local government policies. Disasters disrupt multiple levels of socio-cultural systems in which lives are embedded. The study used Bronfenbrenner's bioecological systems theory to analyse individual and, by proxy, community resilience. The theory provided a comprehensive framework to evaluate the interacting factors that support resilience across different disaster sites and communities. While Bronfenbrenner's theory has been used extensively, the authors believe that this is the first time it has been used to model disaster resilience. The project aimed to: 1) Identify private and public sector groups' beliefs, behaviours and policies that have supported community resilience to a disaster event; 2) Examine the commonalities of the experience for the four types of disaster and the possible impact of their respective intensities, duration and perceived frequency, as well as how well communities cope with the unexpected; 3) Assess the degree of community resilience in each of four study sites in disaster affected areas; and 4) Construct a model with findings to help implement appropriate and equitable emergency management policies and mitigation strategies for climate change events. A key hypothesis underpinning the research was that individuals remaining in the disaster impacted communities were likely to be resilient to disaster.

The Tsunami of March 2011 and the Subsequent Nuclear Incident at Fukushima: WhoCompensates the Victims?

Abstract: The tsunami which took place on 2011.3.11 before the coast of Japan and the subsequent nuclear incident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant have shocked the world and raised many questions. One of the questions is to what extent victims of the tsunami and of the nuclear incident can receive adequate compensation. We focus on the compensation system for earthquakes in Japan and show that Japan relies on an interesting private-public partnership whereby earthquake insurance is added to fire insurance and supplemented with a government guarantee in the re-insurance scheme. Since the earthquake coverage is, however, limited substantial government aid is still provided as well which raises questions on the influence of this government compensation on incentives of victims to take preventive measures and to purchase insurance coverage. Interestingly Japan has a detailed system of risk differentiation, e.g., rewarding victims for choosing earthquake proof constructions. After a critical analysis of the earthquake system we move to the compensation for nuclear damage in Japan, showing that, strikingly, Japan has a system of unlimited liability. However, given limited liability of the nuclear operator liability may de facto still be limited and should therefore be supplemented with financial guarantees. These are provided by the Japan Atomic Energy Insurance Pool. In case the damage is caused by an uninsurable risk like a natural disaster insurance coverage does not intervene, but the liability of the operator is covered via an indemnity agreement with the government. The indemnity is not a subsidy (like in many other legal systems) but the operator has to pay a fee for the indemnity provided by government. Only when the nuclear incident would be caused by a natural disaster of an exceptional character would liability of the operator be excluded. We show that the government is reluctant to admit the 3.11 tsunami as such a “natural disaster of an exceptional character” and the liable operator (TEPCO) takes up his financial responsibility. However, even though the operator in Japan pays a fee for the indemnity agreement also the compensation regime for nuclear disasters in Japan has substantial subsidies. This is also made clear by the recent act which is supposed to deal with the damage caused by the Fukushima incident via a Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation. The damage to be paid via this corporation will be financed not only by the liable operator TEPCO, but also via financial interventions from other nuclear operators and via the government. We examine the way in which the nuclear liability regime in Japan has been applied to two well-known incidents, being the Tokai-mura incident of 1999 and of course the recent Fukushima incident of March 2011. Moreover, we examine how the compensation regime for earthquakes and nuclear incidents in Japan compares to international tendencies and developments in the US. We argue that there are important lessons to be learned from the Fukushima disaster. An important lesson can be related to the fact that many hold that the incident was due to a construction failure for which most likely not the operator (TEPCO) was liable (or at least not only), but the constructor General Electric. This raises important questions concerning the efficiency of the so-called channeling of liability to the nuclear operator (meaning that only the operator can be held liable, excluding all other parties from liability) as it is incorporated in the international conventions.